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THE 


WAR   WITH    MEXICO. 


BY   R.   S.  RIP  LEY, 

BREVET    MAJOR    IN    THE    UNITED    STATES    ARMY,    FIRST    LIEUTENANT    OP    THE 
SECOND    REGIMENT    OF    ARTILLERY,    ETC. 


IN     TWO     VOLUMES. 
VOL.     I  . 


NEW    YO  RK: 

HARPER  &  BROTHERS,   PUBLISHERS, 
82   CLIFF   STREET. 

1849. 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  one  thousand 
eight  hundred  and  forty -nine,  by 

HARPER  &  BROTHERS, 

in  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  Southern  District 
of  New  York. 


PREFACE. 


A  PERIOD  of  more  than  thirty  years  of  peaceful 
intercourse  with  the  great  nations  of  the  earth  had 
left  the  recent  history  of  the  United  States  without 
any  great  events  of  a  military  character  at  the 
commencement  of  the  war  with  Mexico.  The  gov 
ernment  of  the  republic  commenced  and  prosecuted 
the  war,  having  had  little  experience  in  extended 
military  operations,  and  being  at  the  outset  in  a 
measure  unprepared.  In  spite  of  those  difficulties, 
however,  but  little  more  than  two  years  was  re 
quired  to  bring  it  to  a  termination,  and  during 
that  period  American  arms  suffered  no  reverse. 

The  novelty  and  importance  of  the  struggle 
caused  it  to  be  regarded  as  the  matter  of  chief  in 
terest  during  its  continuance,  and  that  which  was 
felt  in  it  by  the  American  people  was  in  no  ways 
lessened  by  the  glorious  achievements  of  the  army. 
The  many  modern  facilities  for  extending  informa 
tion  were  all  employed  to  set  forth  the  different 
events  as  fast  as  they  occurred,  and  the  accounts 
were  published  with  a  rapidity  and  a  redundancy 
almost  unexampled.  Various  writers  followed  the 
march  of  the  American  army,  and  wrote  lengthy 


PREFACE. 

epistles  on  the  operations  for  the  columns  of  news 
papers  at  home.  Others,  remaining  in  the  United 
States,  employed  themselves  from  the  first  in  col 
lecting  and  embodying  the  material  into  the  form 
of  extended  narratives.  Many  of  them  have  been 
published ;  some  for  political  effect,  some  for  the 
purpose  of  making  a  ready  sale  during  the  first  en 
thusiasm  of  the  public,  and  some,  perhaps,  with  the 
intention  of  giving  a  true  record  of  the  events  of 
the  war. 

With  all  of  these  before  the  public  at  the  time, 
it  may  be  deemed  that  the  subject  has  been  ex- 
f  hausted  for  the  present,  and  that  another  work  is 
|  unnecessary.  It  can  not  be  that  the  great  end  of 
j  history  can  be  injuriously  affected  by  too  great  a 
number  of  works  upon  the  subject,  if  they  are  all 
written  with  a  correct  intention,  and  with  truth 
continually  in  view.  It  may  well  be  a  difficult 
thing  for  a  writer  to  keep  in  the  strait  and  nar 
row  path  when  variety  of  information,  national 
pride,  interest,  and  inclination,  all  tend  to  induce 
him  to  chronicle  those  events  which  redound  most 
to  the  honor  of  his  own  country,  and  to  perpetuate 
the  belief  in  the  infallibility  of  the  military  and 
political  measures  by  which  a  great  and  glorious 
success  has  been  achieved.  Without  reference  to 
the  many  providential  or  fortunate  circumstances 
which  may  have  assisted  in  bringing  about  the  re 
sult,  it  is  perhaps  too  generally  believed,  as  a  mat 
ter  of  course,  that  the  end  has  been  obtained  prin 
cipally  by  the  exercise  of  skill  or  sagacity  on  the 


PREFACE.  xy 

part  of  one  or  a  few.  Such  is  the  popular  helief 
soon  after  every  military  achievement,  and  for  the 
reason  that  it  requires  time  and  reflection  to  per 
ceive  the  effect  which  various  fortuitous  circum 
stances  may  have  exercised  upon  the  course  of 
events. 

But  it  will  not  do  to  hase  future  action  upon  the 
results  of  experience,  unless,  indeed,  the  part  which 
fortune  has  home  has  heen  fairly  considered,  and 
it  therefore  hecomes  more  than  ever  important  that 
the  record  should  he  exact ;  for  the  continuance  of 
peace  is  always  uncertain,  and  governments  and 
people  are  prone  to  adopt  one  course  of  policy  in 
wars,  to  a  certain  degree,  regardless  of  the  diverse 
nature  of  their  enemies.  Different  views  of  mili 
tary  matters,  which  may  very  truly  and  properly 
be  taken  by  writers  viewing  them  from  different 
points,  may  assist  in  developing  the  truth.  Cer 
tainly  many  written  with  good  intention  are  re 
quired,  when  some  are  erroneous  on  account  of  in 
accuracies  purposely  set  forth  for  the  furtherance 
of  partial  interests. 

The  present  work  has  been  mainly  prepared 
during  a  period  of  respite  from  ordinary  profes 
sional  duties.  It  is  feared  that  the  time  has  been 
too  short  for  the  undertaking,  in  consideration  of 
its  magnitude  and  the  importance  of  the  subject, 
but  the  time  at  my  disposal  has  nearly  expired, 
and  it  must  be  presented  as  it  is. 

It  has  been  my  intention  to  give  a  general  and 
impartial  account  of  those  events  which,  for  a  few 


xvj  PREFACE. 

past  years,  have  "been  of  absorbing  interest,  and 
which  must  necessarily  be  looked  upon  in  future 
years  as  the  most  prominent  of  any  which  have 
occurred  since  the  independence  of  the  country. 

My  aim  has  been  to  be  impartial,  and  to  present 
the  different  occurrences  in  their  true  light,  stripped 
of  the  show  and  ornament  which  have  been  hung 
upon  them  in  the  exultation  of  the  moment,  and 
for  the  undue  gratification  of  national  or  personal 
pride.  It  would  be  claiming  more  than  any  man 
has  a  right  to  claim  to  say  that  I  had  been  fully 
successful;  but,  having  had  several  advantages  in 
the  collection  of  material,  and  having  undertaken 
the  work  with  the  end  in  view,  I  have  felt  some 
confidence  that,  in  the  respect  of  impartiality,  it 
may  not  be  without  merit.  A  personal  observa 
tion  of  the  country  on  both  of  the  principal  routes 
of  operation,  an  intimate  acquaintance  with  many 
American  officers,  and  some  intercourse  with  those 
of  the  Mexican  army,  were  among  those  advant 
ages.  The  various  official  publications  of  the  dif 
ferent  governments  have  afforded  the  correspond 
ence  and  reports  of  the  different  civil  and  military 
functionaries,  and  other  documents,  except  those 
of  a  nature  of  the  papers  appended  to  the  work. 

In  the  narrative  of  facts,  the  official  papers  have 
been  referred  to  and  followed,  except  where  they 
contained  known  and  obvious  errors.  The  observ 
ations  upon  the  different  events  of  the  war  have 
been  made  with  reference  to  the  simplest  and  ap 
proved  maxims  of  great  military  men,  and  where, 


PREFACE. 

on  account  of  the  novel  nature  of  the  operations, 
they  would  not  apply,  I  have  tried  to  be  guided  by 
the  dictates  of  reason.  The  observations,  however, 
must  be  considered  as  being  more  exclusively  my 
own ;  and  that  they  should  not  interfere  with  the 
narrative,  they  have  generally  been  inserted  after 
that  of  the  events  to  which  they  refer.  They  may, 
and  probably  will  be  at  variance  with  the  opinions 
of  many  officers  of  the  American  army;  but  as  they 
appeared  to  me  to  be  correct,  I  have  thought  proper 
to  insert  them,  and  to  trust  to  the  accompanying 
arguments  for  their  support. 

I  would  gladly  have  endeavored  to  make  the 
account  more  thoroughly  minute  and  circumstan 
tial,  that  the  deeds  of  very  many  brave  officers  and 
soldiers  might  be  well  known  and  understood.  In 
military  affairs  especially,  those  in  high  position 
are  the  principal  objects  of  regard  either  for  appro 
bation  or  condemnation,  while  the  efforts  and  ac 
tions  of  those  of  subordinate  rank,  no  less  distin 
guished  by  the  characteristics'  of  good  or  evil,  are 
unknown,  except  to  a  small  circle  of  those  inti 
mately  acquainted  with  the  facts.  But  to  present 
the  acts  of  individuals  would  be  a  greater  task  than 
the  space  or  time  of  the  present  work  will  allow, 
and,  moreover,  would  increase  the  chances  of  doing 
injustice  to  few  or  many. 
L— B 


CONTENTS  OF  THE  FIRST  VOLUME. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Introduction — Sketch  of  Mexican  History  in  the  early  Periods  of  Independ 
ence — Settlement  of  Texas — Texan  War — Treaty  with  Santa  Anna-^-Rec- 
ognition  of  Texan  Independence  by  the  United  States  and  other  Powers- 
Mexican  Action  upon  the  Treaty — Public  Sentiment  in  the  United  States 
— Mexican  Outrages  on  American  Property — American  Action  as  recom 
mended  by  Jackson — Suspension  of  diplomatic  Intercourse — Action  of 
American  Government  on  Recognition  of  Texan  Independence — Resump 
tion  of  diplomatic  Intercourse  with  Mexico,  and  partial  Adjustment  of 
Claims — French  Claims,  and  Attack  on  San  Juan  d'Ulloa— Mexican  Claim 
of  Sovereignty  in  Texas — Correspondence  on  Interference  of  American 
Citizens — On  Annexation — Negotiations  for  Annexation — Conclusion  of 
Treaty — Is  rejected — Mexican  Action — Public  Sentiment  in  United  States 
— Election  of  American  President — American  Action  on  Annexation — Brit 
ish  and  French  Policy — Passage  of  Joint  Resolution  for  Annexation — Efforts 
of  British  and  French  Agents  to  defeat  the  Measure — Mexican  Acknowl 
edgment  of  Texan  Independence  —  Rejected — Movement  of  American 
Troops  into  Texas — Location  of  Troops — State  of  Mexico — Downfall  of 
Santa  Anna — Herrera's  Administration — Mexican  Action  on  Annexation — 
Informal  Proposition  to  United  States— Mission  of  Slidell— Disturbance  in 
Mexico — Failure  of  Negotiations — Paredes's  Pronuuciamiento — Fall  of 
Herrera — Administration  of  Paredes — Return  of  Slidell — Motives  of  Pare- 
des — Review — Monarchical  Scheme — Almonte's  Intrigues  with  Abolition 
ists — Paredes's  Order  to  Arista  to  commence  the  War — Public  Sentiment 
in  the  United  States — March  of  the  American  Army  to  Matamoras— Views 
of  Secretary  Marcy — of  General  Taylor — Commencement  of  Hostilities — 
General  Review— Military  State  of  Mexico— Origin  of  her  Army — Nature 
of  the  People  for  military  Service— Mexican  Army— Resources— Military 
Policy  of  the  United  States — American  Army— Volunteers— Marine — Re 
sources  . Page  25 

CHAPTER  II. 

Movement  from  Corpus  Christi  to  the  Rio  Grande— Passage  of  the  Colorado 
—Arrival  of  American  Army  opposite  Matamoras— Interview  between  Gen 
erals  Worth  and  La  Vega— Mexican  Action— Commencement  of  Fortifica- 


XX 


CONTENTS. 


tions — Arrival  of  General  Ampudia — Correspondence  with  General  Tay 
lor—Blockade  of  the  Mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande — Arrival  of  General  Arista — 
Commencement  of  Hostilities — Capture  of  Thornton's  Squadron — Call  for 
Volunteers — March  to  Point  Isabel— "-Mexican  Passage  of  the  Rio  Grande 
— Bombardment  of  Fort  Brown— Battle  of  Palo  Alto — Battle  of  Resaca 
de  la  Palma — Expedition  against  Burita — American  Passage  of  the  Rio 
Grande — Observations Page  100 

CHAPTER  III. 

American' Preparation  for  War — Difficulties  of  Executive — Avowed  Object 
of  War — California — New  Mexico — Plan  of  Operations — General  Gaines's 
Action  at  New  Orleans — Term  of  Service  of  V.olunteers — General  Scott's 
Dispute  with  the  War  Department — (General  Taylor  assigned  to  Command 

.  — Mr.  Marcy's  and  General  Scott's  Letters  to  him  on  the  Plan  of  Opera 
tions — General  Taylor's  Reply- — Mr.  Marcy's  on  the  same  Subject — Gen 
eral  Taylor's  Answer — Want  of  settled  Plan  of  Operations — Observations 
— Difficulties  in  preparing  Advance  from  Matamoras— Occupation  of  Rey- 
nosa  and  Camargo — Arrival  of  Twelve  Months'  Volunteers,  and  Discharge 
of  Louisiana  Troops — Preparations  for  Movement — Organization  of  Regu 
lars — Worth  marches  to  Serralvo — Establishment  of  Entrepot — Organiza 
tion  of  Field  Division  of  Volunteers — Concentration  of  active  Force  at  Ser 
ralvo — March  toward  Monterey 142 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Delays  in  Mexican  Preparation — Intrigues  of  the  Santanistas — Action  of  San 
ta  Anna — His  Plan  for  a  Pronunciamiento — Immediate  Effect — Action  of 
the  American  Government — Efforts  of  Paredes  to  retain  Power — His  Diffi 
culties — Revolution  of  August,  1846 — Downfall  of  Paredes — Return  of 
Santa  Anna — His  Manifesto,  August  the  16th — Action  of  the  Mexican 
Government  under  Salas — Attempted  Issue  of  Prize  .Letters — American 
Offer  of  Negotiations — Arrival  of  Santa  Anna  at  the  Capital — Measures  of 
the  Mexican  Government — Preparation  at  Monterey — General  Mejia — 
Decrees  and  Proclamations  of  Ampudia 176 

CHAPTER  V. 

Monterey — Its  Locality — Defenses — Garrison— American  Force— Plan  of 
Attack — Movement  of  Worth's  Division  to  turn  the  Town — Demonstration 
on  the  East  in  Favor — Operations  of  the  21st  on  the  East  of  Monterey— 
on  the  West— Inactivity  on  the  East  on  the  22d— Operations  on  the  West 
of  the  same  Day — Advance  into  the  Town  from  the  East  on  the  23d — 
Withdrawal  of  the  Troops — Advance  into  the  Town  from  the  West— Offer 
of  Mexican  General  to  Capitulate— Negotiations — Convention  of  Monterey 
—Observations..  194 


CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  VI. 

New  Mexico.  Object  of  Expedition  against  New  Mexico — Instructions  to 
Colonel  Kearney— His  Movement— Nature  of  the  New  Mexican  Govern 
ment — of  the  People— Preparations  for  Defense — Flight  of  Amijo— Kear 
ney  takes  Possession  of  Santa  Fe— Establishes  a  civil  Government— March 
es  to  California — Observations. 

California.  Fremont's  Expeditions — Controversy  with  General  Castro- 
March  to  the  North— Return — Affairs  at  Sonoma  and  with  De  la  Tone- 
Declaration  of  Californian  Independence — Instructions  of  Secretary  of  Na 
vy  to  Commodore  Sloat — He  takes  Possession  of  Monterey  and  San  Fran 
cisco — Proclamation — Correspondence  with  Mexican  Authorities — Suc 
ceeded  by  Commodore  Stockton — Organization  of  California  Battalion — 
Expedition  to  the  Ciudad  de  los  Angeles — Flight  of  Pico  and  Castro— Es 
tablishment  of  civil  Government. 

Chihuahua.  Object  and  Organization  of  Chihuahua  Expedition— Progresses 
to  Monclova — Is  given  up. 

Naval  Operations  in  Gulf  of  Mexico.  Blockade — Attempt  upon  Alvarado— 
Expedition  to  Tobasco Page  270 

CHAPTER  VII. 

Views  of  American  Authorities  at  Washington — Intended  Expedition  against 
Tampico— 111  Feeling  of  General  Taylor  toward  the  War  Department- 
Its  Cause — His  Recommendation  of  taking  up  a  defensive  Line — Observa 
tions — Termination  of  Armistice — Advance  to  Saltillo — Occupation  of  Tam 
pico — Action  of  General  Patterson — Movement  on  Victoria — Taylor's  Views 
and  Intentions — Observations — False  Alarms  at  Saltillo — Concentration  of 
Force  at  that  Point— Occupation  of  Victoria 311 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

General  Scott  proceeds  to  the  Theater  of  War — Expedition  against  Vera  Cruz 
— Official  Coi-reupondence — Withdrawal  of  Troops  from  the  Northern  Line 
of  Operations — Observations , 340 

CHAPTER  IX. 

Action  of  Mexican  Authorities — General  Santa  Anna — His  Difficulties — His 
Policy — Efforts  of  the  Mexican  Government  to  raise  Men,  Material,  and 
Money — State  of  Things  in  the  Capital — Scheme  of  sequestrating  Church 
Property — Opposition  of  the  Clergy — Meeting  of  Mexican  Congress — Elec 
tion  of  Santa  Anna  and  Gomez  Farias — Consideration  of  American  Pro 
posal  to  negotiate — Of  Scheme  of  sequestrating  Church  Property — Is 
adopted — Fails — Movements  of  General  Santa  Anna  upon  receipt  of  in 
tercepted  American  Dispatches — Strength  of  his  Army — Advance  to  En- 
carnacion.. 362 


XX11 


*  *  .,  -•  ••  •*• 

CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  X. 

American  Force  about  Saltillo — Capture  of  Borland's,  Gaines's,  and  Heady's 
Commands — Arrival  of  General  Taylor — Movement  in  Advance  to  Agua 
Nueva — Reconnaissances  to  La  Hedionda  and  Encarnacion — Retreat  to 
Buena  Vista — Advance  of  Santa  Anna  from  Encarnacion — Pass  of  Angos 
tura — Affair  of  the  22d  of  February — Movement  of  Minon's  Cavalry — Sal 
tillo — BATTLE  OF  BUENA  VISTA — Mexican  Retreat  to  Agua  Nueva — Com 
munications — Position  of  Santa  Anna — His  Retreat  toward  San  Luis — Tay 
lor's  Advance  to  Agua  Nueva — Expedition  to  Encarnacion — Urrea's  Opera 
tions  on  American  Communications — His  Retreat — Observations.  Page  378 

CHAPTER  XI. 

Doniphan's  Expedition  into  the  Navajoe  Country — Insurrection  in  New  Mex 
ico—Affair  of  Canada— Affair  of  Embudo— Affair  of  Pueblo  de  Taos— Don 
iphan's  March  toward  Chihuahua — Affair  of  Brazito — of  Sacramento- 
American  Occupation  of  Chihuahua — State  of  Affairs  at  that  Place — Doni- 
phan  abandons  it — Marches  to  Saltillo 445 

CHAPTER  XII. 

Commodore  Stockton's  Action  in  California — Insurrection — Preparations  to 
suppress  it — General  Kearney's  Arrival — Affair  at  San  Pasqual — At  Hill 
of  San  Bernardo — Expedition  from  San  Diego  to  Ciudad  Los  Angeles — 
Passage  of  the  Rio  San  Gabriel — Affairs  at  Los  Angeles— Fremont's  Action 
in  the  North — Advance  from  Monterey — Surprise  of  San  Luis  Obispo — Ad 
vance  to  the  South — Capitulation  of  Cowenga — Dispute  between  Stockton 
and  Kearney — Kearney  and  Fremont — Arrival  of  Commodores  Shubrick 
and  Biddle,  and  Colonel  Mason — Trial  and  Conviction  of  Fremont.. .  469 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

Politics  in  the  United  States— Avowed  Policy  and  Recommendations  of  the 
Administration  at  the  Opening  of  the  second  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth 
Congress — Action  of  Congress — Attempt  to  create  a  Lieutenant  General — 
Provisions  made  by  the  twenty-ninth  Congress  for  the  Prosecution  of  the 
War — Politics  in  Mexico — Polka  Rebellion — Return  of  Santa  Anna  to  the 
Capital — Reorganization  of  the  Army 496 


THE  WAE  WITH  iYEXICO. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Introduction — Sketch  of  Mexican  History  in  the  early  Periods  of  Independ 
ence — Settlement  of  Texas — Texan  War — Treaty  with  Santa  Anna — Rec 
ognition  of  Texan  Independence  by  the  United  States  and  other  Powers- 
Mexican  Action  upon  the  Treaty — Public  Sentiment  in  the  United  States 
— Mexican  Outrages  on  American  Property — American  Action  as  recom 
mended  by  Jackson — Suspension  of  diplomatic  Intercourse — Action  of 
American  Government  on  Recognition  of  Texan  Independence — Resump 
tion  of  diplomatic  Intercourse  with  Mexico,  and  partial  Adjustment  of 
Claims — French  Claims,  and  Attack  on  San  Juan  d'Ulloa — Mexican  Claim 
of  Sovereignty  in  Texas — Correspondence  on  Interference  of  American 
Citizens — On  Annexation — Negotiations  for  Annexation — Conclusion  of 
Treaty — Is  rejected — Mexican  Action — Public  Sentiment  in  United  States 
— Election  of  American  President — American  Action  on  Annexation — Brit 
ish  and  French  Policy — Passage  of  Joint  Resolution  for  Annexation — Efforts 
of  British  and  French  Agents  to  defeat  the  Measure — Mexican  Acknowl 
edgment  of  Texan  Independence  —  Rejected — Movement  of  American 
Troops  into  Texas — Location  of  Troops — State  of  Mexico — Downfall  of 
Santa  Anna — Herrera's  Administration — Mexican  Action  on  Annexation — 
Informal  Proposition  to  United  States — Mission  of  Slidell — Disturbance  in 
Mexico — Failure  of  Negotiations — Paredes's  Pronunciamiento — Fall  of 
Herrera — Administration  of  Paredes — Return  of  Slidell — Motives  of  Pare- 
des — Review — Monarchical  Scheme — Almonte's  Intrigues  with  Abolition 
ists— Paredes's  Order  to  Arista  to  commence  the  War— Public  Sentiment  in 
United  States — March  of  American  Army  to  Matamoras — Views  of  Secre 
tary  Marcy — of  General  Taylor — Commencement  of  Hostilities — General 
Review — Military  State  of  Mexico — Origin  of  her  Army — Nature  of  Peo 
ple  for  military  Service — Mexican  Army — Resources— Military  Policy  of 
United  States — American  Army — Volunteers — Marine — Resources. 

THE  controversies  in  arms  in  which  great  nations 
of  modern  times  have  engaged  have  almost  invari 
ably  been  brought  about  by  a  long  series  of  circum- 


26  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

stances,  so  connected,  that  in  their  succession  the 
danger  of  the  conflict  could  hardly  be  perceived  un 
til  its  occurrence  was  inevitable  ;  for  the  gradual 
progress  of  free  institutions  of  government  has  taken 
the  power  from  the  hands  of  the  governing  authori 
ties  of  nations,  to  plunge  their  subjects  unadvisedly 
into  war,  in  pursuit  of  objects  either  of  capricious 
fancy  or  private  interest.  Although  the  sentiment 
of  the  mass  may  be  no  less  warlike  than  that  of  in 
dividuals,  yet  there  can  never  be  found  in  the  ac 
tion  of  free  governments  the  utter  disregard  of  the 
interests  and  wishes  of  different  classes  of  the  peo 
ple  upon  a  question  of  war  which  characterized 
the  conduct  of  sovereigns  in  many  national  dis 
putes  of  more  ancient  date.  There  must  be  a  di 
versity  of  general  national  interest ;  the  nature  of 
the  belligerent  people  must  be  adverse ;  the  general 
course  of  national  policy  pursued  by  the  authorities 
of  each  must  be  antagonistic ;  and  it  often  happens 
that  the  different  steps  of  aggression  and  dispute 
are  taken  for  immediate  partial  effect,  both  at  home 
and  abroad,  without  regard  to  the  ultimate  effect 
upon  the  peace  of  the  countries.  But  as,  in  the 
accumulation  of  mistakes  committed  with  such 
end  in  view,  the  controversy  draws  nigh,  the  cause 
of  rupture  is  generally  seen  in  some  matter  of  re 
cent  date,  instead  of  the  course  of  events  by  which 
an  infinite  Providence  has  caused  the  advance  of 
the  world  another  degree  in  its  progress  to  destiny, 
so  the  origin  of  the  conflict  is  laid  at  the  door  of 
the  authorities  who  hold  power  at  the  time  of  its 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  27 

commencement,  regardless  of  the  entail,  by  the 
acts  of  predecessors,  in  the  course  of  national  policy 
on  either  side. 

In  the  war  with  Mexico,  the  third  great  war  in 
which  the  United  States  of  America  have  been  en 
gaged  since  the  declaration  of  their  independence, 
this  was  especially  the  case.  Different  in  origin, 
different  in  progress,  different  in  character,  different 
in  religion,  the  two  greatest  republics  of  the  earth 
are  different  in  all  things  save  in  their  name  of  re 
public.  The  United  States  are,  and  have  been,  the 
model  of  republican  greatness,  while  Mexico  is  the 
type  of  republican  anarchy.  The  one  is  the  fruit 
of  a  system  progressing  gradually,  and  from  a  re 
publican  root ;  the  other  that  of  the  hot-house  graft 
of  freedom  on  the  decayed  trunk  of  despotism.  The 
founders  of  the  first  emigrated  to  the  New  World 
from  the  love  of  liberty  and  a  hardy  spirit  of  ad 
venture,  and,  in  their  progress  to  national  grandeur, 
they  and  their  posterity  watched,  with  jealous  care, 
the  encroachments  of  the  king,  who  assumed  to  be 
their  protector,  upon  their  liberties.  Of  the  rise  of 
the  second,  the  ultimate  cause  is  to  be  seen  in  an 
unscrupulous  love  of  gain;  and  bigotry,  supersti 
tion,  and  most  arbitrary  tyranny  were  the  means, 
in  aid  of  physical  force.  The  cause  of  controversy 
between  adjacent  countries,  which  have  risen  by 
such  different  means,  and  peopled,  as  they  are,  by 
different  races,  might  ultimately  be  found,  did  space 
or  time  admit  of  following  the  thread  of  circum 
stance,  in  the  action  of  their  rulers  at  a  compara- 


28  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

tively  ancient  period.  But  from  the  time  of  the 
independence  of  Mexico,  the  question  which  was 
the  immediate  cause  of  war  was  agitated  in  some 
manner,  and  to  relate  so  much  of  it  as  may  be  seen 
in  the  course  of  Mexican  action  thereon,  and  in  the 
events  of  history  of  the  same  periods,  reference  must 
be  had  to  the  time  of  the  first  separate  existence  of 
Mexico  as  a  nation.^ 

On  the  24th  of  August,  1821,  the  treaty  of  Cor 
dova  was  signed,  and  the  colonies  of  Mexico  be 
came  de  facto  independent  of  Spanish  dominion. 
Prior  to  this  the  viceroyalty  had  been  the  theater 
of  a  long,  bloody,  and  devastating  civil  war,  which, 
commencing  in  the  outbreak  of  Hidalgo,  in  1810, 
had  been  carried  on,  with  no  permanent  success  on 
the  part  of  the  insurgents,  until,  on  the  21st  of  Feb 
ruary,  1821,  the  plan  of  Iguala  was  presented.  Its 
author,  Augustin  Iturbide,  was  a  Creole  officer,  high 
in  rank  and  reputation  with  the  Spaniards,  and,  un- 

*  For  the  facts  of  the  early  history  of  Mexico  as  an  independent  natiou, 
and  of  her  various  early  revolutions,  the  writer  has  consulted  the  works  of 
Ward,  Poinsett,  Bullock,  Mayer,  Gilliam,  and  others.  The  facts  in  relation 
to  the  settlement  of  Texas,  her  straggle  for  independence,  and  the  whole 
question  of  dispute  until  action  upon  the  question  of  annexation,  have  been 
derived  from  documents  made  public  from  time  to  time  in  the  discussion  of 
the  question  before  the  American  Congress.  All  referred  to  in  the  text  may 
be  found  in  the  Congressional  Globe  of  the  periods  of  the  discussion.  As  the 
sketch  thus  far  is  exceedingly  general,  no  attempt  has  been  made  to  give 
distinct  references,  except  in  the  text ;  and  it  may  be  proper  to  remark,  that 
several  matters  of  controversy,  which  were  no  immediate  cause  of  war  (such 
as  the  seizure  of  Monterey  by  Commodore  Jones),  have  been  left  unnoticed. 
It  has  only  been  endeavored  to  direct  attention  to  the  events  which  had  u 
general  national  effect,  and  those  in  relation  to  the  dispute  which  were  the 
subject  of  continued  correspondence  on  the  part  of  the  diplomatists  of  the 
two  countries. 


THE    W4R    WITH   MEXICO.  £9 

til  that  time,  had  been  one  of  the  most  formidable 
opponents  of  the  insurgent  party.  The  movement 
met  with  complete  success ;  for  Iturbide  controlled 
the  army,  which  had  hitherto  supported  the  vice 
regal  authority,  and,  although  the  principles  set 
forth  in  the  plan  of  Iguala  were  not  wholly  accept 
able  to  the  old  leaders  of  the  rebellion,  yet  that  plan 
had  for  its  primary  object  the  independence  of  Mex 
ico  ;  and,  broken  up  as  they  were,  powerless,  and 
incapable  of  supporting  their  own  views/  in  arms, 
most  of  the  chiefs  who  had  escaped  tie  fate  of  Hi 
dalgo  and  Morelos  promptly  gave  their  assistance 
to  Iturbide. 

General  O'Donoju,  who  had  arrived  in  Mexico 
with  the  commission  of  captain  general,  seeing  all 
efforts  vain  to  oppose  the  revolution,  proposed  ne 
gotiations,  and  the  treaty  of  Cordova  was  the  con 
sequence.  The  Spanish  Cortes,  however,  with  the 
peculiar  obstinacy  of  their  race,  refused  to  acknowl 
edge  the  independence  of  the  colony,-  and  by  a  res 
olution,  which  must  be  regarded  as  an  exponent  .of 
their  will  rather  than  their  intention,  declared  that 
the  Spanish  sovereignty  should  be  preserved  by 
force  of  arms,  and  that  their  troops  in  the  country 
should  be  re-enforced,  when  neither  men  nor  money 
'could  be  spared  from  Spain,  then  in  a  position  but 
little  different  from  that  which  for  ten  years  had 
been  occupied  by  Mexico.  By  this  refusal  the  ad 
vantages  which  might  have  resulted  to  Spain  from 
the  occupation  of  the  Mexican  throne  by  a  Bour 
bon  prince  were  given  up,  and  no  successful  at- 


30  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

tempt  for  the  recovery  of  sovereignty  was  then  or 
has  since  been  made.  In  consequence,  the  author 
of  the  plan  of  Iguala  was  elevated  to  the  throne  of 
the  empire. 

The  new  monarch  soon  found  that  his  seat  was 
not  one  of  idle  repose  nor  of  undisturbed  possession. 
The  ancient  chiefs  of  the  insurgents,  although  will 
ing  to  co-operate  with  one  of  their  former  enemies 
for  the  attainment  of  Mexican  independence,  yet 
could  not  with  complacency  witness  his  elevation 
to  supreme  power.  The  manner  in  which  the  war 
of  independence  had  been  carried  on  was  inductive 
of  the  revolts  which  soon  took  place,  and  of  the  un 
settled  state  of  public  affairs  which  has  ever  since 
existed  in  Mexico.  Arising  first  in  the  insurrec 
tionary  movement  of  a  small  party,  led  on  by  a 
man  whose  feelings  were  more  of  a  personal  than 
of  a  patriotic  character,  it  had  been  conducted  for 
much  time  by  different  adventurers  on  their  own 
responsibility,  without  the  sanction  of  any  thing 
resembling  a  government,  or  of  any  body  empow 
ered,  directly  or  indirectly,  to  act  for  the  people. 
Each  particular  chief  considered  himself  supreme 
in  his  own  section  of  country ;  and  many,  while 
fighting  for  Mexican  independence,  free  from  all 
responsibility  to  superior  officers  or  a  representa 
tive  body,  forgot  their  object,  and,  in  fact,  warred 
for  the  plunder  to  be  obtained  from  the  rich  store 
houses  of  the  Europeans.  The  first  Congress, 
which  had  been  assembled  for  the  purpose  of  giv 
ing  something  like  nationality  to  the  insurrection- 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  gj 

ary  proceedings,  was  powerless,  and  one  of  its  own 
generals  dissolved  it  in  the  darkest  hour  of  the 
cause. 

Chiefs  in  such  a  war,  the  old  guerilla  leaders  were 
quite  ready  to  revolt  against  the  new  emperor  upon 
any  grounds,  either  personal  or  patriotic,  and  that 
portion  of  the  army  which  they  had  formerly  led 
was  quite  as  ready  to  follow  them  in  new  enter 
prises,  while  the  troops  whom  Iturhide  had  seduced 
from  their  former  allegiance,  it  was  fair  to  suppose, 
could  be  easily  induced  to  turn  traitors  to  him. 
The  population  of  Mexico  had  been  reared  in  igno 
rance  and  slavery  under  the  iron  rule  of  the  Span 
iard,  and,  by  the  adoption  of  the  plan  of  Iguala,  had 
been  suddenly  admitted  to  a  freedom  of  which  nei 
ther  the  value  nor  the  use  was  understood.  Such 
a  population  is  at  first  easily  imposed  upon,  and 
will  readily  join  for  the  time  in  any  movement,  no 
matter  how  it  arises,  which  is  heralded  by  the  cry 
of  liberty. 

The  storm  soon  came,  and  Santa  Anna  pro 
nounced  against  the  emperor  at  Vera  Cruz.  Itur- 
bide  was  compelled  to  abdicate  his  throne,  and  a 
republican  form  of  government  was  introduced,  un 
der  which  the  veteran  insurgent,  Guadalupe  Vic 
toria,  was  first  chosen  president.  He  maintained 
his  seat  in  the  presidential  chair  until  the  expira 
tion  of  his  legal  term  of  office  ;  but  party  strife  was 
violent  during  his  administration,  and  the  country 
was  shaken  by  its  civil  discords.  The  president 
and  vice-president,  Bravo,  were  rivals,  and,  from 


32  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

their  dispositions .  and  former  habits,  were  each 
ready  to  support  the  parties  of  which  they  were  re 
spectively  the  heads  by  an  appeal  to  arms.  Indeed, 
on  one  occasion,  in  January,  1828,  Bravo  pronounced 
against  the  government,  but  was  defeated  and  made 
prisoner.  Nothing  was  effected  during  the  admin 
istration  of  Victoria  which  could  settle  the  affairs 
of  the  country,  so  long  in  a  state  of  anarchy  and 
confusion. 

Mr.  Poinsett  was,  during  a  part  of  this  time,  the 
resident  minister  of  the  United  States  near  the  Mex 
ican  government,  and  attempted  to  obtain  the  as 
sent  of  Mexico  to  a  boundary  between  the  two 
countries  which  would  include  the  settled  territory 
west  of  the  Sabine.  This  country  had  been  ceded 
to  Spain  in  1819,  but  the  American  settlers  had 
protested  against  the  cession,  and  the  government 
of  the  United  States  had  previously  attempted  to 
recover  it.  'But  the  Mexican  minister  of  foreign  af 
fairs  refused  to  negotiate  on  the  point,  although  he 
was  willing  to  conclude  a  treaty  of  alliance  and  of 
commerce,  and  such  a  one  was  negotiated,  though 
not  at  that  time -ratified  by  the  United  States  Sen 
ate.  In  1827,  the  United. States,  through  their  min 
ister,  Mr.  Butler,  proposed  to  obtain  the  country  de 
sired  by  purchasing  to'  the  Rio  del  Norte,  but  Mex 
ico  rejected  the  proposal. 

Grants  of  land  in  Texas  were,  however,  made  to 
foreigners,  principally  to  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  and  the  colonization  went  on.  The  induce 
ment  for  making  these  grants  consisted  in  the  pro- 


THE  WAR   WITH  MEXICO.  33 

tection  hoped  for  from  the  settlers  against  the  sav 
age  hordes  who  inhabited  the  northern  Mexican 
frontier;  but,  had  the  Mexicans  known  their  own 
character  and  that  of  their  northern  neighbors,  they 
must  have  regarded  such  a  policy  as  exceeding 
ly  dangerous.  Indeed,  changes  of  administration 
brought  change  of  policy,  and  in  1830  the  further 
colonization  of  Texas  was  forbidden. 

The  election  of  a  president  to  succeed  Victoria 
took  place  in  1828,  and  with  it  commenced  the  se 
ries  of  revolutions  which  have  ever  since,  with  few 
intervals  of  quiet,  existed.  Santa  Anna  pronounced 
at  Perote  in  favor  of  General  Guerrero  against  Pe- 
draza,  the  president  elect,  and  though  checked  for 
a  time,  yet  the  pronunciamento  was  successful,  Lo 
renzo  de  Zavala  having  moved  in  support  of  the 
plan  in  the  city  of  Mexico ;  but  Yucatan  soon  se 
ceded  from  the  republic,  and  Bustamente  revolted 
against  the  new  president.  The  war  lasted  for 
three  years,  when  Guerrero  was  defeated,  and,  be 
ing  taken  prisoner  by  treachery,  was  shot.  Busta 
mente  assumed  the  presidency,  and  maintained  it, 
against  all  opposition,  until  Santa  Anna  declared 
against  him  in  1832,  when,  after  a  few  successes, 
he  was  defeated  and  obliged  to  quit  the  country. 
Santa  Anna  was,  of  course,  elected  president,  and  at 
once  set  about  remodeling  the  Constitution.  While 
the  Congress  was  engaged  in  that  work,  the  states 
of  Zacatecas,  and  Coahuila  and  Texas,  pronounced 
in  opposition  to  the  change,  but  were  compelled  by 
force  of  arms  to  submit.  This  was  the  commence- 
L— C 


34 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


ment  of  the  Texan  revolution,  and  led  through  a 
series  of  events,  until  the  war  in  Texas  terminated 
in  one  with  the  United  States. 

Under  the  grants  of  land  made  to  citizens  of  the 
United  States  hy  the  Spanish  authorities,  and  the 
Mexican  government  under  Victoria,  emigrants  had 
crowded  into  Texas  until  they  had  far  outnumber 
ed  the  Mexicans  in  that  territory.  The  difference 
of  race  and  education  gave  a  natural  desire  to  the 
settlers  for  their  own  form  of  government  rather 
than  the  Mexican,  and  the  population  of  Texas 
having  increased  sufficiently,  a  petition  was  sent 
to  Mexico  praying  for  admission  into  the  Union  as 
a  separate  state.  The  Mexican  Congress  paid  no 
attention  to  this  petition,  and  the  messenger  who 
bore  it  was  imprisoned.  Soon  after,  a  Mexican  mil 
itary  force  appeared  at  Monclova,  and  its  general 
required  the  surrender  of  the  governor  of  Coahuila 
and  Texas,  and  others.  Failing  to  obtain  them,  he 
dispersed  the  Legislature,  and  ordered  the  American 
settlers  to  give  up  their  arms.  The  natural  conse 
quence  ensued,  and  in  the  first  attempt  to  enforce 
the  order,  the  Mexican  troops  were  beaten  back. 
The  Texans,  in  convention,  resolved  to  support  the 
Constitution  of  1824,  and  called  upon  the  remain 
ing  states  of  the  republic  to  sustain  them  in  defense 
of  the  constitutional  liberty  of  the  country,  over 
thrown  by  Santa  Anna  and  other  military  chief 
tains.  The  appeal  to  the  states  of  Mexico  was  dis 
regarded,  and  the  war  continued.  By  the  Mexi 
cans  it  was  prosecuted  with  savage  ferocity,  and 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  35 

by  the-Texans  with  desperate  valor,' until,  finally, 
in  the  darkest  hour  of  her  fortunes,  Texas  declared 
herself  independent.  The  victory  of  San  Jacinto 
soon  followed,  and  the  Mexican  president  found 
himself  a  prisoner  in  the  hands  of  the  insurgents. 

His  liberty  was-  obtained"  by  the  conclusion  of  a* 
treaty,  in -which  the  independence  of  Texas- was  ac 
knowledged  by  him,  as  chief  of  the  Mexican  nation, 
and  by  Filasola,  Urrea,  Ramirez  de  Lesma,  and  Ga- 
ona  as'chiefs  of  armies,  and  each  and- all  were  pledg 
ed,  in  their  personal  and  official  character,  to  pro 
cure  the  confirmation  of  the  treaty  by  the  legitimate 
government  of  Mexico.  The  southern  and  west 
ern  boundaries  of  Texas  were  then  define^  to  be 
the  Rio  Grande  from  its  mouth  'to  ifs  source, 'as' 
such  were  acknowledged  by  the  Mexican  president 
and  his  general  officers,  and  their  troops  at  once  re 
tired  to  the  west  bank  of  the  river. 

The  independence  of  Texas  being  thus  acknowl 
edged  by  a  treaty  signed  by -the  President  of  Mex 
ico,  and  she  having  shown  herself  fully  equal  to 
its  sustenance,  its  recognition  was  sought  and  ob 
tained  from  the  United  States,  and  subsequently 
from  Great  Britain,  France,  and  other  nations.  The 
grounds  upon  which  this  recognition  was  based 
could  hardly  have  been  cause  of  complaint  on  the 
part  of  Mexico,  for  the  Texans  were  fully  as  capa 
ble  of  maintaining  a  stable  government  as  were  the 
Mexicans.  Indeed,  the  conventions  by  which  the 
independence  of  each  had  been  recognized  by  the 
representatives  of  the  mother  country  were  made 


30  THE    WAR   WITH   MEXICO. 

under  nearly  the  same  circumstances.  It  is  true, 
O'Donoju,  when  he  negotiated  the  treaty  of  Cor 
dova,  was  not  an  actual  prisoner ;  but  without  men 
or  means  of  carrying  on  the  war,  his  accession  to 
the  terms  of  Iturbide  was  compulsory.  The  Mex 
ican  government,  however,  made  the  analogy  be 
tween  the  fate  of  the  two  conventions  still  more 
striking ;  for,  although  Filasola  was  ordered  to  take 
measures  to  procure  the>  liberation  of  the  prisoners, 
yet  it  refused  to  ratify  the  treaty,  and  numerous 
resolutions  were  passed,  setting  forth  that  the  sov 
ereignty  in  Texas  should  be  asserted  and  estab 
lished  by  force  of  arms.  v  Thus,  like  Spain,  Mexico 
published  to  the  world  her  pertinacity  of  dominion 
when  she  was  notoriously  incompetent  to  main 
tain  it. 

The  struggle  between  Mexico  and  the  revolted 
state  was  one  of  deep  interest  to  the  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  and  its  progress  had  been  watched 
with  unceasing  anxiety.  The  settlers  in  Texas 
were  of  their  own  race,  and  engaged  in  a  struggle 
with  the  military  government  of  Mexico,  which  had 
overthrown  the  Constitution  under  which  they  had 
emigrated,  and  attempted  to  fasten  upon  them  a 
despotism  worse  than  that  of  absolute  monarchy. 
With  the  same  spirit  which  animated  those  Amer 
icans  who  had  assisted  Mexico  in  her  efforts  to  gain 
her  independence,  many  gave  their  persons  and  for 
tunes  to  the  Texan  cause. 

Although  cause  of  hostility  to  Mexico  had  exist 
ed  for  a  series  of  years,  and  notwithstanding  the 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  .         37 

sympathy  and  assistance  given  by  the  people  of  the 
United  States,  the  government  of  that  country  took 
no  part  in  the  operations. 

From  the  first  existence  of  the  Mexican  Repub 
lic,  outrages  upon  the  persons  and  property  of  Amer 
ican  -  citizens  were  frequently  committed  by  the 
Mexican  authorities,  and  redress  either  positively 
refused,  or  delayed  until  the-  delay  amounted  to  a 
refusal.  The  subjects  of  other  powers  suffered  in 
a  like  manner,  but  to  a  less  extent  than  those  of 
the  United  States,  the  contiguity  of  whose  position 
and  the  commercial  character  of  whose  people  had 
led  naturally  to  a  more  extended  intercourse.  For 
a  long  time  the  American  government  endured  this 
state  of  things,  and  patiently  awaited  the  day  when 
domestic  tranquillity  would  enable  Mexico  to  at 
tend  properly  to  her  relations  with  foreign  powers, 
To  none,  at  the  time  of  the  commission  of  the  out 
rages  alluded  to,  was  Mexico  under  more  obliga 
tions  for  the  early  recognition  of  independence,  and 
the  personal  assistance  of  many  citizens  in  its  at 
tainment,  and  by  none  was  her  progress  watched 
with  more  anxiety,  or  with  a  more  ardent  desire 
for  her  success  in  the  attempt  at  free  government, 
But  in  the  face  of  treaties  of  amity  and  alliance 
between  the  two  countries,  the  outrages  and  spoli 
ations  continued ;  and  no  redress  having  been  ob 
tained,  nor  any  disposition  to  render  it  having  been 
manifested,  on  the  8th  of  February,  1837,  General 
Jackson,  then  President  of  the  United  States,  de 
clared,  in  a  message  to  Congress,  "  that  the  length 


3g  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

of  time  since  some  of  the  injuries  had  been  com 
mitted,  the  repeated  and  unavailing  applications 
for  redress,  the  wanton  character  of  some  of  the 
outrages  upon  the  persons  and  property  of  our  citi 
zens,  upon  the  officers  and  flag  of  the  United  States, 
independent  of  recent  insults  to  this  government 
by  the  late  extraordinary  Mexican  minister,  would 
justify,  in  the  eyes  of  all  nations,,  immediate  war." 
In  consideration  of  the  state  of  Mexican  domestic 
affairs,  he  did  not,  however,  recommend  an  imme 
diate  resort  to  it,  but  proposed  that  another  demand 
.should  be-  made  for  redress,  to  be  followed  up  by 
reprisals  upon  Mexican  commerce  if  not  complied 
with. 

The  insults  alluded  to  in  the  extract  quoted 
were  contained  in  the  correspondence  and  conduct 
of  Mr.  Gorostiza,  until  a  short  time  previous  to  the 
date  of  the  message  envoy  extraordinary  of  Mexi 
co  at  Washington.  That  diplomatist  had  taken 
umbrage  at  the  spirit  displayed  by  the  American 
people  in  favor  of  the  Texan  cause,  and  at  an  or 
der  given  by  the  American  government  to  General 
Gaines  for  the  protection  of  the  southwestern  fron 
tier,  then  threatened  with  an  Indian  war,  direct 
ing  him,  under  certain  contingencies,  to  pass  the 
boundaries  into  Texas,  then  in  a  state  which  pre 
vented  any  thing  like  a  restraint  of  the  Indians  by 
Mexican  forces.  -  Upon  the  subj  ect  of  the  violation 
of  American  neutrality,  communications  had  passed 
between  the  functionaries  of  the  two  governments, 
commencing  November  the  19th,  1835  ;  but  at  that 


THE   WAR  WLTH  MEXICO.  gg 

time  Mexico  felt  no  apprehension  for  the  result  of 
the  struggle,  and  she  did  not  request  any  thing 
further  to  be  done  than  the  enforcement  of  the  or 
dinary  laws.  This  had  been  directed  by  Mr.  For- 
syth,  then  secretary  of  state,  prior  to  the  reception 
of  the  note  of  the  acting  minister  of  foreign  rela 
tions  of  Mexico,  and  was  so  stated  in  his  reply  of 
January  the  29th,  1836;  but  it  was  therein  de 
clared  that  the  policy  which  the  United  States 
would  pursue  would  be  the  same  which  had  gov 
erned  them  during  the  various  struggles  between 
Spain  and  her  South  American  possessions,  and 
that  the  government  could  not  be  responsible  for 
the  conduct  of  individuals  over  which  it  had  no 
control.  Subsequently  Mr.  Gorostiza  called  the 
attention  of  Mr.  Forsyth  to  the  infractions  of  neu 
trality  by  certain  citizens  of  the  southwest,  and 
measures  were  at  once  taken  for  their  prosecution 
and  punishment.  But  he  insisted  upon  the  with 
drawal  of  the  order  to  General  Gaines  ;  and,  in 
consequence  of  the  refusal  of  the  American  presi 
dent  to  comply  with  the  demand,  on  the  15th  of 
October,  1835,  he  asked  for  and  obtained  his  pass 
ports,  terminated  his  mission,  and  published  a  pam 
phlet  containing  a  portion  of  his  correspondence 
with  the  governments  of  Mexico  and  the  United 
States,  thereby  appealing  to  the  American  people 
against  the  acts  of  their  own  government. 

Not  only  was  his  course  approved  by  the  Mexi 
can  government,  but  its  action  was  delayed  upon 
the  demand  for  indemnity  for  spoliations  commit- 


V*.'  '(     '  .£,- 

4Q.  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

ted  upon  American  commerce,  and  at  the  close  of 
the  year  1836,  Mr.  Ellis,  then  envoy  from  the  Unit 
ed  States  to  Mexico,  demanded  his  passports.  Dip 
lomatic  intercourse  was  thus  suspended  prior  to  the 
message  of  February,  1837. 

During  the  progress  of  these  events,  Texas  had 
asked  for  the  recognition  of  her  independence  and 
for  admission  into  the  Union.  The  subject  was 
spoken  of  by  President  Jackson  in  his  message  of 
December  21st,  1836,  in  which  the  desire  of  a  large 
portion  of  the  American  people  for  the  recovery  of 
the  territory  is  admitted  ;  but,  in  submitting  the 
question  of  recognition  to  Congress,  having  in  ulti 
mate  view  the  annexation  of  Texas  to  the  United 
States,  he  says,  "It  becomes  us  to  beware  of  too 
early  a  movement,  as  it  might  subject  us,  however 
unjustly,  to  the  imputation  of  seeking  to  establish 
the  claim  -of  our  neighbors  to  territory  with  the  view 
to  its  subsequent  acquisition  by  ourselves.  Pru 
dence,  therefore,  seems  to  dictate  that  we  should 
stand  aloof  and  maintain  our  present  position,  if 
not  until  Mexico  herself,  or  one  of  the  great  for 
eign  powers,  shall  recognize  the  independence  of 
the  new  government,  at  least  until  the  lapse  of 
time  or  the  course  of  events  shall  have  proved 
beyond  cavil  or  dispute  the  ability  of  the  people 
of  that  country  to  maintain  their  separate  sover 
eignty,  and  to  uphold  the  government  constituted 
by  them." 

The  independence  of  Texas  was  acknowledged 
in  a  resolution  which  passed  the  American  Senate 


THE    WAR    WIT;H    MEXICO.  41 

on  the  first  of  March,  1837,  hut  no  steps  were  tak 
en  at  that  time  for  its  annexation. 

Another  demand  was  made  upon  the  Mexican 
government  for  redress,  in  accordance  with  the  rec 
ommendation  of  the  president  and  resolutions  of 
the  American  Senate,  before  extreme  measures 
were  resorted  to.  Negotiations  were  insisted  on, 
and  a  treaty  of  indemnity  was  concluded  on  the 
llth  of  April,  1839,  and  duly  ratified.  By  its  terms, 
the  claims  of  American  citizens  were  to  he  referred 
to  a  commission,  and  that  commission  met  in  Wash 
ington  on  the  25th  of  August,  1840.  It  expired  in 
February,  1842,  and  much  of  its  time  was  fruitless 
ly  expended  in  unimportant  discussions  of  minor 
points,  so  frequent  in  the  transaction  of  business 
with  Mexican  functionaries,  in  consequence  of 
which  a  large  amount  of  business  was  left  un 
touched. 

\~- 

The  Mexican  government,  soon  after,  asked  for 
a  postponement  of  the  payment  of  the  claims  which 
had  been  allowed  by  the  judgment  of  the  commis 
sion,  and  the  United  States  acceded  to  the  request. 
Only  a  small  portion  of  the  amount  due  was  paid, 
even  with  this  extension,  and  the  two  governments 
were  not  able  to  conclude  terms  upon  which  an 
other  commission  should  be  appointed  for  the  de 
cision  of  those  claims  which  had  not  been  audited 
at  the  time  of  the  dissolution  of  the  first. 

In  the  mean  while  various  revolutions  had  oc 
curred  in  Mexico,  and  Texas  was  undisturbed  save 
by  a  predatory  warfare  upon  her  borders.  Santa 


42  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

Anna,  upon  his  return  from  captivity,  found  Busta- 
mente  in  the  presidential  chair,  and  remained  some 
time  at  his  estate,  taking  no  other  part  in  public 
affairs  than  to  command  the  troops  at  the  city  of 
Vera  Cruz  against  the  French.  That  power,  tired 
with  the  vexatious  delays,  on  frivolous  pretexts,  of 
the  Mexicans,  and  having  no  particular  sympathy 
for  their  form  of  government,  was  resolved  to  en 
force  the  payment  of  claims,  arising  from  outrages 
committed  upon  the  persons  and  property  of  French 
citizens  during  the  various  revolutions,  hy  some 
thing  more  strenuous  than  the  negotiation  of  trea 
ties,  made  only  to  he  disregarded,  and  in  the  spring 
of  1838  proposed  ultimata  which  the  commander 
of  the  French  squadron  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  was 
instructed  to  enforce.  After  much  discussion,  on 
the  27th  of  Novemher  the  French  made  an  attack 
upon  the  Castle  of  San  Juan  d'Ulloa,  then  in  a  di 
lapidated  condition,  which  was  captured.  The 
French  were  not  so  fortunate  in  their  assault  upon 
the  town,  and  the  British  minister  interposed  his 
mediation.  The  French  claims  were  nearly  all  al 
lowed,  and  San  Juan-  d'Ulloa  was  delivered  up. 
The  Mexican  government  soon  after  completely 
repaired  the  castle,  and  placed  in  it  the  heavy  arm 
ament  which  renders  it  one  of  the  strongest  fortifi 
cations  in  America. 

In  September,  1841,  Bustamente  was  over 
thrown,  and  Santa  Anna  became  again  the  chief 
of  the  republic,  which  station  he  held  as  provis 
ional  president,  dictator,  and  president  until  1844. 


THE  WAH  WI'TH  MEXICO,  43 

when  he  was  overthrown  in  turn,  and  forced  to 
leave  the  country. 

During  this  period  the  Mexican  government  arid 
people  insisted  upon  their  right  of  sovereignty  over 
Texas,  notwithstanding  the  independence  of  the 
latter  country  had  been  recognized  by  most  of  the 
European  powers,  and  Mexico  herself  had  been  un 
able  to  make  any  vigorous  effort  to  re-establish  her 
authority.  But  while  Santa  Anna  exercised  the 
supreme  power  the  intention  of  making  such  an 
effort  was  continually  spoken  of,  and,  had  suffi 
cient  means  been  at  his  disposal,  there  is  no  doubt 
that  it  would  have  been  undertaken.  '  The  spirit 
which  pervaded  the  United  States  in  favor  of  Tex 
as  was  known  by  Mexico,  as  well  as  the  probabil 
ity  that  much  assistance  in  men  and  means  would 
be  privately  furnished  to  Texas  in  case  the  quar 
rel  should  be  actually  renewed.  This  assistance 
was  dreaded  by  the  government  of  Mexico,  and  on 
the  12th  of  May,  1842,  Mr.  Bocanegra,  then  min 
ister  of  foreign  relations,  addressed  to  Mr.  Webster, 
the  American  minister  of  state,  a  paper,  setting 
forth  the  alleged  aggressions  of  citizens  of  the  Unit 
ed  States  upon  ftie  soil  of  Mexico,  declaring  the 
belief  that  the  government  of  the  United  States 
had  the  power,  and  was  in  duty  bound  to  restrain 
the  passage  of  men  vand  munitions  of  war,  under 
any  circumstances,  into  Texas,  and  that  Mexico 
"  considered  as  a  violation  'of  the  treaty  of  amity 
the  toleration  of  a  course  of  conduct  which  pro 
duced  an  incomprehensible  state  of  things — a  state 


44  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

of  neither  peace  nor  war — but  inflicting  upon  Mex 
ico  the  same  injuries  and  inconveniences  as  if  war 
had  been  declared  between  the  two  nations."^ 

On  the  31st  of  May  a  circular  was  addressed  by 
the  same  functionary  to  the  members  of  the  diplo 
matic  corps  in  Mexico,  setting  forth,  in  a  recapitu 
lation  of  the  asserted  wrongs  in  allowing  men  and 
munitions  to  be  sent  to  Texas,  "  the  violation  com 
mitted  and  the  wrong  done  by  thus  acting  in  op 
position  to  the  most  sacred  principles  of  national 
law  and  the  treaties  of  amity  by  which  both  coun 
tries  {the  United  States  and  Mexico)  were  strongly 
bound." 

Both  these  papers  were  answered ;  the  first, 
which  was,  in  effect,  a  demand  upon  the  United 
States  to  prohibit  emigration  to  and  trade  with  a 
country  whose  independence  had  been  officially 
recognized  by  the  great  powers  of  Europe  as  well 
as  themselves,  in  a  masterly  document  from  the 
pen  of  Mr.  Webster,  in  which  'the  power  of  the 
United  States  to  prevent  emigration  was  denied, 
and  the  right  of  their  citizens  to  leave  their  own 
country  in  a  private  capacity,  under  any  circum 
stances,  was  maintained ;  while,  with  regard  to 
the  alleged  violation  of  treaty  stipulations  in  per 
mitting  the  export  of  arms  or  munitions  of  war  to 
Texas,  it  was  shown  that  the  doctrine  that  a  gov 
ernment  was  obliged  to  prevent  the  exportation  of 
such  articles  was  novel  and  absurd.  By  a  refer 
ence  to  the  sixteenth  and  eighteenth  articles  of  the 

*  Appendix  to  Thompson's  Recollections  of  Mexico,  p.  285-304. 


THE  WAJl  WITH  MEXICO.  45 

treaty  of  the  5th  of  April,  1831,  between  the  two 
countries,  it  was  demonstrated  that  such  traffic 
had  been  contemplated,  that  those  articles  which 
were  to  be  considered  as  contraband  of  war  had 
been  denned,  and  were  to  be  allowed  to  meet  the 
fate  prescribed  for  them  by  the  laws  of  nations, 
without  its  being  the  duty  of  either  government  to 
prevent  the  traffic  in  them  by  their  citizens,  in  the 
case  of  war  between  either  and  other  powers.  The 
letter  of  Mr.  Bocanegra  was  pronounced  to  be,  in 
the  end,  a  complaint  against  the  recognition  of  the 
independence  of  Texas,  and  in  that  view  was  sum- 
marily  disposed  of,  as  it  was  stated  that  the  ac 
knowledgment  of  it  was  not  likely  to  be  retracted. 

Toward  the  conclusion  of  the  reply  of  Mr.  Web 
ster,  it  was  said,  "Every  provision  of  law,  every 
principle  of  neutral  obligation,  will  be  sedulously 
enforced  in  relation  to  Mexico  as  in  relation  to 
other  powers,  and  to  the  same  extent  and  with  the 
same  integrity  of  purpose.  All  this  belongs  to  the 
constitutional  power  and  duty  of  the  government, 
and  it  will  all  be  fulfilled.  But  the  continuance 
of  amity  with  Mexico  can  not  be  purchased,  at  a 
higher  rate.  If  the  peace  of  the  two  countries  be 
disturbed,  the  .responsibility  will  devolve  on  Mex 
ico." 

The  second,  which  appears  to  have  been  an  in 
quiry  how  far  the  other  powers  of  the  world  could 
be  brought  to  interfere  in  behalf  of  Mexico  in  event 
of  the  threatened  rupture  with  the  United  States, 
was  answered  in  a  circular  addressed  to  the  diplo- 


46  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

matic  corps  by.  Mr.  Thompson,'  then  American  en 
voy  to  Mexico,  and  contained,  in  effect,-  the  same 
views  which  were  expressed  by  Mr.  Webster.  . 

Both  of  these  papers,  of  Mr.  Bocanegra  failed  to 
effect  their  objects,  and  contributed  only  to  foster 
the  prejudices  existing  in  the  one  nation  against 
the  other,  and  imbitter  the  tone  of  diplomatic  in 
tercourse. 

The  subject  of  the  annexation  of  Texas  to  the 
United  States,  which  had  before  been  spoken  of, 
became  prominent  soon  after,  and  was  openly  dis 
cussed  in  the  public  prints.  The  Mexican  govern 
ment  became  alarmed  for  the  nominal  sovereignty 
to  which,  for  seven  years,  it  had  pertinaciously 
clung,  and  on  the  23d  of  August,  1843,  Mr.  Boca- 
negra  addressed  a  note  to  Mr.  Thompson,  in  which 
his  attention  was  called  to  ,the  agitation  of  the 
question,  and  the  United  States  were  warned  that 
Mexico  would  endeavor  to  prevent  its  consumma 
tion  by  an  appeal  to  arms.^  The  note  was  couched 
in  terms  so  threatening,  and  was  in  its  tone  so  in 
sulting,  that  no  other  answer  was  given  by  Mr, 
Thompson  tjian  to  acknowledge  its  reception,  and 
to  deprecate  strongly  the  threats  which  had  in  that, 
as  well  as  in  former  communications,  been  put  forth 
by  the  Mexican  government.  Mr.  Bocanegra's  an 
swer  to  this  note  was  more  conciliatory.  But  the 
correspondence  was  dropped  by  the  American  min 
ister,  without  speaking  of  the  real  dispositions  of 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  2,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of 
the  twenty-eighth  Congress,  p,  26-30. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  47 

his  government ;  and,  perhaps,  for  the  reason  that 
the  lapse  of  time  and  the  course  of  events  had 
proved,  heyond  cavil  or  dispute,  the-  ability  of  the 
people  of  Texas  to  maintain  their  own  sovereignty ; 
and,  as  a  natural  consequence,  the  annexation  of 
that  state  to  the  Union  was  at  that  time  contem 
plated. 

On  the  6th  of  October,  1$43,  the  American  sec 
retary  of  state,  Mr.  Upshur,  proposed  a  renewal  of 
negotiations,  in  the  face  of  the  Mexican  threats  of 
war,  and  his  proposal  was  accepted  by  Texas. 

In  the  mean  time  the  Mexican  government  is 
sued  two  decrees,^  the  one  prohibiting  foreigners 
from  the  retail  trade  in  Mexico,  and  the  other  shut-- 
ting  her  northern  custom-houses.  Both  seriously- 
affected  the  interest  of  American  citizens,  and  the 
first  was  alleged  to  be  a  violation  of  treaty  stipu 
lations  by  Mr.  Thompson.  Mr.  Bocanegra  main 
tained  the  contrary,  and  the  Mexican  government 
refused  to  rescind  the  decrees. 

In  November,!  correspondence  on  the  subject  of 
the  annexation  of  Texas  was  resumed  between 
General  Almonte,  the  Mexican  minister  at  Wash 
ington,  and  the  American  secretary  of  state,  in 
much  the  same  style  and  with  much  the  same  re 
sult  in  which  it  had  been  carried  on  in  Mexico. 
The  envoy  threatened  war  in  case  of  the  consum 
mation  of  the  measure,  while  the  American  sec 
retary  did  not  avow  the  intention  of  his  govern- 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  2,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of 
the  twenty-eighth  Congress,  p.  31-38.  t  Idem,  p.  38-48. 


48  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

ment,  but  stated  that  the  United  States  considered 
Texas  as  free  and  fully  able  to  maintain  her  in 
dependence,  and  that  they  were  not  obliged  to 
consult  any  other  nation  in  their  intercourse  with 
her. 

The  negotiation  of  the  treaty  for  the  annexation 
went  on,  and  on  the  12th  of  April,  1844,  it  was 
signed  by  Mr.  Calhoun,  who  had  succeeded  Mr.  Up- 
shur,  and  the  Texan ,  commissioners,  Messrs.  Van 
Zandt  and  Henderson.  It  was  submitted  to  the 
American  Senate,  but  was  rejected  by  that  body, 
and  the  diplomatic  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  Mexico  continued.  The  tone  of  the 
correspondence  became  still  more  unfriendly.  The 
United  States  began  to  demand  of  the  Mexican 
government  the  rescinding  of  the  decrees  before  al 
luded  to,  prohibiting  foreigners  from  carrying  on  a 
retail  trade  and  shutting  tjie  northern  custom 
houses,  while  Santa  Anna  abruptly  terminated  the 
armistice  which  had  existed  for  some  time  with 
Texas,  prepared  to  renew  the  war  with  vigor,  and 
to  carry  it  on  with  the  utmost  severity.  No  quar 
ter  was  to  have  been  given  to  any  foreigner  taken 
fighting  against  the  troops  of  Mexico,  and  it  was 
evident  that  it  was  intended  to  be  a  war  of  exterm 
ination,  if  entered  upon. 

The  American  envoy  at  Mexico  was  instructed 
to  inform  the  Mexican  government  that  the  re 
newal  of  the  war  with  Texas  while  the  question 
of  annexation  was  pending  would  not  be  looked 
upon  with  indifference  by  the  United  States,  and 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


49 


to  protest  against  it  and  the  manner  in  which  it 
was  proposed  to  be  carried  on.^ 

But  the  Mexican  government  had  compromised 
itself  by  the  answer  of  Mr.  Bocanegra  to  Mr.  Green, 
American  charge  d'affaires  ad  interim,  when  the 
latter  informed  him  that  the  treaty  of  annexation 
had  been  signed.f  In  that  document,  after  run 
ning  over  the  arguments  and  protests  which  had 
before  been  used  on  the  Mexican  side  of  the  ques 
tion,  and  combating  the  positions  of  the  United 
States  as  set  forth  in  Mr.  Green's  note,  he  conclud 
ed  by  reiterating  the  declaration  that  Mexico  would 
consider  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  as  a  declara 
tion  of  war. 

In  thus  committing  themselves,  the  Mexican 
authorities  fell  into  an  error  which  has  since  been 
the  cause  of  a  foreign  war,  and  of  many  and  con 
tinued  misfortunes  to  their  country.  The  meas 
ures  of  public  policy  have  been  and  are  discussed 
with  great  freedom  in  the  prints  of  the  United 
States,  and  this  was  the  case  with  the  measure  of 
annexation  in  particular.  While  its  friends  claim 
ed  for  it  all  the  merit  it  deserved,  and  indulged  in 
anticipations  of  its  success,  its  opponents  were  par 
ticularly  violent,  especially  the  Northern  abolition 
prints,  and  its  defeat  was  loudly  predicted.  In 
judging  of  the  fate  of  the  measure,  the  wishes  and 
predictions  of  that  party  in  the  United  States  which 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  2,  House  of  Representatives,  second  Session 
of  the  twenty-eighth  Congress,  p.  21-27. 
t  Idem,  Correspondence,  p.  52-76. 

I.— D 


50.  THE   WAR   WITH  MEXICO. 

was  most  favorable  to  Mexican  interests  seem  to 
have  had  more  weight  than  those  of  the  opposite. 
Convinced  that  the  treaty  would  fail,  and  with  a 
true  Mexican  spirit  of  hravado,  the  government  of 
that  country  chose  to  indulge  in  a  correspondence 
the  tone  of  which  was  exceedingly  warlike,  and, 
to  insure  its  publicity,  not  only  sent  copies  of  it  to 
the  diplomatic  corps,  but  had  it  inserted  in  the  of 
ficial  journals.  The  treaty  was  rejected,  and  the 
Mexican  government  received  a  short-lived  popu 
larity  with  its  own  people  as  the  result  of  its  war 
like  declarations.  But  the  correspondence  had  fos 
tered  a  spirit  of  animosity  between  the  two  coun 
tries,  which,  perhaps,  might  have  been  allayed  by 
a  different  tone. 

Upon  the  arrival  of  an  American  frigate  off  Vera 
Cruz,  the  Mexican  government  became  alarmed. 
Mr.  Bocanegra  inquired  of  Mr.  Green  the  meaning 
of  the  appearance  of  this  force,  of  certain  articles 
which  had  appeared  in  the  American  newspapers, 
and  whether  the  troops  of  Mexico  would  be  opposed 
by  those  of  the  United  States  in  their  attempt  to 
reconquer  Texas.  The  answer  from  the  American 
charge  d'affaires  avowed  an  ignorance  of  the  in 
tentions  of  his  government ;  but  he  expressed  his 
belief  that,  if  the  force  had  actually  been  prepared, 
as  stated  in  the  newspapers,  it  had  been  induced 
by  the  oft-repeated  threats  of  war  on  the  part  of 
Mexico.^ 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  2,  House  of  Representatives,  second  Session 
of  the  twenty-eighth  Congress,  Correspondence,  p.  76-90. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  Q± 

The  correspondence  thus  resumed  upon  the  sub 
ject  was  carried  on  with  less  bitterness  than  form 
erly,  and  the  Mexican  government  appeared  will 
ing,  while  insisting  upon  the  deep  injury  which 
had  heen  done  them  hy  the  United  States,  to  avoid 
the  event  so  often  threatened.  It,  however,  was 
premature,  and  before  the  facts ;  for,  although  a 
small  brigade  of  United  States'  troops  had  previous 
ly  been  ordered  to  concentrate  near  the  frontier  of 
Texas,  yet  the  object  of  the  movement  was  con 
jectured  rather  than  known  by  the  authors  of  the 
newspaper  articles  alluded  to  by  the  Mexican  min 
ister,  and  it  was  not  until  some  time  after  the  cor 
respondence,^  September  17th,  1844,  that  the  com 
manding  officer  was  directed,  under  any  contin 
gency,  to  move  into  Texas.  The  ostensible  pur 
pose  of  the  movement  was  to  have  been  service 
against  the  Indians,  and  it  was  to  have  been  made 
upon  the  requisition  of  the  American  charge  d'af 
faires  at  the  Texan  government.  The  ultimate 
object  of  this  order  was  no  doubt  to  place  a  small 
force  near  Texas,  in  readiness  to  repel  a  Mexican 
invasion,  should  it  actually  take  place,  while  an 
nexation  was  undergoing  discussion,  as  well  as  to 
accomplish  the  object  set  forth  in  the  order.  But 
no  requisition  for  the  troops  was  made  by  the 
charge,  and  they  remained  in  their  cantonments. 

During  the  fall  of  1844  occurred  the  election  for 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  2,  House  of  Representatives,  second  Session 
of  the  twenty-eighth.  Congress,  Correspondence  of  the  Assistant  Adjutant 
General  with  General  Taylor,  p.  37. 


52  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

President  of  the  United  States.  In  this  contest 
the  question  of  the  annexation  of  Texas  was  a 
prominent  one.  The  correspondence  which  had 
taken  place  on  the  subject  had  been  published, 
and  the  American  people  were  fully  cognizant  of 
what  had  been  done  in  the  matter,  as  well  as  the 
obstacles  which  had  been  thrown  in  the  way  of  its 
consummation  by  Mexico.  It  wras  discussed  in 
every  town  and  hamlet  in  the  nation.  Naturally 
anxious  for  the  aggrandizement  of  their  own  re 
public,  and  with  the  remembrance  of  the  outrages 
inflicted  upon  American  citizens  by  Mexico,  the 
long-delayed  and  partial  redress,  the  nature  of  the 
Texan  rebellion,  as  well  as  the  barbarities  which 
had  been  perpetrated  by  the  Mexican  troops  in  the 
prosecution  of  the  war,  the  people  entertained  a 
spirit  of  hostility  toward  Mexico  which  caused 
them  to  look  with  little  favor  upon  the  position 
she  had  assumed,  and  her  claim  to  perpetual  sov 
ereignty  was  regarded  as  preposterous.  They  could 
not  believe  that  she  could  have  any  reasonable 
ground  of  complaint  in  the  annexation  of  a  terri 
tory  to  the  American  confederacy  over  which  for 
seven  years  she  had  exercised  no  authority,  and 
whose  people  were  petitioning  for  the  measure. 

The  United  States  had  for  thirty  years  enjoyed 
a  period  of  prosperous  peace,  during  which  their 
resources  had  been  more  than  doubled.  No  foreign 
war  had  occurred  other  than  with  Indian  tribes 
along  the  frontiers,  and  the  prospect  of  a  collision 
was  looked  upon  by  the  generation  which  had  in 


THE  WA^R  WITH  MEXICO.  53 

the  mean  time  arisen  with  far  more  desire  than 
apprehension.  Confident  in  themselves,  and  pant 
ing  for  excitement,  American  citizens  were  perfect 
ly  willing  to  encounter  the  dangers  and  perils  of 
war  in  defense  of  any  great  question  of  national 
right,  and  maintained  their  claim  to  another  terri 
tory  whose  boundary  was  in  dispute  with  a  far 
more  powerful  and  dangerous  nation  than  Mexico 
with  equal  pertinacity — even  at  the  risk  of  a  war 
with  Great  Britain.  With  such  a  spirit,  had  any 
thing  been  needed  to  render  their  verdict  upon  the 
question  of  annexation  certainly  an  affirmative 
one,  nothing  could  have  been  found  more  effective 
than  the  oft-repeated  threats  of  Mexico. 

These  principles  were  held  by  the  Democratic 
party,  and  the  speedy  annexation  of  Texas  and 
settlement  of  the  Oregon  boundary  were  sustained 
by  it.  The  opposition  conceded  much  of  the  ques 
tion  of  right  in  both  matters,  but  was  more  in  fa 
vor  of  delay,  and  desired  to  avoid  a  rupture  with 
either  Mexico  or  Great  Britain  by  the  use  of  more 
moderate  and  temporizing  measures.  A  party  in 
the  Northern  States,  actuated  by  a  misjudged  phi 
lanthropy,  advocated  the  abolition  of  black  slavery, 
and,  on  account  of  the  existence  of  that  institution 
in  Texas,  was  opposed  to  the  measure.  But  oppo 
sition  to  either  the  speedy  settlement  of  boundary 
or  the  annexation  found  but  little  favor  in  the  eyes 
of  the  people,  and  Mr.  Polk,  the  democratic  candi 
date,  was  elected  to  the  presidency  by  a  majority 
which  could  leave  no  doubt  of  the  popular  will. 


54  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

President  Tyler  brought  the  subject  before  Con 
gress  again  in  his  message  of  1844,  and  urged  it 
upon  its  attention,  and  immediately  after  the  or 
ganization  of  the  two  houses  joint  resolutions  were 
introduced  for  effecting  the  measure,  and  it  contin 
ued  for  some  time  to  be  the  all-absorbing  topic  of 
the  session. 

By  the  rejection  of  the  treaty  of  April,  1844,  the 
question  had  not  only  been  placed  before  the  peo 
ple  of  the  United  States,  but  before  the  world,  and 
European  powers  had  had  full  and  ample  time  for 
considering  the  effect  of  the  measure.  By  them  it 
was  looked  upon  with  no  complacency.  Negotia 
tions  had  been  carried  on  by  Texas  with  France 
and  England,  and  the  influence  of  both  was  used 
against  annexation  with  Texas  and  the  United 
States. 

They  were  actuated,  as  is  always  the  case  in  dip 
lomatic  affairs,  by  their  own  measures  of  policy. 
Both  were  anxious  to  prevent  the  extension  of  sla 
very,  if  they  could  not  effect  its  entire  abolition. 
Great  Britain,  after  many  years  of  effort,  had  ac 
complished  the  emancipation  of  the  slaves  in  her 
own  colonies,  and  it  became  her  settled  policy  to 
effect  it  throughout  the  world.  Had  she  foreseen 
the  injurious  effect  of  the  measure  upon  the  colo 
nies,  it  is  fair  to  suppose  she  would  not  have  been 
so  anxious  for  it;  but  the  deed  was  done.  She 
had  advised  Texas  to  the  abolition  of  slavery,  and, 
from  the  letters  of  Lord  Aberdeen  upon  the  subject, 


, 

THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO.  55 

it  was  evident  that  whatever  influence  she  possess 
ed  was  to  be  exercised  in  its  favor.^ 

The  citizen  king  of  France  looked  with  distrust 
upon  the  growth  of  a  nation  which  had  once  been, 
and  might  again  be,  an  example  for  his  people  to 
hurl  to  the  dust  the  throne  around  which  he  was 
endeavoring  to  collect  the  support  necessary  for  the 
transmission  of  his  power  through  his  family  to  fu 
turity,  while  his  minister,  G-uizot,  openly  avowed 
the  right  of  European  nations  to  interfere  in  na 
tional  affairs  upon  the  Western  continent,  to  pre 
serve  the  balance  of  power. 

The  representatives  of  both  France  and  England 
at  Washington  protested  against  the  measure  on 
the  .part  of  their  governments  ;  but,  although  the 
protests  were  made,_and  the  unfriendliness  of  the 
powers  which  made  them  was  manifested,  yet  nei 
ther  had  any  intention  to  carry  the  interference 
further.  Their  commercial  interests  forbade  an  .ap 
peal  to  arms  ;  and  although  their  force  was  superior 
to  that  of  the  American  Union,  yet  the  increasing 
growth  of  a  desire  among  their  people  for  free  in 
stitutions,  with  the  example  of  the  United  States 
constantly  before  them,  rendered  such  a  collision 
exceedingly  hazardous  to  the  continuance  of  the 
power  of  their  governments.  But  the  same  rea 
sons  made  them  extremely  desirous,  of  seeing  a  pe 
riod  put  to  the  rapid  growth  of  a  nation,  whose  in 
stitutions,  thus  far  firm  and  stable,  were  the  result 

*  State  Papers.     Lord  Aberdeen's  letter,  presented  by  Mr.  Pakenham, 
February  26,  1844. 


56  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

of  the  only  successful  experiment  of  a  popular  gov 
ernment  known  to  history. 

But  the  American  people  and  their  government 
had  formed  the  determination  of  carrying  the  meas 
ure  through ;  and  the  wishes  of  Texas  having  heen 
long  manifested,  and  recognizing  her  right  to  make 
such  treaties  as  she  deemed  most  proper  without 
consulting  Mexico,  with  the  independence  which 
has  ever  characterized  their  action  in  foreign  rela 
tions,  which  has  called  forth  the  admiration  of  the 
prominent  men  of  the  Old  World,  and,  in  the  lan 
guage  of  one  of  their  greatest  historians,^  "  has  set 
an  example  to  the  crazy  despotisms  of  Europe,"  the 
measure  was  discussed  in  the  American  national 
Legislature  with  no  attention  either  to  foreign  pro 
tests  or  interests.  Finally,  after  a  spirited  opposi 
tion,  the  joint  resolution  for  the  admission  of  Tex 
as  into  the  American  Union  passed  hoth  houses, 
and  on  the  3d  of  March,  1845,  the  president  an 
nounced  that  he  had  given  it  his  sanction,  and  that 
it  had  hecome  a  law. 

On  the  6th  of  March,  the  Mexican  minister,  Al 
monte,  protested,  renewed  the  declaration  of  the 
right  of  Mexico  to  recover  Texas  by  any  means 
which  were  in  her  power,  and  demanded  his  pass 
ports.  They  were  transmitted  him  on  the  10th 
by  the  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Buchanan,  who, 
while  declining  to  reopen  the  discussion  on  the 
question  of  right,  yet  expressed,  in  a  conciliatory 
manner,  the  wish  of  the  president  for  an  amicable 

*  Col.  Napier. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  57 

adjustment  of  every  cause  of  complaint  between 
the  two  governments.^ 

Although  the  joint  resolution  had  passed  the 
American  Congress,  still  the  measure  was  not  con 
summated.  The  consent  of  the  people  of  Texas 
was  required,  and  those  opposed  to  the  annexation 
looked  anxiously  to  that  quarter.  The  executive 
of  Texas  had  hoped  that  the  United  States  would 
have  offered  her  more  liberal  terms  than  were  set 
forth  in  the  joint  resolution,  and  was  not  indis 
posed  to  listen  to  the  representatives  of  France 
and  England,  who  endeavored  to  defeat  the  meas 
ure.  Knowing  the  terms  which  would  be  offered 
by  the  discussion  which  had  preceded  the  passage 
of  the  resolution,  the  Texan  government  had  sub 
mitted  to  those  envoys  preliminary  conditions  for 
a  treaty  of  peace  between  Mexico  and  Texas,  the 
prominent  features  of  which  were,  that  the  inde 
pendence  of  Texas  should  be  acknowledged  by 
Mexico,  and  that  she  should  bind  herself  not  to 
annex  herself,  or  become  subject  to  any  country 
whatever.!  These  preliminaries  were  forwarded 
to  Mexico,  and  laid  before  the  government,  at  that 
time  Herrera's,  backed  by  French  and  British  in 
fluence.  Alarmed  at  the  near  approach  of  the 
crisis,  the  Mexican  executive  submitted  them  to 
its  Congress,  and  that  body  having  given  the  nec 
essary  authority,  they  were  agreed  to,  and  Texas 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate,  first  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth 
Congress,  p.  38-89. 

t  Idem,  Mr.  Donelson's  Correspondence  with  Mr.  Buchanan  and  with 
Texan  Officers,  p.  40-105. 


58  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

was  informed  that  Mexico  was  disposed  to  com 
mence  the  negotiation  as  she  might  desire,  and 
that  her  commissioners  would  he  received.  But, 
as  usual  in  Mexican  correspondence  on  the  subject, 
it  was  intimated  that  war  would  he  a  consequence 
if  the  preliminaries  were  not  at  once  ratified. 

Nevertheless,  this  result  was  not  attained  with 
out  (in  the  words  of  the  Baron  de  Cyprey,  French 
envoy  in  Mexico)  "much  management  of  suscepti 
bilities,"  and  the  self-congratulation  which  was  in 
dulged  in  by  that  functionary  in  concluding  his 
note  which  transmitted  the  acceptance  of  the  Mex 
ican  government  to  the  Texan  president  showed 
how  /much  foreign  influence  had  been  brought  to 
bear  throughout  the  whole  negotiation. 

The  attempt  to  defeat  the  measure  signally  fail 
ed,  for  the  preliminaries  were  at  once  unanimous 
ly  rejected  by  the  Texan  Senate,  and  its  only  ef 
fect  was  to  give  the  friends  of  annexation  an  ad 
ditional  argument  in  favor  of  the  actual  independ 
ence  of  Texas,  and  her  consequent  right  to  make 
such  dispositions  as  she  thought  proper. 

On  the  23d  of  June,  1845,  the  existing  govern 
ment  of  Texas  gave  its  consent  to  the  measure  by 
the  unanimous  vote  of  both  houses  and  the  ap 
proval  of  the  executive.  The  Convention  to  which 
the  matter  had  been  finally  referred,  by  its  ordi 
nance  of  July  4th,  1845,  assented  to  it,  and  an 
nexation  was  concluded  so  far  as  Texas  was  con 
cerned.^ 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate,  first  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  59 

Mr.  Donelson,  the  American  charge  d'affaires, 
wrote  on  the  28th  of  June  to  General  Taylor,  then 
in  command  of  the  United  States  forces  on  the 
frontier  of  Texas,  that  the  measure  was  about  to  be 
consummated,  and  that,  if  reliance  was  to  be  placed 
upon  the  threats  of  Mexico,  an  invasion  of  Texas 
might  be  confidently  anticipated.  That  the  event 
was  so  probable  as  to  justify  the  removal  of  his 
forces  without  delay  to  the  western  frontier  of 
Texas,  in  order  that  he  might  be  ready  to  give  the 
protection  which  the  president  had  felt  himself  au 
thorized  to  offer.^  General  Taylor  had  received 
orders  from  Washington  to  hold  himself  in  readi 
ness  to  act  upon  the  receipt  of  such  information 
from  Mr,  Donelson,  and  took  immediate  measures 
for  the  removal  of  his  troops  to  the  position  which 
he  had  been  advised  to  take  up  for  the  defense  of 
Texas.  Seven  companies  of  the  second  dragoons, 
the  cavalry  of  his  command,  marched  by  land  to 
San  Antonio,  while  his  infantry,  the  greater  part 
of  two  regiments  (third  and  fourth),  moved  to  New 
Orleans,  preparatory  to  taking  transports  for  Aran- 
sas  Bay. 

The  question  of  the  boundary  between  Texas 
and  Mexico  rendered  the  proper  position  of  the 
troops  a  matter  of  some  doubt,  for  the  joint  resolu 
tion,  as  it  finally  passed,  and  under  which  Texas 

Congress,  Mr.  Donelson's  Correspondence  with  Mr.  Buchanan  and  with 
Texan  Officers,  p.  40-105. 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate,  first  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth 
Congress,  Mr.  Donelson's  Correspondence  with  Mr.  Buchanan  and  with 
Texan  Officers,  p.  105-109. 


60  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

came  into  the  Union,  included  explicitly  that  ter 
ritory  rightfully  belonging  to  that  country.  Mex 
ico  had  never  positively  ratified  the  treaty  which 
acknowledged  any  boundary  whatever,  and  as  the 
United  States  had  hitherto  acted  upon  the  state  of 
things  de  facto,  without  attention  to  Mexican  the 
ory,  the  government,  in  its  instructions  to  its  gen 
eral,  looked  to  what  had  actually  been  held  by 
Texas.  By  the  treaty  made  by  the  Texans  with 
the  Mexican  generals  in  1836,  the  Rio  Grande  had 
been  looked  to  as  the  boundary.  In  the  proclama 
tion  of  General  Woll  of  June  25th,  1844,  putting 
an  end  to  the  armistice  which  had  before  existed, 
every  individual  who  might  be  found  at  the  dis 
tance  of  one  league  from  the  left  bank  of  the  Rio 
Grande  was  regarded  as  an  accomplice  of  the  usurp 
ers  of  the  national  territory.^  This  was  consid 
ered  as  an  admission  that  the  country  had  been, 
and  .was  at  that  time  held  by  the  Texans,  and  no 
change  in  the  dispositions  of  the  forces  of  either 
Texas  or  Mexico,  which  affected  the  occupation 
of  the.  territory,  had  been  made  during  the  year 
immediately  following.  The  Mexican  general  as 
sumed  too  much  in  his  proclamation,  however,  and 
gave  an  argument  to  the  enemies  of  his  country, 
for  Texas  had  never  held  undisputed  or  uninter 
rupted  possession  of  any  post  within  the  short  dis 
tance  of  the  Rio  Bravo,  mentioned  by  him.  Her 
claim  to  the  river  was  a  matter  of  doubt,  although, 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  2,  House  of  Representatives,  second  Session 
of  the  twenty-eighth  Congress,  p.  34. 


THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO.  ^ 

perhaps,  as  far  as  the  actual  occupation  or  sover 
eignty  of  the  country  could  support  it,  it  was, as 
good  as  that  of  Mexico,  for  neither  party  had  exer 
cised  much  control  over,  or  collected  many  revenues 
from  the  scattered  ranches  on  the  eastern  banks 
of  the  stream.  The  claim  of  the  country  to  the 
northwest,  and  to  the  banks  of  the  Rio  Bravo, 
rested  entirely  upon  the  treaty  with  Santa  Anna 
and  his  generals,  for  the  Mexicans  held  possession 
of  it  at  the  time,  and  the  only  effort  which  had 
been  made  to  disturb  them,  the  Santa  Fe  Expedi 
tion,  had  resulted  in  a  total  failure.  No  military 
measures  were  immediately  taken  by  the  American 
government  to  support  the  claim  in  that  quarter. 
But  General  Taylor  was  directed  to  occupy  San 
Antonio  de  Bexar,  to  take  post  west  of  the  Nueces, 
and  to  approach  as  near  the  boundary  claimed  as 
prudence  would  dictate.  But,  while  Taylor's  forces 
were  directed  to  pass  to  the  west  of  the  Nueces, 
the  Mexicans  had  some  small  posts  east  of  the 
Rio  Bravo,  and  those  he  was  directed  not  to  dis 
turb.* 

On  the  25th  of  July,  1845,  eight  companies  of 
the  third  United  States  infantry  arrived  at  Aran- 
sas  Bay,  and  were  temporarily  established  on  Saint 
Joseph's  Island.  The  difficulties  of  the  coast  were 
found  much  greater  than  had  been  anticipated  ei 
ther  by  the  government  at  Washington  or  by  the 
commanding  general.  Owing  to  the  unsettled  state 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  196,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session 
of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  Correspondence,  p.  68-72. 


62  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

of  the  country  on  the  coast,  it  had  been  but  little 
reconnoitered,  and  time  was  spent  in  selecting  a  de 
pot  and  a  site  for  encampment.  The  bars  were 
found  to  be  so  shoal  that  the  transport  service  was 
one  extremely  troublesome  and  expensive.  The 
want  of  timber  and  good  water  rendered  it  imprac 
ticable  to  select  a  good  position  for  encampment 
immediately  on  the  coast,  while  the  nature  of  the 
service  forbade,  at  that  time,  any  distant  move 
ment  into  the  interior.  After  much  examination, 
General  Taylor  selected  Corpus  Christi,  a  point  im 
mediately  west  of  the  mouth  of  the  Nueces,  and 
which  had  long  been  in  possession  of  Texas,  as  his 
post.  To  that  place,  during  the  fall  of  1845,  was 
dispatched  the  greater  part  of  the  small  regular 
force  of  the  United  States. 

During  the  progress  of  these  negotiations  and 
events,  changes  had  taken  place  in  Mexico,  which, 
however,  did  not  change  the  policy  of  her  govern 
ment  in  relation  to  this  subject.  In  December, 
1844,  the  pronunciamiento broke  out,  by  which  San 
ta  Anna  was  deprived  of  power  and  banished  from 
the  country.  Although  he  was  firmly  opposed  to 
the  annexation  of  Texas  to  the  United  States,  and 
anxious  to  defeat  it,  yet  the  tone  of  the  American 
press  and  the  result  of  the  presidential  election  told 
too  plainly  that  Mexican  opposition  would  be  use 
less.  His  measures  and  actions  indicated  a  dispo 
sition  to  recede  from  the  warlike  ground  which  had 
been  assumed.  They  were  received  with  marked 
disfavor  both  by  the  army  and  the  people,  who,  ig- 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  gg 

norant  of  the  real  strength  of  the  United  States, 
had  heen  too  long  indulged  in  the  hope  and  cry  for 
the  reconquest  of  Texas  and  enmity  to  the  Ameri 
cans,  to  change  it  with  the  celerity  which  the -cri 
sis  demanded.  Santa  Anna's  administration  had 
heen  rigorous  and  arbitrary,  and  there  was  hut  lit 
tle  wanting  to  turn  the  country  against  him.  The 
opportunity  was  favorable  for  his  enemy,  Paredes, 
who  placed  himself  at  the  head  of  the  movement 
for  his  overthrow.  He  pronounced  and  was  com 
pletely  successful.  Santa  Anna  was  driven  from 
the  presidency,  taken  prisoner,  and  became  an  hum 
ble  suppliant  for  his  life  at  the  mercy  of  the  Mex 
ican  Congress.  Herrera  succeeded  him,  and,  for  a 
time,  maintained  an  unyielding  position  with  ref 
erence  to  the  question  of  annexation.  During  the 
progress  of  the  joint  resolution  through  the  Ameri 
can  Congress,  the  Mexican  was  too  much  engaged 
in  the  disposal  of  the  former  president,  and  too 
much  disturbed  by  the  intrigues  of  his  friends,  to 
attend  seriously  to  foreign  relations.  But,  finally, 
that  matter  was  disposed  of,  and  Santa  Anna  ban 
ished.  Upon  the  receipt  of  the  news  of  the  pas 
sage  of  the  resolution,  however,  the  American  en 
voy  was  denied  communication  with  the  Mexican 
government,  and,  by  permission  of  his  own,  soon 
after  returned  hornet 

The  government,  in  the  mean  time,  by  the  influ 
ence  of  France  and  England,  was^nduced  to  ac 
cept  the  proposition  offered  by  the  Texan  execu- 

*  President's  Message,  1846- 


64 


THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO. 


tive ;  but,  as  has  been  seen,  it  was  rejected  by  the 
Texan  Senate.  Mexico  then  found  herself  in  the 
alternative  of  abandoning  her  position  or  of  going  to 
war.  Had  she  possessed  the  means  for  immediate 
action,  there  is  no  doubt  what  her  course  would 
have  been ;  but  those  means  were  not  at  her  dispo 
sal.  In  effect,  she  was  bankrupt.  The  government 
of  Herrera  looked  to  the  administration  of  affairs  on 
liberal  principles,  and,  while  following  that  course, 
preparation  for  war  was  impossible  in  a  country 
where  public  credit  was  gone,  and  where  the  tariff 
and  taxes  were  already  so  high  as  to  be  extravagant 
ly  oppressive.  Under  these  circumstances,  Mexico 
was  obliged  to  take  into  consideration  the  settle 
ment  of  affairs  by  negotiation.  The  pride  of  her  au 
thorities  would  not  suffer  them  to  take  the  initia 
tive  ;  but  informal  intimations,  through  Mr.  Black, 
the  American  consul  at  Mexico,  reached  Washing 
ton  about  the  17th  of  September,  1845,  to  the  effect 
that  a  negotiation  might  be  opened  with  a  pros 
pect  of  success.^  The  President  of  the  United 
States,  anxious,  if  possible,  to  avoid  a  war,  was  will 
ing  to  waive  all  ceremony,  and  to  dispense  with 
the  request  of  Mexico  to  recommence  diplomatic 
intercourse,  which  a  strict  observance  of  etiquette 
would  have  required,  and  the  American  consul  was 
directed  to  ascertain  confidentially  whether  an  en 
voy  from  the  United  States,  empowered  to  settle 
all  questions  in  dispute  between  the  two  countries, 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  196,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of 
the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  p.  8-15. 


THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO. 


65 


would  be  received.  The  response  is  contained  in 
the  letter  of  Senor  Pena  y  Pena,  then  Secretary  of 
Foreign  Relations,  of  October  15th,  '1845,  to  Mr. 
Black,  and,  while  reasserting  the  deep  injury  done 
to  Mexico  by  the  United  States,  and  the  determ 
ination  of  her  government  to  demand  ample  rep 
aration,  yet  accedes  to  the  proposition,  and  agrees 
to  receive  a  commissioner  empowered  to  settle  the 
controversy  peaceably.  The  consent,  however,  was 
literally  confined  to  the  reception  of  a  commission 
er  for  the  settlement  of  the  dispute  on  the  Texas 
Question,  and  did  not  apply  to  a  plenipotentiary  to 
reside  near  the  government  of  Mexico,  and  this 
was  afterward  made  the  ground  of  refusing  to  re 
ceive  the  envoy.  The  answer  also  insisted  that 
the  naval  force  of  the  United  States,  then  before 
Vera  Cruz,  should  be  withdrawn  prior  to  the  recep 
tion  of  a  commissioner— a  point  considered  neces 
sary  for  the  honor  of  Mexico,  which  her  govern 
ment  and  people  have  ever  shown  themselves  ready 
to  defend  in  words,  although,  in  their  acts,  differ 
ent  successive  governments  have  considered  it  of 
minor  consequence. 

Upon  the  receipt  of  this  letter  at  Washington, 
Mr.  Slidell  was  immediately  accredited  and  sent 
to  Mexico  as  envoy  extraordinary  and  minister 
plenipotentiary,  and  his  letter  of  credence  inform 
ed  the  Mexican  president  that  he  was  aware  of 
the  sincere  desire  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States  to  restore,  cultivate,  and  strengthen  friend- 
L— E 


66  THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO. 

ship  and  good  correspondence  between  the  two 
countries. ^ 

In  the  mean  time,  the  matter  was  placed  before 
the  Mexican  Congress,  in  secret  session,  and  re 
ceived  its  assent,!  and  the  American  squadron  was 
withdrawn  from  Vera  Cruz.  But  the  negotiation 
was  heard  of  by  some  of  the  opponents  of  the  ad 
ministration  of  Herrera,  and  at  once  became  the 
subject  of  much  angry  discussion.  The  presi 
dent  and  his  ministers  were  denounced  as  trai 
tors,  and  the  feeling  ran  so  high  in  opposition  to 
the  measure  that,  on  the  4th  of  November,  a  revo 
lution  was  openly  talked  of.  Paredes,  who  had 
headed  the  movement  which  had  placed  Herrera 
in  power,  had  his  own  ulterior  purposes;  and  one 
of  his  pretexts  for  pronouncing  had  been  hostility 
to  the  United  States.  He  did  not  possess  the  con 
fidence  of  the  president  and  ministers,  and,  being 
in  command  of  a  large  body  of  troops  at  San  Luis 
Potosi,  was  dreaded  by  them.  He  was  therefore 
ordered  to  break  up  his  cantonments  and  send  his 
troops  to  different  parts  of  the  republic  ;$  an  order 
which  he  was  not  very  ready  to  obey,  as,  in  effect, 
its  execution  would  have  deprived  him  of  com 
mand,  and  of  the  opportunity  of  overturning  the 
government  whenever  it  was  suitable  to  his  pur 
poses. 

On  the  29th  of  November,  Mr.  Slidell  arrived  at 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  196,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session 
of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  p.  22. 
t  Idem,  Mr.  Black  to  Mr.  Buchanan,  p.  13.  t  Idem  ibidem,  p.  13. 


_ 
THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  67 

Vera  Cruz,  and  soon  after  started  on  his  way  to  the 
city  of  Mexico.  But  on  the  announcement  of  his 
arrival  to  the  Mexican  government,  it  manifested 
more  surprise  than  pleasure,  and  a  dread  lest  the 
occurrence  should  he  the  cause  of  its  overthrow, 
and  the  total  defeat  of  any  thing  like  peace. #  In 
truth,  the  Mexican  authorities  were  about  right, 
for,  at  the  very  time  they  were  consulting  ahout 
the  matter,  their  opponents  were  organizing  a  rev 
olution  which  had  heen  foreshadowed  hy  the  agi 
tation  of  November.  They  were  powerless  ;  Pa- 
redes  held  most  of  the  troops  under  his  command, 
and  their  finances  were  prostrate.  In  the  vain 
hope  of  holding  on  until  the  opening  of  the  Mexi 
can  Congress,  they  resolved  to  delay  their  commit 
tal  to  actual  measures,  and  accordingly  convoked 
the  Council  of  Government  (an  irresponsible  body, 
and  containing  many  members  decidedly  hostile 
to  the  administration),  and  submitted  to  its  con 
sideration  the  credentials  of  Mr.  Slidell  and  the 
question  of  his  reception.!  Various  and  many 
were  the  arguments  there  made  use  of  against 
opening  the  proposed  negotiation.  Perhaps  no  body 
known  in  the  civilized  world  can  develop  more 
ingenuity  in  searching  for  objections  to  a  measure, 
at  all  inimical  to  its  interests,  prejudices,  or  fancies, 
than  a  Mexican  junta ;  and,  although  the  matter 
was  placed  before  the  members  several  times,  they 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  196,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session 
of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  Mr.  Black  to  Mr.  Buchanan,  p.  17. 
t  Idem,  Mr.  Slidell  to  Mr.  Buchanan,  p.  19. 


68  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

disapproved  of  the  measure,  and  advised  that  the 
American  envoy  should  not  be  received.  Fearful 
of  being  compromised  in  the  business  while  the 
agitation  on  the  subject  continued,  and  having  re 
ceived  such  advice  from  the  Council  of  Government, 
the  Mexican  minister,  on  the  20th  of  December, 
replied  to  Mr.  Slidell,  and,  while  reiterating  pro 
fessions  of  good  faith  in  the  negotiation,  declared 
the  determination  of  his  government  not  to  receive 
him,  because  he  had  been  appointed,  not  solely  for 
the  purpose  of  settling  the  dispute  relative -to  Tex 
as,  but  came  in  the  character  of  a  plenipotentiary.^ 
But  on  the  15th,  Paredes,  having  his  own  ends 
in  view,  not  being  particularly  pleased  with  the 
conduct  of  the  government,  especially  that  part  of 
it  which  ordered  him  to  disperse  his  troops,  had 
pronounced  at  San  Luis,  and  moved  his  columns 
upon  the  capital.  He  was  delayed  a  short  time 
on  account  of  a  disagreement  with  the  chiefs  of  the 
revolt  in  the  city  of  Mexico.  But,  in  the  mean 
time,  the  garrisons  of  San  Juan  d'Ulloa,  Vera  Cruz, 
and  Jalapa  joined  the  insurgents,  and,  finally,  on 
the  29th  of  December,  the  greater  portion  of  the 
troops  at  the  city  of  Mexico  pronounced,  and  the 
government  was  left  without  support.  But  this 
had  not  been  done  without  the  manifestation  of 
strong  opposition  on  the  part  of  all  the  civil  author 
ities,  and  a  show  of  resistance  on  the  part  of  Con 
gress,  which  denounced  the  plan  of  Paredes  as  an 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  196,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session 
of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  Mr.  Slidell  to  Mr.  Buchanan,  p.  19. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  gg 

undisguised  military .  despotism,  and  declared  its 
abhorrence  of  his  treachery.^  The  explosion  of 
these  paper  missiles  was  harmless  to  the  revolu 
tionists,  and  on  the  30th  of  December  Herrera  re 
signed  the  presidency.  Paredes  entered  the  city 
on  the  2d  of  January,  1846,  and  being,  in  fact, 
military  dictator,  set  about  organizing  a  govern 
ment  which  suited  his  own  purposes.  It J  was 
made,  and  sanctioned  by  a  junta  of  officers,  and 
he,  of  course,  declared  the  president. 

Upon  the  receipt  of  the  news  of  this  last  revo 
lution  at  Washington,  the  American  government, 
anticipating  the  refusal  of  the  Mexican  to  receive 
its  envoy,  and  fatigued  with  the  attempt  at  nego 
tiation  with  an  impracticable  government,  changed 
by  the  word  of  a  military  chieftain,  himself  im 
practicable,  ordered  the  general  in  command  of  the 
troops  at  Corpus  Christi  to  prepare  an  advance  to 
the  Rio  Grande,  and  the  squadron  of  the  navy  in 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico  to  be  increased.!  Neverthe 
less,  Mr.  Slidell  was  directed  not  to  leave  Mexico 
without  making  another  attempt  to  obtain  a  hear 
ing  from  the  new  government.  He  had  removed 
to  Jalapa,  and  from  thence  addressed  a  note  to  the 
new  minister  of  foreign  relations,  representing  his 
credentials,  and  asking  to  be  received.  On  the 
12th  of  March,  the  answer  of  Mr.  Castillo  y  Lanzas 
was  written,  which,  after  setting  forth  in  full  the 

.,    •  t      •     ' 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  196,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session 
of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  Mr.  Slidell  to  Mr.  Buchanan,  p.  27. 
t  Idem,  Correspondence,  p.  76-82. 


7Q  THE    WAR   WITH    MEXICO. 

alleged  wrongs  and  injustices  committed  by  the 
United  States  against  Mexico,  refused  to  receive 
the  American  plenipotentiary  as  such,  and  ended 
by  intimating  that  his  government  was  preparing 
for  war.  It  was  asserted  that  the  United  States 
had  already  commenced  the  war  by  the  location 
of  their  troops  at  Corpus  Christi,  and  the  station 
of  a  squadron  off  Vera  Cruz.  Mr.  Slidell  replied 
on  the  17th,  and,  after  denying  the  assertions  and 
refuting  the  arguments  of  the  Mexican  minister, 
demanded  his  passports,  and  on  the  1st  of  April 
left  Mexico.* 

The  motives  which  influenced  the  government 
of  Paredes  were  obvious.  That  personage,  how 
ever  much  he  might  have  disguised  his  sentiments, 
was  strongly  in  favor  of  the  establishment  of  a 
monarchy  in  Mexico.!  Ambitious,  proud,  and 
poor,  and  possessing  a  talent  for  agitation,  that 
end  by  which  he  hoped  for  permanent  personal 
aggrandizement  was  the  wish  of  his  heart.  The 
disposal  of  Santa  Anna  was  necessary  to  the  suc 
cess  of  the  designs,  opposed  as  he  was  to  the  estab 
lishment  of  any  other  monarchy  than  his  own  dic 
tatorship,  and,  whatever  else  may  have  been  his 
faults,  devoted  as  he  was  to  the  maintenance  of 
Mexican  nationality.  His  disposition  to  open  ne 
gotiations  with  the  United  States,  and  to  recede 
from  a  position,  the  maintenance  of  which  could 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  196,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session 
of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  Correspondence,  p.  65-67. 
-t  Idem,  p.  41-49. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


71 


only  bring  misfortune  on  his  country,  was  made, 
with  other  pretexts,  the  cause  of  his  overthrow. 
The  time  for  proposing  the  plan  of  monarchy  had 
not  arrived  when  Santa  Anna  was  hurled  from 
power  and  banished.  Herrera  was  elected  presi 
dent — a  naturally  good  man,  and  with  sufficient 
energy  to  carry  out  the  ordinary  measures  of  good 
government  with  any  practicable  nation,  but  with 
not  enough  of  energy  or  of  head  to  control  the  el 
ements  of  disorder  ever  at  work  in  the  Mexican 
army  and  people.  The  distrust  of  Paredes  in 
duced  the  order  to  disperse  his  troops,  and  that  oc 
casioned  Herr era's  downfall.  On  finding  himself 
in  power,  Paredes,  with  the  assistance  of  Don  Lu 
cas  Alaman,  prepared  an  edict  calling  together  the 
Congress,  and  prescribing  the  mode  of  its  election. 
By  it  the  majority  of  the  representatives  was  giv 
en  to  that  class  of  persons  whom  he  believed  to 
be  favorable  to  his  own  views,  and  it  may  have 
been  hoped  that,  could  the  Congress  elected  under 
that  convocataria  be  assembled,  decided  measures 
would  be  taken  for  calling  a  foreign  prince  to  the 
throne  of  Mexico.  That  negotiations  with  the 
King  of  the  French,  having  that  end  in  view,  had 
been  carried  on,  was  evident  from  the  manner  in 
which  the  subject  was  discussed  by  the  leading 
government  journals  of  France,  in  which  it  was 
asserted  that  the  good  of  humanity,  and  of  Mexico 
herself,  demanded  the  interference  of  European 
powers,  and  the  erection  of  a  monarchical  govern 
ment  in  that  country. 


72  THE    WAR   WITH    MEXICO. 

But,  in  the  mean  time,  the  government  of  Pare- 
des,  like  that  of  its  predecessors,  was  committed  to 
a  war  with  the  United  States,  and  it  could  not  hope 
to  sustain  itself  for  any  time  unless  its  promises 
Were  carried  out.  To  silence  opposition  while  the 
plans  of  the  president  progressed  to  maturity,  it  was 
resolved  to  prosecute  it,  and  that,  too,  with  a  fair 
prospect  of  primary  success.  San  Juan  d'Ulloa  was 
in  good  defensible  condition,  with  a  powerful  arm 
ament,  and  could  bid  defiance  to  any  fleet  which 
could  he  sent  against  it.  The  whole  American  force 
on  the  northern  frontier  of  Mexico  amounted  to  but 
little  over  three  thousand  men,  and  the  result  of  the 
conflicts  in  which  American  troops  have  astonished 
the  world  by  their  success  against  overwhelming 
numbers  could  not  then  have  been  anticipated.  Be 
ing  successful,  it  would  have  been  easy,  under  the 
eclat  which  would  have  attended  the  military  op 
erations  of  the  existing  government,  to  have  carried 
out  the  proposed  measure,  and,  before  the  United 
States  could  have  reorganized  their  forces  for  a  re 
newal  of  the  war,  interference  on  the  part  of  the 
European  king,  from  whose  family  the  prospective 
Emperor  of  Mexico  was  to  have  been  selected,  could 
have  been  looked  for  with  confidence.  Moreover, 
the  question  of  the  Oregon  Territory,  which,  during 
the  session  of  1845-6,  was  agitated  in  the  Ameri 
can  Congress,  had  assumed  a  troublesome  aspect, 
and  rendered  it  highly  probable  that  Great  Britain 
would  be  a  party  opposed  to  the  United  States  ; 
and,  finally,  the  opposition  party  of  the  American 


THE    WAR    WITH   MEXICO. 


73 


people  was  looked  to  to  defeat  the  measures  of 
their  government.  Nor  was  reliance  placed  entire 
ly  upon  the  manifestation  of  their  sentiments  in 
public  prints.  Almonte,  after  receiving  his  pass 
ports  from  the  United  States  government,  had  tar 
ried  long  enough  in  the  country  to  concoct,  with 
some  abolitionists  of  black  slavery,  whose  crazy 
philanthropy  enabled  them  to  look  upon  high  trea 
son  with  Mexican  eyes,  schemes  of  action  by  which 
they  were  to  assist  the  Mexican  against  their  own 
government,  should  the  war  break  .out,  and  the 
hostilities  be  actually  commenced.^  Upon  his  re 
turn  home  he  mixed  in  the  intrigues  resulting  in 
the  accession  of  Paredes  to  power,,  and  took  the 
post  of  secretary  of  war  and  marine;  one  which, 
under  the  circumstances,  was  congenial  to  his  tem- 

*  The  correspondence  of  citizens  of  the  United  States  and  members  of  the 
opposition  party  with  Mexican  functionaries  has  been  extensively  believed. 
And  a  sufficient  cause  to  induce  the  belief  among  the  supporters  of  the  admin 
istration  of  Mr.  Polk  was  found  in  the  course  of  action  of  many  prominent 
men  during  the  war ;  but  the  assertion  in  this  place 'does  not  rest  upon  prob 
ability.  When  the  city  of  Mexico  was  occupied  by  the  .American  army  in 
1847,  there  were  found  in  the  Mexican  post-office  numerous  letters  from  this 
class  of  persons  to  officers  of  the  Mexican  government,  principally  to  Almon 
te,  who  had  been,  at  the  time,  for  some  months  in' prison  by 'order  of  Santa 
Anna.  Two  of  these  letters  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  author.  The  first,  over 
the  signature  of  Lewis  H.  Putnam  (perhaps  fictitious),  went  so  far  as  to  speak 
of  a  movement  in  arms  against  the  United  States  government.  The  object 
of  the  letter  may  have  been  to  obtain  means  in  money  from  the  Mexican 
government  to  raise  the  riot,  with  the  intention  of  ultimate  fraud..  The  sec 
ond  is,  however,  evidently  written  in  good  faith.  The  author  had  the  good 
sense  to  omit  his  name  and  the  place  of  date ;  yet  he  is  evidently  a  man  of 
talent,  information,  and  probably  of  high  situation  about  the  government  at 
some  period.  Certainly,  whoever  he  may  have  been,  he  had  access  to  au 
thentic  sources  in  studying  the  history,  public  and  secret,  of  the  Mexican 
dispute. — See  Appendix,  Nos.  1  and  2. 


74  THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO. 

per,  though  it  is  doubtful  whether  his  talent  would 
have  been  sufficient  to  have  managed  his  auxilia 
ries  with  success  had  they  made  their  movement 
in  any  decided  manner. 

Money  was  accordingly  raised  by  extraordinary 
efforts.  The  army  was  paid,  though  the  civil  em 
ployees  were  neglected,  and  the  preparations  for 
the  chastisement  of  the  "  barbarians  of  the  north" 
were  pushed  with  all  the  vigor  which  Mexico  pos 
sessed. 

Notwithstanding  all  this,  however,  the  opposi 
tion  increased,  and  as  early  as  March,  1846,  a  pro- 
nunciamento  against  Paredes  was  agitated,  while, 
with  the  admirable  inconsistency  of  the  Mexicans, 
Santa  Anna,  scarce  one  year  banished,  was  spoken 
of  as  the  chosen  leader  of  the  movement. 

To  silence  opposition,  and  incidentally  to  give 
employment  to  a  general  officer  who  was  the  last 
to  give  in  his  accession  to  the  new  administration, 
and  whose  indefinite  proposals  for  a  revolt  in  the 
north  had  not  been  received  with  great  favor  by 
the  American  general  to  whom  they  had  been 
made,  the  Mexican  army  of  the  north  was  ordered 
to  advance  on  Matamoras,  and,  on  the  4th  of  April, 
General  Arista  was  directed  to  cress  the  Rio  Grrande, 
and  attack  and  destroy  the  American  army  by  ev 
ery  means  in  his  power. 

The  progress  of  events  which  were  gradually 
bringing  the  two  nations  into  collision  was  watch 
ed  with  great  interest  in  the  United  States.  The 
movement  of  the  small  body  of  troops  which  had 


THE    WAR    WITH   MEXICO. 


75 


entered  Texas  was  particularly  observed  by  the 
public,  and  from  time  to  time  rumors  of  its  danger 
were  put  forth,  and  once  of  its  actual  defeat.  These 
induced  General  Gaines,  who  commanded  at  New 
Orleans,  to  forward  to  Corpus  Christi  a  small  re- 
enforcement  of  volunteer  artillery ;  nor  were  the 
fears  of  the  public  for  the  safety  of  the  troops  al 
layed  until  the  arrival  at  Corpus  Christi  of  such  a 
number  as  made  the  safety  of  the  corps  no  longer 
problematical  in  case  of  an  attack  by  any  force  of 
the  Mexicans  known  to  be  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
Rio  Grande  was  announced.  The  Oregon  Ques 
tion,  for  a  time,  drew  off  public  attention  from  the 
affairs  in  Texas  and  with  Mexico,  but  it  soon  be 
came  evident  that  that  matter  would  be  settled 
without  a  resort  to  arms.  The  public  attention 
was  again  directed  to  the  southwest,  and  the  ne 
gotiations  pending  in  Mexico  during  the  winter  of 
the  years  1845-6  were  chronicled  by  the  press  as 
fast  as  they  became  public.  The  prevailing  senti 
ment  in  the  public  mind  with  regard  to  the  con 
duct  of  the  Mexican  government  was  disgust  at 
its  inconstancy  of  purpose,  and  contempt  for  its 
imbecility. 

On  the  8th  of  March  the  army  marched  from 
Corpus  Christi.  The  news  of  its  progress  toward 
the  Rio  Grande,  and  its  arrival  on  its  banks  with 
out  any  physical  opposition,  became  public  in  the 
United  States,  and  the  general  opinion  with  the 
American  people  now  was  that,  after  having  ex 
hausted  her  spleen  in  threats,  and  after  two  or 


7g  THE    WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

three  more  revolutions  in  her  government,  Mexico 
would  abandon  her  purpose  of  hostility  and  make 
the  best  she  could  of  circumstances.  The  most 
that  was  apprehended  was  the  continuance  of  the 
non-intercourse  which,  under  the  name  of  a  war, 
she  had  maintained  for  such  a  number  of  years  in 
regard  to  Te±as.  This  was  also  the  prevailing 
opinion  with  regard  to  the  matter  in  the  Amer 
ican  Congress,  and  the  contingency  of  war  was 
deemed  so  remote  that  it  was  with  the  greatest 
difficulty  that  an  Increase  of  the  army  by  one  reg 
iment  of  mounted  rifles  was  pressed  through,  and 
that  for  an  object  having  no  reference  to  Mexican 
hostility.  Both  people  and  Legislature  were  un 
prepared  for  the  events  which  soon  followed. 

But,  from  the  time  of  ordering  the  advance  on 
Matamoras,  the  American  secretary  of  war  appears 
to  have  been  aware  of  the  danger  to  which  Gen 
eral  Taylor's  corps  might  be  subjected  in  carrying 
out  the  objects  for  which  it  had  been  sent,  and  in 
the  letter  which  ordered  his  forward  movement, 
that  officer  was  directed  to  report  to  the  depart 
ment  what  means  he  might  require,  if  any,  beyond 
those  which  he  then  possessed,  to  ejiforce  and 
maintain  a  common  right  to  navigate  the  Rio  del 
Norte,  together  with  his  views  as  to  its  importance 
for  the  defense  of  Texas.  He  was,  however,  di 
rected  not  to  enforce  it  without  instructions,  and 
was  reminded  of  the  change  in  the  relations  of 
Texas  to  the  United  States,  which  enabled  him  to 
make  a  direct  requisition  upon  the  governor  for  aid, 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


77 


should  it  be  needed.  Long  prior  to  this,  General 
Taylor  had  been  empowered  to  call  upon  the  gov 
ernors  of  the  states  of  Louisiana,  Mississippi,  and 
Alabama  for  a  similar  purpose.  General  Taylor 
answered  on  the  4th  of  February,  1846,  and  de 
layed  his  report  until  he  should  ascertain  the  tem 
per  and  disposition  of  the  people  on  the  Mexican 
frontier  to  which  he  was  approaching.  That,  he 
had  reason  to  believe,  was  favorable  to  the  Ameri 
cans  ;  and  he  stated  his  determination  to  call  for 
no  more  militia  force  in  addition  to  the  few  com 
panies  which  he  then  had  until  circumstances  ren 
dered  it  necessary.  On  the  16th  of  February  he 
wrote  again,  and  warned  the  department  against 
paying  attention  to  exaggerated  accounts  of  the 
Mexican  preparations  to  oppose  his  advance  and 
for  the  invasion  of  Texas,  and  expressed  the  hope 
that  they  would  have,  no  effect.  His  belief  was 
that  his  advance  would  be  unresisted,  although  he 
stated  that  he  should  be  prepared  for  a  state  -of 
hostilities  should  they  be  provoked.^ 

Still,  the  feeling  of  security  so  confidently  ex 
pressed  by  the  general  was  not  fully  entertained 
by  the  secretary,  and  in  his  letter  of  March  the 
2d  he  again  reminded  him  of  his  power  to  call  for 
volunteers,  and  directed  him  to  use  it  efficiently, 
and  suggested  that  his  position,  while  it  was  near 
er  the  enemy,  was  further  from  support,  and  that 
it  was  necessary  to  take  more  than  ordinary  pre- 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  196,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session 
of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  p.  68-105. 


78  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

cautions.  But,  having  confidence  in  his  troops,  and 
no  desire  for  increasing  the  expenditure  of  the 
service  or  the  excitement  of  the  public  by  a  call 
for  assistance  upon  an  uncertain  contingency,  Gen 
eral  Taylor  did  not  deem  it  necessary  to  act  upon 
the  suggestions  of  the  letter  until  some  time  sub 
sequently  ;  and,  in  consequence  of  the  want  of  in 
formation  and  difficulty  of  communication,  no  fur 
ther  instructions  were  given  him  from  the  War 
Department. 

But  in  a  short  time  news  of  a  warlike  character 
arrived  in  the  United  States,  and  was  soon  con 
firmed  by  that  of  the  murder  of  Colonel  Cross,  as 
sistant  quarter-master  general  of  the  army,  the  de 
feat  of  a  party  under  Lieutenant  Porter,  and  of  the 
capture  of  Captain  Thornton's  squadron  of  dra 
goons.  The  greatest  excitement  prevailed  through 
out  the  nation,  and  the  anxiety  for  the  fate  of  the 
little  army  was  intense.  Its  imminent  danger  si 
lenced  opposition  to  hostility,  and  all  looked  with 
eagerness  for  the  action  of  the  government.  For 
some  days  nothing  wa&  heard  from  the  seat  of  war, 
and  rumors  were  rife  of  the  defeat  and  annihilation 
of  Taylor's  corps,  while  the  cry  for  action  became 
daily  stronger  with  the  people. 

On  the  llth  of  May,  immediately  after  the  re 
ceipt  of  the  news  of  Thornton's  capture,  the  Pres 
ident  sent  a  message  to  Congress,  calling  upon  it 
to  make  provision  for  the  support  of  the  war  with 
Mexico,  brought  on  by  the  act  of  Mexico  herself. 
The  difficulties  and  disputes  with  that  country  for 


THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO.  79 

a  series  of  years,  and  the  efforts  of  the  United 
States  at  conciliation,  were  enumerated.  The  cup 
of  forbearance  was  declared  to  have  been  exhaust 
ed  long  previous  to  the  reception  of  the  intelligence 
of  the  recent  occurrences  upon  the  frontier,  and  the 
fact  was  announced  that  now,  by  the  acts  of  her 
generals,  Mexico  had  proclaimed  that  hostilities 
had  commenced,  and  that,  in  pursuit  of  them, 
American  blood  had  been  shed  upon  American 
soil.  In  pursuance  of  the  recommendation  of  the 
commanding  general,  Congress  was  called  upon 
by  the  President  to  pass  a  law  authorizing  the  em 
ployment  of  a  large  body  of  volunteers  for  twelve 
months,  to  make  provision  for  sustaining  the  entire 
military  force,  and  furnishing  it  with  the  material 

The  act  was  passed  on  the  13th  of  May,  and  the 
existence  of  a  state  of  war  was  officially  recognized. 

In  the  above  sketch,  the  principal  events  which 
took  place,  bearing  upon  the  dispute  between  the 
United  States  and  Mexico,  from  the  existence  of 
the  latter  until  the  breaking  out  of  hostilities,  have 
been  marked.  A  short  review  of  those  occurrences 
may  not  be  misplaced. 

The  increase  of  the  United  States  since  the  for 
mation  and  adoption  of  the  Federal  Constitution, 
in  extent,  power,  and  prosperity,  has  surpassed  the 
fondest  anticipations  of  the  framers  of  that  wise 
instrument,  and  has  startled  the  world,  which,  in 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  196,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session 
of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress. 


80  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

the  decay  of ;  ancient  institutions,  watches  their 
progress.'  •  Under  the  free  and  popular  government, 
each  man  .is  left  to  struggle  with  his  fellow  for 
power  and  distinction,  unshackled  by  the  ordinary 
restraints  which  have  heen  imposed  hy  the  ancient 
systems  of  the  Old  ,World,  and  the  education  and 
temper  of  the  people  are  such  that  their  freedom 
has  hitherto  been  -enjoyed  with  moderation.  In 
the  spirit  of  enterprise  which  is  thus  brought  into 
life  and  cherished,  the  American  is  constantly  in 
observation  for  some  new  opening  for  his  exertions 
and  for  his  success.  It  caused  the  early  settle 
ment  of  Texas,  -the  obtainance  of  the  Mexican 
grants,  and  colonization  of  the  country  to  the  ex 
tent  which  alarmed  'the  Mexican  government,  and 
induced  it,  too  late,  to  repent  of  its  primary  policy, 
and  to  forbid  immigration.  The  revolutions  of 
Mexico  and  the  central  despotism  of  Santa  Anna 
aroused  the  resistance  of  the  settlers,  and  the 
means  resorted  to  by  that  chief  to  support  his  au 
thority,  who,  although  aware  and  fearful  of  the 
enterprise  of -the  colonists,  was  ignorant  of  their 
warlike  character,  or,  if  aware  of  it,  too  vain  to 
dream  of  successful  resistance  by  a  handful  of  ad 
venturers  against  the  "Napoleon  of  the  West," 
were  arbitrary  and  despotic  in  themselves,  and  en 
forced,  so  far  as  they  were  enforced,  with  a  cruel 
ty  and  ferocity  which  drew  upon  the  Mexicans  the 
indignation'  of  mankind.  The  signal  defeat  with 
which  the  effort  was  attended  rendered  the  revolt 
ed  state  de  facto  independent,  and  the  treaty  made 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  gj 

with  the  Mexican  generals  gave  to  it  as  much  of 
the  sanction  of  law  as  could  have  been  obtained 
from  a  government  so  wedded  to  the  maintenance 
of  false  principles,  and  so  treacherous  in  the  course 
of  its  policy  as  the  Mexican  has  been.  Seven  years 
elapsed  before  the  government  of  the  United  States, 
notwithstanding  the  applications  which  had  been 
made,  and  notwithstanding  the  desire  early  mani 
fested  and  expressed  until  the  commencement  of 
the  Texan  revolution,  entered  into  negotiations  for 
annexation,  and  during  that  time  none  but  abortive 
attempts  had  been  made  by  Mexico  to  repossess 
herself  of  the  territory.  Its  independence,  and  con 
sequent  right  to  make  treaties  and  dispose  of  itself 
in  its  own  way,  had  been  recognized  by  the  world, 
with  the  exception  of  Mexico,  and  not  till  then 
was  the  proposition  considered  with  a  view  to  ac 
tion.  The  treaty  was  made,  but  the  Senate  of  the 
United  States,  anxious  for  the  opinion  of  the  nation 
upon  a  measure  so  important,  and  of  so  novel  a 
character,  rejected  it.  Whatever  may  have  been 
the  use  made  of  the  question  by  politicians  for  par 
ty  purposes,  and  how  much  soever  it  was  made  to 
subserve  them,  the  verdict  of  the  people  was  deci 
sive,  and  the  same  Senate  which  had  rejected  the 
treaty  gave  its  consent  to  a  joint  resolution  with 
the  House  of  Representatives  for  the  same  end. 

In  the  mean  time,  Mexico,  tenacious  of  posses 
sion  in  words,  when,  in  fact,  she  had  been  forced  to 
relinquish  it,  and  trusting  to  the  loud-mouthed  op- 
position  of  a  party  in  the  American  Union,  had  be- 
L— F 


82  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

come  compromised  in  the  event  of  the  consumma 
tion  of.  the  measure  even  to  the  extent  of  a  war 
with  a  power  to  which,  either  in  arts  or  in  arms, 
she  was  and  had  been  hut  as  sounding  hrass  and 
tinkling  cymbal.  Perhaps,  had  the  measure  been 
then  delayed,  and  negotiations  for  the  purchase  of 
the  claim  of  Mexico  been  offered  by  the  United 
States,  the  rupture  might  have  been  avoided.  But 
the  speed  with  which  those  opposed  to  the  meas 
ure  would  have  rushed  to  the  support  of  the  delay, 
and  the  extreme  publicity  of  the  proceeding  of  re 
publican  assemblies,  might  again  have  deceived 
Mexico  into  the  fallacious  hope  that  it  was  owing 
to  her  oft-repeated  threat  of  war,  and  that  the  fear 
of  its  prosecution  would,  if  the  threat  was  persist 
ed  in,  cause  the  total  defeat  of  the  measure,  and 
indulge  her  still  in  her  asserted  possession.  The 
pride,  folly,  and  obstinacy  of  her  people  experience 
has  shown  to  be  fully  equal  to  such  conclusion. 

And,  moreover,  the  independence  of  Texas  Jiad 
been  recognized,  and  the  attempt  at  purchasing  a 
territory  from  Mexico  over  which  she  had  no  rec 
ognized  right  to  authority  would  have  placed  the 
United  States  in  a  position  somewhat  false. 

But  the  measure  passed  the  American  Congress, 
and  the  diplomatic  intercourse  between  the  two 
countries  was  suspended.  Mexican  consuls  were 
directed  to  close  their  business  and  inform  their 
citizens  that  their  functions  had  ceased.  Their 
Congress  passed  the  necessary  bills  to  enable  the 
government  to  prosecute  the  war  and  to  raise 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  33 

money  for  its  support ;  but  the  passage  of  the  law 
was  easier  than  to  effect  a  loan,  and  Mexico  found 
herself — after  all  her  declarations,  protests,  and  at- 
tempts  to  maintain  an  ohsolete  principle  of  perpet 
ual  sovereignty, -which,  had  it  heen  ohserved  hy 
other  nations,  and  sustained  by  her  own  mother 
country,  would  have  compromised  her  own  nation 
ality — powerless,  and  compelled  to  yield  to  circum 
stances.  At  this  time  the  President  of  the  United  . 
States,  waiving  all  ordinary  rules  of  diplomatic  et 
iquette,  and  sacrificing  to  his  desire  for  peace  the 
regulating  principles  of  national  intercourse — 
which  the  condition  of  Mexico  enabled  him  to  do 
without  subjecting  his  government  to  the  charge 
of  timidity — took  the  initiative  by  sending  an  en 
voy  with  full  powers  to  treat  on  the  subjects  in 
dispute.  The  Mexican  government  had  looked 
at  first  favorably  upon  the  renewal  of  negotiations, 
for  at  length  it  was  fully  aware  of  the  difficulties 
and  dangers  attending  the  execution  of  its  threats. 
But  it  was  odious  to  the  people  and  the  army,, who 
had  too  long  been  indulged  in  the  cry  for  hostili 
ties  for  sustaining  the  honor  of  their  magnani 
mous  nation,  and  in  a  false  belief  in  their  own 
strength,,  to  change  the  one  into  a  tone  of  compro 
mise  and  conciliation,  or  the  other  into  a  true  and 
unexaggerated  estimate  of  their  condition.  By 
them  the  frequent  and  strenuous  efforts  for  peace 
made  by  the  Americans  were  mistaken  for  an  ex 
ponent  of  American  weakness ;  and  for  a  proof  of 
it,  they  pointed  to  the  small  force  on  the  frontier, 


84  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

which  comprised  the  larger  part  of  the  army  of  the 
United  States,  and  asked  whether  the  sons  of  Hi 
dalgo  and  Morelos  were  to  be  vanquished  by  so 
-small  a  number  of  the  "  barbarians  of  the  North." 
Their  delusion  was  not  dissipated  by  the  American 
general,  who  was  necessarily  ignorant  of  the  state 
of  affairs,  and  who,  while  in  the  dark  chaos  of  Mex 
ican  politics  some  glimmering  of  the  light  of  peace 
was  seen,  hesitated  to  avail  himself  of  the  means 
which  were  at  his  disposal  for  an  increase  of  his 
force. 

The  Mexican  government  met  the  defeat  which 
awaits  all  governments  attempting  measures  much 
in  advance  or  behind  the  spirit  of  their  people. 
Defeat  with  it  is  followed  by  a  revolution;  and 
that  came,  notwithstanding  the  endeavor,  by  tem 
porizing  and  bad  faith  with  the  United  States,  to 
turn  aside  the  storm.  The  power  passed  from  the 
hands  of  Herrera,  and  a  military  aspirant  for  the 
position  of  a  king-maker  seized  it  for  his  own  pur 
poses.  He  found  himself  obliged  to  carry  out  the 
measures  of  hostility,  and  all  prospect  of  peace  was 
lost.  Immediate  action  was  necessary  for  primary 
success,  and  his  best  and  most  disposable  troops 
were  moved  on  Matamoras,  crossed  the  Rio  Bravo, 
and  commenced  the  war.  And,  notwithstanding 
the  peaceful  policy  of  the  government  of  the  Unit 
ed  States,  and  the  prevailing  belief  that  hostilities 
would  be  avoided,  the  mass  of  the  American  peo 
ple  was  quite  willing  to  accept  it. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


85 


The  state  of  military  preparation  existing  in  the 
two  countries  at  the  commencement  of  the  war 
was  as  different  as  their  natures,  their  people,  or 
their  policies.  The  government  of  Mexico  had  al 
ways  heen  controlled  hy  the  army ;  and,  as  in  all 
cases  where  the  proper  subordinate  agent  becomes 
the  superior,  injuries  both  to  its  own  efficiency  and 
the  welfare  of  the  state  had  resulted.  Springing 
from  the  masses  of  the  people,  and  actuated  as 
much  by  a  spirit  of  revenge  for  private  griefs  as  by 
patriotic  feeling,  the  various  chiefs  of  the  revolu 
tionists  had  sustained  themselves  in  the  war  of  in 
dependence  in  a  manner  which  respected  but  little 
the  rights  of  peaceable  citizens.  One  object  which 
they  had  in  view  in  all  their  proceedings  was  to 
hold  perpetual  military  rank  ;  and,  to  obtain  their 
support,  as  well  as  that  of  the  army  under  his  com 
mand,  Iturbide  declared,  in  articles  sixteen  and 
seventeen  of  the  plan  of  Iguala,  "  that  this  army 
should  be  considered  as  of  the  line"  as  well  as  all 
"  the  old  partisans  of  independence"  who  should 
immediately  adhere  to  it.  They  were  so  consid 
ered,  and  the  incubus  of  a  large  standing  army  was 
fastened  upon  the  infant  country,  which  only  pass 
ed  from  the  dominion  of  Spain  to  come  under  the 
changing  military  despotism  of  its  own  chieftains. 
The  composition  of  the  army  was  such  as  to  ren 
der  it  an  easy  instrument  to  be  worked  by  factious 
chiefs,  who  sought  to  subvert  the  measures  of  the 
government  for  their  own  ends.  Various  guerilla 
leaders,  whose  irresponsible  and  predatory  warfare 


86  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

had  been  carried  on  throughout  the  country  as  best 
suited  their  purposes,  were  not  likely  to  yield  im 
plicit  obedience  to  a  poor  government,  administer 
ed  by  one  of  their  own  number,  and  no  great  gen 
ius  was  immediately  at  hand,  who,  by  the  power 
of  his  mind,  could  remedy  the  evil,  and  reduce  the 
discordant  elements  to  discipline.  The  army  re 
mained  as  it  was  in  the  first  days  of  Mexican  in 
dependence,  and  was  employed  from  time  to  time 
in  fighting  itself,  on  the  side  of  one  pronunciado  or 
another,  all  of  whom  were,  like  Iturbide,  pledged 
to  its  support. 

But,  after  the  lapse  of  years  and  a  series  of  rev 
olutions,  the  moral  power  which  makes  the  great 
strength  of  military  bodies  and  renders  them  in 
vincible  was,  in  great  measure,  wanting  to  the 
Mexican  army.  The  cry  of  liberty,  which  had 
aroused  the  first  insurgents,  and  given  them  an  en 
thusiasm  which  bore  them  even  to  the  muzzles  of 
the  cannon,  as  at  the  battle  of  Las  Graces,  had  lost 
much  of  its  force.  The  masses  of  Mexico  found 
that  revolutions  brought  only  change  of  masters ; 
and  so  frequent  had  they  become,  that,  like  festal 
days,  they  produced  but  temporary  excitement. 
Obedience  to  new  authorities  was  yielded  until 
the  next  prbnunciamiento,  which  would  produce  no 
more  enthusiasm  or  interference  on  their  part  than 
the  former.  The  common  people  hated  the  mili 
tary  service,  and,  when  forced  into  it,  served  me 
chanically,  upon  compulsion,  being  perfectly  will 
ing  to  desert  upon  the  first  occasion  which  offered 


THE    WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 


87 


impunity.  Still,  the  material  of  the  Mexican  army 
was  characterized  hy  many  of  the  necessary  quali 
ties  of  a  good  soldiery.  Patient  under  suffering, 
requiring  hut  little  subsistence,  with  extraordinary 
capacity  for  enduring  fatigue,  and  with  quite 
enough  of  physical  courage  to  enable  them  to  en 
counter  danger  without  fear,  the  Mexican  troops 
might,  if  properly  led,  compare  well  with  the  troops 
of  other  nations.  But  corruption  existed  among 
their  officers  from  the  highest  to  the  lowest  grade, 
and  commissions  were  given  from  time  to  time  hy 
the  functionaries  of  the  government  as  rewards 
for  the  most  disgraceful  private  services,  disgrace 
ful  alike  to  the  doer  and  the  recipient.  The  pros 
pect  of  a  foreign  war  was,  however,  new,  and  the 
distant  contingency  had  afforded  means  for  arous 
ing  some  enthusiasm  of  a  national  character.  The 
greater  portion  of  the  army  was  ignorant  of  the  en 
emy,  and,  in  the  pride  of  their  race,  overlooking 
their  own  condition,  the  Mexican  officers  and  sol 
diers  flattered  themselves  that  they  were  invinci 
ble.  As  they  wished  for  laurels  in  a  foreign  war, 
and  as  experience  had  not  taught  the  greater  por 
tion  the  fallacy  of  their  anticipations,  they  had 
been  induced  to  join  in  revolts  against  two  suc 
cessive  governments,  which,  knowing  the  actual 
situation  of  their  country,  strove  to  avoid  the  dan 
ger. 

The  Mexican  army  included,  besides  the  troops 
of  the 'line,  the  active  battalions  of  the  different 
states  and  the  local  national  guards  of  the  cities. 


g3  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

The  cavalry,  principally  of  lancers,  had  a  high 
though  factitious  reputation  both  at  home  and 
abroad.  Many  corps  were  fairly  disciplined,  and 
the  men  were  expert  in  all  the  feats  of  horseman 
ship  peculiar  to  Mexico,  as  well  as  the  use  of  their 
lances.  The  horses  of  the  country,  however,  want 
ed  both  speed  and  power,  though  endurance  they 
possessed  in  a  remarkable  degree.  The  carbines 
with  which  the  cavalry  was  armed  were,  for  the 
most  part,  of  an  ancient  model  and  manufacture, 
and,  where  accuracy  of  aim  was  necessary,  were 
useless. 

The  Mexican  artillery  numbered  many  foreign 
ers  among  its  officers,  and  most  of  the  juniors  were 
eleves  of  the  Military  College  of  Chapultepec. 
They  had  there  acquired  much  of  the  theory  of 
their  profession,  and  the  nature  of  Mexican  revolu 
tions  had  given  them  much  practice.  As  far  as 
the  actual  gunnery  went,  they  were  exceedingly 
proficient.  Their  guns  were  fine,  but  clumsily 
mounted,  and,  in  consequence,  had  but  little  mo 
bility.  Light  artillery,  as  practiced  by  modern 
troops,  was  but  little  known  or  used  by  the  Mexi 
cans  until  it  was  taught  them  by  their  enemy. 

The  Mexican  infantry  was  in  many  regiments 
tolerably  drilled,  and  a  severe  discipline  was  en 
forced  with  the  privates.  All  ceremonious  points 
and  detail  duties  were  strictly  carried  out.  The 
muskets  of  the  infantry  were  inferior,  and  the  men 
were  by  no  means  proficient  in  their  accurate  use. 

The  organization  of  the  staff  of  the  army  depend- 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  gg 

ed  much  upon  the  general  who  happened  to  "be  in 
command,  and,  from  the  nature  of  things,  the  civil 
staff  was  filled  in  any  convenient  method.  Of  en 
gineer  officers,  Mexico  had  many  of  talent  and 
skill,  and  the  practice  of  their  revolutions  had  made 
them  perfect  in  the  hranch  of  field  fortification. 

Of  general  officers  there  existed  an  enormous 
disproportion,  and  so  great  was  their  numher  that 
it  was  a  common  remark  that  they  had  rather  a 
brigade  of  generals  than  generals  of  hrigade.  With 
all  of  them,  however,  there  were  few  who  possessed 
any  other  talent  than  for  the  pomp  and  circum 
stance  of  war,  and  probably  there  was  not  one  in 
service  combining  the  various  attributes  of  a  gen 
eral.  . 

Mexico's  whole  military  force  of  all  arms  was 
stated  variously  between  thirty  and  fifty  thousand 
men,  both  by  foreigners  and  their  own  authorities. 
And  it  was  at  least  equal,  at  the  commencement 
of  the  war,  to  the  lower  of  the  numbers.  Scatter 
ed  as  it  was  under  different  chiefs,  and  consisting 
of  troops  of  different  kinds,  it  would  be  difficult  to 
ascertain  the  precise  number.  It  is  hardly  proba 
ble  that  it  was  accurately  known  at  Mexico. 

The  country  was  full  of  arms  and  munitions  of 
war,  such  as  they  were.  They  were  of  ancient 
manufacture,  and  for  replenishing  the  supply  de 
pendence  was  necessarily  placed  upon  importa 
tions.  Mexico  had  but  few  resources  in-  her  own 
mechanics,  certainly  none  beyond  the  repair  of  par 
tial  damages,  and  such  an  establishment  as  a  na- 


90  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

tional  armory  was  unknown  in  the  republic.  At 
the  great  fortifications  and  in  some  large  cities 
there  were  partial  establishments,  but,  in  com 
parison  to  the.  size  of  the  armament,  they  were  but 
trifling. 

Of  maritime  power  Mexico  was  utterly  desti 
tute.  She  had  attempted  to  organize  something 
of  a  navy,  but,  as  in  the  various  .revolutions  the 
navy  could  be  made  no  instrument  of  success  on 
the  side  of  either  pronunciado,  it  had  been  lost 
sight  of,  and  died  from  want  of  sustenance.  A 
few  steamers  and  sail  vessels  of  small  class  were 
on  her  list  at  the  commencement  of  hostilities,  but 
the  government  lacked  both  money  and  energy  to 
fit  them  out.  Indeed,  it  may  well  have  been  good 
policy,  for  they  would  soon  have  been  captured  by 
the  enemy ;  and  as  Mexican  pride  had  never  been 
flattered  by  any  maritime  exploits,  no  boasting 
pretensions  were  put  forth  in  support  of  that  arm 
of  national  defense  which  could  induce  the  attempt 
at  naval  warfare. 

In  the  numerical  strength  of  regular  soldiery 
the  United  States  were  exceedingly  deficient.  It 
has  never  been  their  policy  to  keep  upon  foot  a 
large  standing  army,  against  which  species  of  force 
a  prejudice  has  existed  since  the  days  of  the  Rev 
olution.  Indeed,  nothing  but  necessity,  taught  by 
experience,  induced  the  early  Congress  to  substi 
tute  the  continental  line  for  the  three  and  six 
months'  volunteers  who  first  served  the  different 
states  in  their  rebellion.  It  was  disbanded  imine- 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


91 


diately  after  the  war,  and,  true  to  their  principles, 
officers  and  soldiers  of  the  army  made  no  opposi 
tion  to/the  action  of  a  government  which  was  pow 
erless  against  their  strength,  and,  without  their  ar 
rears  of  pay,  broke  up  and  returned  to  their  homes. 
Under  the  first  presidents,  a  small  force  was  kept 
up  for  protection  upon  the  Indian  frontiers,  and  in 
cidental  service  upon  the  seaboard.  '  But  it  was 
never  increased  much  beyond  the  actual  and  in 
dispensable  wants  of  the  government,  and,  when, 
necessity  had  passed  away,  was  again  reduced. 

The  limited  permanent  force  which  the  adopted 
policy  of  the  government  allowed,  led  different  ad 
ministrations  to  look  to  the  improvement  of  such 
as  was  in  service.  In  1812  the  Military  Academy 
was  established  for  the  education  of  officers  of  the 
army,  and  during  subsequent  years  the  course  of 
military  instruction  had  been  enlarged,  until  it  be 
came  as  perfect  as  the  length  of  time  allowed  the 
cadets  would  permit.  The  permanent  establish 
ment  of  the  school  had  not  been  accomplished 
without  strong  opposition  on  the  part  of  state  gov 
ernments  as  well  as  of  the  people.  The  institution 
was  denounced  as  aristocratic  in  its  tendency  and 
useless  in  effect.  But  the  efforts  for  its  suppression 
were  vain,  and  it  has  ever  since  furnished  nearly 
a  sufficient  number  of  graduates  to  fill  the  regi 
ments  and  corps  of  the  army.  The  course  of  in 
struction  there  received,  and  the  secluded  life  led 
for  four  years,  devoted  entirely  to  military  studies 
and  pursuits,  it  can  not  be  denied,  have  a  tendency 


92  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

to  create  an  exclusive  class,  and  cause  the  young 
graduates  to  look  upon  an  uneducated  soldier  with 
but  little  sympathy  or  consideration,  and  to  think 
lightly  of  the  policy  of  their  country  which  places 
her  reliance  upon  her  citizens  rather  than  upon  a 
standing  army.  But  the  graduates  of  the  Military 
Academy  have,  upon  entering  the  service,  the  full 
theory  of  their  profession,  and  when  their  deeds  in 
their  country's  service  are  remembered,  it  may  well 
be  said,  without  incurring  the  charge  of  vanity,  that 
they  form  a  body  of  officers  which,  in  education, 
talent,  and  bravery,  has  no  superior  in  the  world. 

In  1845  the  American  army  consisted  of  two 
regiments  of  dragoons,  four  of  artillery,  and  eight 
of  infantry,  with  the  different  departments  of  the 
staff.  The  latter  were  larger  than  were  actually 
required  for  the  troops  of  the  line  in  service,  but 
the  engineers  and  ordnance  officers  were  employ 
ed  in  carrying  out  the  policy  of  the  government — 
that  of  building  all  necessary  fortifications,  and 
keeping  on  hand  a  large  quantity  of  the  imperish 
able  material  of  war,  ready  for  defense  and  use  by 
the  citizens,  should  the  state  of  foreign  relations 
render  it  necessary. 

The  United  States  dragoons  were  well  mount 
ed,  and  well  disciplined  as  light  cavalry,  to  which 
their  duties  were  confined ;  and  although  the  short 
term  of  service  did  not  allow  their  officers  to  make 
them,  in  bearing,  equal  to  the  finished  cavalry  sol 
diers  of  Europe,  yet  they  were  highly  efficient  in 
their  proper  arm. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  93 

The  artillery,  for  the  most  part,  had  been  con 
fined  to  the  service  of  fortifications,  and  the  men 
had  no  instruction  in  their  own  arm,  except  in  the 
manual  exercise  of  the  heavy  guns.  The  duties 
of  construction  usually  devolving  upon  the  artil 
lery  in  foreign  services,  in  the  American  were  as 
signed  to  the  ordnance,  by  which  the  artillery  of 
ficers  and  soldiers  were  deprived  of  the  opportunity 
of  acquiring  the  most  practical  part  of  their  prpr 
fession.  In  the  exigencies  of  the  service,  created 
by  the  different  Indian  wars,  the  artillery  men  had 
often  been  ordered  to  the  field  as  infantry,  and 
kept  for  long  periods  in  service  as  such,  a  pro 
ceeding  certainly  not  calculated  to  increase  their 
proficiency  as  artillerists.  But,  under  the  adminis 
tration  of  the  War  Department  by  Mr.  Poinsett,  it 
was  noticed  that  the  artillery  of  the  United  States 
was  far  behind  that  of  the  nations  of  Europe,  and 
had  not  even  a  nucleus  upon  which  to  form  an  ef 
ficient  corps  in  one  of  its  most  important  branches. 
To  remedy  the  evil,  one  company  of  each  regiment 
was  organized  as  light  artillery,  and  by  the  dili 
gence  of  the  officers  were  soon  brought  to  a  state 
of  discipline  and  efficiency  which  was  rightly  con 
sidered  a  maximum.  By  the  order  of  the  general- 
in-chief,  the  junior  officers  of  the  artillery  had 
served  in  these  companies  in  succession,  and  near 
ly  all  of  them  were  proficient  in  practice  as  well 
as  theory  of  that  branch  of  their  duty. 

Although  the  infantry  of  the  American  army 
was  much  scattered  from  the  nature  of  the  service, 


94  THE    WAR   WITH    MEXICO. 

and,  in  consequence,  the  practice  of  military  tac 
tics  upon  a  large  scale  was  impossible ;  yet  a  strict 
discipline. had  always  been  enforced  in  the  differ 
ent  detachments,  and  nothing  was  wanting  to  ren 
der  the  infantry  as  imposing  a  body  of  troops,  for 
its  number,  as  any  in  the  world,  except  reunion  in 
masses  for  a  few  weeks. 

The  rank  and  file  contained  many  foreigners,  but 
nearly  all  were  from  Great  Britain,  Ireland,  and 
Germany,  and  the  greater  portion  possessed  the 
warlike  nature  of  their  native  -countries,  with  an 
attachment  for  the  land  of  their  adoption.  But  the 
mass > of  the  troops  was  American;  and  all  banded 
together  by  a  salutary  discipline,  well  and  regular 
ly  paid,  well  fed  and  clothed,  every  desirable  con 
dition  of  efficiency  was  satisfied  in  the  physical 
state  of  the  American  regular  army. 

Under  the  spirit  of  retrenchment  which  pervad 
ed  the  American  Congress  in  1842,  the  number  of 
privates  in  the  companies  of  dragoons  had  been  re 
duced  to  fifty,  and  in  those  of  artillery  and  infant 
ry  to  forty-two,  numbers  far  too  small  to  keep  those 
corps  up  to  a  proper  numerical  strength ;  for  the 
difficulty  of  supplying  the  remote  posts  with  re 
cruits  was  such  that  it  was  never  practicable  to 
keep  the  regiments  more  than  two  thirds  full,  ac 
cording  to  the  legal' standard.  The  number  of  offi 
cers  was  sufficient  for  the  command  of  companies 
of  the  full  size,  and,  in  the  adoption  of  the  skele 
ton  system,  it  had  been  believed  that  they  could 
be  raised  to  that  standard  when  the  necessity  be- 


THE   WAR,  WITH   MEXICO.  95 

came  apparent.  Many  officers  were,  however,  su 
perannuated,  and  unfit  for  service  except  in  the  or 
dinary  duties  of  a  garrison.  This  class  was  found, 
of  course,  among  the  higher  grades,  and  there  was 
hardly  a  regiment  in  service  which  could  take  the 
field  with  its  full  number  of  field  officers.  This 
evil  had  arisen  from  the  want  of  a  retired  list ;  and 
as  the  different  administrations  of  the  government 
had  not  wished  to  take  the  alternative  of  forcing 
aged  officers,  whose  life  had  been  spent  in  the  army, 
unprovided  from  the  service,  their  duties  had  been 
performed  by  juniors,  without  either  the  proper 
rank  or  pay  of  their  commands,  although  most  of 
the  seniors,  with  the  customary  pertinacity  of  old 
soldiers,  even  when  their  incapacity  was  notorious, 
insisted  that  they,  and  they  alone,  possessed  the 
skill  and  experience  necessary  for  high  command. 

The  general  officers  were  also  advanced  in  years, 
and  many  of  them  too  much  so  to  be  useful.  But 
few  retained  the  ardent  enthusiasm  which  creates 
resources  where  there  are  none,  and,  when  com 
bined  with  warlike  genius  and. sound  judgment, 
accomplishes  deeds  looked  upon  as  impracticable. 
Such  never  has  been  the  attribute  of  aged  gener 
als,  and  the  Mexican  war  furnishes  hardly  an  ex 
ception  to  the  rule. 

The  want  of  vacancies  had  induced  the  govern 
ment  of  the  United  States  to  introduce  into  the 
service  the  pernicious  system  of  breveting  officers 
to  higher  grades  than  they  held  in  the  line  of  the 
army,  and  their  desire  to  exercise  the  command  of 


gg  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

their  brevet  rank  had  often  led  to  disputes  benefi 
cial  neither  to  the  service  nor  themselves.  From 
Corpus  Christi,  a  petition  was  sent  to  the  govern 
ment  in  1845,  praying  that  the  powers  and  privi 
leges  of  brevet  rank  might  be  strictly  defined,  and 
the  question  was  decided.  By  the  decision,  brevet 
rank  conferred  no  authority  except  upon  special 
assignment,  or  upon  detachments  specially  sent  out. 
This  decision  was  in  opposition  to  the  views  of  the 
general-in-chief,  who  supported  brevet  rank  as  be 
ing,  in  the  main,  real  rank,  and  gave  offense  to 
many  holding  such  commissions  in  the  arniy.  One 
general  officer  was  so  much  aggrieved  that  he  threw 
up  his  commission,  and  for  a  time  left  the  service. 
But,  vat  the  close  of  the  year  1845,  the  whole 
number  of  bayonets  and  sabers  allowed  by  the  or 
ganization  of  the  army  was  but  7883  ;  and,  accord 
ing  to  the  return  of  the  army  for  November  of  that 
year,^  but  5304,  including  sergeants  and  corporals, 
were  present  throughout  the  country.  General 
Taylor  was  then  at  Corpus  Christi,  and  the  strength 
of  his  command,  including  sick,  was  but  3593  ;  and 
during  the  winter  this  number  was  much  reduced 
by  ordinary  casualties  and  expiration  of  service,  and 
hardly  amounted,  when  he  arrived  opposite  Mata- 
moras,  to  3000  men  of  all  arms — too  small  a  force 
for  the  position  and  circumstances — and  this  the 
Mexican  authorities  knew  to  be  the  greater  portion 
of  the  American  army. 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate,  first  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth 
Congress,  p.  221. 


THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO.  97 

Mexico  did  not  count  upon,  nor  could  any  one 
unacquainted  with  the  American  people  have 
counted  upon,  the  ease  and  celerity  with  which 
any  required  number  of  volunteers  can  be  called 
into  the  field.  In  great  measure,  each  man  in  the 
United  States  considers  that  he  has  a  direct  inter 
est  in  the  government,  and  feels  bound  to  support 
it  in  a  foreign  war.  It  is  a  point  of  honor  for  each 
state  and  county  to  furnish  promptly  the  requisi 
tions  made  upon  it ;  'and,  upon  the  call  of  the  gov 
ernment,  it  is  often  the  dispute  for  the  privilege 
of  serving  rather  than,  for  exemption  from  the  fa 
tigues  and  dangers  of  the  duty.  Party  strife,  which 
is  so  prevalent,  takes  the  form  of  emulation,  for 
military  service  is  that  which  appears  more  dis 
tinctly  patriotic  than  any  other,  and  it  is  the  in 
terest  of  politicians  to  give  their  support  in  actual 
service,  however  much  they  may  oppose  the  policy 
of  the  administration. 

Volunteer  troops  are  necessarily  undisciplined, 
and,  at  the  commencement  of  their  military  ca 
reer,  are  but  little  better  than  when  they  practice 
to  display  their  ignorance  at  militia  musters  and 
independent  company  parades.  But  nearly  every 
man  is  acquainted  with  the  use  of  arms  in  his  own 
way ;  and  if  the  officers  are  well  selected,  and  have 
perseverance  enough  to  learn  their  duties,  with  in 
dependence  enough  to  execute  them,  volunteer 
regiments  soon  improve,  and  the  infantry  becomes 
highly  efficient.  With  the  cavalry  it  is  a  different 
matter,  whenever  it  is  attempted  to  use  it  as  cav- 
I.— G 


98  THE   WAR/WITH  MEXICO, 

airy  proper,  for  it  requires  more  time  than  can  be 
given  by  volunteer  troops,  to  acquire  the  knowl 
edge  and  practice  the  duties  of  that  arm ; .  and,  va 
riously  equipped  and  mounted  as  they  are  upon 
entering  the  service,  the  experiment  of  making  a 
respectable  dragoon  out  of  a  volunteer  must  almost 
necessarily  fail.  One  species  of  mounted  force, 
peculiar  to  the  western  frontier  of  the  United 
States,  is,  however,  efficient.  The  inhabitants  of 
that  frontier,  from  their  vicinity  to  hostile  Indians, 
are  well  practiced  in  partisan  warfare,  and,  al 
though  they  will  not  easily  submit  to  discipline, 
yet  take  the  field  in  rough,  uncouth  habiliments, 
and,  following  some  leader  chosen  for  his  talent 
and  bravery,  perform  partisan  duties  in  a  manner 
hardly  to  be  surpassed.  Their  actual  services  on 
the  field  are  generally  those  of  light  infantry  and 
riflemen ;  for,  although  mounted,  of  the  duties  of  a 
dragoon  as  such  they  know  nothing,  and  almost  in 
variably  dismount  and  act  upon  foot. 

The  greatest  objection  to  a  volunteer  force  is  to 
be  found  in  the  ignorance  of  the  'officers  of  the  line, 
and  especially  of  the  staff,  in  administrative  duties. 
Besides  the  want  of  discipline,  which  is  a  necessa 
ry  consequence,  this  renders  such  a  force  wasteful- 
ly  extravagant,  and  expensive  until  experience  has 
taught  the  rules  and  routine  of  service.  The  sys 
tem  of  electing  officers  is  also  bad,  for  it  can  hard 
ly  be  supposed  that  good  military  selections  should 
be  generally  made  by  men  entirely  ignorant  of  the 
duties  of  the  office.  All  these  difficulties,  howev- 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


99 


er,  have  been  overlooked  in  the  adoption  of  the 
policy  of  the  country,  and  utterly  forgotten  in  the 
good  conduct  which,,  on  many  occasions,  volunteer 
troops  have  displayed. 

The  navy  of  the  United  States,  like  the  army, 
was  not  in  proportion  with  the  size  and  power  of  the 
nation,  although  the  disparity  was  not  so  marked. 
It  was  sufficiently  large,  however,  to  blockade  com 
pletely  every  port  of  Mexico,  and  in  efficiency  and 
discipline  the  American  navy  was  considered  a 
model. 

Though  immediately  deficient  in  numerical  mil 
itary  strength,  the  United  States  were,  neverthe 
less,  most  powerful  in  all  other  things  which  make 
a  nation  formidable  in  war.  In  variety  and  ex 
tent  of  their  climate,  of  resources,  of  revenue,  in 
the  nature  of  their  people,  in  the  ingenuity  and 
industry  of  their  mechanics,  in  the  immense  agri 
cultural  products  of  their  soil,  in  facilities  for  in 
ternal  communication,  in  their  large  commercial 
marine,  and,  in  greater  degree  than  in  all  others, 
in  the  moral  power  and  national  pride  with  which 
a  free  government  .endows  its  citizens,  would  be 
found  the  elements  of  warlike  strength,  even  had 
they  not  one  armed  man  in  service,  or  a  single  ves 
sel  in  commission ;  certainly  when  placed  in  com 
parison  with  Mexico,  deficient  as  the  latter  was, 
and  is  still,  in  most  of  these  results  of  continued 
prosperity. 


100  THE   WAR  ,WITH   MEXICO. 


CHAPTER  II. 

Movement  from  Corpus  Christ!  to  the  Rio  Grande — Passage  of  the  Colorado 
— Arrival  of  American  Army  opposite  Matamoras — Interview  between  Gen 
erals  Worth  and  La  Vega — Mexican  Action — Commencement  of  Fortifica 
tions — Arrival  of  General  Ampudia — Correspondence  with  General  Tay 
lor — Blockade  of  the  Mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande — Arrival  of  General  Arista — 
Commencement  of  Hostilities— Capture  of  Thornton's  Squadron — Call  for 
Volunteers — March  to  Point  Isabel — Mexican  Passage  of  the  Rio  Grande 
— Bombardment  of  Fort  Brown — Battle  of  Palo  Alto — Battle  of  Resaca 
da  la  Palma — Expedition  against  Burita — American  Passage  of  the  Rio 
Grande — Observations. 

ON  the  8th  of  March,  1846,  General  Taylor  broke 
up  his  camp  at  Corpus  Christi,  and  commenced 
his  march  to  take  position  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rio  Grande,  opposite  Matamoras.  He  had  already 
determined  upon  Point  Isabel  as  his  depot,  and  to 
that  point  the  greater  part  of  his  stores  were  sent 
by  sea.  The  last  detachment  of  the  little  army 
marched  from  Corpus  Christi  on  the  llth  of  March, 
with  which  was  the  commander.  Taylor,  how 
ever,  passed  rapidly  to  the  front,  and  took  the  ad 
vance.^ 

The  first  demonstration  of  Mexican  hostility 
was  met  at  the  passage  of  the  Arroyo  Colorado,  a 
point  some  thirty  miles  north  of  Matamoras.  On 
the  19th,  the  American  advance  encamped  within 

*  Correspondence  of  General  Taylor  with  the  Adjutant  General,  March 
11, 1846.  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Ses- 
aiou  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  121. 


f*. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  JQ^ 

three  miles  of  the  ford,  and  reconnoitering  officers 
were  sent  forward  to  examine  it.  A  party  of  Mex 
ican  rancheros  occupied  the  right  hank  of  the 
stream ;  hut,  although  it  was  signified  to  the  Amer 
ican  officers  that  any  attempt  to  pass  would  he 
considered  an  act  of  hostility,  and  would  he  resist 
ed,  yet  no  ohstacle  was  thrown  in  the  way  of  the 
reconnaissance.  In  consequence  of  the  Mexican 
threats,  Taylor  made  his  dispositions  to  force  the 
passage,  and  early  on  the  morning  of  the  20th, 
the  cavalry  and  Worth's  hrigade  of  infantry  were 
in  position  at  the  ford,  with  two  hatteries  of  field 
artillery  planted  to  sweep  the  opposite  hank.  A 
shrill  hlast  of  trumpets  was  sounded  on  the  right 
hank  of  the  stream,  and  the  same  party  which  had 
been  met  the  previous  day  made  its  appearance. 
The  officer  in  command  informed  Captain  Mans 
field,  who  was  sent  to  communicate  with  him,  that 
he  had  positive  orders  to  open  fire  upon  the  Amer 
ican  troops  should  they  attempt  the  passage.  An 
other,  represented  as  a  staff  officer  of  the  Mexican 
general  Mejia,  then  in  command  at  Matamoras, 
crossed  to  the  left  hank,  and  delivered  a  message 
of  a  similar  nature  to  General  Taylor.  He  placed 
in  the  hands  of  the  American  general  a  proclama 
tion  of  Mejia,  issued  omthe  18th,  in  which  hostil- 
ty  to  the  United  States  was  advocated,  and  the 
people  of  the  country  called  to  arms.  In  the  face 
of  threats  and  proclamation,  Taylor  informed  the 
Mexican  staff  officer  of  his  intention  to  cross,  and 
warned  him  of  the  consequences  of  resistance. 


102  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

Four  light  companies  under  Captain  C.  F.  Smith, 
constituting  the  American  advance,  were  ordered 
forward,  and,  as  they  moved  into  the  stream,  Worth 
and  his  staff  dashed  past  and  crossed  at  their  head. 
The  resistance  which  had  been  so  vauntingly 
threatened  hy  the  continued  blasts  of  the  trumpets 
proved  to  he  nothing,  for  no  other  force  of  Mexican 
troops  was  found  in  the  vicinity  than*  that  which 
had  before  been  seen,  and  it,  such  as  it  was,  made 
a  precipitate  retreat  to  Matamoras.^ 

Having  remained  near  the  Colorado  until  the 
23d,  awaiting  the  arrival  of  his  supply  train,  on 
that  day  Taylor  advanced.  On  the  24th  the  army 
was  halted  within  eleven  miles  of  Matamoras, 
while  the  general  proceeded  with  an  empty  train 
and  an  escort  of  cavalry  to  Point  Isabel,  to  com 
municate  with  his  transports  and  to  establish  his 
depot.  When  near  that  place  he  was  met  by  a 
deputation,  and  presented  with  a  formal  protest 
against  American  occupation  of  the  country  from 
the  prefect  of  the  northern  district  of  Tamaulipas. 
But,  at  the  moment  of  receiving  it,  the  buildings 
of  the  village  at  the  Point  were  discovered  to  be 
on  fire,  and  deeming  this  fact  to  be  a  -demonstra 
tion  of  hostility,  the  general  pushed  on  with  his 
escort,  while  the  deputation  was  hastily  informed 
that  the  protest  would  be  answered  from  a  point 
opposite  Matamoras.f 

*  Correspondence  of  General  Taylor  with  the  Adjutant  General,  March 
21, 1846.  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Se* 
aion  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  123. 

t  Idem,  March  25.     Idem,  p.  129. 


THE    WAR   WITH   MEXICO.  103 

The  buildings,  which  were  of  little  value,  were 
consumed  by  the  time  of  the  arrival  of  the  Ameri 
can  party,  and, the  incendiaries  bad  effected  their 
escape.  The  transports,  however,  entered  the  port 
at  the  moment,  and,  having  made  some  arrange 
ments  for  the  defense  of  the  depot,  and  laden  his 
train  with  supplies,  the  general  returned  to  his 
army.  On  the  28th  he  sat  down  opposite  Mata- 
moras,  without,  any  attempt  at  retaliating  hostility, 
although  two  American  dragoons  had  been  seized 
and  carried  across  the  river  by  the  Mexicans. ^ 

An  immediate  attempt  was  made  to  communi 
cate  with  General  Mejia,  and,  for  the  purpose,  Gen 
eral  Worth  and  staff  crossed  the  river.  Mejia  re 
fused  to  hold  personal  communication  with  any 
other  American  officer  than  General  Taylor,  but 
sent  his  second  in  command,  General  de  la  Vega, 
to  confer  with  Worth.  An  interview  of  some  length 
took  place.  The  Mexican  officer  received  the  com 
munications  borne  by  Worth  for  Mejia,  the  author 
ities  of  Matamoras,  and  the  American  consul,  but 
would  allow  no  personal  communication  with  the 
latter.  Some  discussion  of  the  annexation  of  Tex 
as  and  the  American  occupation  of  the  left  bank 
of  the  Rio  Grande  was  commenced  by  De  la  Vega, 
but  soon  put  a  stop  to  by  Worth,  whose  character 
and  temper  were  not  at  all  suited  by  the  discussion 
in  words  of  such  a  question,  at  that  time  and  place, 

*  Correspondence  of  General  Taylor  with  the  Adjutant  General,  March 
29, 1846.  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Ses« 
sion  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  132. 


104 


THE   WAR   WITH   MEXICO. 


especially  when  he  had  just  been  refused  an  au 
dience  with  the  consul  of  his  nation.  The  inter 
view  ended  in  nothing  but  in  a  confirmation  of  the 
belief  in  Mexican  hostility.^ 

In  the  existence  of  this  state  of  things,  General 
Taylor  determined  to  .fortify  himself;  and  his  en 
gineer  officers  were  employed  for  several  days  in 
reconnoitering  the  banks  of  the  river,  and  selecting 
the  site  for  a  field-work.  The  Mexican  general 
commenced  his  works  on  the  right  bank  imme 
diately,  and,  although  he  made  no  hostile  move 
ment,  he  kept  up  great  displays  of  his  force.  In 
the  dispatches  which  he  sent  daily  to  the  govern 
ment  of  Mexico,  the  force  and  condition  of  the 
American  army  were  absurdly  underrated.  As 
Mejia  was  soon  to  be  superseded,  he  could  in  safety 
indulge  in  anticipations  of  success  ;  and,  mean 
while,  as  he  could  give  no  evidence  of  military 
prowess,  he  chose  to  congratulate  himself  on  his 
diplomatic  talent  and  good  management  in  sowing 
discord  among  the  American  officers.!  As  the  ba 
sis  of  this  .good  opinion  of  himself,  Mejia  alluded 
to  the  resignation  of  General  Worth,  which  took 
place  about  that  time,  not  caused,  however,  by  any 
instrumentality  of  the  Mexican  general,  as  he  well 
knew,  but  on  account  of  the  decision  of  the  presi 
dent  in  relation  to  brevet  rank,  which  just  then 
was  received  in  the  American  camp. 

*  Minutes  of  Interview.    Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Represent 
atives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  134. 
t  Mexican  Official  Correspondence. 


THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO.  105 

The  American  fort  was  commenced  on  the  5th 
of  April,  and  from  that  time  the  army  was  constant 
ly  employed  to  its  completion.  General  Ampudia 
arrived  at  Matamoras  on  the  llth,  and  immediate 
ly  assumed  command  of  the  Mexicari  forces.  His 
division,  some  three  thousand  strong,  arrived  on 
the  12th.  The  forces  under  his  command  amount 
ed  to  over  six  thousand  hayonets  and  lances,  and, 
like  Mejia,  he  assumed  a  hostile  attitude.  True 
to  the  customs  of  his  country,  he  commenced  oper 
ations  on  paper,  and  the  demonstrations  of  this 
character  were,  as  usual,  more  vigorous  than  any 
which  he  could  actually  put  forth  in  reality.  On 
the  12th,  General  Taylor  was  required,  in  peremp 
tory  terms,  to  break  up  his  camp  within  twen 
ty-four  hours,  and  retire  heyond  the  Nueces  until 
the  question  of  boundaries  should  he  settled,  and 
war  was  threatened  as  the  immediate  alternative. 
The  answer  to  this  demand  was  mild  hut  firm,  and 
the  American  general  declined  complying  with  it, 
as  he  was  there  in  a  military  capacity,  and  without 
authority  in  relation  to  the  question  of  boundary.^ 

Both  armies  continued  at  work  upon  their  forti 
fications,  and  Ampudia  made  no  immediate  at 
tempt  to  enforce  his  threatened  alternative*  But, 
as  a  measure  of  precaution,  and  for  the  purpose  of 
demonstrating  that  the  existing  state  of  quasi  hos 
tility  would  not  be  without  inconvenience  to  the 

*  Correspondence  of  General  Taylor  with  the  Adjutant  General,  April  12, 
1846.  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session 
of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  139. 


THE   WAR   WITH   MEXICO. 

Mexican  commander,  General  Taylor  caused  the 
mouth  of  .the  Rio  Grande  to  be  blockaded  by  the 
small  naval  force  which  had  accompanied  his  trans 
ports  from  Corpus  Christi.  In  consequence  of  this, 
two  vessels,  laden  with  provisions  for  the  Mexican 
army,  were  warned  off,  and  returned  to  sea.  Not 
withstanding  his  declaration  of  hostile  purposes, 
General  Ampudia  protested  against  the  blockade, 
and  with  a  short  but  unfortunate  argument  on  the 
law  of  nations,  demanded  that  the  vessels  which 
he  supposed  had  been  seized,  should  be  restored, 
with  their  cargoes,  to  the  owners,  and  allowed  to 
enter  the  river.  Although  the  argument  and  de 
mand  were  treated  with  some  attention  in  the  an 
swer  of  General  Taylor,  yet  he  refused  to  raise  the 
blockade,  and  affairs  continued  in  this  state  for  sev 
eral  subsequent  weeks.^ 

On  the  10th  of  April,  Colonel  Cross,  assistant 
quarter-master  general  of  the  American  army,  was 
murdered  at  some  distance  from  the  camp  by  a 
roving  party  of  banditti.  In  the  subsequent  search 
for  him,  a  party  of  the  fourth  infantry,  under  com 
mand  of  Lieutenant  Porter,  fell  in  with  and  drove 
a  body  of  Mexicans,  taking  possession  of  their  camp 
and  horses.  On  the  return  to  camp,  the  party  was 
ambuscaded  and  dispersed,  the  officer  and  one  man 
having  been  killed. 

Arista,  the  general  in  chief  of  the  Mexican  army 

•'•V 

*  Correspondence  of  General  Taylor  with  the  Adjutant  General,  April  23, 
1846.  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session 
of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  142-147 


THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 


107 


of  the  North,  assumed  command  of  the  forces  inMat- 
amoras  on  the  24th  of  April.  With  him  arrived  a 
large  re-enforcement,  and  he  immediately  announ 
ced  to  General  Taylor  that  he  considered  hostili 
ties  as  having  commenced,  and  that  he  should  pros 
ecute  them.  In  the  pursuit  of  his  intention,  he 
at  once  sent  General  Torrejon,  with  a  force  some 
2500  strong,  across  the  river,  some  miles  ahove  the 
American  position.  Rumors  of  this  movement 
reached  Taylor  on  the  25th,  and  a  squadron  of  dra 
goons,  under  Captain  Thornton,  was  sent  out  on 
that  day  to  obtain  certain  information  of  the  num 
ber  and  character,  of  the  enemy.  # 

Thornton  proceeded  some  sixteen  miles  up  the 
river ;  hut,  although  he  received  certain  informa 
tion  that  the  enemy  had  crossed,  yet  he  could  gain 
nothing  reliable  in  regard  to  the  number  or  descrip 
tion  of  his  force.  His  guide  refused  to  proceed  fur 
ther  ;  but  Thornton,  in  his  anxiety  to  execute  his 
orders,  determined  to  proceed,  though  the  nature 
of  the  country  rendered  the  operations  of  cavalry 
extremely  hazardous. 

Some  three  miles  in  advance  he  arrived  at  a 
rancho,  and  entered  the  surrounding  corral  with 
the  advanced  guard.  The  squadron  followed  after 
while  Thornton  was  questioning  a  Mexican,  and 
hardly  had  the  rearmost  files  entered  when  the 
alarm  was  given.  The  squadron  was  in  confusion ; 

*  Correspondence  of  General  Taylor  with  the  Adjutant  General,  April  26, 
1846.  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session 
of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  288. 


108  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

but  Thornton,  taking  the  lead,  dashed  at  once  at 
the  only  opening  of  the  inclosure.  That  was  al 
ready  shut  and  defended  by  a  large  body  of  Mexi 
cans,  and  the  passage  was  impracticable.  In 
searching  for  a  passage  to  the  right  the  dragoons 
encountered  a  galling  fire,  which  increased  the 
confusion,  and  Thornton's  horse  falling  wounded 
upon  his  rider,  the  whole  party  gave  back  to  the 
center  of  the  corral.  Captain  Hardee,  who  succeed 
ed  to  .the  command,  rallied  the  men,  and,  after  a 
vain  endeavor  to  find  an  opening,  surrendered.  In 
this  affair  Lieutenant  Mason  had  been  killed,  and 
sixteen  non-commissioned  officers  and  men  had 
fallen  dead  or  wounded.^ 

Hostilities  having  been  thus  positively  com 
menced,  and  General  Taylor  made  aware  of  his 
situation,  he  was  at  liberty,  in  the  absence  of  any 
prospect  of  peace,  to  throw  off  his  purely  defensive 
policy.  The  'state  of  things  which  had  existed 
since  the  28th  of  March  was  at  an  end,  and  he 
not  only  contemplated  beating  the  enemy  to  his 
own  bank  of  the  river,  but  intended  to  carry  the 
war  as  soon  as  possible  into  his  territory.  For  this 
purpose,  on  the  26th  of  April  he  addressed  calls  to 
the  Governors  of  Louisiana  and  Texas  for  an  aux 
iliary  force  of  five  thousand  volunteers.! 

The  Mexican  troops   continued  their  partisan 

*  Proceedings  of  the  Court  Martial.  Reports  of  Captains  Thornton  and 
Hardee,  and  Captain  Thornton's  Defense. 

t  Correspondence  of  General  Taylor  with  the  Adjutant  General,  April  26, 
1846.  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session 
of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  288. 


THE   WAR    WITH  MEXICO. 


109 


operations,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  28th  fell  in 
with  a  small  party  of  Texan  Rangers,  posted  mid 
way  between  Matamoras  and  Point  Isabel,  of  which 
nine  were  killed  and  taken  prisoners.  The  main  ef 
forts  of  both  armies,  however,  were  put  forth  to  fin 
ish  their  different  works,, and  on  the  30th  of  April 
the  American  fort  was  in  fair  defensive  condition. 
The  plan  of  immediate  operations  was  meanwhile 
considered  by  General  Taylor,  and  although  he 
was  strongly  inclined  to  move  at  once  in  pursuit 
of  the  enemy,  and  beat  the  force  which  had  crossed 
at  once  over  the  river,  yet  more  defensive  meas 
ures  were  recommended  by  his  elder  officers.  The 
defensive  policy  prevailed  for  a  time  longer,  and  the 
enemy  was  allowed  to  cross,  with  any  force,  at  his 
leisure,  if  he  chose  to  do  so.  It  was,  however,  nec 
essary  to  communicate  with  Point  Isabel,  which  de 
pot  was  weakly  defended.  Such  communication 
was  hazardous  for  any  small  body  of  troops,  and 
impracticable  for  a  train  under  any  ordinary  es 
cort.  On  the  30th  the  general  took  the  resolution 
to  leave  the  fort  garrisoned  by  two  companies  of  ar 
tillery  and  the  seventh  regiment  of  infantry,  while 
he  moved  the  main  body  of  his  army  in  escort  of 
the  train  to  Point  Isabel,  and  opened  the  commu 
nication.  Accordingly,  the  garrison  at  once  took 
post  in  the  works,  and  all  the  stores  of  the  army 
were  moved  within  them.  Every  preparation 
which  time  would  admit  was  made  to  enable  the 
garrison  to  stand  a  siege,  and  at  four  o'clock  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  '1st  of  May  the  main  body  of  the 


• 


THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 


army  made  a  forced  march  in  the  direction  of  Point 
Isahel.  It  arrived  there  on  the  following1  day  at 
noon,  having  met  no  hinderance  from  the  enemy. 

During  the  interval  between  Thornton's  capture 
and  the  march  to  Point  Isahel,  Torrejon's  command 
had  turned  the  American  position,  and  occupied 
the  left  hank  of  the  Rio  Grande,  some  miles  below 
Matamoras,  in  order  to  cover  the  passage  of  the 
river  by  the  main  Mexican  army.  Of  this  a  large 
portion  crossed  on  the  1st  of  May,  with  the  avow 
ed  intention  of  intercepting,  what  was  called  by 
the  Mexican  officers  the  American  retreat.^  But 
this  stroke  of  military  action  was  not  attempted, 
on  account  of  the  alleged  want  of  time,  and  the 
bulletins  from  Matamoras  contained  loud  com 
plaints  of  the  conduct  of  General  Taylor  in  avoid 
ing  a  battle  by  the  celerity  of  his  flight. 

The  town  of  Matamoras  is  situated  about  one 
thousand  yards  from  the  southern  bank  of  the  Rio 
Grande.  The  course  of  the  stream  in  the  vicinity 
is,  as  throughout  its  extent,  exceedingly  tortuous 
and  rapid  to  a  degree.  The  usual  points  of  pas 
sage  from  the  Texas  shore  had  been,  before  Ameri 
can  occupation,  at  two  ferries,  of  which  the  upper 
was  nearly  opposite  the  west  of  the  town.  The 
lower,  which  was  less  used,  was  at  a  distance  and 
below  the  city. 

The  Mexican  works  were  in  general  a  line  of 
detached  batteries  between  the  two.  The  most 
considerable  of  their  forts  was  a  pentagonal  redoubt 

*  Mexican  bulletins  published  at  Matamoras. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


Ill 


of  considerable  capacity  and  relief?  called  Fort  Pa- 
redes,  at  the  upper  ferry.  The  other  fortifications 
were  open  in  the  rear,  and  constructed  with  a 
view  to  prevent  the  direct  passage  of  the  river  and 
to  annoy  the  American  works.  Those  directly  op 
posite  to  them  were  armed  with  guns  of  different 
calibers,  and  the  lower  batteries  with  howitzers 
and  mortars,  but  none  of  them  were  heavy.  , 

The  Americans  had  constructed  various  traverses 
and  intrenchments  before  the  site  for  the  principal 
work  had  been  selected,  but  they  were  of  no  use, 
and  the  main  work  was  the  only  one  relied  upon. 
It  was  opposite  Matamoras,  some  fifteen  hundred 
yards  or  more  east  of  Fort  Paredes,  and  within 
good  eighteen  pound  range  of  the  right  bank  of  the 
Rio  Grande.  The  work  was  a  pentagon,  with  bas- 
tioned  fronts,  having  the  southern  fronts  of  greater 
length  than  the  others,  and  was  of  capacity  to  re 
ceive  a  garrison  of  the  whole  strength  of  the  army. 
But  all  left  in  it,  including  ineffectives,  did  not 
number  over  five  hundred.  The  armament  was 
of  four  eighteen  pounders,  and  a  field  battery  of 
four  light  sixes. 

The  ground  about  the  fort  was  generally  level 
and  clear  for  much  distance,  except  toward  the 
rear.  In  that  direction,  within  one  thousand  yards, 
were  various  clumps  of  shrubbery,  and  a  cluster  of 
Mexican  huts,  called  by  General  Arista,  in  his 
dispatches,  the  "Fanques  del  Raminero."  They 
were  upon  the  road  from  Point  Isabel  to  the  upper 
ferry  at  Matamoras. 


112  THE    WAR   WITH   MEXICO. 

Arista  commenced  his  operations  against  the 
garrison  of  the  American  fort  on  the  3d  of  May. 
Early  on  the  morning  of  that  day  seven  guns  open 
ed  from  the  Mexican  batteries  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  Rio  Grande,  to  which  the  Americans  replied 
with  their  eighteen  pounders  and  the  guns  of 
Bragg's  light  field  battery.  The  latter  produced 
little  or  no  effect,  for  the  range  was  too  great,  and 
their  fire  was  soon  suspended ;  but  the  eighteen 
pounders  told  well,  and  in  the  course  of  thirty  min 
utes  dismounted  two  Mexican  guns.  Upon  this 
the  enemy  ceased  his  direct  fire,  and  commenced 
a  bombardment  from  his  lower  battery,  which,  with 
some  intermissions,  was  kept  up  throughout  the 
day.  It  had,  however,  little  other  effect  than  an 
noyance  upon  the  garrison,  for  the  shells  were  of 
brass,  of  small  caliber,  and  the  explosions,  although 
many  fell  inside  the  works,  were  by  no  means  de 
structive.  While  the  bombardment  continued  the 
American  guns  were  turned  upon  the  town  of  Mat- 
amoras,  though  also  without  positive  effect,  for  this 
range  was  too  great  even  for  the  eighteen  pound 
ers,  and  the  hot  shot  were  harmless.  From  the  na 
ture  of  Mexican  buildings,  the  town  could  not  be 
fired,  and,  a  few  bullets  having  been  expended  in 
the  attempt,  the  American  guns  ceased  altogether. 

On  the  4th  the  Mexicans  continued  the  vertical 
fire,  but,  as  on  the  preceding  day,  it  was  harmless. 
The  bulletins  from  Matamoras,  however,  announ 
ced,  as  the  result  of  the  cannonade  of  the  3d,  a 
complete  success.  It  was  said  that  the  American 


1HE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  -^3 

works  were  entirely  destroyed,  and  that  nothing 
was  required  except  to  take  possession  of  the  ru 
ins.  This,  it  was  stated,  was  to  be  accomplished 
hy  the  troops  under  command  of  General  Canales. 
Notwithstanding  the  bold  assertions  put  forth  in 
the  bulletins,  Canales  entertained  very  different 
views,  and  soon  after  wrote  to  the  publisher,  ex 
pressing  the  hope  that  in  his  future  accounts  he 
would  confine  himself  to  the  truth  ;  that  the  works 
were  still  exceedingly  strong,  and  that  he  had  no 
such  assault  as  had  been  represented  in  contem 
plation.^ 

The  main  Mexican  army,  having  crossed  the  Rio 
Grande,  remained  in  camp,  awaiting  the  move 
ments  of  General  Taylor,  and  meanwhile  Arista's 
efforts  were  continued  against  the  American  works. 
A  reconnaissance  was  made  by  Mexican  officers 
about  nine  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  5th,  from 
the  north  of  the  position,  and  during  that  day  and 
night  a  mortar  battery  was  constructed  beyond  the 
huts  of  the  "  Fanques  del  Raminero."  On  the 
morning  of  the  6th,  this,  together  with  the  mortar 
and  howitzer  batteries  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Rio  Grande,  opened  and  kept  up  a  desultory  fire. 
The  first  serious  loss  to  the  American  garrison  was 
the  result,  for  Major  Brown,  its  gallant  command 
er,  was  mortally  wounded.  The  fort,  which  was 
the  scene  of  his  devotion  and  his  death,  was  sub 
sequently  named  in  his  honor  ;  and,  although  not 
known  by  the  name  of  Fort  Brown  during  the 

*  Mexican  bulletins  published  at  Matamoras. 

I.-H 


• 
*- 


114  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

operations  immediately  succeeding,  yet  it  may  be 
permitted  so  to  call  it  in  the  continuation  of  the 
narrative. 

About  ten  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  6th 
Arista  moved  his  troops  forward,  demonstrating  an 
assault  upon  the  northern  fronts  of  the  fort ;  but 
the  works  in  that  quarter  had  been  entirely  finish 
ed  on  the  previous  evening.  The  demonstration  of 
attack  brought  the  Mexican  troops  within  range 
of  the  six  pounders,  which  were  opened  with  such 
positive  effect  as  to  change  the  intention  of  assault, 
if,  indeed,  such  had  been  seriously  entertained. 
Whether  it  had  been  or  not,  the  speedy  retreat 
of  his  troops  so  incensed  Arista  that  he  showered 
a  continued  stream  of  shells  upon  the  works  for  an 
hour  and  a  half.  But  his  fire  produced  no  great 
damage;  and  when  he  summoned  the  garrison  in 
the  afternoon  of  the  day,  every  American  officer 
was  in  favor  of  continuing  the  resistance.  A  pos 
itive  refusal  was,  in  consequence,  returned  to  the 
summons,  and  immediately  after  its  receipt  by  the 
Mexican  commander  all  his  batteries  recommenced 
the  fire.  It  was  kept  up  continually  until  night 
fall,  but,  as  before,  it  did  little  positive  damage. 

The  Mexican  fire  was  renewed  and  continued 
throughout  the  7th,  wounding  a  sentinel  and  kill 
ing  one  of  the  artillery  horses.  The  garrison,  as 
during  the  greater,  part  of  the  cannonade,  kept  per 
fectly  quiet,  in  readiness  for  an  assault,  should  one 
be  attempted  by  the  enemy.  Toward  evening  a 
party  made  a  sortie  from  the  works,  and  leveled  a 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

traverse  thrown  up  at  the  position  of  the  former 
American  camp,  near  the  river,  as  it  afforded  pro 
tection  to  small  parties  of  Mexicans,  which,  creep 
ing  up  under  the  hanks  of  the  river,  took  position 
under  the  traverse,  and  delivered  thence  an  annoy 
ing  fire. 

The  same  desultory  and  annoying,  although  in 
effectual  practice,  was  -continued  hy  the  Mexicans 
throughout  the  8th  and  9th,  hut  nothing  more  pos 
itive  was  attempted  against  Fort  Brown.^ 

Meanwhile  General  Taylor  was  at  Point  Isahel, 
completing  the  defenses  of  that  depot,  which  he 
had  found  in  an  unfinished  state,  and  obtaining  ad 
ditional  supplies  and  munitions  preparatory  to  his 
return.  He  had  communicated  with  Fort  Brown 
on  the  4th,  through  Captain  Walker,  of  the  Texan 
Rangers,  and  the  answer  received  during  the  night 
of  the  5th  assured  him  of  the  safety  of  the  gam- 
son.  The  subsequent  continued  firing  told  that  it 
still  held  out,  and  it  was  not  until  all  his  arrange 
ments  were  completed,  on  the  evening  of  the  7th, 
that  he  commenced  his  march  from  Point  Isahel.f 
His  numerical  force  had  "been  in  no  way  increased ; 
for,  although  several  hodies  of  recruits  had  arrived, 
they  were  in  no  greater  strength  than  was  neces 
sary  to  complete  the  garrison  of  Point  Isahel,  with 
the  addition  of  a  hody  of  marines  and  sailors  which 
subsequently  arrived.  The  column  was  accom- 

*  Reports  of  Major  Hawkins. 

t  Correspondence  of  General  Taylor  with  the  Adjutant  General,  May  5th 
and  7th,  1846.  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first 
Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  292,  293. 


.     ..It    ?•,',         ',•.« 

*  '     ,    '   *    '      «  >•/  •    f. 

'* 


Hg  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

panied  by  a  train  of  three  hundred  wagons,  lad 
en  with  subsistence  and  munitions.  Six  twelve 
pounders,  intended  to  increase  the  armament  of 
Fort  Brown,  were  packed  in  the  wagons,  and  two 
eighteens,  intended  for  the  same  object,  being 
mounted,  were  an  addition  to  the  effective  Ameri 
can  artillery. 

Hearing  of  General  Taylor's  movement,  on  the 
morning  of  the  8th  General  Arista  broke  up  his 
head-quarters  at  the  "  Fanques  del  Raminero," 
with  the  determination  of  disputing  the  communi 
cation  with  Fort  Brown.  The  reputation  which 
the  Americans  enjoyed  as  skirmishers  and  in  forest 
warfare,  with  the  justice  of  which  the  Mexicans 
had  become  impressed  in  the  course  of  their  Texan 
operations,  induced  Arista  to  believe  that  they 
were  only  formidable  as  such,  and  that  Taylor 
would  be  easily  crushed  by  his  overwhelming  force 
in  a  conflict  in  the  open  field.  His  troops  were 
some  of  the  best  in  Mexico,  well  equipped  and 
fairly  disciplined.  Leaving  Ampudia  for  a  time,  to 
make  arrangements  for  the  continued  blockade  and 
bombardment  of  Fort  Brown,  he  moved  with  his 
main  force  to  Palo  Alto,  some  nine  miles  from  Mat- 
amoras,  where  he  took  up  his  position  for  battle.^ 

The  Mexican  left  was  composed  of  the  regular 
cavalry,  which  occupied  the  road,  and  rested  upon 
a  thicket  of  chaparral,  while  the  infantry  in  line, 
with  the  artillery,  twelve  pieces  in  number,  posted 
in  the  intervals,  extended  across  the  prairie.  On 

*  Arista's  Official  Correspondence. 


pyU0    ALTO 


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TO   FACE  P.    116—  VOL.t. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  J17 

its  right  was  formed  the  ranchero  cavalry,  being 
within  a  short  distance  of  the  chaparral  south  of 
the  road.  The  Mexican  reserves  were  some  dis 
tance  to  the  rear,  behind  an  intervening  thicket. 
General  Arista  has  stated  that  his  force  numbered 
three  thousand  men  of  all  arms ;  but  this  was  evi 
dently  erroneous.  The  line,  as  he  occupied  it,  could 
not  have  been  covered  by  less  than  six  thousand ; 
and,  in  addition  to  this  force,  he  had  his  reserves. 
On  the  morning  of  the  8th,  it  was  a  matter  of 
some  doubt  with  the  American  general  whether 
his  march  would  be  opposed,  for  his  scouts  had 
been  in  advance,  to  a  position  on  which  the  Mex 
ican  troops  had  been  encamped  some  days  previ 
ous,  without  meeting  an  enemy ;  but  at  twelve 
o'clock  his  advanced  guard  came  in  sight  of  the 
enemy's  line,  and  preparations  were  at  once  made 
for  battle.  The  column  was  halted,  and  after  a 
short  rest,  in  which  the  soldiers  filled  their  can 
teens,  Taylor  formed  his  line  and  advanced,  leav 
ing  his  train  parked  under  guard  of  a  squad 
ron  of  dragoons.  The  fifth  regiment  of  infantry 
was  on  the  right  of  his  line,  and,  with  Ringgold's 
light  battery,  the  third  regiment  of  infantry, 
Churchill's  eighteen  pounders,  and  the  fourth 
regiment  of  infantry,  constituted  the  right  wing, 
under  Colonel  Twiggs.  The  left  was  the  first 
brigade,  under  Lieutenant. colonel  Belknap,  con 
sisting  of  a  battalion  of  artillery  serving  as  infant 
ry,  Duncan's  light  battery,  and  the  eighth  regi 
ment  of  infantry. 


118 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


At  two  o'clock  the  line  moved  in  advance  by 
the  heads  of  regiments.  Before  it  came  within 
range  of  the  Mexican  positions,  a  single  horseman, 
Lieutenant  Blake,  of  the  Topographical  Corps,  gal 
loped  rapidly  to  the  front,  without  drawing  rein 
until  within  close  vicinity  of  the  enemy.  Dis 
mounting,  he  commenced  his  reconnaissance  ;  but, 
as  two  Mexican  officers  rode  out  to  receive  him, 
Blake  remounted  his  horse,  and,  after  having  rid 
den  along  the  extended  Mexican  front,  returned 
with  an  accurate  report  of  the  numbers  and  artil 
lery  of  the  enemy. 

As  the  American  troops  came  within  seven 
hundred  yards  of  the  enemy's  line,  his  artillery 
opened  from  the  right,  and,  in  quick  succession, 
all  his  batteries  took  up  and  continued  the  fire. 
Taylor  halted,  at  once  advanced  all  his  artillery, 
and  replied.  The  American  guns  soon  told  with 
deadly  effect  upon  the  masses  of  the  enemy ;  but 
the  intervals  were  closed  up  as  soon  as  they  were 
made,  and  the  Mexican  soldiers  stood  their  ground 
manfully.  Their  artillery  was  directed  against 
the  American  guns  ;  for  the  infantry,  although  in 
supporting  distance,  was  kept  as  far  as  possible 
out  of  range.  Against  guns  alone  the  Mexican 
artillery  fire  was  ineffectual,  compared  with  that 
of  the  American  light  pieces,  and,  after  having 
suffered  the  cannonade  for  more  than  an  hour, 
Arista  commenced  maneuvering  for  the  victory. 
He  first  sent  Torrejon's  cavalry,  with  a  support  of 
infantry  and  two  guns,  to  turn  and  attack  the 


THE    WAR  WITH    MEXICO.  -j^g 

American  right.  The  cavalry  moved  at  once ;  but 
it  had  been  much  cut  up  by  the  fire  of  Blnggold's 
battery ;  and  being  still  under  it  and  that  of  the 
eighteen  pounders,  its  pace  was  increased  to  a  gal 
lop,  until,  in  some  confusion,  it  disappeared  from 
view  behind  the  chaparral.  To  oppose  the  move 
ment,  Taylor  sent  the  fifth  regiment  to  the  right,- 
where  it  took  post  in  square,  upon  the  edge  of  the 
thicket,  having  a  narrow  lagoon  immediately  be 
tween  it  and  the  enemy.  Torrejon  turned  the  la 
goon,  and,  coming  up  from  the  right  and  rear,  ap 
proached  within  short  musket  range.  His  troop 
ers,  unslinging  their  escopetas,  commenced  a  noisy 
fire,  which  wounded  two  men  of  the  square ;  but, 
on  a  closer  approach,  one  front  of  it  delivered  so 
effective  a  volley,  that,  with  twenty  empty  sad 
dles,  the  whole  mass  of  cavalry  gave  back.  A 
portion  passed  to  the  rear  in  the  direction  of  the 
train,  with  the  apparent  intention  of  cutting  it  up. 
To  oppose  it,  Colonel  Twiggs  sent  the  third  regi 
ment  of  infantry,  and,  as  it  approached,  the  caval 
ry  gave  it  up,  and  retired  beyond  range.  The 
Mexican  artillery,  which  had  advanced  to  the  fur 
ther  bank  of  the  lagoon,  to  within  easy  range  of 
the  fifth  regiment,  had  not  unlimbered,  when 
Lieutenant  Bidgely,  coming  forward  at  a  gallop 
with  two  of  Binggold's  guns,  threw  them  promptly 
into  battery,  and  poured  in  such  a  shower  of  can 
ister  that  the  enemy  withdrew  at  once  without 
firing  a  shot. 

While  these  movements  and  operations  were 


120  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

progressing,  the  cannonade  between  the  main  cr 
imes  had  continued,  and  the  Mexican  masses  were 
still  suffering  severely ;  for  Arista  kept  his  infantry 
close  to  his  guns,  and,  in  consequence,  the  Ameri 
can  artillery  was  turned  in  greater  part  upon  it. 
But,  though  wasted  by  every  discharge,  his  men 
held  their  ground  with  obstinacy,  and,  for  a  time, 
showed  no  sign  of  fear  or  retreat. 

During  the  action  the  dry  grass  of  the  prairie 
took  fire,  and,  under  a  gentle  breeze,  the  sheet  of 
flame  rolled  away  to  the  American  left,  partially 
concealing  the  armies  from  each  other,  and  inter 
fering  with  the  aim  of  the  artillery.  The  firing 
slackened,  and  meantime  Arista  drew  back  his 
left  wing,  which  had  suffered  most,  and  reformed 
his  whole  line  in  front  of  the  chaparral,  changing 
front  to  the  left.  Taylor  made  a  corresponding 
change,  and  advanced  his  eighteen  pounders  with 
the  fifth  regiment  near  to  the  position  which  Tor- 
rejon's  cavalry  had  occupied  at  the  commencement 
of  the  action.  Ringgold's  and  Duncan's  guns,  with 
their  supporting  infantry,  also  advanced,  and  when, 
after  an  hour's  cessation,  the  cannonade  was  steadi 
ly  resumed,  the  Mexican  ranks  were  again  mowed 
down  by  their  sweeping  fire. 

The  Mexican  soldiers  had  stood  their  ground  so 
far  with  a  constancy  worthy  a  better  fate ;  but,  un 
der  the  continued  destruction,  many  became  restive, 
and  impatiently  demanded  to  be  led  against  their 
enemy,  or  to  be  allowed  to  fall  back.*?  Yielding 

*  Arista's  Official  Report. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

to  their  importunities,  Arista  moved  his  whole  right 
wing  to  turn  the  American  left,  under  cover  of  the 
smoke  and  flame  which  rose  from  the  burning  prai 
rie,  ordered  two  squadrons  of  cavalry  and  a  strong 
battalion  of  infantry  from  the  reserve  for  the  same 
purpose,  and  sent  a  body  of  cavalry  against  the 
American  right.5*  His  troops  had  hardly  got  in 
motion  when  Duncan  caught  a  glimpse  of  them 
through  the  smoke,  and  seeing  at  once  the  necessi 
ty  of  opposing  the  movement,  he  reported  it  to  Bel- 
knap.  With  Belknap's  consent,  without  waiting  for 
support,  he  moved  the  two  sections  of  his  battery  in 
succession,  at  a  gallop,  to  the  left.  His  guns  came 
round  the  cloud  of  fire  which  had  hidden  his  move 
ment  with  a  celerity  which  astonished  the  Mexi 
cans.  The  cavalry  which  formed  their  right  pull 
ed  up  at  once  in  apparent  amazement,  but  the  corps 
from  the  reserve  debouched  from  the  chaparral,  and 
moved  steadily  down  upon  Duncan's  left.  One  sec 
tion  of  the  battery  opened  upon  this  attack,  while 
with  the  other  he  cannonaded  the  force  in  his  front, 
which  meantime  remained  in  unaccountable  inac 
tivity.  Ker's  squadron  of  dragoons  and  the  eighth 
regiment  of  infantry  had  hastened  to  the  support 
of  the  battery,  but  before  they  came  within  sup 
porting  distance  the  Mexican  attacking  column 
had  fallen  back  under  the  steady  fire  of  two  guns. 
The  main  body,  however,  held  its  ground,  though 
inactive,  and  the  beaten  force,  having  been  rallied, 
advanced  again.  It  soon  gave  way  a  second  time, 

*  Arista's  Official  Report. 


•  f  **  •"    V  *  «   •    ^  ':    *  ' 

*  ;^r-f  .'::i*> 

122  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

and  commenced  its  flight  in  earnest.  The  whole 
battery  was  then  turned  upon  the  mass  in  front, 
which  stood  for  a  time ;  but  much  cut  up,  squadron 
after  squadron  took  the  panic,  the  cavalry  fell  back 
upon  the  infantry,  and  the  whole  fled  out  of  range. # 

Upon  the  American  right  the  enemy  had  ad 
vanced  a  corps  of  his  cavalry  in  the  while,  which 
persisted  in  its  movements  until  within  grape 
range  of  the  eighteen  pounders.  A  close  discharge 
dispersed  the  mass ;  but  scattered  parties  advanced 
and  opened  fire  upon  the  artillery  battalion,  which, 
formed  in  square,  supported  the  guns.  A  volley 
from  one  front  of  the  square  silenced  their  fire  and 
finished  the  battle  of  Palo  Alto.  By  this  time  it 
was  quite  dark,  and  further  operations  were  dis 
continued  on  either  side. 

The  American  force  engaged  on  this  day  amount 
ed  to  2111  sabers  and  bayonets,  and  ten  guns.  Its 
loss  in  the  battle  was  nine  killed  and  forty-seven 
wounded.  Of  the  latter  class,  three  were  commis 
sioned  officers,  and  two  had  mortal  wounds. f  One 
was  Major  Binggold,  much  distinguished  as  an  ar 
tillery  officer,  and  a  favorite  with  the  country; 
the  other,  also  distinguished  and  beloved  among 
his  comrades,  was  Captain  Page,  of  the  fourth  in 
fantry.  Victims  in  the  first  positive  action  of  the 
Mexican  war,  their  services  have  been  remember 
ed,  and. their  names,  from  the  first,  cherished  in 
the  memory  of  their  countrymen. 

*  Official  Reports  of  Lieutenant-colonel  Belknap,  Captain  Duncan,  and 
General  Taylor.  t  Official  Returns. 


gss»s*E3s6 


mmimm 

vS^i^  "•  '•"•'  a-  d* '•  •'  •'"  -:;V.  .->•-.-. 


RESACADE  LA  PALM  A 


L  frit  of  S 


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>  <    £*.-  4   -.  V"7**  *  -  •  *.        * 

*  .  .%'",*"  **** 

THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  123 

The  loss  of  the  Mexican  army  on  this  field  was 
officially  stated  as  being,  in  all,  252  ;*  but,  from  the 
known  effect  of  the  American  artillery,  and  the 
masses  of  slain  which  encumbered  the  field,  it  is 
probable  that  the  loss  was  much  greater.  If  the 
return  of  killed  and  wounded  was  in  the  same 
ratio  with  the  Mexican  field  report,  it  must  have 
been  at  least  double  the  stated  number. 

During  the  night  both  armies  remained  upon 
and  near  the  field  of  battle.  The  result  of  the  ac 
tion  had,  however,  changed  the  opinion  of  the 
Mexican  general  in  regard  to  the  capacity  of  the 
American  troops  for  battle  in  the  open  field,  and,  in 
the  continuation  of  the  conflict,  he  determined  to 
avail  himself  of  an  advantageous  defensive  posi 
tion,  f  Wherefore,  collecting  his  scattered  forces 
during  the  night,  at  early  dawn  on  the  morning 
of  the  9th  he  moved  in  retreat  to  the  position  of 
Resaca  de  la  Palma. 

The  American  general  had  not  anticipated  this 
movement  of  the  enemy,  and  although  his  troops 
were  drawn  out  for  action  so  soon  as  it  was  ob 
served  that  he  was  in  motion,  yet  no  attempt  was 
made  to  improve  the  opportunity  for  a  close  pursuit.  J 
It  was  even  a  question  whether  a  forward  move 
ment  should  be  made,  and  for  obtaining  an  expres 
sion  of  opinion  a  meeting  of  the  senior  officers  of 
brigades  and  regiments  was  called.  It  is  an  old 

*  Arista's  Official  Report. 

t  General  Arista  speaks  of  it  as  the  American  superiority  in  artillery.— 
Official  Report. 
t  Campaign  Sketches  of  Captain  Henry,  p.  94. 


124  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

remark  among  military  men,  "that  a  council  of 
war  never  fights."  Experience  has  shown  that 
this  is  generally  true,  and  in  this  case,  had  it  been 
left  to  the  decision  of  the  majority,  the  rule  would 
have  been  verified.  Most  of  the  officers,  with  a 
prudence  which  was  hardly  prudent  in  the  state 
of  affairs  which  existed,  and  since  operations  had 
been  commenced,  advised  defensive  measures. 
Some  proposed  that  the  army  should  intrench  in 
position ;  others,  that  it  should  retire  to  Point  Isa 
bel,  to  await  the  arrival  of  strong  re-enforcements, 
and,  in  support  of  the  advised  delay,  the  remark 
was  made  that  the  army  then  present  could  not  be 
expected  to  fight  the  whole  strength  of  Mexico. 
There  was  some  foundation,  apparently,  for  their 
views,  in  the  immense  disparity  of  force ;  but,  al 
though  General  Taylor  had  called  the  meeting,  he 
did  not  coincide  in  opinion  with  the  greater  por 
tion  of  his  officers.  Two  officers,  Lieutenant-col 
onel  Belknap  and  Captain  Duncan  (who  had  come 
unbidden  to  the  meeting,  and  supported  his  views 
with  strong  arguments  and  bold  determination), 
advised  the  advance,  and  when  the  meeting  broke 
up,  General  Taylor  ordered  preparations  to  be  made 
for  the  march. 

The  train  was  parked  on  the  field  of  Palo  Alto, 
the  first  brigade,  with  the  two  eighteen  pounders 
and  two  twelves  (newly  mounted),  was  stationed 
for  its  defense,  and  the  wounded  of  the  action  of 
the  8th  were  sent  under  an  escort  of  cavalry  to 
Point  Isabel. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

At  one  o'clock  the  army  again  advanced  in  the 
direction  of  Fort  Brown,  preceded  by  a  picked  corps 
of  two  hundred  and  twenty  skirmishers,  under  Cap 
tains  M'Call  and  C.  F.  Smith,  accompanied  by 
Walker's  Rangers  and  a  small  party  of  dragoons. 
This  advanced  guard,  disposed  on  either  side  of  the 
road,  and  following  the  route  of  the  Mexican  army, 
beat  through  the  chaparral  which  covered  the 
ground  in  front  of  Resaca  de  la  Palma,  meeting 
with  but  few  of  the  enemy  until  it  entered  an  open 
space  immediately  in  front  of  the  ravine.  A  shot 
from  a  battery  posted  to  defend  the  passage  in 
duced  a  halt,  and  it  becoming  evident  from  a  short 
reconnaissance  that  the  enemy  was  in  force,  the  ar 
rival  of  General  Taylor  was  awaited.  On  coming 
up,  he  ordered  Captain  M'Call  to  bring  on  the  ac 
tion  and  ascertain  the  position  of  the  enemy,  and 
the  skirmishers  advanced. 

Arista  had  been  re-enforced  during  the  morning 
by  near  two  thousand  infantry  and  a  strong  body 
of  cavalry.  His  infantry  occupied  the  northern 
crest  of  Resaca  de  la  Palma,  which  ravine  is  cross 
ed  by  the  main  road  from  Point  Isabel  to  Matamo- 
ras  at  a  point  some  four  miles  from  the  latter  place. 
The  general  outline  of  the  ravine  is  an  irregular 
curve,  of  which  the  convexity  is  given  to  the  south. 
The  road  running  toward  the  south  crosses  the  ra 
vine  about  the  center  of  its  length.  Three  guns 
on  the  northern  crest  defended  the  point  of  passage, 
and  two  on  each  side  of  the  road  south  of  the  ra 
vine  supported  the  first  battery  with  a  flank  and 


126  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

cross  fire.  Along  the  southern  crest  was  posted  a 
second  line  of  infantry,  and  the  cavalry,  which 
were  necessarily  unahle  to  act,  was  in  strong  mass 
es  to  the  rear.  The  position  and  disposition  of  the 
Mexican  forces  were  exceedingly  strong  against  an 
enemy  advancing  by  the  road,  and  the  thick  growth 
of  chaparral  rendered  such  an  advance  the  one  most 
probable,  if  not  absolutely  necessary.  But  the  same 
cause  rendered  a  complete  view  of  the  operations 
impracticable,  and  made  any  action  at  the  point 
one  of  detail  on  both  sides,  with  the  advantage, 
however,  of  a  knowledge  of  locality  on  the  part  of 
the  Mexicans  not  possessed  by  their  enemy. 

M' Call's  and  Smith's  skirmishers  pressed  forward 
on  the  left  and  right,  driving  the  Mexican  troops 
of  the  first  line  from  their  positions  at  the  northern 
extremities  of  the  ravine.  Bidgely's  guns  were 
planted  at  a  point  on  the  right  of  the  path,  within 
three  hundred  yards  of  the  Mexican  artillery,  and 
thence  opened  a  lively  fire ;  it  was  briskly  return 
ed  from  the  Mexican  advanced  battery ;  but  the 
chaparral  prevented  accurate  aim  and  the  conse 
quent  full  effect  of  artillery  on  either  side.  The 
fifth  regiment  and  the  left  wing  of  the  fourth,  de 
ployed  as  skirmishers,  were  sent  into  action  on  the 
left,  while  the  third,  with  the  right  wing,  displayed 
on  the  right,  and  supported  the  advanced  parties : 
these  troops  pressed  on  through  the  thicket,  and  the 
action  became  general.  >  The  nature  of  the  ground 
prevented  the  use  of  any  other  artillery  than  Ridge- 
ly's  battery  ;  there  was  no  position  in  which  a 


. 

THE    WAR    WITH   MEXICO.  12T 

line  could  be  arrayed,  nor  was  it  attempted.  The 
enemy's  shot  fell  thick  and  fast  from  his  positions 
on  the  crest  of  the  ravine,  and  each  captain  and 
subaltern  led  his  command  as  an  independent  body.  . 
All  was  apparently  in  confusion ;  but,  confident  in 
the  courage  and  discipline  of  those  around  them, 
there  was  a  general  harmony  in  the  attack ;  none 
thought  of  retreat ;  and,  with  loud  shouts,  each 
small  party  of  the  American  troops  pressed  vigor 
ously  forward,  and  the  fire  of  small  arms  was  in 
cessant.  While  the  action  continued  in  this  man 
ner,  the  Mexican  artillery  continued  its  fire  upon 
the  advancing  American  troops,  although  that  of 
the  advanced  battery  had  slackened  under  the 
quick  discharges  of  Bldgely's  guns.  To  finish  the 
action  as  soon  as  possible  by  its  capture,  General 
Taylor  sent  Captain  May's  squadron  of  dragoons 
directly  against  it.^  May  started  down  the  road 
at  a  gallop  in  obedience  to  his  order,  and  pulling 
up  for  a  moment  as  he  passed  Bldgely's  position, 
the  latter  poured  in  a  discharge  of  canister,  which 
drew  the  Mexican  fire  in  reply.  May  continued  . 
his  course,  and,  though  his  command  was  in  confu 
sion,  rode  over  the  whole  battery.  The  Mexican 
infantry,  however,  from  the  second  line,  drove  him, 
and  the  six  men  whom  he  was  able  to  rally  from 
his  whole  squadron,  back  under  a  severe  fire  ;  but 
he  carried  with  him  General  de  la  Vega,  who  had 
been  entangled  in  the  melee  and  taken  prisoner.! 
Eidgely  had,  meanwhile,  followed  at  a  gallop  and 

*  General  Taylor's  Official  Report.       t  Captain  May's  Official  Report. 


128  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

unlimbered  on  the  northern  crest,  ready  to  defend 
the  position  without  infantry  support ;  but,  al 
though  much  exposed,  the  fear  of  injuring  the  dra 
goons  prevented  his  firing. 

When  the  action  had  fairly  commenced,  Gener 
al  Taylor  had  sent  orders  to  Lieutenant -colonel 
Belknap  to  advance  one  regiment  from  the  guard 
of  the  train,  and  at  this  time  he  led  the  eighth  in 
fantry  into  action.  Moving  down  the  road  in  col 
umn  at  a  charging  pace,  the  eighth,  joined  by  a 
portion  of  the  fifth,  which  had  beat  through  to 
the  ravine  on  the  left  of  the  road,  crossed  the  ra 
vine,  secured  the  guns,  and,  pushing  into  the  chap 
arral,  after  a  severe  struggle  drove  the  enemy 
from  the  vicinity. 

The  battle  was  won ;  but  still,  in  small  parties, 
the  Mexicans  disputed  the  American  advance,  un 
til  their  last  gun,  which  had  been  in  position  to 
their  left,  was  captured,  and  their  camp  entered 
by  the  fourth  infantry,  and  then  the  rout  began. 

Ker's  squadron  of  dragoons,  Duncan's  and  Kldge- 
ly's  batteries,  the  artillery  battalion,  and  the  light 
companies  under  Captain  C.  F.  Smith,  were  sent 
on  the  track  of  the  fugitives.  Following  closely 
in  pursuit,  they  dispersed  the  routed  Mexican  army, 
driving  its  broken  masses  into  the  chaparral  and 
beyond  the  Bio  Grande.  As  the  advance  of  the 
pursuing  forces  came  in  sight  of  the  Mexican  bat 
teries  at  Matamoras,  these  opened  fire.  The  Amer 
ican  guns  of  Fort  Brown  also  commenced  firing  on 
the  upper  ferry,  at  which  the  fugitives  were  cross- 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  ^29 

ing ;  but  night  coming  on,  rendered  it  impossible  to 
distinguish  friend  from  foe,  and  the  cannonade 
ceased  on  both  sides.  The  pursuing  forces  occu 
pied  the  former  American  camp  on  the  banks  of 
the  Rio  Grande,  but  for  the  night  the  main  army 
remained  on  the  field  of  battle. 

The  rout  of  the  Mexicans  was  complete.  Their 
artillery  (eight  pieces),  with  its  equipment  and  am 
munition,  their  camp  and  camp  furniture,  and  five 
hundred  pack-mules  and  saddles,  remained  in  the 
hands  of  the  victors.  General  Arista  lost  his  per 
sonal  baggage,  plate,  and  public  correspondence. 
The  loss  of  his  army,  in  killed  and  wounded,  it 
was  almost  impossible  to  determine ;  but  it  was 
certainly  heavy,  and  the  American  general  was 
not  extravagant  when  he  estimated  it,  in  the  two 
days'  action,  at  over  one  thousand  men.^ 

Of  the  Americans,  thirty-nine  were  slain,  includ 
ing  three  subalterns  of  merit :  Inge  of  the  Dragoons, 
Cochrane  of  the  fourth,  and  Chadbourne  of  the 
eighth  infantry.  Eighty-two  were  wounded,  in 
cluding  two  lieutenant  colonels,  two  captains,  arid 
eight  subalterns.! 

On  the  following  day  the  American  army  was 
engaged  in  burying  the  dead,  and  Arista,  without 
further  offensive  demonstration,  in  collecting  the 
fragments  of  his  beaten  forces.  An  exchange  of 
prisoners  took  place  on  the  llth,  by  which  Thorn 
ton's  party  was  released,  and  returned  to  the  Amer 
ican  camp. 

*  General  Taylor's  Official  Report.  t  Official  Return. 

I.— I 


130        THE  WAR  WITH'  MEXICO. 

With  a  view  of  preparing  for  the  passage  of  the 
Bio  Grande  and  carrying  the  war  into  Mexican 
territory,  on  the  llth  General  Taylor  repaired  in 
person  to  Point  Isabel,  where  re-enforcements  had 
commenced  arriving.  To  favor  the  passage  of  the 
stream  by  the  main  force,  he  arranged  an  expedi 
tion,  in  conjunction  with  the  naval  force  which 
was  then  off  Brazos  Santiago,  against  the  little  vil 
lage  of  Burita,  some  twenty  miles  below  Matamo- 
ras,  on  the  right  bank  of  the  river.^  No  opposi 
tion  was  made  on  the  part  of  the  Mexicans,  and 
the  hamlet,  which  was  entirely  worthless  in  itself, 
was  taken  possession  of  by  the  expedition.  On 
the  14th  the  general  returned  to  Fort  Brown,  tak 
ing  with  him  two  siege  mortars,  with  their  ammu 
nition,  and  an  increase  of  heavy  ordnance  stores. 
The  15th,  16th,  and  17th  were  spent  in  making 
preparations  and  selecting  points  for  the  passage 
of  the  river.  The"  notice  of  Arista  being  attracted 
by  the  American  movements,  on  the  17th  he  sent 
General  Requena  to  propose  an  armistice  until  the 
boundaries  of  the  two  countries  could  be  settled  by 
negotiation.  General  Taylor  at  once  rejected  the 
offer,  and  on  the  following  morning  commenced 
the  passage  two  miles  above  Matamoras. 

Three  batteries  of  field  artillery  and  two  eighteen 
pounders  were  posted  on  the  left  bank,  to  command 
and  protect  the  passage,  and  the  light  companies 

*  Correspondence  of  General  Taylor  with  the  Adjutant  General,  May  12th, 
1846.  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session 
of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  297. 


THE    WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  ^  3  ^ 

of  infantry  and  the  cavalry  were  thrown  across  the 
stream  as  rapidly  as  the  few  hoats  which  were  in 
the  possession  of  the  army  would  transport  them. 
But  it  was  soon  ascertained  that  the  enemy  had 
evacuated  the  town ;  and  while  the  troops  which 
had  already  passed  the  river  moved  down  on  the 
right  bank  and  took  possession  of  the  Mexican 
works,  the  main  body  of  the  army  returned  to 
Fort  Brown,  and  crossed  at  the  upper  ferry  at 
leisure.^ 

Arista  had  left,  early  in  the  morning  of  the  18th, 
with  the  remnant  of  his  army  and  eleven  guns, 
having  secreted  and  destroyed  the  remainder  of  the 
artillery  which  had  been  in  battery  around  Mata- 
moras.  On  the  19th  Lieutenant-colonel  Garland, 
with  the  whole  mounted  force  of  the  American 
army,  pursued,  and,  twenty-seven  miles  from  the 
town,  fell  upon  the  Mexican  rear  guard,  which  was 
dispersed,  with  the  loss  of  twenty  men  taken  pris 
oners  and  a  quantity  of  baggage.  Garland's  force 
was,  however,  too  small  for  continued  operations, 
and,  having  continued  the  pursuit  for  sixty  miles, 
he  returned  ;f  and  the  short  campaign  of  the  Rio 
Grande  was  finished. 


.The  position  of  the  American  army  opposite 
Matamoras,  in  the  face  of  a  Mexican  force  of  more 

*  Correspondence  of  General  Taylor  with  the  Adjutant  General,  May  18th, 
1846.  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session 
of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  297.  t  Idem,  May  24.  Idem. 


132  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

than  three  times  its  numerical  strength,  and  in 
front  of  a  town  of  several  thousand  inhabitants, 
can  not  fail,  even  now,  to  be  regarded  as  critical. 
As  a  military  position,  it  was  false ;  for  not  only 
was  the  enemy  in  overwhelming  numbers,  but  he 
was  in  his  own  country,  had  good  communication 
with  the  interior,  and  his  vicinity  was,  to  a  degree, 
populated,  and  capable  of  supporting  an  army. 
The  American  army  had  a  long  and  hazardous 
route  of  communication  by  land,  which  was,  in 
deed,  never  relied  on,  was  twenty-seven  miles  from 
its  depot,  which  was  in  an  unfinished  and  almost 
defenseless  condition,  and  the  only  communication 
with  New  Orleans,  which  was  the  true  base  of 
operations,  was  by  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  The  ad 
vantages  on  the  Mexican  side  were  fully  demon 
strated  by  the  concentration  of  a  large  army  at 
Matamoras,  before  General  Taylor  deemed  it  nec 
essary  to  call  for  a  re-enforcement  of  a  single 
man. 

The  march  of  the  army  from  Corpus  Christi 
must  be  regarded  as  an  experiment  on  the  part  of 
the  United  States  government  at  Washington,  un 
dertaken  for  the  purpose  of  inducing  Mexico  to 
listen  to  the  offer  of  negotiations  made  through 
Mr.  Slidell,  and  of  demonstrating  to  her  the  con 
sequences  of  a  refusal  in  the  forcible  seizure  of  the 
territory  in  dispute.  Although  the  whole  disposa 
ble  force  of  the  American  regular  army  was  made 
use  of,  yet  the  inadequacy  of  it  to  the  effect  de 
sired  appears  to  have  been  the  subject  of  appre- 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


133 


hension  at  "Washington,  from  the  letters  of  Mr. 
Marcy  to  General  Taylor.^  Indeed,  it  may  well 
have  been ;  for,  where  forcible  possession  is  to  be 
taken  of  disputed  territory,  it  is  obvious  that  it 
should  be  done  in  great  strength,  otherwise  the 
proceeding  only  invites  resistance  to  what  the  en 
emy  denominates  injustice,  with  a  prospect  of  suc 
cess,  especially  where  every  advantage  of  position 
is  with  the  enemy. 

The  reasons  why  General  Taylor  did  not  avail 
himself  of  the  means  placed  at  his  disposal  have 
been  previously  noticed.  All  of  them  had  their 
rise  in  the  military  policy  of  the  United  States,  in 
depending  almost  entirely  upon  a  citizen  soldiery. 
By  the  laws  under  which  the  President  is  empow 
ered  to  call  upon  the  militia,  the  term  of  service  is 
fixed  at  three  months ;  and  it  was  evidently  a 
measure  of  bad  policy  on  the  part  of  General  Tay 
lor  to  call  for  volunteers  for  that  short  period  upon 
a  contingency  which,  however  hazardous  in  case 
it  arose,  was  certainly,  at  the  time  of  his  move 
ment  from  Corpus  Christi,  exceedingly  doubtful. 
As  he  did  not  call  for  them  at  the  time,  it  was 
natural  that  he  should  have  delayed  the  call,  after 
his  arrival  opposite  Matamoras,  until  the  necessity 
became  palpable,  and  the  whole  term  of  service 
could  be  employed  with  some  prospect  of  advant 
age.  In  consequence,  he  found  himself  in  a  po 
sition  which  certainly  was  one  of  danger,  and 

*  Correspondence.    Executive  Document,  No.  196,  House  of  Representa 
tives,  second  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress. 


134  (  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

which  created,  for  the  time,  great  anxiety  for  his 
safety  in  the  United  States. 

Had  the  regular  force  of  the  United  States  been 
larger,  the  danger  would  not  have  been  encoun 
tered  ;  for  the  movement  to  the  Rio  Grande  would 
have  been  made  in  such  force,  that  Mexico,  torn 
as  she  was  by  her  domestic  troubles,  could  never 
have  assembled  a  body  of  troops  so  superior  in 
number  as  that  which  Arista  commanded.  The 
immediate  cause  of  the  weakness  of  the  American 
army  is  to  be  found  in  the  reduction  of  1842.  Had 
the  authorized  number  of  privates  in  each  compa 
ny  been  one  hundred  instead  of  forty-two,  the  force 
under  General  Taylor's  command  opposite  Mata- 
moras  would  have  been  near  seven  thousand  of  all 
arms.  With  this  number  of  American  troops,  the 
occupation  of  the  disputed  territory  would  have 
been  positive,  and  no  Mexican  force  which  could 
be  placed  on  the  frontier  would  have  dared  to  cross 
the  border.  If  it  had,  the  result  would  have  been 
in  no  way  problematical,  and  the  anxiety,  and 
confusion,  and  hurry  of  subsequent  preparation 
would  have  been  avoided. 

The  course  of  action  to  be  adopted  upon  the 
commencement  of  hostilities,  when  the  capture  of 
Thornton's  squadron  demonstrated  that  they  were 
inevitable,  was  not  only  of  the  greatest  importance, 
but  a  matter  upon  which  it  may  well  have  been 
difficult  to  decide. 

It  was  that  of  the  commencement  of  military  op 
erations,  and,  like  all  others,  they  depend  for  sue- 


THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 


135 


cess  upon  their  commencement  in  a  great  degree. 
It  was,  the  commencement  of  the  war,  and  the 
moral  effect  which  success  or  defeat  would  exer 
cise  on  either  party  was  of  the  most  vital  moment. 
Unless  General  Taylor  had  heen  assured  of  success, 
his  course  of  action  would  have  been  to  have  bro 
ken  up  his  camp  opposite  Matamoras,  abandoned 
his  position,  and  withdrawn  his  army  to  Point  Isa 
bel  ;  for  it  is  an  approved  maxim  in  war,  "  that  a 
battle  should  not  be  fought  when  the  advantages 
which  may  be  gained  by  a  victory  are  less  than 
the  dangers  to  be  apprehended  from  a  defeat."* 
In  this  case,  the  advantages  to  be  gained  by  a  vic 
tory  were  the  vindication  of  the  position  of  the 
United  States  and  the  supremacy  of  moral  power, 
which  the  victory  would  retain  and  increase,  be 
sides  the  safety  of  the  army.  The  moral  force  of 
the  victory  was  the  greatest  advantage  to  be  hoped 
for  in  the  commencement  of  a  war,  which,  from  the 
policy  of  the  United  States,  was  necessarily  to  be 
prosecuted  in  the  main  by  new  levies ;  for  the  ex 
ample  of  his  veteran  comrade  exercises  a  most  ben 
eficial  influence  on  a  recruit,  and  hastens  the  time 
when  he,  too,  becomes  a  veteran. 

The  disadvantages  to  be  apprehended  in  case  of 
defeat  were  no  less  than  the  total  destruction  of 
the  army,  involving  the  loss  of  both  positions  at 
Point  Isabel  and  Fort  Brown,  and  the  consequent 
loss  of  morale  in  the  commencement  of  operations. 
In  a  war  with  so  impressionable  a  people  as  the 

*  Napoleon's  Maxims  of  War. 


136  THE    WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

Mexicans,  this  must  have  been  most  disastrous  in 
future  conflict.  Moreover,  the  annihilation  of  the 
main  force  of  the  American  regular  army  would 
have  gone  far  to  increase  the  dependence  of  the 
United  States  upon  a  volunteer  force,  and  to  have 
deprived  their  future  army  of  the  proper  elements 
of  organization.  Therefore,  had  General  Taylor 
considered  the  result  doubtful,  he  might  well  have 
secured  the  safety  of  his  army  and  saved  himself 
from  the  disasters  of  defeat  by  falling  back  with  his 
whole  force  to  Point  Isabel.  That  he  could  have 
defended  himself  there,  there  can  be  no  doubt ;  and 
for  his  operations,  whatever  they  may  have  been, 
he  would  have  had  his  whole  force.  His  commu 
nication  with  New  Orleans  would  have  been  direct, 
and,  upon  the  arrival  of  re-enforcements,  he  could 
have  taken  the  field  in  strength.  A  decided  vic 
tory  would  have  had  the  immediate  result  of  that 
of  Resaca,  whether  Fort  Brown  was  occupied  or 
not ;  and  the  Mexican  army,  if  beaten,  must  have 
retired  beyond  the  Rio  Grande,  for  the  reason  that 
the  country  on  the  east  of  it  was  comparatively  a 
desert. 

That  General  Taylor  had  at  first  no  doubt  of  the 
result  of  the  action,  is  evident  from  his  letters  an 
nouncing  his  call  for  volunteers,  and  his  march 
from  Point  Isabel  ;#  and  his  dependence  must 

*  "  This  will  constitute  an  auxiliary  force  of  nearly  5000  men,  which  will 
be  necessary  to  prosecute  the  war  with  vigor,  and  carry  it,  as  it  should  be, 
into  the  enemy's  country." —  Taylor's  Letter  to  the  Adjutant  General,  April 
26,  1846.  "  If  the  enemy  oppose  my  march,  in  whatever  force,  I  shall  fight 
him."—  Taylor's  Letter  to  the  Adjutant  General,  May  7,  1846. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

have  been  upon  the  moral  force  of  his  army.  This 
he  well  knew,  and  that  the  prevailing  sentiment 
throughout  the  ranks  was  an  anxiety  for  the  bat 
tle,  without  waiting  the  arrival  of  re-enforcements ; 
for  a  strong  desire  to  reap  the  full  harvest  of  glory 
pervaded  both  officers  and  men.  The  regular  army 
had  long  been  the  subject  of  animadversion  by  pop 
ular  orators  ;  and  the  officers  and  men,  feeling  con- 
fident  in  their  talent,  bravery,  and  discipline,  were 
now  anxious  that  their  efficiency  should  be  put  to 
the  test,  in  the  commencement  of  the  war,  against 
overwhelming  odds.  No  greater  stimulus  for  exer 
tion  certainly  could  have  been  desired ;  and,  know 
ing  this  sentiment,  participating  in  it -to  a  degree, 
and  knowing  the  strength  of  his  army,  who  can 
doubt  that  the  proper  course  was  pursued  by  Gen 
eral  Taylor  when  he  chose  to  retain  both  of  his  po 
sitions  and  to  force  the  communication  ? 

Having  decided  upon  this  point,  the  proper  ac 
tion  was  evidently  to  bring  on  a  conflict  with  the 
Mexican  army  in  detail,  or  tq  dispute  the  passage 
of  the  Rio  Grande,  had  either  or  both  been  possi 
ble.  To  either  of  these,  the  nature  of  the  country 
and  the  winding  course  of  the  river  presented  diffi 
culties,  and  the  craft  of  the  Mexican  general  was 
such  as  to  have  rendered  extreme  celerity  necessa 
ry  to  insure  success,  which  the  first  difficulties  men 
tioned  in  a  measure  forbade. 

As  no  such  operation  was  attempted,  the  move 
ment  to  Point  Isabel  became  one  of  imperative  ne 
cessity;  and  had  it  not  been  that  the  defensive 


138  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

works  of  that  depot  were  in  an  unfinished  state, 
prudence  would  have  dictated  an  immediate  re 
turn  ;  for  certainly,  with  all  these  known  charac 
teristics  of  the  enemy,  it  could  hardly  have  been 
believed  that  an  army  of  ten  thousand  men,  with 
heavy  fixed  batteries,  could  have  failed  in  an  at 
tack  against  a  field  work  garrisoned  by  two  skele 
ton  companies  of  artillery  and  a  weak  regiment  of 
infantry.  Although  delayed  to  the  last  moment, 
and  bold  in  itself,  yet  the  march  in  return  was  en 
tailed  by  the  movement  to  the  Point,  and,  being 
opposed,  the  battles  of  Palo  Alto  and  Resaca  were 
the  consequence. 

At  Palo  Alto,  the  American  artillery,  thrown,  as 
it  was,  frankly  and  fearlessly  into  action,  had  the 
most  powerful  effect,  and  took  advantage  of  the 
false  disposition  of  Arista's  infantry.  The  Ameri 
can  infantry,  located  as  far  out  of  range  as  was 
compatible  with  a  position  within  supporting  dis 
tance,  secured  the  artillery,  and,  while  the  latter 
had  such  decided  effect,  it  was  certainly  the  part 
of  good  policy  to  engage  no  other  arm  until  the  en 
emy  was  in  confusion ;  but  no  advantage  was  tak 
en  of,  this  when  it  had  been  effected  by  the  fire  of 
the  artillery  and  the  prompt  action  of  Duncan's  bat 
tery  on  the  left.  Had  the  movement  of  the  whole 
American  force  in  advance  taken  place  at  that  time, 
it  has  been  the  expressed  opinion  of  many  that  the 
field  would  have  been  swept  and  the  conflict  would 
have  been  ended  at  once  ;#  and  it  is  hardly  doubt- 

*  This  opinion  is  expressed  in  Campaign  Sketches,  p.  93. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


139 


ful  that  such  would  have  been  the  case;  for  a  de 
termined  charge  by  the  American  infantry,  which 
had  been  almost  intact,  upon  an  enemy  so  cut  up  as 
was  the  Mexican  army,  must  have  driven  the  lat 
ter,  dispersed,  into  the  chaparral,  where  it  is  hardly 
possible  that  Arista  could  have  rallied  his  forces 
during  the  night.  The  reason  which  has  been  as 
signed  that  the  charge  was  not  ordered,  that  the 
American  general  wished  to  protect  his  train,  hard 
ly  has  force,  for  there  was  no  enemy  in  position  to 
attack  it,  and  if  encumbered  by  his  train  on  the 
8th,  he  was  no  less  so  on  the  9th.  He  had  to  fin 
ish  the  battle,  and  why  it  was  not  finished  on  the 
8th,  when  the  opportunity  was  offered  for  instan 
taneous  and  decisive  action,  can  not  be  accounted 
for  by  any  reasons  of  the  policy  which  had  been 
adopted. 

The  indecision  and  hesitancy  to  attack  display 
ed  on  the  morning  of  the  9th,  when  Arista  moved 
off,  and  the  subsequent  summons  of  a  meeting  of 
officers  to  give  opinions  on  the  propriety  of  an  ad 
vance,  were  still  less  in  keeping  with  this  policy; 
and  the  evil  effect  of  the  delay  was  demonstrated  at 
the  strong  position  of  Resaca  de  la  Palma,  by  the 
occupation  of  which  Arista  threw  one  half  of  his 
enemy's  most  powerful  arm,  the  artillery,  out  of 
action,  and  rendered  the  fire  of  the  other  uncertain. 

But  the  advance  being  resolved  upon,  it  was 
persisted  in,  and  the  bold  and  vigorous  manner  in 
which  the  American  troops  fell  on  at  Resaca  de  la 
Palma  can  not  be  too  much  admired.  Once  in  ac- 


140  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

tion,  however,  the  control  of  the  general,  except  in 
his  timely  advance  of  the  cavalry  and  reserve,  was 
gone,  and  the  bravery  of  subordinates  and  soldiers 
did  the  work.  Being  accomplished,  General  Tay 
lor  did  not  allow  his  enemy  again  to  retire  at  his 
leisure ;  though,  from  want  of  boats,  and  the  full , 
knowledge  of  the  magnitude  of  the  success,  the  vic 
tory  was  not  immediately  followed  by  the  passage 
of  the  Rio  Grande.  Arista  was  therefore  allowed 
to  draw  off  the  remnant  of  his  force. 

But  all  these  operations  were,  at  the  commence 
ment  of  a  war,  prosecuted  against  greatly  superior 
forces,  and  without  the  full  data  in  the  character 
and  dispositions  of  the  enemy  which  they  afforded 
for  the  future ;  and  this  must  be  remembered  in 
forming  a  judgment  upon  their  notice,  as  well  as 
that  critical  remarks  upon  military  operations  are 
always  after  the  fact. 

The  course  of  action  so  boldly  pursued  by  Gen 
eral  Taylor  placed  every  physical  advantage  in 
Arista's  hands ;  and  had  he  been  equal  to  the  cri 
sis,  and  his  troops  properly  maneuvered,  the  com 
mencement  of  the  war  might  possibly  have  been  of 
brighter  augury  to  the  Mexican  nation.  The  Amer 
ican  army  was  allowed  to  pass  the  Mexican  on  the 
night  of  the  1st  of  May,  and,  as  Arista  knew  the 
whole  locality  well,  an  excellent  opportunity  for 
annoyance,  at  least,  was  lost.  Then  the  opportu 
nity  for  crushing  the  garrison  of  Fort  Brown  was 
neglected;  for  the  attack  of  a  field  work  by  bom 
bardment,  at  long  range,  the  experience  of  Mexican 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  J41 

revolutions  might  have  shown  to  be  useless  when 
not  followed  by  a  vigorous  assault. 

The  greatest  oversight  of  the  Mexican  command 
er  was  on  the  field  of  Palo  Alto,  in  awaiting  the 
American  advance  with  his  infantry  in  false  posi 
tion,  and  subsequently  in  sustaining  a  murderous 
cannonade  for  an  hour  before  attempting  any  of 
fensive  movement.  In  consequence,  the  moral 
force  of  his  troops  was  shaken,  which  had  before 
been  excellent  for  Mexican  soldiers.  They  had 
been  assured  of  the  victory,  and  their  imposing 
array  and  overwhelming  numbers  might  well  have 
induced  confidence.  If,  instead  of  sustaining  the 
fire  of  the  American  artillery  in  line,  Arista  had 
thrown  his  masses  at  once  into  the  action  in  the 
first  enthusiasm  of  the  battle,  with  such  impression- 
able  soldiers  as  he  commanded,  certainly  he  had 
the  best  chance  of  success  ;  and  the  full  strength 
of  the  moral  power  of  the  American  army  would 
have  been  required  to  withstand  the  onset  of  such 
overwhelming  numbers  in  their  first  good  order  and 
array.  One  success  would  haye  achieved  another ; 
and  though  desperate  fighting  would  have  been 
required  to  win  the  victory,  yet  the  Mexican  sol 
diers  would  have  been  taught  that  it  was  possible. 

As  it  was,  they  were  beaten  at  Palo  Alto  by  the 
.artillery  before  a  movement  was  commenced ;  and 
though  the  subsequent  maneuvers  of  the  field  were 
well  calculated  to  restore  the  battle  and  achieve 
success,  the  moral  force  to  sustain  a  close  conflict 
and  carry  them  out  with  vigor  was  gone. 


142  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

Nor  was  it  recovered  at  Resaca  de  la  Palma,  un 
der  the  prestige  of  the  preceding  defeat,  and  the 
vigorous  charge  of  the  victorious  soldiers  of  Palo 
Alto. 

The  total  and  complete  overthrow,  and  the 
speedy  retreat  into  the  interior,  so  different  a  re 
sult  from  that  which  had  heen  anticipated,  had  its 
full  effect  upon  the  Mexican  army  for  future  op 
erations.  The  prowess  of  American  soldiers,  so 
fully  demonstrated,  could  never  be  forgotten  in  the 
whole  course  of  the  war. 


CHAPTER  III. 

American  Preparation  for  War — Difficulties  of  Executive — Avowed  Object 
of  War — California — New  Mexico — Plan  of  Operations — General  Games' s 
Action  at  New  Orleans — Term  of  Service  of  Volunteers — General  Scott's 
Dispute  with  the  War  Department— General  Taylor  assigned  to  Command 
— Mr.  Marcy's  and  General  Scott's  Letters  to  him  on  the  Plan  of  Opera 
tions — General  Taylor's  Reply — Mr.  Marcy's  on  the  same  Subject — Gen 
eral  Taylor's  Answer — Want  of  settled  Plan  of  Operations — Observations. 
— Difficulties  in  preparing  Advance  from  Matamoras — Occupation  of  Rey- 
nosa  and  Camargo — Arrival  of  Twelve  Months'  Volunteers,  and  Discharge 
of  Louisiana  Troops — Preparations  for  Movement — Organization  of  Regu 
lars — Worth  marches  to  Serralvo — Establishment  of  Entrepdt — Organiza 
tion  of  Field  Division  of  Volunteers — Concentration  of  active  Force  at  Ser 
ralvo — March  toward  Monterey. 

THE  news  of  the  commencement  of  hostilities  on 
the  Rio  Grande  having  reached  Washington,  the 
great  labor  of  military  preparation  and  arrange 
ment  was  thrown  at  once  upon  the  government. 
This  was  a  necessary  consequence  of  the  policy  of 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  ^43 

depending  almost  entirely  upon  a  volunteer  force, 
and  of  keeping  the  regular  army  to  the  minimum 
standard.  In  other  cases  of  war,  such  policy  might 
lead  to  positive  disastrous  results  in  the  outset,  hy 
allowing  an  enemy  hetter  prepared  to  use  his  means 
of  offense  while  the  United  States  marshaled  their 
forces  for  the  conflict. 

But  in  the  knowledge  of  the  strength  of  the  coun 
try,  and  that,  when  the  necessity  hecame  palpahle, 
any  sufficient  numerical  force  could  he  raised,  the 
policy,  such  as  it  was,  had  heen  persisted  in.  No 
increase  of  the  army,  other  than  hy  a  single  regi 
ment  of  rifles  for  Oregon  service,  had  been  recom 
mended  by  the  President  or  advocated  in  Congress 
until  the  existence  of  positive  facts  of  war.  It  may 
have  been  that  the  delay  arose  as  much  in  reasons 
of  home  policy  as  in  a  belief  in  the  efficiency  of  the 
system;  for,  with  a  strong  and  jealous  opposition, 
watching  narrowly  every  act  of  the  executive,  it 
was  almost  impossible  to  have  provided  for  the 
contingency.  The  attempt  would  have  been  de 
nounced  as  one  to  increase  executive  patronage, 
and  in  the  fancied  strength  of  the  volunteer  sys 
tem  would  have  been  found  an  argument  suffi 
ciently  strong  to  have  insured  its  defeat.  And  it 
would  have  been  at  once  argued  by  the  opposition 
that  the  laws  already  in  force,  empowering  the 
President  to  call  forth  the  militia  to  repel  invasion, 
were  sufficient  provision  for  the  danger,  and  that 
the  endeavor  to  increase  the  army  had  therefore 
its  origin,  not  in  a  desire  for  the  necessary  defense 


144  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

of  the  country,  but  in  the  wish  to 'enforce  what  had 
already  been  termed  the  injustice  designed  and  per 
petrated  against  Mexico. 

But  the  crisis  had  come ;  overt  acts  of  hostility 
had  been  commenced  on  the  part  of  Mexico,  and 
the  country  was,  de  facto,  in  war.  The  enthusi 
asm  of  the  American  people  was  fairly  aroused ;  and 
when  the  message  of  the  President  announced  the 
existence  of  war,  and  called  upon  Congress  to  make 
provision  for  its  prosecution,  the  fear  of  the  resent 
ment  of  a  free  people,  whose  first  impulse  is  for  the 
defense  of  national  right  and  national  honor,  si 
lenced  the  opposition,  if,  indeed,  its  members  were 
not  impressed  with  the  necessities  of  the  case. 

They  joined,  therefore,  with  the  supporters  of  the 
administration,  the  state  of  war  was  officially  recog 
nized  as  being  the  consequence  of  the  act  of  Mex 
ico,  and  bills  were  passed  providing  men,  money, 
and  munitions  with  an  alacrity  which,  had  all  par 
ty  feeling  been  left  out  of  the  question,  would  have 
been  indicative  of  the  desire  of  legislators  to  make 
amends  for  past  delay,  and  have  left  no  doubt  of 
their  opinion  as  to  the  necessity  of  the  crisis  and 
the  justice  of  the  cause. 

By  the  act  of  May  13th,  1846,  the  President  was 
authorized  to  call  forth  volunteers  in  any  number 
not  exceeding  fifty  thousand,  to  serve  for  the  peri 
od  of  one  year,  or  during  the  war,  and  to  appoint 
the  requisite  general  and  staff  officers  for  their  com 
mand.  The  field  and  company  officers  were  to  be 
appointed  and  commissioned  according  to  the  laws 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO: 


145 


of  the  states  whence  the  volunteers  were  called. 
Other  acts,  passed  soon  after,  empowered  him  to 
increase  the  number  of  privates  in  the  companies 
of  the  regular  army  to  one  hundred,  should  it  he 
necessary,  and  to  appoint  an  additional  number  of 
general  officers  iri  the  regular  service.^  Money 
was  appropriated  for  carrying  the  provisions  of  the 
several  acts  into  effect,  and  every  thing  which  the 
government  had  asked  for  the  cojmtmencement  of 
operations,  thus  far  was  promptly  allowed  and  ap 
propriated.  The  American  Congress  had  done  its 
part,  and  the  President  and  cabinet  proceeded  to 
the  execution  of  the  difficult  duty  of  carrying  on  a 
foreign  war :  a  duty  which  the  various  safeguards  tp 
popular  liberty,  protected  and  cherished  by  the  free 
institutions  of  the  United  States,  render  more  diffi 
cult  of  execution  on  the  part  of  the  American  exec 
utive  than  such  duty  is  for  that  of  any  government 
less  dependent  upon  the  will  of  the  people.  The 
limitation  of  the  power  of  executive  officers,  the  fre 
quent  calls  for  information  concerning  measures 
requiring  secrecy  for  success,  the  thousand  prying 
eyes  and  brazen  tongues  attendant  upon  a  free  and 
uncontrolled  public  press,  which  often  publishes 
false  and  exaggerated  accounts  of  military  move 
ments  before  in  propriety  they  should  be  discussed 
at  all,  are  a  few  of  the  elements  of  difficulty  in  the 
military  operations  of  the  government  which  that 
of  the  United  States  must  encounter.  In  the  jeal 
ous  watch  of  the  opposition  party,  all  these  elements 

*  Congressional  Globe,  first  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress. 

I.— K 


146  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

are  brought  into  play  with  the  vigor  of  party  ani 
mosity  ;  for  rieither  orators  nor  editors" will  scruple 
to  attach  as  much  opprobrium  as  it  is  possible  to 
attach  to  the  acts  of  the  .executive.  For  the  end 
of  their  own  argument  and  political  effect,  each 
act  will  be  spied  out  and  remarked  upon  in  the 
attempt  to  prove  the  baseness  of  the  party  in  power, 
and  that  the  incumbent  chief  magistrate  of  the  na 
tion  is  unworthy  of  his  place  and  should  be  super 
seded.  It  matters  not  to  the  reckless  politicians 
that  indirect  assistance  is  afforded  to  the  enemy  by 
such  a  course  of  conduct.  In  their  headlong  rush 
for  power,  this  is  a  matter  which  does  not  imme 
diately  interfere  with  political  prospects,  and  the 
reverse  of  the  course  might  strengthen  the  admin 
istration  ;  and  thus  it  is  announced  to  the  enemy 
that  he  has  a  strong  party,  where,  were  the  dictates 
of  patriotism  observed  by  all,  the  whole  strength 
of  the  country  would  be  displayed  in  the  crisis  of 
war.  Under  more  arbitrary  governments,  the  strong 
arm  of  power  can  be  exerted  to  arrest  the  action  of 
such  elements  as  these.  But  the  government  of 
the  United  States,  restricted  as  it  is  by  constitu 
tional  principles,  and  providing  rather  for  the  pro 
motion  of  the  welfare  of  the  community  in  time 
of  peace,  depends  upon  public  opinion  for  bringing 
forth  the  strength  of  the  nation  in  war,  as  well  as 
for  all  other  support.  This  -opinion  is  the  correct 
ive  for  the  difficulties  alluded  to,  and  the  absolute 
necessity  of  propitiating  it  may  give  rise  to  other 
difficulties  in  the  desire  always  existing  in  a  peo- 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

pie  so  enterprising  as  the  American  for  action,  of 
which,  in  war,  the  great  portion  should  be  -at  least 
ignorant  of  the  immediate  object  of  military  move 
ments,  and  necessarily  are  of  details  and  difficulties. 

The  general  plan  of  operations,  and  the  prelim 
inary  arrangements  for  its  prosecution,  were  soon 
determined  upon  by  the  executive,  and  the  quan 
tity  of  force  which  it  was  deemed  necessary  to  em 
ploy  was,  in  a  few  days  after  the  commencement 
of  preparations,  required  from  the  states  nearest  the 
scene  of  action. 

The  avowed  object  of  the  United  States  in  war 
has  been  to  obtain  "  indemnity  for  the  past  and  se 
curity  for  the  future."  This  was  especially  set 
forth  in  the  war  of  1812  with  Great  Britain;  and 
although  the  government  then  combated  the  vari 
ous  obstacles  in  its  prosecution  with  but  little  suc 
cess,  and  utterly  failed  in  obtaining  the  first  object, 
yet  the  bold  declaration  of  war,  and  the  develop 
ment  of  strength,  however  misapplied,  which  was 
its  consequence,  drew  the  attention  of  the  world, 
and  went  far  toward  obtaining  security  from  a  rep 
etition  of  the  outrages  which  had  led  to  the  rupture. 

The  same  object  was  avowed  in  the  prosecution 
of  hostilities  against  Mexico,  and  it  was  determined 
to  seize  upon  her  territory  as  indemnity  for  the 
wrongs  inflicted  by  the  commencement  of  war,  as 
well  as  those  of  former  date.  California,  compara 
tively  uninhabited  and  unknown,  and  at  a  distance 
from  the  central  and  richer  portions  of  Mexico,  had 
been  explored  by  American  travelers,  who  brought 


148  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

back  reports  of  the  salubrity  of  its  climate,  the  fer 
tility  of  its  soil,  and  its  mineral  and  other  elements 
of  wealth,  which,  even  .with  estimates  for  exagger 
ation  to  which  travelers  are  prone,  showed  that  it 
was  a  territory  of  great  value.  British  merchants 
had  made  efforts  to  obtain  possession  of  its  lands, 
and  the  harbors  which  were  upon  its  coast  were 
known  to  be  the  only  good  ones  upon  the  shore  of 
the  northern  Pacific  Ocean.  In  the  absence  of  any 
such  upon  the  coast  of  Oregon,  and  the  desire  of 
the  United  States  to  possess  a  good  and  safe  port 
for  that  region  of  country,  then  beginning  to  at 
tract  the  serious  attention  of  the  government,  was 
found  a  strong  reason  for  its  acquisition.  Lying 
immediately  south  of  the  territory  of  Oregon,  with 
no  defined  natural  boundary  between  them,  it  was 
early  looked  upon  'with  a  view  to  its  acquisition 
by  individuals,  and  the  measure  had  been  discuss 
ed  in  the  public  prints  long  previous  to  the  com 
mencement  of  hostilities.  Many  Americans,  in 
pursuit  of  wealth  and  adventure,  had  gone  thither 
and  settled,  and  were  in  considerable  numerical 
strength  in  the  northern  part  of  the  country.  It 
has  often  been  charged  that  the  acquisition  of  the 
territory  was  the  cause  of  war,  both  by  Mexican 
and  American  opponents  of  the  administration  of 
the  United  States  ;  but,  when  taken  in  connection 
with  the  oft-repeated  offers  of  negotiation,  such  an 
idea  appears  absurd.  The  tone  of  public  opinion, 
and  the  speedy  adoption  of  the  plan  of  seizing  it,  as 
well  as  instructions  previously  given  to  naval  com- 


THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO.  j[  4  9 

manders,^  would  go  to  show  that  its  acquisition 
had  been  looked  to  as  a  consequence  of  Mexican  ob 
stinacy,  and  as  indemnity  in  case  war  was  really 
the  event.  And  doubtless  great  efforts  would  have 
been  made  to  obtain  it  by  purchase,  had  she  ac 
ceded  to  the  offer  of  negotiations. 

New  Mexico,  another  department  of  the  Mexican 
republic,  lying  upon  the  direct  route  to  California, 
and  in  great  part  included  in  the  boundaries  claim 
ed  by  Texas  upon  her  admission  to  the  American 
Union,  was  also  another  territory  which  attracted 
attention. 

The  general  plan  of  operations  was  to  seize  and 
occupy  those  territories,  with  a  view  to  their  re 
tention  as  indemnity  for  the  expenses  of  the  war, 
while  the  movements  of  the  main  army  upon  the 
center  of  Mexican  resources  were  to  force  an  agree 
ment  to  the  terms  of  peace. f  The  only  serious  dif 
ficulties  which  could  be  anticipated  in  the  conquest 
and  occupation  of  the  territories  in  question  were 
the  distance  of  the  route,  and  those  presented  by 
the  uninhabited  and  uncultivated  country  through 
which  it  led.  These  operated  as  much  against 
Mexico  as  against  the  United  States,  for  the  routes 
which  troops  from  the  populous  portions  of  the 
former  would  be  forced  to  traverse  were  nearly  as 
difficult  as  those  from  the  latter. 


*  Mr.  Bancroft  to  Commodore  Sloat.  Executive  Document,  No.  62,  House 
of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  231. 

t  Collated  from  instructions  to  army  and  naval  officers  of  the  period  of 
the  commencement  of  the  war. 


150  THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO. 

Another  expedition  was  soon  after  planned, 
which  was  to  be  sent  against  the  city  and  state  of 
Chihuahua.  The  city  was  represented  as  the  de 
pot  for  trade  in  the  north  of  Mexico,  and  it  was 
believed  that,  as  the  people  were  inimical  to  the 
central  government,  they  were  therefore  willing  to 
agree  to  American  occupation.  Another  object  of 
this  expedition  was  to  operate  in  conjunction  with 
the  main  army.  The  instructions  for  each  of  these 
will  be  noticed  in  another  place.  But  the  expedi 
tions  to  California,  New  Mexico,  and  Chihuahua 
were,  from  their  nature,  but  partial  operations  of 
the  war,  with  the  view  of  securing  incidental  ends, 
and  entirely  separate  from  the  great  movements 
of  the  conflict. 

In  preparing  for  the  main  operations  of  the  army, 
embarrassments  were  soon  presented,  arising  in  the 
conduct  of  American  general  officers.  The  first  of 
these,  and  which  was  a  partial  cause  of  the  second, 
was  the  action  of  Brevet  Major-general  Gaines,  a 
gallant  veteran  of  the  war  of  1812.  Advanced  in 
years,  he  had  nevertheless,  under  the  system  of 
the  American  army,  retained  his  commission,  and, 
at  the  commencement  of  hostilities,  was  in  com 
mand  of  the  Western  Geographical  Division  of  the 
United  States.  He  was  the  second  in  rank  in  the 
army ;  but  old  age  had  shattered  his  judgment,  al 
though  it  had  left  all  the  enthusiasm  of  his  nature. 
In  the  anticipation  of  Mexican  hostilities,  he  had 
early  requested  to  be  assigned  to  the  command  of 
the  army  which  was  to  enter  Mexico,  according  to 


THE    WAR,  WITH    MEXICO. 


151 


his  views,  not  so  much  for  "  conquering  a  peace" 
as  for  a  crusade  against  the  "  awful  maladies  of 
alternate  anarchy  and  despotism."^  Upon  receiv 
ing  the  news  of  the  danger  of  the  army  on  the 
Rio  Grande,  he  had  taken  measures  for  calling  into 
service  a  number  of  volunteers,  far  exceeding  the 
requisition  of  _  General  Taylor,  without  the  color  of 
authority,  except  in  his  own  opinion  of  the  neces* 
sity  of  the  case.  From  the  vicinity  of  his  head 
quarters  at  New  Orleans  to  the  seat  of  war,  in  the 
excited  state  of  the  public  mind  in  the  southwest, 
and  the  apparent  exigency  of  the  crisis,  the  calls 
were  quickly  responded  to ;  and  with  no  other  pro 
vision  than  a  hurried  and  incomplete  armament, 
volunteers  for  six  months,  in  numhers  unknown 
either  to  the  commanding  general  in  the  field  or 
the  authorities  at  Washington,  were  soon  put  en 
route  for  Brazos  Santiago.  Having  thus  com 
menced  the  business,  and  with  his  enthusiasm  fair 
ly  aroused,  Gaines  proceeded  to  appoint  officers 
in  the  line  and  staff,  to  call  for  an  indefinite  num 
ber  of  troops,!  and,  in  short,  appeared  about  to 
raise  an  army  on  his  own  responsibility,  and  to  in- 
vade  Mexico  without  regard  to  the  necessities  of 
his  troops,  or  the  action  of  the  government,  except 
in  so  far  as  it  was  intended  that  payment  of  ex 
penses  should  be  made  through  it.  To  put  a  stop 
to  his  embarrassing  eccentricities,  it  was  found 
necessary  to  relieve  him  from  command ;  and,  ac- 

*  Correspondence  of  General  Gaines  with  the  Adjutant  General.   Congres 
sional  Globe,  first  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress.         t  Idem  ibidem. 


152  THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO. 

cordingly,  on  the  2d  of  June,  the  order  relieving 
him  was  sent  from  Washington.^ 

In  preparing  for  the  operations  of  the  main  army, 
the  knowledge  of  American  strength  and  of  Mexi 
can  weakness  led  to  action  on  the  part  of  the  gov 
ernment  which  could  not  fail  to  entail  difficulty 
in  the  prosecution  of  hostilities.  Without  taking 
into  consideration  the  natural  obstinacy  of  all  peo 
ple  of  Spanish  descent,  or  the  military  topography 
of  the  country  of  Mexico,  or  the  difficulties  to  he 
encountered  at  home,  it  had  been  believed  that  no 
more  than  one  year  would  be  required  to  complete 
the  operations  of  the  .war,  and  the  volunteers  were 
therefore  originally  called  upon  to  serve  for  that 
short  period.  The  consequence  of  this  was,  neces 
sarily,  the  trouble  of  discharging  them  and  raising 
new  troops  if  Mexico  continued  obstinate,  and  the 
very  measure  was  an  encouragement  for  her  to  do 
so ;  for  knowing,  as  she  must,  the  short  term  of 
service  of  the  main  force  of  the  army,  she  might 
well  believe  that  the  strife  would  be  but  tempora 
ry,  and  that,  in  the  accumulated  difficulties  attend 
ing  the  prosecution  of  the  war  beyond  the  original 
term  of  service,  ghe  could  obtain  more  favorable 
terms  of  peace  in  the  end,  even  if  unsuccessful  in 
the  contest.  It  was  hardly  thought  at  Washing 
ton  that  it  would  be  requisite  to  carry  the  arms  of 
the  United  States  to  the  city  of  Mexico.  Deem 
ing  that  a  few  more  blows  as  vigorous  as  those  of 

*  Correspondence  of  General  Gaines  with  the  Adjutant  General.  Congres 
sional  Globe,  first  Session  of  the  twenty -ninth  Congress, 


THE   WAR  WIT-H   MEXICO.  15g 

Palo  Alto  and  Resaca  would  convince  Mexico  of 
the  futility  of  resistance,  attention  was  at  first 
turned,  in  the  impracticability  of  operating  on  the 
seaboard  in  summer,  and  in  the  anxiety  of  the 
American  public,  toward  the  Rio  Grande  as  the 
base  of  operations.  For  conducting  the  great  move 
ments  of  the  war,  and  the  command  of  all  troops, 
both  regular  and  volunteer,  General  Scott,  the 
commander-in-chief  of  the  American  army,  was. 
designated,  and  was  ordered  to  hold  himself  in 
readiness  for  the  duty.  Although  he  at  first  man 
ifested  no  anxiety  for  the  service,  and  treated  the 
matter  with  indifference,  he  at  once  entered  upon 
the  duties  of  preparation,  and  upon  an  occupation 
which  might  have  served  to  amuse  his  leisure 
for  several  previous  months.  "  The  study  of  the 
routes  of  march  and  water  conveyances  for  the 
several  bodies  of  troops  to  the  best  points  on  the 
frontiers  of  Mexico,  in  the  study  of  the  northern, 
interior,  and  southern  routes  of  that  republic,  in 
looking  to  the  means  of  transportation  on  the  Rio 
Grande,  to  and  beyond  that  river,  and  in  deter 
mining  the  depots  of  supplies  of  all  sorts  on  the 
American  side,"  &c> 

But  circumstances  and  the  character  of  the  gen- 
eral-in-chief  soon  produced  an  embarrassing  rup 
ture,  and  rendered  his  study  of  no  immediate  profit 
to  himself  or  the  service.  General  Scott  had  for 
a  long  period  cherished  political  aspirations,  and 

*  Correspondence  of  General  Scott  with  the  War  Department.    Congres 
sional  Globe,  first  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress. 


154  THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO. 

from  his  position,  his  high  reputation  for  bravery 
and  military  skill,  the  Whig  party  leaders  had  fre 
quently  spoken  of  him  as  their  candidate,  and  kept 
alive  hopes  destined  to  be  blasted  either  by  the 
selection  of  another  or  by  the  success  of  political 
enemies. 

The  war  with  Mexico  afforded  a  field  for  the  ex 
ercise  of  Scott's  military  knowledge,  which  might, 
in  reason,  be  expected  to  increase  his  reputation 
with  a  people  so  adulous  of  military  glory  as  are 
the  Americans,  and  ultimately  raise  him  to  the 
presidency.  Such  were  the  anticipations  of  many 
of  both  political  parties ;  and,  in  the  crisis  in  which 
the  country  then  was,  the  movements  of  the  gen- 
eral-in-chief  were  watched  with  anxiety.  Many 
remarks  were  made  by  prominent  men  concerning 
his  delay  in  Washington,  both  on  the  part  of  his 
friends  and  enemies. 

To  disprove  the  charge  of  inactivity  which  would, 
in  any  interval  of  active  operations,  be  brought 
against  the  government,  the  President  of  the  Unit 
ed  States  was  anxious  for  his  departure,  and  espe 
cially  that  the  troops  called  out  by  General  Gaines, 
and  already  at  the  seat  of  war,  should  be  employ 
ed  under  direction  of  the  general  who  was  to  con 
duct  the  main  operations.  Of  this  wish,  and  the  ex 
isting  state  of  opinion,  General  Scott  was  informed 
by  the  Secretary  of  War  in  a  personal  interview. 

The  information  was  considered  of  so  much  im 
portance,  that,  on  the  21st  of  May,  the  general-in- 
chief  felt  himself  called  upon  to  suspend  his  labors 


THE    WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

• 

of  preparation,  to  explain  his  occupation  and  views, 
to  denounce  those  who  differed  from  him  in  opin 
ion,  and  to  impress  upon  the  executive  officers  of  * 
the  government  that  it  was  necessary  that  the  com 
manding  general  of  an  invading  army  should  have 
the  full  confidence  and  support  of  his  superiors  at 
home ;  all  of  which  was  apparently  considered  re 
quisite,  on 'the  part  of  General  Scott,  "to  protect 
himself  from  a  fire  in  his  rear  from  Washington."* 
The  requests,  in  many  things,  were  sensible,  and  his 
views  upon  the  proposed  military  operations,  had 
they  been  based  upon  accurate  data,  might  not  have 
been  without  merit ;  unless,  indeed,  he  was  too  confi 
dent  of  success  in  preparing  and  organizing  a  force 
in  three  months'  time  which  was  to  conquer  a  peace 
by  "  regular,  incessant,  and  forward  movements" 
in  the  direction  of  Mexico,  from  the  base  of  the  Rio 
Grande.  But,  whatever  reason  there  was  in  his 
requests  or  in  his  views,  his  manner  of  expressing 
them  was  singularly  unfortunate.  His  letter  was 
considered  arrogant  in  its  tone,  reflecting  strongly 
upon  the  motives  of  the  President  and  Secretary, 
and  the  reasons  alleged  for  its  composition  were 
deemed  to  be  of  an  exceedingly  personal  charac 
ter.  It  was  at  once  determined  to  relieve  him  from 
the  service  proposed,  and  on  the  25th  the  Secreta 
ry  of  War  informed  General  Scott  that  he  would 
remain  in  Washington. 

In  subsequent  correspondence,  the  general-in- 

*  Correspondence  of  General  Scott  with  the  War  Department.     Congres 
sional  Globe,  first  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

• 

chief  endeavored  to  explain  the  offensive  portions 
of  his  letter,  to  place  his  imputations  of  bad  faith 
at  the  door  of  the  President's  advisers,  and  express 
ed  his  willingness  to  depart  at  such  time  as  the 
President  might  direct.7^  The  confidence  which 
may  have  been  reposed  in  him  up  to  that  time  was, 
however,  shaken,  and  no  orders  were  given  him 
immediately  to  proceed  to  Mexico.  The  superse- 
dure  of  the  general-in-chief  necessarily  attracted 
much  attention,  and  would  doubtless  have  been 
made  the  subject  of  a  charge  of  injustice  had  not 
the  correspondence  been  called  for  by  Congress  and 
published.  In  consequence,  the  rebuke  adminis 
tered  by  refusing  the  command  of  the  army  to  Gen 
eral  Scott  was  supported  by  the  manifestations  of 
public  opinion,  called  forth,  however,  as  much  by 
the  peculiarity  of  his  style  as  by  any  just  appreci 
ation  of  his  motives. 

The  geiieral-kuchief  having  been  set  aside  in  a 
measure,  General  Taylor  was  soon  after  charged 
with  the  direction  of  the  movements  of  the  main 
army,  and  in  the  want  of  any  well-understood 
plan  of  operations,  the  consequence  of  his  absence 
from  Washington,  and  other  circumstances,  was 
soon  found  another  element  of  difficulty.  More 
over,  General  Taylor  had  two  superiors  at  Wash 
ington,  both  of  whom  wrote  to  him,  soon  after  his 
assignment  to  command,  in  terms  which,  when  the 
two  letters  are  compared,  will  be  seen  to  have  been 

*  Correspondence  of  General  Scott  with  the  War  Department.     Congres 
sional  Globe,  first  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


157 


calculated  to  impress  him  with  the  belief  that  the 
authorities  at  home  were  not  very  decided  as  to 
their  own  views  of  the  necessary  end  of  the  opera 
tions,  and  to  induce  a  corresponding  indecision  on 
his  part. 

Mr.  Marcy  wrote  to  General  Taylor  on  the  8th 
of  June,  informing  him  of  his  assignment  to  the 
command,  and  of  the  amount  of  re-enforcement 
which  he  might  expect.  In  regard  to  the  imme 
diate  operations  of  the  army,  the  hope  was  express 
ed  that  he  would  he  ahle  to  place  considerable 
bodies  of  troops  in  healthy  situations  upon  the  Rio 
Grande,  and  that,  in  the  mean  time,  Monterey 
should  be  taken  and  held.  Much  was  left  to  the 
discretion  of  the  general.  His  views  upon  future 
operations  were  requested,  and  he  was  directed  to 
inform  the  department  of  the  requisite  proportion 
of  the  different  arms  of  troops.  The  question  of 
most  importance  propounded  was,  "  Shall  the  cam 
paign  be  conducted  with  the  view  of  striking  at  the 
city  of  Mexico,  or  confined,  so  far  as  regards  the 
forces  under  your  immediate  command^  to  the  north 
ern  provinces  of  Mexico  ?"  And  this  was  a  ques 
tion  to  which  the  answer  of  the  commanding  gener 
al  was  necessary  before  any  decision  could  be  made 
with  regard  to  the  proper  course  of  operations.^ 
.  Four  days  after  this  question  was  proposed  in 
Mr.  Marcy's  letter,  General  Scott  wrote  to  Gen- 

*  Correspondence  of  the  War  Department  with  General  Taylor.  Execu 
tive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirti 
eth  Congress,  p.  323. 


158  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

eral  Taylor  on  the  same  subjects,  giving  him  simi 
lar  information  of  the  amount  of  re-enforcement 
sent  to  him,  and  positively  setting  forth  what  was 
called  the  wish  of  the  President  as  follows : 

"  Without  waiting  for  the  arrival  of  that  amount 
of  force  (28,070),  but  before,  and  as  soon  as  you  shall 
deem  it  safe  in  respect  to  the  relative  numbers  and 
position  of  the  enemy,  your  knowledge  of  the  coun 
try,  your  supplies,  and  the  means  of  transporta 
tion,  it  is  the  wish  and  expectation  of  the  Presi 
dent  that,  with  your  accustomed  energy,  you  take 
up  lines  of  march  beyond  the  Rio  Grande,  and 
press  your  operations  toward  the  heart  of  the  ene 
my's  country,  that  is,  upon  such  important  points 
as  you  may  deem  it  necessary  to  conquer  and  to 
hold.  The  high  road  to  the  capital  of  Mexico  will, 
of  course,  be  one  of  those  lines ;  and,  if  successful 
in  your  advances,  the  establishment  of  posts  in 
your  rear,  well  guarded,  according  to  their  distan 
ces  from  each  other  and  the  dangers  of  recapture, 
will  be  objects  demanding  your  care.  How  far  it 
may  be  necessary  for  you  to  penetrate,  if  not,  at 
least,  to  the  capital,  and  what  halts  you  may  find 
it  proper  to  make  short  of  that  mark;  will,  of  course, 
depend  upon  the  events  of  the  war.  Should  con 
tinued  success  attend  your  operations,  you  may, 
some  time  before,  be  met  by  the  proposition  to  treat 
for  peace,  with  an  intermediate  armistice.  No  such 
proposition  will  be  entertained  by  you  without 
your  being  first  satisfied  that  it  is  made  in  good 
faith,  and  without  your  being  in  possession,  or  put 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

by  stipulation  into  possession  of  such  commanding 
positions  as  will  insure  good  faith  on  the  part  of 
the  enemy.  Being  satisfied  on  this  point,  you  may 
conclude  an  armistice  for  a  limited  time,  and  refer 
the  proposition  to  treat  for  peace  to  the  govern 
ment  here."^ 

The  discrepancy  between  these  two  papers  re 
quires  but  little  commentary.  The  first  propound 
ed  a  question  to  the  commanding  general  in  the 
field,  which  must  .have  implied  that  it  was  yet 
open,  and  that  his  views  were  necessary  for  its  de 
cision.  The  second,  from  General  Scott,  gave  him 
to  understand  that  it  was  the  wish  and  expecta 
tion  of  the  President  that  the  high  road  to  the  city 
of  Mexico  should  be  one  of  his  lines  of  march ;  and 
if  this  had  already  been  decided  at  Washington, 
how  could  it  be  believed  that  General  Taylor  could 
do  otherwise  than  give  his  attention  to  move 
ments  upon  it?  What  necessity  was  there  of  his 
expressing  an  immediate  opinion,  if  he  had  any, 
upon  other  movements?  Certainly  having  two 
commanders  at  Washington  was  as  absurd  as  it 
was  useless,  especially  when  the  state  of  feeling 
existing  between  them  was  such  as  to  render  har 
monious  action  impossible.  If  General  Scott's  let 
ter  were  submitted  to  the  Secretary  of  War  .before 
it  was  sent  off,  it  must  have  been  seen  that  it  could 
have  none  other  than  a  pernicious  effect.  If  Gen- 

*  Correspondence  of  General  Scott  with  General  Taylor.  Executive  Doc 
ument,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Con 
gress,  p.  325. 


160  THE    WAR   WITH    MEXICO. 

eral  Scott,  desirous  of  retaining  the  semblance  of 
•command,  wrote  it  without  any  authority  other 
than  that  which  was  gathered  in  incidental  con 
versation,  it  was  a  most  unwarrantable  interference, 
and  especially  in  the  directions  concerning  the  ar 
mistice,  which  might  better  have  come,  under  any 
circumstances,  direct  from  the  secretary.  A  sup 
plemental  note  on  this  subject  was  afterward  sub 
mitted  to  him,  and  received  his  sanction;^  but 
whether  the  first  letter  had  it  or  not,  the  attempt  to 
keep  General  Scott  in  imaginary  command  seems 
to  have  been"  soon  after  given  up  on  the  part  of  the 
administration  as  well  as  his  own ;  for  no  further 
instructions  of  the  nature  proceeded  from  him  for 
some  subsequent  time. 

On  the  2d  of  July  General  Taylor  answered 
both  these  letters,  in  a  communication  to  the  ad 
jutant  general  of  the  army,  from  Matamoras;  and 
in  the  answer  he  confined  himself  to  the  considera 
tion  of  the  facilities  of  the  advance  by  the  northern 
route  from  the  base  of  the  Rio  Grande.  After  ex 
plaining  delays,  and  announcing  his  intention  of 
moving  with  a  column  of  about  6000  men  upon  an 
experimental  expedition  as  far  as  Monterey,  the 
great  object  of  which  appeared  to  be  to  ascertain 
the  agricultural  capacity  of  the  route,  and  especial 
ly  the  valley  of  the  San  Juan,  he  proceeded  to  give 
his  views  in  respect  to  that  route,  and  to  opera- 

*  Correspondence  of  General  Scott  with  General  Taylor.  Executive  Doc 
ument,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Con 
gress,  p.  328. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


161 


tions  upon  it,  which  were  made  to  depend  almost 
entirely  on  the  question  of  subsistence.  It  was 
considered  that  6000  men  was  the  maximum  force 
which  could  be  employed  on  the  expedition,  having 
regard  to  their  subsistence,  and  the  "  resources  of 
the  country  in  'pack  mules  and  transportation  gen 
erally"  His  ulterior  views,  having  advanced  to 
Saltillo,  upon  the  movements  of  the  war,  as  de 
pendent  upon  the  topography  of  the  country  and 
the  questions  previously  discussed,  were  set  forth 
in  the  following  paragraphs  : 

"Supposing  a  column  of  the  above  strength 
(6000  men)  able  to  maintain  itself  at  Saltillo,  it 
will  become  a  question,  depending  for  its  solution 
upon  the  elements  above  indicated,  how  far  that 
force  may  be  increased,  or  what  amount,  of  the 
twelve  months'  volunteers  may  be  safely  and  prof 
itably  thrown  forward  from  the  rear  with  a  view 
to  future  operations. 

"  From  Camargo  to  the  city  of  Mexico  is  a^line 
little,  if  any,  short  of  1000  miles  in  length.  The 
resources  of  the  country  are,  to  say  the  best,  not 
superabundant,  and  over  long  spaces  of  the  route 
are  known  to  be  deficient.  Although  the  road,  as 
we  advance  south,  approaches  both  seas,  yet  the 
topography  of  the  country,  and  the  consequent 
character  of  the  communications,  forbid  the  taking 
up  a  new  line  of  supply  from  Tampico  or  the  Pa 
cific  coast.  Except  in  the  case,  deemed  improba 
ble,  of  the  entire  acquiescence,  if  not  support,  on 
the  part  of  the  Mexican  people,  I  consider  it  im- 
I.— L 


THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO. 

practicable  to  keep  open  so  long  a  line  of  commu 
nication.  It  is  therefore  rny  opinion  that  our  op 
erations  from  this  frontier  should  not  look  to  the 
city  of  Mexico,  but  should  be  confined  to  cutting 
off  the  northern  provinces — an  undertaking  of  com 
parative  facility  and  asstirance  of  success."^ 

The  remainder  of  General  Taylor's  answer  con 
tained  information  relative  to  his  arrangements; 
but  throughout  there  was  no  other  decided  recom 
mendation  of  any  military  course,  except  that  the 
operations  from  the  north  should  be  confined  to  the 
cutting  off  of  the  northern  provinces,  which  it  was 
supposed  at  the  time  would  be  assisted  by  the 
Chihuahua  expedition. 

Before  this  answer  was  received  at  Washington, 
on  the  9th  of  July  Mr.  Marcy  addressed  a  confi 
dential  communication  to  General  Taylor  upon  the 
subject  of  the  campaign.  He  was  enjoined  to  con 
tinue  the  peaceful  policy  which  he  had  hitherto 
adopted  with  the  people  of  the  country,  and  to  take 
every  opportunity  of  disabusing  them  of  the  idea 
that  the  war  was  to  be  one  of  rapine  and  plunder ; 
to  assist  any  of  the  northern  states  in  their  at 
tempt  to  become  independent  of  the  central  gov 
ernment,  or  to  remain  neutral  during  the  war,  pro 
vided  such  assistance  did  not  interfere  with  his 
military  operations.  These,  it  was  said,  must  pro 
ceed  vigorously.  "  Policy  and  force  are  to  be  com- 

*  General  Taylor  to  the  Adjutant  General.    Executive  Document,  No. 
60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

bined,  and  the  fruits  of  the  former  will  "be  prized  as 
highly  as  the  latter."* 

Such  directions  as  the  foregoing  must  have  been 
induced  by  the  knowledge  of  the  unstable  nature 
of  Mexican  authority,  without  a  definite  under 
standing  of  the  importance  or  the  resources  of  the 
states  referred  to,  which  could  not  be  well  ascer 
tained  at  Washington.  Being  indefinite,  they  can 
only  be  regarded  as  an  expression  of  general  policy, 
to  be  made,  if  possible,  an  incidental  aid  in  obtain 
ing  the  end  of  the  war.  But  in  this  letter  of  July 
9th  is  found  the  first  positive  mention  of  any  plan 
for  striking  at  the  center  of  Mexican  resources  found 
in  any  of  the  military  correspondence  on  the  Mexi 
can  war.  It  is  set  forth  as  follows : 

*"  If,  from  all  the  information  which  you  may 
communicate  to  the  department,  as  well  as  that 
derived  from  other  sources,  it  should  appear  that 
the  difficulties  and  obstacles  to  the  conducting  of 
a  campaign  from  the  Rio  Grande,  the  present  base 
of  your  operations,  for  any  considerable  distance 
into  the  interior  of  Mexico,  will  be  very  great,  the 
department  will  consider  whether  the  main  inva 
sion  should  not  ultimately  take  place  from  some 
other  point  on  the  coast,  say  Tampico,  or  some 
other  point  in  the  vicinity  of  Vera  Cruz.  This 
suggestion  is  made  with  a  view  to  call  your  atten 
tion  to  it,  and  to  obtain  from  you  such  information 
as  you  may  be  able  to  impart.  Should  it  be  de- 

*  Mr.  Marcy  to  General  Taylor.  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of 
Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  333. 


164  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

termined  that  the  main  army  should  invade  Mex 
ico  at  some  other  point  than  the  Rio  Grande — say 
the  vicinity  of  Vera  Cruz — a  large  and  sufficient 
numher  of  transport  vessels  could  he  placed  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande  hy  the  time  the  healthy 
season  sets  in — say  early  in  November.  The  main 
army,  with  all  its  munitions,  could  he  transported, 
leaving  a  sufficient  force  behind  to  hold  and  occu 
py  the  Rio  Grande,  and  all  the  towns  and  prov 
inces  which  you  may  have  conquered  before -that 
time.  In  the  event  of  such  being  the  plan  of  oper 
ations,  your  opinion  is  desired  what  increased 
force,  if  any,  will  be  required  to  carry  it  out  with 
success.  We  learn  that  the  army  could  be  disem 
barked  a  few  miles  distant  from  Vera  Cruz,  and 
readily  invest  the  town  in  its  rear,  without  coming 
within  range  of  the  guns  of  the  fortress  of  San 
Juan  d'Ulloa.  The  town  could  readily  be  taken 
by  land,  while  the  fortress,  being  invested  by  land 
and  sea,  and  all  communication  cut  off,  must  soon 
fall.  From  Yera  Cruz  to  the  city  of  Mexico  there 
is  a  fine  road,  upon  which  the  diligences  or  stage 
coaches  run  daily.  The  distance  from  Vera  Cruz 
to  the  city  of  Mexico  is  not  more  than  one  third 
of  that  from  the  Rio  Grande  to  the  city  of  Mexico. 
Upon  these  important  points,  in  addition  to  those 
mentioned  in  my  letter  of  the  8th  of  June,  your 
opinions  and  views  are  desired  at  the  earliest  pe 
riod  your  duties  will  permit  you  to  give  them.  In 
the  mean  time,  the  department  confidently  relies 
on  you  to  press  forward  your  operations  vigorously 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  ^5 

to  the  extent  of  your  means,  so  as  to  occupy  the 
important  points  within  your  reach  on  the  Rio 
Grande  and  in  the  interior."^  The  letter  closed 
by  requesting  a  table  of  distances  from  Chihuahua 
to  the  port  of  Guyamas,  on  the  Pacific,  as  that 
was  necessary  in  order  to  determine  the  practica- 
bility  of  completing  a  cordon  across  the  continent. 
To  this  General  Taylor  replied  on  the  1st  of 
August  from  Matamoras.  The  first  and  second 
paragraphs  of  his  letter  were  in  answer  to  the  por 
tions  of  Mr.  Marcy's  dispatch  which  related  to  the 
policy  of  the  American  government  in  treating  the 
inhabitants  of  the  country  with  leniency,  and 
availing  itself  of  the  dissensions  among  the  Mex 
icans.  His  views  on  that  subject  were  as  indef 
inite  as  his  instructions,  although  he  coincided, 
in  the  main,  with  the  Secretary  of  War,  and 
stated  that  he  should  fully  comply  with  them 
upon  that  point,  should  opportunity  occur.  The 
third  paragraph  related  to  military  operations, 
and  his  views  were  thus  expressed:  "As  to  the 
military  operations  best  calculated  to  secure  an 
early  and  honorable  peace,  my  report  of  the  2d  of 
July  will  have  put  the  department  in  possession 
of  my  views  touching  operations  in  this  quarter, 
and  I  have  now  little  to  add  to  that  report.  Wheth 
er  a  large  force  can  be  subsisted  beyond  Monterey 
must  be  determined  by  actual  experiment,  and  will 
depend  much  upon  the. disposition  of  the  enemy  to- 

*  Mr.  Marcy  to  General  Taylor.     Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of 
Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  335. 


IQQ  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

ward  us.     If  a  column  (say  10,000  men)  can  be 
sustained  in  provisions  at  Saltillo,  it  may  advance 
thence  upon  San  Luis  Potosi,  and,  I  doubt  not, 
would  speedily  bring  proposals  for  peace.     If,  on 
the  other  hand,  a  column  can  not  be  sustained 
beyond  Monterey,  it  will  be  for  the  government  to 
determine,  from  considerations  of  state,  whether  a 
simple  occupation  of  the  frontier  departments  (in 
cluding  Chihuahua  and  New  Mexico),  or,  in  addi 
tion  to  such  occupation,  an  expedition  against  the 
capital  (by  way  of  Vera  Cruz),  would  be  most  ex 
pedient.     I  can  not  give  a  positive  opinion  as  to 
the  practicability  of  an  expedition  against  Vera 
Cruz,  or  the  amount  of  force  that  would  probably 
be  required  for  it.     The  Department  of  War  must 
be  much  better  informed  than  I  am  on  that  point. 
From  the  impracticable  character  of  the  routes  from 
Tampico,  particularly  that  leading  to  Mexico,  I 
should  judge  an  expedition  against  the   capital 
from  that  point  to  be  out  of  the  question.     The 
simultaneous  embarkation  of  a  large  body  of  troops 
at  Brazos  Santiago,  as  proposed  in  the  secretary's 
communication,  would  be  attended  with  great  dif 
ficulty,  if  we  may  judge  from  the  delays  and  dan 
ger   which   accompany   the   unloading   of  single 
transports,  owing  to  the  almost  perpetual  rough 
ness  of  the  bar  and  boisterous  character  of  the  an 
chorage.     It  may  also  well  be  questioned  whether 
a  force  of  volunteers,  without  much  instruction, 
more  than  those  now  here  can  receive  in  season 
for  such  an  expedition,  can  prudently  be  allowed 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  ^57 

to  form  the  bulk  of  an  army  destined  for  so  deli 
cate  an  operation  as  a  descent  upon  a  foreign  coast, 
where  it  can  have  no  proper  base  of  operations  or 
supplies."^ 

The  remainder  of  the  letter  referred  to  his  pres 
ent  operations,  and  he  inclosed  the  required  table 
of  distances,  which  spoke  more  forcibly  concerning 
the  practicability  of  sending  an  expedition  to  Guy- 
amas  than  could  any  opinions  of  the  general. 

The  correspondence  upon  the  plan  of  operations 
ceased  for  a  time,  and  the  executive  officers  of  the 
United  States  were  thrown  upon  their  own  resour 
ces  for  the  arrangement  of  the  great  movements 
of  the  war ;  and,  in  the  mean  time,  such  as  were 
undertaken  progressed  with  but  partial  ends  in 
view,  and  without  any  regard  to  the  great  object 
of  the  conflict,  or  that  unity  of  action  which  is  the 
first  requisite  of  military  operations. 

This  was  first  neglected  in  the  minor  expedi 
tions  of  New  Mexico,  and  California,  and  Chihua 
hua.  But  the  two  first  were  each  for  a  definite 
end,  and  all  three  were  against  separate  states,  dis 
tant  from  the  resources  of  Mexico,  which  could  not, 
from  the  nature  of  the  country  and  the  force  of  cir 
cumstances,  be  brought  to  their  support.  They 
could  not  interfere  with,  much  less  control,  the  op 
eration  of  the  main  army.  That  could,  in  propri 
ety,  have  but  one  object,  which  was  to  force  Mexi 
co  to  make  peace  on  the  terms^of  the  United  States; 

*  General  Taylor  to  the  President.  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House 
of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  337. 


THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

and  a  determined  and  well-settled  plan  for  obtain 
ing  this  end  was  the  first  requisite  for  successful 
operation.  To  obtain  any  concessions  by  treaty 
through  the  means  of  force,  it  is  necessary  that  the 
demanding  party  should  be  in  position  to  present 
an  alternative  more  disadvantageous  than  the  de 
manded  concession,  and  the  disparity  must  be  in 
creased  with  the  obstinacy  of  the  refusers.  In 
most  nations  it  is  even  necessary  to  present  the 
alternative  of  a  loss  of  nationality  as  the  extreme 
consequence  of  refusal,  certainly  of  great  national 
calamity  and  distress.  With  a  country  so  inde 
pendent  of  commerce  as  Mexico,  and  of  such  pecu 
liar  characteristics,  there  was  but  one  ultimate  end 
— to  seize  upon  the  center  of  her  resources  and  her 
power,  and  present,  as  soon  as  possible,  the  last  al 
ternative,  of  submission  or  extinction. 
,  The  capital  of  Mexico,  like  that  of  all  other  coun 
tries  without  commerce  and  free  communication, 
was  the  center  of  her  resources,  and  attention  was 
directed  to  its  capture,  should  it  become  necessary, 
and  the  route  by  which  it  was  to  be  achieved. 
Certainly,  in  the  attainment  of  peace,  it  was  the 
part  of  good  policy  to  threaten  the  great  and  final 
military  object  as  speedily  as  possible,  and  to  waste 
no  more  time  upon  partial  operations  than  was  ab 
solutely  necessary.  While,  therefore,  it  was  well 
to  employ  the  troops,  during  the  sickly  season  on 
the  Gulf  coast,  in  the  partial  operations  of  the 
north,  both  in  reference  to  their  instruction  and 
health,  besides,  by  inflicting  the  lesser  evils  of  the 


THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO. 

war  upon  Mexico,  to  increase  her  inducements  to 
make  peace  in  a  season  of  necessary  inactivity, 
yet  to  regard  such  employment  as  the  great  end 
of  the  war  would  have  heen  folly.  Certainly  the 
contemplated  movement  of  troops  in  a  distant 
country,  without  any  definite  ohject  other  than 
to  ascertain  the  capacity  of  a  certain  region  in 
subsistence,  when  it  was  considered,  and  with 
good  reason,  a  question  of  much  doubt  whether 
one  step  in  advance  should  he  taken  after  the  ex 
periment  was  verified,  might  have  induced,  on  the 
part  of  the  general  commanding- in  the  field,  a  sug 
gestion  of  some  other  end  than  that  which  he  had 
immediately  in  view,  and  something  more  positive 
upon  the  suggestion  of  Mr.  Marcy,  which  was  final 
ly  adopted  at  Washington,  than  the  statement  of 
difficulties  without  any  suggestion  for  overcoming 
them.  The  effect  of  the  want  of  arrangement  of  a 
plan  of  operations  in  the  outset  will  he  seen  in  the 
sequel ;  hut,  under  all  these  circumstances,  with, 
an  unfriendly  general-in-chief,  with  a  small  regu 
lar  army,  with  a  violent  opposition  party,  and  with 
out  positive  advice  or  suggestion  from  the  general 
in  the  field,  it  can  not  he  denied  that  the  task  of 
the  cabinet  at  Washington  to  arrange  the  outline 
of  attack,  at  a  distance  of  near  two  thousand  miles 
from  Mexico,  was  one  of  no  small  magnitude  and 
difficulty. 

While  the  correspondence  upon  the  plan  of  cam 
paign  was  carried  on,  various  circumstances  delay 
ed  the  preparations  for  movement  in  the  partial  op- 


170  THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO. 

erations  which  the  general  had  determined  upon. 
The  number  of  volunteers  which  had  heen  sent 
out  under  the  unauthorized  requisitions  of  Gener 
al  Gaines  exceeded  by  some  three  thousand  the 
number  which  had  heen  called  for  by  General  Tay 
lor  on  the  26th  of  April,  and  the  arrival  of  these 
troops,  without  any  corresponding  increase  of  trans 
portation,  field  equipment,  or  subsistence,  necessa 
rily  embarrassed  his  movements.^  When  the  req 
uisition  had  been  made,  it  had  been  the  intention 
of  General  Taylor  to  employ  the  new  troops,  in  con 
junction  with  the  regulars,  for  the  purpose  of  clear 
ing  the  river,  and  performing  any  other  service 
which  might  be  ordered  by  the  government.  After 
the  arrival  of  the  first  detachments  of  the  force,  he 
contemplated  making  the  movement  upon  Monte 
rey,  to  operate  in  the  valley  of  the  San  Juan, f  and 
for  this  object  it  was  deemed  absolutely  necessary 
to  use  the  Rio  Grande  as  the  channel  of  communi 
cation  as  far  up  as  Camargo.  Some  arrangements 
for  procuring  a  number  of  steamers  to  navigate  the 
Rio  Grande  had  been  early  made,  but  it  was  not 
until  the  28th  of  May  that  an  officer  was  sent  to 
the  United  States  to  purchase  and  send  out  steam 
ers  of  sufficient  number  and  suitable  description  for 
the  navigation  of  the  river  to  the  extent  required 
for  any  great  operation.^  There  was  much  delay 

*  General  Taylor  to  the  Adjutant  General,  May  20th,  1846.  Executive 
Document,  No.  -60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth 
Congress,  p.  99.  t  Idem,  May  21,  1846.  Idem,  p.  300. 

t  Major  Bliss  to  Capt.  Sanders,  May  28th,  1846.  Executive  Document,  No. 
60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  552. 


THE    WAR,  WITH   MEXICO.  ^^j 

in  the  arrival  of  those  purchased  under  the  author 
ity  of  the  general,  as  well  as  of  others  dispatched 
by  the  quarter-master's  department  from  New  Or 
leans.  The  light  draft  required  rendered  it  a  mat 
ter  of  much  hazard  for  them  to  cross  the  Gulf,  and 
delays  were  a  necessary  consequence.  In  the 
mean  while,  a  battalion  was  pushed  up  the  river 
as  far  as  Reynosa,  and  upon  the  arrival  of  steam 
ers  a  regiment  was  sent  at  once  to  Camargo,  which 
town  was  looked  to  as  the  depot  pending  the  op 
erations  on  Monterey.  These  small  towns  were 
occupied  without  any  opposition  whatever,  for  the 
Mexican  army  had  fallen  back  beyond  them,  on 
the  road  to  Monterey.  As  steamers  continued  to 
arrive,  additional  troops  and  munitions  were  thrown 
forward,  but  it  was  not  until  the  24th  of  July  that 
Worth's  division  was  concentrated  at  Camargo. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  different  quotas  of  twelve 
months'  volunteers  commenced  to  arrive  in  the 
country  of  operations.  As  no  definite  end  of  the 
immediate  movements  of  the  army  had  been  con 
certed  between  the  commanding  general  and  the 
officers  of  the  executive  departments,  many  things 
necessary  for  the  efficient  equipment  of  the  whole 
number  of  troops,  regulars  and  volunteers,  were 
wanting.  But  as  the  season  advanced,  and  steam 
ers  continued  to  arrive,  the  difficulty,  so  far  as  oc 
casioned  by  the  want  of  water  transportation,  was 
partially  obviated. 

The  Louisiana  volunteers,  who  had  responded 
to  G-aines's  call,  were  disposed  of  by  discharging 


172  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

them,  inasmuch  as  they  had  been  mustered  into 
service  for  an  illegal  term,  and  the  term  of  three 
months,  for  which  alone  they  could  be  held  to 
serve,  was  too  short  for  the  completion  of  any  oper 
ation  of  magnitude  in  which  they  might  engage. 
But  one  company  out  of  the  whole  number  would 
consent  to  be  mustered  into  service  for  twelve 
months,  and,  with  this  exception,  the  Louisiana 
volunteers  were  transported  by  return  steamers  to 
the  mouth  of  the  river,  and  thence  to  New  Orleans, 
to  be  discharged.^ 

By  the  1st  of  August  arrangements  had  been 
made  for  throwing  forward  the  main  body  of  the 
army  (regulars,  and  twelve  months'  volunteers). 
On  the  4th  General  Taylor  moved  his  head-quar 
ters  from  Matamoras,  and  arrived  on  the  8th  at 
Camargo.  The  greater  portion  of  his  troops  was 
soon  after  concentrated  at  that  point,  and  the  ex 
pedition  to  Monterey  was  organized.  Competent 
garrisons  had  been  left  at  the  various  towns  on 
the  river,  a  plentiful  supply  of  water  transportation 
had  arrived,  and  the  means  were  at  hand  for  keep 
ing  up  a  depot  of  any  requisite  size  at  Camargo, 
filled  from  the  valley  of  the  Mississippi.  The  only 
lack  of  means  then  felt  was  in  the  quantity  of  land 
transportation.  A  considerable  amount  was  at 
hand,  in  the  shape  of  pack  mules  of  the  country, 
and  the  disposition  of  the  inhabitants  was  such  as 
to  render  them  available.  Arrangements  were  im- 

*  Correspondence.      Executive  Document,  No.  60,  first  Session  of  the 
thirtieth  Congress,  House  of  Representatives,  p.  307-320. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  ^  7  3 

mediately  made  for  their  procurement,  and  a  suffi 
cient  number  for  the  service  of  a  column  of  about 
6000  men,  which  General  Taylor  had  contem 
plated  moving  with,  were  soon  engaged.  Whether 
'the  country  could  have  afforded  more  than  were 
furnished  is  perhaps  questionable ;  but  as  the  want 
of  transport  was  subsequently  made  a  subject  of 
serious  complaint,  it  may  be  believed  that  it  would 
have  been  difficult  to  obtain  them. 

The  regular  troops  of  the  army  were,  soon  after 
General  Taylor's  arrival  at  Camargo,  organized  into 
two  divisions,  under  Generals  Twiggs  and  Worth, 
and  on  the  19th  of  August  the  movement  on  Mon 
terey  commenced.  On  that  day  Worth's  first  bri 
gade  marched  to  establish  an  entrepot  at  Serralvo ; 
for  the  two  routes  which  led  from  Camargo  to 
Monterey,  through  Serralvo  and  China,  had  been 
reconnoitered  by  parties  under  Colonels,  Duncan 
and  Hays,  and,  in  consequence,  the  most  northerly, 
by  Serralvo,  had  been  chosen.  Serralvo  was  occu 
pied  without  opposition,  and  the  establishment  of 
the  entrepot  was  at  once  commenced.  Worth  em 
ployed  himself  in  collecting  additions  to  the  sup 
plies  of  bread-stuffs  and  forage  with  some  success, 
and  also  obtained  considerable  additional  trans 
portation.^  Spies  were  thrown  out  from  his  posi 
tion  toward  Monterey,  and  one  was  so  successful  as 
to  enter  that  town  and  return,  bringing  information 

*  General  Worth  to  Major  Bliss,  September  3d,  1846.  Executive  Docu 
ment,  No.  60,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  House  of  Representa 
tives,  p.  419. 


174  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

of  the  amount  of  Mexican  force,  and  the  nature  of 
the  defenses.  But  other  accounts  differed  so  wide 
ly,  that,  in  general,  not  much  was  known  of  the 
condition  of  things  at  the  city  which  was  about  to 
be  the  object  of  attack. 

On  the  24th,  Butler's  second  brigade  moved  from 
Camargo,  and  advanced  as  far  as  Puntiaguda, 
twelve  miles  in  rear  of  Serralvo,  to  which  place  its 
convoy  was  thrown  forward. 

Twiggs's  troops  marched  by  brigades  subsequent 
ly,  each  having  under  its  escort  a  train  of  provis 
ions  for  the  entrepot,  and  thus,  in  succession,  the 
corps  of  the  regular  army  were  brought  up  to  Ser 
ralvo  and  its  vicinity. 

The  troops  of  the  twelve  months'  volunteers, 
which  were  to  form  part  of  the  column,  were  organ- 
ized  into  a  field  division.  The  reasons  for  dispens 
ing  with  a  large  force,  which  was  at  his  disposal, 
in  the  ensuing  operations,  were  assigned  by  Gen 
eral  Taylor  in  the  following  paragraph  of  "  Orders 
No.  108,"  as  follows : 

"  The  limited  means  of  transportation,  and  the 
uncertainty  in  regard  to  the  supplies  that  may  be 
drawn  from  the  theater  of  operations,  imposes  upon 
the  commanding  general  the  necessity  of  taking 
into  the  field,  in  the  first  instance,  only  a  moder 
ate  portion  of  the  volunteer  force  now  under  his 
orders."* 

In  consequence,  four  regiments  constituted  the 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session 
the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  500. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


175 


field  division,  under  the  command  of  General  But 
ler,  with  Hamer  and  Quitman  as  his  brigadiers. 
The  remainder  of  the  volunteer  force,  amounting 
in  all,  exclusive  of  strong  garrisons  for  the  different 
posts  in  the  rear,  to  over  6000  troops,  were  left  in 
camp  and  garrison  at  Camargo,  and  at  the  different 
points  along  the  river. 

On  the  5th  of  September  General  Taylor  left 
Camargo  for  the  advance.  Butler's  division  march 
ed  on  the  6th.  On  the  9th  General  Taylor  arrived 
at  Serralvo,  and  by  the  13th  the  last  brigade  had 
arrived  at  that  point,  and  the  column  was  in  mo 
tion  for  Monterey. 

The  order  of  march  had  been  issued  on  the  llth, 
and  on  the  13th  Twiggs's  division  moved  in  ad 
vance,  followed  on  the  14th  and  15th  by  Worth's 
and  Butler's.  Two  regiments  of  Texan  horse, 
which  completed  the  force  of  the  column,  had  been 
sent  from  Camargo  by  the  southern  route  through 
the  town  of  China,  under  orders  to  join  the  main 
force  at  Marin. 

The  progress  of  the  column  was  unopposed  by 
any  serious  resistance,  although  several  alertes  took 
place  with  Mexican  cavalry  pickets  stationed  at 
different  points  on  the  route.  They  were  first  seen 
at  Papagayas  on  the  13th,  but  retired  without  re 
sistance.  On  the  14th,  a  trifling  affair  took  place 
at  Ramos  between  the  advanced  Texan  Rangers 
and  another  party  of  observation.  On  the  15th,  as 
the  head  of  the  column  approached  Marin,  a  force 
of  Mexican  lancers  was  observed  in  the  town,  but 


176  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

it  fell  back  immediately,  and  Twiggs's  division 
marching  through  the  place,  pitched  its  camp  that 
night  on  the  banks  of  the  Rio  San  Juan,  three 
miles  beyond  Marin,  and  twenty-four  miles  to  the 
northeast  of  Monterey.  At  this  point  the  army 
was  concentrated  on  the  following  days,  and  on  the 
morning  of  the  18th  the  whole  force  advanced  to 
gether. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Delays  in  Mexican  Preparation — Intrigues  of  the  Santanistas — Action  of  San 
ta  Anna — His  Plan  for  a  Pronunciamiento— Immediate  Effect — Action  of 
the  American  Government — Efforts  of  Paredes  to  retain  Power — His  Diffi 
culties — Revolution  of -August,  1846 — Downfall  of  Paredes — Return  of 
Santa  Anna — His  Manifesto,  August  the  16th— Action  of  the  Mexican 
Government  under  Salas — Attempted  Issue  of  Prize  Letters — American 
Offer  of  Negotiations — Arrival  of  Santa  Anna  at  the  Capital — Measures  of 
the  Mexican  Government— Preparation  at  Monterey — General  Mejia — 
Decrees  and  Proclamations  of  Ampudia. 

WHILE  the  preparations  of  the  United  States  for 
the  prosecution  of  hostilities  progressed  but  slowly 
in  the  cabinet  and  in  the  field,  those  of  Mexico  for 
the  same  end  were  delayed  by  the  political  in 
trigues  of  her  different  factions,  all,  as  usual,  pro 
fessing  deep  devotion  to  the  cause  of  their  country, 
and  denouncing  their  political  as  well  as  their  na 
tional  enemies  in  the  same  connection.  To  relate 
the  causes  of  changes  in  Mexican  administration, 
as  well  as  the  action  of  the  government  of  the 
United  States  as  connected  therewith,  reference 


THE    WAR   WITH   MEXICO.  5.77 

must  be  had  to  the  state  of  Mexico  a  short  period 
anterior  to  the  commencement  of  hostilities. 

The  monarchical  intentions  of  Paredes  and  his 
party,  well  divined  and  understood  by  his  oppo 
nents,  had  called  forth  a  violent  opposition  to  his 
administration.  The  partisans  of  Santa  Anna  at 
once  took  advantage  of  it  to  intrigue  for  his  reac- 
cession  to  power  and  the  overthrow  of  Paredes. 
The  ex-dictator  was  during  the  while  at  Havana, 
apparently  amusing  himself,  but  anxiously  watch 
ing  the  turns  of  the  political  wheel  in  Mexico,  in 
the  course  of  which  he  hoped  again  to  be  in  the 
ascendant.  He  had  not  been  wanting  in  personal 
agency  in  the  endeavors  to  bring  about  such  result, 
and  early  in  the  year  1846  had  proposed  a  plan 
for  a  pronunciamiento,  which  provided  in  its  first 
article  for  the  overthrow  of  the  government  of  Pa 
redes,  in  its  second  and  third  for  the  convocation 
of  a  Congress,  to  be  chosen  according  to  the  Con 
stitution  of  1824,  in  its  fourth  for  the  existence  of 
the  army,  and  in  its  fifth  for  the  punishment  of  its 
opponents.^  In  letters  to  his  friends  in  Mexico, 
Santa  Anna  declared  himself  in  favor  of  the  Con 
stitution  of  1824,  because,  in  the  existing  state  of 
things,  the  plan  which  he  had  formerly  advocated 
of  drawing  the  whole  power  of  Mexico  to  a  center 
for  the  purpose  of  insuring  unity  of  action  was  im 
practicable.  His  first  great  purpose  was,  however, 
the  overthrow  of  Paxedes's  government,  and  the  de- 

*  General  Santa  Anna's  plan.     Executive  Document,  No.  4,  House  of 
Representatives,  second  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  p.  35. , 

I.— M 


]_78  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICQ. 

feat  of  the  designs  of  that  person  and  Don  Lucas 
Alaman,  and  their  supporters.^  His  friends  in  gen 
eral  being  satisfied  with  his  views  ;and  intentions, 
the  plan  proposed  by  him  was  assiduously  circula 
ted  in  Mexico.  It  probably  would  have  met  with 
early  and  complete  success,  had  not  dissensions 
arisen  among  the  Santanistas  themselves,  in  con 
sequence  of  which,  at  the  instigation  of  Almonte, 
who,  although  one  of  the  ministry  of^Piaredes, 
was  mixed  up  in  the  intrigues,  various  alterations 
were  introduced,  which  rendered  the  plan  odious 
to  many  parties.!  Like  all  other  plans  which  are 
presented  by  Mexican  chiefs  when  they  wish  to 
ride  into  power  on  the  wave  of  revolution,  one  of 
its  strongest  features  was  the  guarantee  of  the  ex 
istence  of  the  army.  In  the  reasons  advised  by 
Santa  Anna  to  be  given  for  the  pronunciamiento, 
that  body  was  declared  to  be  in  danger  in  case  of 
the  accession  of  a  foreign  prince  to  power,  who,  it 
was  asserted,  would  confide  in  no  other  troops  than 
those  which  he  should  bring  with  him,  and  who 
would  exclude  all  Mexicans  from  public  employ 
ment  in  favor  of  his  own  countrymen  and  court 
iers.  Considerations  such  as  these,  once  fully  im 
pressed  upon  the  minds  of  the  leeches  who  have 
drained  the"  treasury  of  Mexico  for  their  own  bene 
fit,  would  doubtless  have  caused  the  immediate 
success  of  the  revolt,  the  downfall  of  the  despotism 
of  Paredes,  and  the  renewal  of  that  of  Santa  Anna. 

*  Letter  of  Santa  Anna.     Executive  Document,  No.  4,  House  of  Repre 
sentatives,  second  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  p.  36-38. 
t  Note  to  the  same.     Idem,  p.  38. 


,THE    WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  ^79 

The  effect  of  the  movement,  notwithstanding 
the  alteration  of  the  plan  proposed,  was  soon  ap 
parent.  Pronunciamientos  were  rife  early  in  the 
spring  of  1846,  and  in  April,  Don  Juan  Alvarez, 
who,  in  a  manner,  controlled  the  south  of  Mexico, 
pronounced  against  Paredes  upon  apian  of  his  own, 
and,  so  far  as  his  influence  extended  in  the  south 
ern  departments,  met  with  complete  success.^ 

Of  the  nature  of  these  intrigues,  and  the  designs 
of  either  party,  the  government  of  the  United  States 
was  fully  informed  by  Mr.  Black,  who  remained 
in  the  city  of  Mexico  after  the  departure  of  Mr. 
Slidell.  The  information  appears  to  have  heen 
given,  with  the  purpose  that  it  should  reach  the 
United  States  government,  hy  a  leading  Santanis- 
ta  ;  for  he  not  only  communicated  the  original  de 
sign  of  the  revolt  to  Mr.  Black,  hut  furnished  him 
with  a  copy  of  Santa  Anna's  plan,  and  of  a  letter 
which  explained  his  position  and  intended  course 
of  action.f  The  letter  of  Mr.  Black,  with  the  ac 
companying  papers,  reached  Washington  ahout 
the  12th  of  May,  and  the  suhject  was  immediately 
acted  upon  hy  the  executive  of  the  United  States. 

The  American  government  looked  with  no  favor 
upon  the  project  of  re-establishing  a  monarchy 
upon  the  northern  continent,  and  it  had  become 
fully  aware,  from  the  intelligence  just  then  re 
ceived  from  the  Rio  Grande,  as  well  as  from  the 

*  Mr.  Black  to  Mr.  Buchanan,  April  26,  1846. .  Executive  Document, 
No.  4,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress, 
p.  34.  t  Correspondence.  Idem,  p.  38. 


180  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

failure  of  negotiations,  that  there  existed  no  chance 
of  peace  while  Paredes  remained  in  power.*?  Its 
action  was  therefore  immediately  taken  to  favor 
his  competitor,  so  far  as  it  could  he  done  incidental 
ly,  and- without  any  direct  compromise  of  the  United 
States.  On  the  13th  of  May  orders  were  issued  to 
Commodore  Connor,  commanding  the  hlockading 
squadron  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  to  permit  the  en 
trance  of  Santa  Anna  into' Vera  'Cruz,  should  he  at 
tempt  to  pass.f  This  order,  given  hefore  the  re 
ceipt  of  .the  intelligence  of  the  battles  of  Palo  Alto 
and  Resaca  de  la  Palma,  could  have  heen  intend 
ed  for  no  other  purpose  than  to  intimate  ^sympathy 
for  the  liberal  as  opposed  to  the  monarchical  party 
of  Mexico,  for  it  was  given  without  any  correspond 
ence  with  Santa  Anna,  without  pledge  or  promise 
from  him,  and  was  in  effect  hut  an  intimation,  for 
no  force  could  have  hlockaded  the  coast  of  Mex 
ico  so  effectually  as  to  prevent  his  landing  in  the 
country  at  some  unfrequented  point,  if  he  felt  dis 
posed. 

Had  the  leaders  of  the  liberal  party  in  Mexico 
been  guided  by  aught  else  than  their  own  selfish 
views,  the  measure  of  policy  in  allowing  the  pas 
sage  of  Santa  Anna  would,  probably  have  had  its 
effect;  for.  it  was  certainly  the  interest  of  their 
country  to  make  peace  with  the  United  States,  and 
the  order  referred  to  must  have  been  taken  by  them 

*  President's  Annual  Message,  1846. 

t ,  Mr.  Bancroft  to  Commodore  Connor,  May  13th,  1846.  Executive  Docu 
ment,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Con 
gress,  p.  775-777. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  ^g^ 

as  an  exponent  of  friendly  feeling  in  case  they  were 
successful.  But  they  looked  only  to  the  primary 
objects  of  their  own  selfishness,  and  for  prompting 
these  they  enlarged  upon  the  military  talents  of 
Santa  Anna,  the  necessity  of  employing  them  in  the 
war,  and  kept  up  the  excitement  against  Paredes 
by  the  continued  cry  of  the  danger  in  which  the  lib 
erties  and  honor  of  the  nation  were  placed  in  con 
sequence  of  his  maladministration  while  engaged 
in  his  monarchical  intrigues.  Santa  Anna's  own 
course  was  very,  much  of  the  same  character. 
Whether  he  hoped  to  be  able  to  control  public  opin 
ion,  and  to.  turn  its  tide  when  he  gained  power,  is  a 
question  which  he  alone'  can  decide.  But  he.  was 
committed  to  a  hostile  course  of  action,,  while  lie 
was  at  Havana,  with  his  own  people ;  and,  notwith 
standing  the  repeated  asseverations  of  American 
newspapers  that  he  had  entered  into  engagements  . 
to  make  peace  as  soon  as  possible,  it  is  very  doubtful 
whether  he  ever  was  committed  on  that  side  fur 
ther  than  to  declare  that  he  would  acquiesce  in 
the  will  of  the  Mexican  people  ;  and  this  -not  to 
public  functionaries  nor  in  any  positive  manner, 
but  only  in  ordinary  conversation.  Whatever  may 
have  been  his  intentions,  if,,  indeed,  .he  had  any 
idea  of  making  peace,  the  publications  referred  to 
were  serious  embarrassments,  for  they  only  gave 
an  argument  to.  his  enemies  at  home,  to  meet 
which  he  was  obliged  to  commit  himself  still  more 
positively  to  measures  of  hostility. 

The  defeat  of  Arista  on  the  Rio  Grande  had  de- 


1Q2  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

prived  the  government  of  Paredes  of  the  prestige 
of  military  glory.  For  its  recovery,  and  for  the  re 
tention  of  power  by  a  retention  of  popularity,  all 
the  energy  of  the  president  and  ministry  was  put 
forth  in  raising  men  and  money ;  and  it  was  daily 
announced  that  Paredes  would  repair  to  the  army, 
to  conduct  operations  against  the  invaders  in  per 
son.  But  the  progress  of  the  different  intrigues  in 
which  he  was  a  party,  and  those  of  his  opponents, 
tended  to  prevent  his  departure  for  a  long  time,  if, 
indeed,  he  seriously  contemplated  leaving  the  capi 
tal.  The  revolt  of  Alvarez  had  not  been  suppress 
ed,  and  the  proceedings  of  the  >  Santanistas  threat 
ened  a  revolution  the  moment  he  was  beyond  the 
limits  of  the  city.  A  pronunciamiento  had  broken 
out  in  Jalisco,  and  a  portion  of  the  troops  destined 
for  the  north  were  ordered  thither  for  its  suppres 
sion.  This  was  another  cause  of  complaint  against 
Paredes  on  the  part  of  the  Santanistas,  as  it  was 
said  that  he  deprived  the  army  of  the  north,  then 
preparing  to  make  good  the  national  defense,  of  re- 
enforcement,  in  order  to  sustain  his  personal  pow 
er.  Early  measures  had  been  adopted  by  Paredes 
to  suppress  the  expression  of  opinion  adverse  to  his 
government,  but,  in  spite  of  the  penalties  threaten 
ed  against  editors,  both  opposition  and  its  expres 
sion  increased. 

In  the  mean  while,  a  color  of  legality  had  been 
given  to  his  usurped  authority  by  the  Congress 
assembled  under  his  early  convocataria,  which,  on 
the  13th  of  June,  elected  him  President  of  Mexi- 


THE  WAR,  WITH  MEXICO.  133 

co.^  On  the  following  day  he  solicited  and  ob 
tained  its  permission  to  take  military  command  of 
the  army ;  but  he  was  in  no  haste  to  depart,  and 
leave  political  affairs  in  confusion. 

He  had  to  arrange  many  things  preparatory  to 
active  operations,  as  well  as  to  secure  his  power. 
The  greatest  difficulty  was  encountered  in  raising 
money,  and  to,  enable  him  to  effect  it,  the  Congress 
passed  bills  giving  to  the  President  unlimited  pow 
er  in  that  respect,  as  well  as  in  the  appointment  of 
officers.  These  were  not,  however,  passed  until 
some  time  in  July ;  and  when,  with  the  security 
afforded  in  the  power  conferred,  Paredes  prepared 
to  leave  the  city  of  Mexico,  although  the  revolt  in 
Jalisco  was  still  a  cause  of  uneasiness  and  distrust, 
the  Santanistas,  who  watched  the  course  of  events 
with  eagerness,  fearful  of  danger  to  their  schemes 
should  he  with  this  unlimited  power  assume  com 
mand  of  a  large  army  in  the  field,  arranged  their 
plans  to  insure  his  downfall. 

It  was  announced  that  the  President  would  leave 
the  capital  on  the  31st  of  July.  On  that  day  the 
garrisons  of  Vera  Cruz  and  San  Juan  d'Ulloa,  head 
ed  by  Generals  Landero  and  Perez,  pronounced  in 
favor  of  Santa  Anna.  Immediately  on  the  recep 
tion  of  the  news  in  Mexico,  the  garrison  of  that  city 
joined  in  the  pronunciamiento,  and  General  Salas, 
who  proclaimed  himself  as  the  chief  of  the  liberat 
ing  army,  seized  upon  the  citadel.  'Valentin  Go 
mez  Farias,  a  leader  of  the  liberal  party,  acted  as 

*  Published  proceedings  of  the  Mexican  Congress. 


1£4  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

his  counselor,  and  lent  all  his  influence  to  support 
the  rebellion.  The  vice-president,  Bravo,  and  the 
ministry,  made  some  opposition  on  paper,  hut  it 
was  fruitless,  and  on  the  5th  of  August  the  insur 
gents  were  in  full  power,  and  Paredes  was  a  pris 
oner.  Some  intention  was  at  first  manifested  of 
inflicting  upon  him  summary  punishment  as  a  trai 
tor  and  a  monarchist ;  hut  Salas  chose  to  pursue 
a  different  course  of  policy,  and  the  only  proceed 
ings  against  him  were  to  deprive  him  of  his  liber 
ty.  Soon  after  he  left  the  country,  and  his  inter 
ference  with  Mexican  affairs  was  for  a  time  sus 
pended. 

During  the  progress  of  the  scheme  of  revolution, 
Santa  Anna  had  remained  at  Havana,  awaiting  the 
nioment  when  its  successful  execution  would  per 
mit  him  to  land  in  Mexico  with  safety.  He  was 
surrounded  by  many  political  friends,  and  among 
them  was  Almonte.  In  the  spring  of  1846,  this 
individual  had  been  appointed  minister  to  France 
and  England  by  Paredes,  and  had  proceeded  as 
far  as  Havana  on  his  route,  when  he  was  recalled. 
He  was  there  engaged  in  the  various  intrigues  of 
Santa  Anna,  as  he  had  been  in  Mexico,  and  con 
ducted  a  correspondence  with  some  of  his  friends 
in  the  United  States,^  having  for  its  object  the  em 
barrassment  of  /that  government  at  home  while  en 
gaged  in  the  Mexican  war,  showing  plainly  that, 
whatever  may  have  been  the  sentiments  of  Santa 

*  See  Appendix,  No.  1.     Receipt  of  Havana  letters  acknowledged  by 
American  correspondents. 


THE  WAR  WITH'MEXICO. 

Anna  at  the  time,  that  of  one  of  his  advisers,  at 
least,  was  of  unmitigated  hostility. 

When  news  was  received  at  Havana  of  the  pro- 
nunciamiento  at  Vera  Cruz,  Santa  Anna  and  suite 
sailed  at  once  for  Mexico.  He  landed  at  Vera  Cruz 
on  the  16th  of  August,  having  passed  the  block 
ading  squadron  without  question  or  delay.  On  the 
same  day  he  issued  a  manifesto,^  denouncing  the 
monarchical  schemes  of  Paredes  and  the  ambitious 
views  of  the  United  States,  and  vindicating  his  owri 
conduct.  The  latter  was  a  matter  of  some  difficulty, 
even  upon  paper,  in  so  far  as  related  to  his  assert 
ed  strong  desire  for .  the  prosperity  of  his  country ; 
for  his  tortuous  course  of  puhlic  action  had  render 
ed  it  almost  impossible  to  show  any  thing  like  a 
governing  principle,  except  for  his  own  aggrandize: 
ment,  either  for  good  or  for  evil.  He  ended  by 
again  declaring  himself  in  favor  of  the  Constitution 
of  1824,  and  that  thenceforth  he  was  the  slave  of 
public  opinion,  and  should  yield  implicit  obedience 
to  its  dictates.  Having  put  forth  this  exponent  of 
his  sentiments  for  effect  upon  the  Mexican  people, 
he  retired  to  his  hacienda  to  await  the  course  of 
events,  while  Almonte  and  Rejon  went  to  the  cap 
ital  for  the  purpose  of  controlling  them.  They 
proved  to  be  successful  in  their  action,  and  state 
after  state  declared  in  favor  of  Santa  Anna. 

The  nominal  authority  of  the  new  government 

*  Commodore  Connor  to  Mr.  Bancroft,  and  Manifesto.  Executive  Docu 
ment,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Con 
gress,  p.  775-777. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

remained  in  the  hands  of  Salas  ;  for,  although  San 
ta  Anna  had  been  invited  by  him,  as  general  of  the 
"  liberating  army,"  to  assume  the  exercise  of  pow 
er,  he  chose  to  remain  at  his  hacienda  until  the  af 
fairs  of  the  new  government  were  established,  and 
he  could  enter  the  capital  without  danger  of  inter 
fering  with  the  progress  of  his  popularity  or  to^the 
government.  As  every  action  of  his  at  the  time 
was  one  of  policy,  the  state  of  his  wounded  leg  was 
pleaded  as  an  excuse  for  his  remaining  at  Mango 
del  Clavo,^  by  which  Mexicans  were  again  re 
minded  that  "he  had  suffered  in  the  cause  of  his 
country. 

Between  the  6th  of  August  and  the  14th  of  Sep 
tember,  the  Mexican  government  was  straining  ev 
ery  nerve  to  increase  its  power  and  to  prepare  for 
the  prosecution  of  the  war.  Salas,  whose  boast  it 
was  that  the  chief  end  which  he  had  in  view,  dur 
ing  his  temporary  exercise  of  the  executive  power, 
was  to  assist  the  brave  army  about  to  fight  the  en 
emy,!  issued  various  proclamations,  calling  upon 
the  people  to  take  part  in  the  war,  and  to  contrib 
ute  means  in  money  and  in  kind  for  its  support. 
As  a  measure  of  hostility,  an  attempt  was  made  to 
put  in  execution  the  scheme  of  selling  letters  of 
marque  to  foreigners,  that  they  might  attack  and 
prey  upon  American  commerce.  Blank  prize  let 
ters  and  passports,  with  the  signature  of  Salas, 
countersigned  by  Almonte,  and  accompanied  by 
blank  certificates  of  naturalization,  were  sent  in 

*  Mexican  Official  Correspondence.  t  Idem. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


187 


any  required  quantity  to  Havana,  where  they  were 
offered  for  sale  to  any  who  might  have  a  piratical 
inclination.^  The  measure  had  doubtless  been 
thought  of  and  agreed  upon  at  Havana ;  and  as  such 
men  as  Almonte  and  Rej  on  were  the  active  agents 
in  causing  its  adoption,  it  is  fair  to  suppose  that 
they  had  taken  some  steps  toward  securing  accept 
ance  and  purchase  of  their  permits  to  plunder  on 
the  high  seas  with  impunity  while  arranging  mat 
ters  for  Santa  Anna's  return.  But  the  whole  scheme 
had  been  defeated,  long  previous  to  the  attempt  to 
carry  it  into  execution,  by  the  provisions  of  trea 
ties  existing  between  the  United  States  and  Spain, 
and  other  powers,  and  the  early  avowal  on  the  part 
of  their  government  to  treat  all  persons  as  pirates 
who  should,  without  proper  authority  and  legal  nat 
uralization,  engage  in  the  business.  The  Spanish 
authorities  of  Cuba  at  once  avowed  their  intention 
to  enforce  the  treaty  stipulations  ;f  and  in  the  dan 
ger  of  the  business,  if  any  letters  were  purchased  or 
accepted,  not  a  single  privateer  sailed  under  them, 
and  the  whole  scheme  ended  in  nothing. 

During  the  administration  of  Salas,  another  prop 
osition  was  received  from  the  American  govern 
ment  for  opening  negotiations  for  peace.  The 
American  President,  deeming  that,  after  the  result 
of  the  battles  of  Palo  Alto  and  Resaca  de  la  Palma, 
the  Mexicans  could  not  attribute  any  such  propo- 

*  Letter  of  Mr.  Campbell,  consul  at  Havana,  with  copies  of  blank  pass 
ports,  prize  letters,  and  certificates  of  naturalization.  Executive  Document, 
No.  4,  House  of  Representatives,  second  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth  Con 
gress,  p.  40-42.  t  Idem  ibidem. 


188 


THE    WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 


sitipn  to  a  consciousness  of  weakness,  was  will 
ing  to  sacrifice  again  the  ordinary  rules  of  nation 
al  intercourse  on  the  altar  of  Mexican  pride,  and, 
by  again  taking  the  initiative,  to  afford  her  an  op 
portunity  for  ending  the  war.^  The  measure  may 
have  been  one  of  policy  with  regard  to  the  state 
of  parties  in  the  United  States ;  for,  by  making  the 
offer,  it  was  demonstrated  to  .those  who  had  already 
urged  against  the  administration  of  Mr.  Polk  that 
he  had' plunged  the  country  unnecessarily  into  war, 
that  its  continuance  was,  as  its  commencement  had 
been,  dependent  upon  the  will  of  the  Mexican  gov 
ernment.  As  the  letfer  of  Mr.  Buchanan,  which 
made  the  proposition,  bore  date  on  the  27th  of  July, 
three  days'  before  the  pronunciamiento  at  Vera  Cruz, 
it  can  not  be  believed  that  any  knowledge  o'f  the 
immediate  return  of  Santa  Anna  to  Mexico  was  in 
the  possessidn  of  the  American  President  and  cab 
inet,  however  much  they  might  have  hoped  for  a 
favorable  result  from  the  downfall  of  Paredes's 
administration  and  the  return  of  the  eX-dictator. 
But,  in. making  the  offer,  there  was  no  sacrifice  of 
the  indemnity  which  it  had. been  intended  from 
the  commencement  of  hostilities  to  demand  from 
Mexico ;  for,  by  the  27th  of  July,  the  various  expe 
ditions  against  California  and  New  Mexico  had  so 
far  advanced  that  it  was  certain  that  those  territo 
ries  would  be  occupied  by  the  troops  of  the  United 
States  before  a  treaty  could  be  concluded,  which, 
if  upon  the  basis  of  UTI  possidetis,  would  have  giv- 

*  President's  Annual  Message,  1846. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

en  them  to  the  United  States ;  and  that  basis  was 
looked  to,  at  the  time,  as  one  upon  which  to  treat.^ 

The  letter  was  answered  by  Senor  Rejon,  who 
was  Minister  of  Relations  under  Salas,  on  the  31st 
of  August.  The  government,  which  had  been  for 
so  short  a  time  established,  and  whose  originators 
had  used  the  cry  of  enmity  to  the  United  States  as 
a  means  of  gaining  power,  was  then  in  no  condi 
tion  of  acceding  to  the  proposition,  even  if  it  had 
been  desired.  While,  therefore,  the  answer  of  Mr. 
Rejon  was  courteous  and  modest,  it  insisted  upon 
discussing  the  causes  of  the  war,  which  had  been 
waived  in  the  communication  of  the  American  sec 
retary,  and  was,  in  fact,  a  refusal  to  enter  upon  ne 
gotiations  at  the  time.f  It  was  said,  however,  that 
the  whole  matter  would  be  referred  to  the  Mexican 
Congress,  which  had  been  convoked  to  meet  in  the 
following  December,  for  its  consideration  and  de 
cision.  The  intercourse  ended  with  this  reply,  and 
the  dispute  was  left  to  the  arbitrament  of  arms. 

Mexico  continued  her  efforts  to  rajse  men  and 
means  of  war,  and,  among  other  schemes  which 
were  concocted  for  the  injury  of  her  adversary,  was 
one  which  bore  so  similar  a  character  to  that  of 
selling  her  letters  of  marque  and  blank  certificates 
of  naturalization,  that  it  may  well  be  believed  that 

'  *  Mr.  Bancroft,  to  Commodore  Sloat,  July  12th,  1846.  Executive  Docu 
ment,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Con 
gress,  p.  238. 

t  Correspondence  between  Mr.  Buchanan  and  Seffor  Eejon.  Executive 
Document,  No.  4,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth 
Congress,  p.  42,  43. 


190  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

they  had  their  origin  in  the  same  head,  although 
something  of  the  kind  had  heen  attempted  hy  Gen 
eral  Arista,  on  the  Rio  Grande.  It  was  no  less 
than  a  plan,  officially  and  openly  avowed  hy  the 
Mexican  government,  for  inducing  desertion  from 
the  American  army,  and  a  commission  of  five  offi 
cers  was  actually  appointed^  to  determine  and  re 
port  upon  the  rewards  which  were  to  be  given  to 
traitors.  Whether  it  was  intended  that  the  plan 
should  actually  succeed,  and  that  the  government 
should  fulfill  its  promises  to  those  who  should  prove 
false  to  their  sworn  allegiance  or  no,  the  edict  which 
convoked  the  commission  was  published,  setting 
forth  many  intended  benefits,  in  order  that  the  con 
templated  proposition  might  be  known  to  those 
upon  whose  cupidity  it  was  designed  to  operate : 
perhaps  the  first  instance  known  to  history  where 
a  government  having  any  professed  regard  for  its 
character  has  publicly  undertaken  any  thing  so  in 
jurious  to  its  dignity  as  the  attempt  at  bribing 
private,  soldiers  by  wholesale,  and  by  the  act  of  its 
chief  authorities. 

Santa  Anna  approached  the  capital  in  Septem 
ber.  When  he  reached  Ayotla,  eighteen  miles 
from  Mexico,  he  was  met  by  letters  from  Salas,  as 
head  of  the  Provisional  Government,  again  tender 
ing  him  the  supreme  power.  But  the  offer  was 
again  declined,  on  the  ground  that  the  chief  desire 
of  Santa  Anna  was  to  serve  his  country  in  the  army. 
He  declared  that;  he  would  not  abandon  the  post 

*  Mexican  Official  Publications.     Diario  del  Gobeirno. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

of  danger  for  the  post  of  power  in  the  situation  of 
his  country  at  the  time,  and  closed  his  answer  by 
many  assurances  of  his  disinterested  patriotism.^ 

This  correspondence,  published  and  circulated 
on  the  14th  of  September,  paved  the  way  for  his 
reception  in  the  capital.  He  entered  on  the  15th, 
and  was  received  with  all  the  appearances  of  a  tri 
umph  ;  and,  in  the  show  of  enthusiasm,  it  might 
have  been  believed  that  he  was  looked  upon  as  the 
regenerator  of  Mexico. 

Immediately  after  his  arrival,  the  Provisional 
Government  ordered  a  levy  of  thirty  thousand 
men,  and  issued  its  requisitions  upon  the  different 
states.  The  contingents  were  ordered  to  be  at  San 
Luis  de  Potosi  or  the  capital  within  seventy  days 
from  the  date.  This  prompt  action  on  the  part  of 
the  new  government,  as  contrasted  with  the  delays 
of  that  of  Paredes,  was  loudly  proclaimed  as  the 
benefit  of  the  change,  and  the  success  of  Mexico 
in  the  struggle  with  the  United  States  was  fore 
told  with  confidence.  Santa  Anna  was,  however, 
in  no  haste  to  engage  in  the  struggle,  and  intend 
ed  that  he  should  be  fully  prepared  and  in  strong 
force  before  he  met  the  American  army.  He  had 
sent  orders  to  Ampudia,  who  had  been  assigned  to 
the  command  of  the  northern,  army,  to  evacuate 
Monterey,  unless  he  was  fully  confident  of  a  suc 
cessful  resistance,  and  to  fall  back  upon  San  Luis, 
where  the  new  generalissimo  was  about  to  establish 

*  Santa  Anna's  letter  from  Ayotla,  September  14th,  1846.    Diario  diel  Go- 
beirno. 


192  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

his  head-quarters.  On  the  28th  of  September  four 
thousand  soldiers  marched  from  the  capital  to  San 
Luis,  and  in  a  short  time  Santa  Anna  proceeded 
to  the  same  place. 

Throughout  this  period,  while  the  central  gov- 
qrnment  of  Mexico  had  been  torn  by  the  intrigues 
of  the  different  factions,  preparations  had  been 
slowly  progressing  for  resisting  the  American  ad 
vance  at  Monterey.  As  Arista  and  Ampudia  had 
both  been  summoned  to  Mexico  to  attend  an  in 
vestigation  of  the  affairs  of  Palo  Alto  and  Resaca, 
the  command  of  the  army  had  devolved  upon  Me- 
jia.  The  defenses  of  the  town  had  been  com 
menced  shortly  after  the  arrival  of  Arista's  beaten 
forces,  and  had  been  continued  from  time  to  time  by 
both  citizens  and  soldiers,  as  the  movements  and  in 
tentions  of  the  American  general  became  apparent. 

On  the  20th  of  August,  the  force  present  in  and 
near  the  city  amounted  to  over  four  thousand  men, 
exclusive  of  citizens.  As  it  was  known  that  Am 
pudia  was  en  route  to  'assume  the  command,  Me- 
jia,  upon  whom  the  responsibility  could  not  rest  in 
case  of  failure,  pursued  the  same  course  which  he 
had  at  Matamoras.  He  indulged  the  authorities 
at  Mexico  in  many  anticipations  of  success,  and 
assured  them,  in  his  official  communications,  of 
the  certainty  of  triumph.^ 

He  had  excellent  means  of  information,  and 
knew  the  number  and  description  of  the  American 
troops  nearly  as  well  as  their  own  general.  Of 

*  Mejia's  Official  Correspondence,  published  in  Mexico. 


THE   WAR   WITH   MEXICO. 

their  movements  he  kept  the  Mexican  government 
well  informed,  as  well  as  of  his  awn  intentions ;  but 
he  never  hazarded  any  thing  for  the  doubtful  pros 
pect  of  being  able  to  announce  a  victory.  When 
he  communicated  intelligence  of  Worth's  advance 
to  Serralvo,  he  asserted  that  he  had  contemplated 
attacking  him,  but  had  been  deterred  by  the  con 
sideration  that  Worth's  troops  were  the  veterans 
of  the  American  army,  and  that,  although  he  could 
crush  them,  the  victory  would  leave  him  in  no  con 
dition  for  the  defense  of  Monterey.^  No  other  dem 
onstration  was  therefore  made  than  to  keep  Torre- 
jon's  cavalry  in  observation  of  the  Americans. 

Ampudia  arrived  with  a  large  re-enforcement, 
and  assumed  the  command,  on  the  28th  of  Au 
gust.  His  first  steps  were  to  issue  decrees  which 
threatened  every  native  and  every  foreigner  with 
death  who  should  afford  assistance  to,  or  who  should 
in  any  manner  correspond  with,  the  enemy,  f 
Upon  hearing  of  Taylor's  advance  from  Serralvo, 
on  the  15th  of  September  he  issued  another  proc 
lamation,  calling  upon  the  American  soldiers  to 
desert,  promising  them  good  treatment  and  re 
wards,  and  assistance  for  their  march  into  the  inte 
rior  of  the  country.$  All  alcaldes  and  Mexican 
citizens  were  ordered  to  assist  the  deserters,  if  as- 

'*  Mejia's  Official  Correspondence,  published  in  Mexico. 

t  General  Worth  to  Major  Bliss,  September  3,  1846,  inclosing  the  procla 
mation  of  Ampudia.  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representa 
tives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  420,  421. 

t  General  Taylor  to  the  Adjutant  General,  inclosing  the  circular  and  ad 
dress  of  Ampudia.  Idem,  p.  422,  423. 

L— N 


!94  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

sured  that  they  came  in  good  faith  ;  but  so  much 
discretion  was  allowed  in  the  order  that  it  would 
have  been  a  matter  of  extreme  hazard  for  any  to 
have  trusted  themselves  to  Mexican  clemency. 
The  inducements,  such  as  they  were,  were  set  forth 
in  hand-bills,  which  were  strewed  along  the  line 
of  march  of  the  American  army.  They  had  but 
little  effect,  however,  for  there  were  few  who  chose 
to  leave  their  colors  to  engage  in  a  service  as  pre 
carious  and  thankless  as  that  of  Mexico. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Monterey — Its  Locality — Defenses — Garrison — American  Force — Plan  of 
Attack — Movement  of  Worth's  Division  to  turn  the  Town — Demonstration 
on  the  East  in  Favor — Operations  of  the  21st  on  the  East  of  Monterey — 
On  the  West — Inactivity  on  the  East  on  the  22d — Operations  on  the  West 
of  the  same  Day — Advance  into  the  Town  from  the  East  on  the  23d — 
Withdrawal  of  the  Troops — Advance  into  the1  Town  from  the  West — Offer 
of  Mexican  General  to  capitulate — Negotiations — Convention  of  Monterey 
— Observations. 

MONTEREY,  the  capital  of  the  state  of  Nueva 
Leon,  lies  in  a  valley  at  the  eastern  base  of  the 
Sierra  Madre.  The  valley,  though  not  large,  is  of 
great  fertility,  and  supports  a  considerable  popula 
tion.  On  its  east  rises  the  single  elevation  of  the 
Saddle  Mountain,  and  the  main  chain  of  the  Sierra 
and  its  spurs  are  the  boundaries  on  the  southern, 
western,  and  part  of  the  northern  limits.  The 
main  road  from  the  Rio  Grande  to  the  capital  of 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  ^95 

Mexico  leads  from  the  east,  through  a  cultivated 
country,  some  distance  to  the  north  of  the  Saddle 
Mountain,  and,  passing  through  the  city,  continues 
on  hy  a  pass,  varying  from  one  to  three  miles  in 
width,  through  the  Sierra,  past  Saltillo,  and  on  to 
the  desert  country  between  the  latter  place  and  San 
Luis  de  Potosi.  A  rivulet,  the  Rio  San  Juan  de 
Monterey,  rises  in  this  pass,  and,  running  eastward, 
traverses  the  valley. 

Monterey  stands  on  the  northern  bank  of  this 
rivulet,  and  extends  in  its  length  near  a  mile  and 
a  half  along  the  stream.  It  contains  ordinarily 
about  ten  thousand  inhabitants,  and  that  number 
was  probably  within  its  limits  at-  the  time  of  the 
approach  of  the  Americans,  exclusive  of  the  army 
which  had  been  assembled  for  its  protection. 

The  defensive  works  around  the  city  had  accu 
mulated  during  the  period  of  American  inactivity 
succeeding  the  battles  of  the  8th  and  9th  of  May 
and  the  occupation  of  Matamoras,  and,  although 
they  were  in  great  degree  irregular,  they  had  a  for 
midable  strength.  Directly  to  the  north  of  the 
town,  at  the  junction  of  three  roads,  that  from  the 
east  by  Marin,  and  two  from  Pesqueria  Grande 
and  Monclova,  was  the  citadel,  a  square  bastioned 
work,  with  dry  ditches  and  embrasures  for  thirty- 
four  guns.  It,  however,  mounted  but  ten  or  twelve 
of  all  calibers,  from  fours  to  eighteens.  Within  it, 
the  walls  of  an  unfinished  Cathedral  rose  some 
thirty  feet  from  the  ground,  and  were  of  sufficient 
strength  to  protect  troops  from  any  distant  fire. 


196  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

Around  the  top  of  these  walls  was  placed  a  para 
pet  of  fascines,  which  afforded  a  good  position 
whence  musketry  could  he  delivered  against  an  as 
saulting  force.  The  ditches  of  the  citadel  were  not 
completely  finished  in  front  of  the  curtains,  nor 
were  they  at  any  place  more  than  twelve  feet  wide. 

The  distance  from  this  work  to  the  closely-huilt 
part  of  the  town  was  ahout  one  thousand  yards,  hut 
within  thkt  the  space  was  filled  with  squares  con 
taining  gardens  inclosed  by  hedges  and  irrigating 
ditches,  and  built  up  with  scattered  huts.  From 
a  point  south  of  the  citadel  a  branch  of  the  Klo 
San  Juan  ran  through  the  suburb  in  a  southeast 
erly  direction,  and  emptied  into  that  rivulet  be 
yond  the  town.  Its  banks  were  in  many  places 
steep  and  difficult,  and  deep  irrigating  ditches  ex 
tended  for  much  of  its  length  along  the  northern 
side.  The  branch  was  crossed  at  a  point  near  the 
middle  of  its  course  through  the  suburb  by  the 
bridge  of  La  Purisima,  which  was  defended  by  a 
strong  tete  du  pont.  Two  breast- works  along  its 
southern  bank  opposed  the  passage  of  the  lower 
part  of  the  stream. 

The  southeastern  front  of  the  town  was  defend 
ed  by  a  system  of  lunettes,  well  arranged  for  flank 
ing  purposes,  and  with  ground  between  them  al 
most  impracticable,  on  account  of  the  hedges  and 
bramble  by  which  it  was  covered.  Fort  Teneria, 
the  most  advanced  of  these,  covered  by  its  fire  the 
roads  from  Marin  and  Cadereita,  and  mounted  four 
guns.  Fort  El  Diablo,  to  its  southwest,  mounted 


THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO.  j  g  7 

three,  and  a  third,  still  further  toward  the  rivulet, 
four.  Each  of  these  commanded  the  lunettes  more 
advanced,  and  the  system  terminated  in  a  lunette 
having  a  high  command,  and  covering  the  fords 
across  the  river. 

The  approaches  to  all  of  the  fortifications  on  the 
southeastern  front  of  the  city  were  so  masked  by 
shrubhery  that  accurate  reconnaissance  was  ex 
ceedingly  difficult. 

From  the  most  southern  lunette  a  line  of  barri 
cades  extended  along  the  northern  bank  of  the  San 
Juan  for  many  squares,  and,  turning  at  right  angles, 
encircled  the  strongest  buildings,  and  connected 
with  the  tete  du  pont  of  La  Purisima.  Each  bar 
ricade  was  strongly  and  regularly  constructed,  with 
embrasures  for  one  or  more  guns,  and  the  tops  of 
the  neighboring  houses  were  covered  by  parapets 
of  sand-bags.  The  streets  leading  to  the  west  were 
barricaded  beyond  the  main  line,  and  the  Campo 
Santo,  a  strong  stone  inclosure  in  the  Plaza  de  la 
Capilla,  which  was  traversed  by  these  streets,  was 
prepared  for  defense.  The  walls  had  been  fortified 
to  resist  cannon  shot,  and  were  plentifully  crenelled 
for  musketry,  with  embrasures  for  guns  at  the  an 
gles. 

Immediately  beyond  the  town  and  to  the  north 
of  the  main  road  to  Saltillo  lay  the  Loma  d'ln- 
dependencia.  Half  way  up  the  acclivity  wrere 
the  massive  ruins  of  the  Obispado,  which  had  been 
fortified  with  a  view  of  covering  a  retreat  from  the 
city,  if  it  should  be  necessary.  Its  battlements 


198  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

were  furnished  with  a  sand-bag  parapet,  and  the 
city  front  was  covered  by  a  priest-cap  work,  with 
platforms  for  four  guns  in  barbette.  A  branch 
road  turned  to  the  southwest  as  the  main  road  left 
the  city,  and,  crossing  the  San  Juan,  traversed  a 
range  of  hills  which  lay  along  the  southern  bank 
of  the  river.  At  the  summit  lay  Fort  Soldado,  a 
rudely- constructed  square  redoubt.  The  hills  ex 
tended  northwest  to  the  river,  where  they  were 
terminated  by  the  Loma  de  Federacion,  the  steep 
declivity  of  which  reached  to  its  banks,  and  to  the 
southeast  beyond  the  town  to  the  main  chain  of 
the  Sierra.  Between  the  citadel  and  the  Obispado 
a  system  of  redoubts  had  been  commenced,  but  not 
completed.  The  ground  in  that  direction,  however, 
was  difficult,  on  account  of  the  many  hedges  and 
irrigating  ditches  by  which  it  was  traversed. 

For  some  distance  around  the  citadel,  the  coun 
try  on  the  north  and  east  of  Monterey  was  open, 
or  covered  with  low  chaparral.  To  the  east  the 
ground  was  broken  by  quarry  pits ;  but  beyond 
the  open  ground,  both  on  the  north  and  east,  there 
extended  large  corn-fields  and  heavy  shrubbery. 

For  the  defense  of  the  place,  General  Ampudia 
had  over  10,000  men,  of  which  7000  were  of  the 
line.  His  precise  numerical  strength  it  is  difficult 
to  ascertain.  It  was  at  one  time  announced  in  the 
city  of  Mexico  that  he  commanded  13,750  regular 
troops ;  but  this  was  undoubtedly  an  exaggeration. 
The  accounts  of  the  strength  of  the  different  corps 
as  they  arrived  at  Monterey,  published  in  Mexico, 


THE    WAR,  WITH    MEXICO.  ^99 

made  the  aggregate  of  regulars  over  7000,  and  that 
was  admitted  to  have  been  the  number  of  his 
troops  at  a  subsequent  period.  Generals  Mejia, 
Ortega,  and  Garcia  Conde  each  commanded  brig 
ades  of  infantry ;  General  Requena  had  a  large 
Corps  of  artillerists  ;  Torrejon  had  his  strong  force 
of  regular  cavalry ;  and  to  all  these  were  added 
many  citizens  and  rancheros,  which  swelled  the 
numerical  strength  to,  at  the  lowest  estimate, 
10,000  men. 

The  town  was  plentifully  supplied  with  ammu 
nition,  and  in  the  various  batteries  and  positions 
forty-two  guns  of  different  calibers  were  mounted. 
Subsistence,  beef  cattle,  and  sheep,  for  some  days, 
had  been  introduced  into  the  city,  and  the  attack 
ing  force  was  known  to  be  too  small  to  invest  it 
so  completely  as  to  prevent  the  introduction  of 
more,  or  the  foraging  of  the  cavalry. 

Under  all  these  circumstances,  with  his  superi 
ority  in  numbers,  his  armament,  and  the  strength 
of  his  position,  General  Ampudia  was  confident  of 
success,  and  did  not  choose  to  avail  himself  of  the 
discretionary  power  with  which  Santa  Anna's  or 
der  had  clothed  him,  to  abandon  the  town  and  fall 
back  on  Saltillo  and  San  Luis  de  Potosi. 

The  American  army  which  marched  from  Ma- 
rin  on  the  morning  of  the  18th  of  September  num 
bered  425  officers  and  6220  men.  Two  regiments 
of  volunteers  and  a  battalion  of  regulars  were  of 
cavalry,  and  Twiggs's,  Worth's,  and  Butler's  divi 
sions  constituted  the  infantry  of  the  command. 


J! 

*i*-  .. 


'7:;;. 

200  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

*       '      '  • '•  *,  ,^'~*  f  '*-'*• 

Of  artillery  there  were  four  light  batteries  (each  of 
three  six  pounders  and  one  twelve  pounder  howit 
zer),  one  of  two  twenty-four  pounder  howitzers, 
and,  in  addition,  the  ordnance  officers  had  in  charge 
for  transport  a  ten-inch  mortar  and  one  hundred 
shells.* 

The  various  contradictions  in  the  accounts  re 
ceived  of  the  state  of  things  at  Monterey  had  shak 
en  the  confidence  of  General  Taylor  in  even  the 
most  authentic ;  and,  notwithstanding  the  evident 
hostility  of  the  Mexican  cavalry  pickets,  their  slow 
retreat,  and  the  proclamations  of  Ampudia  found 
along  the  road,  he  even  doubted  whether  any  re 
sistance  would  be  made  to  his  occupation  of  the 
city.  He  underrated  the  force  of  his  enemy,  and 
on  the  17th  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  War  from 
Marin  that  his  "  regular  force  was  small — say  3000 
— eked  out  to  perhaps  6000  by  volunteers,  many 
of  them  forced. "f 

But,  at  eight  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  19th, 
General  Taylor  arrived,  with  the  advanced  guard, 
within  about  fifteen  hundred  yards  of  the  citadel 
of  Monterey.  The  display  of  the  Mexican  flag,  a 
large  corps. of  cavalry  in  the  plain,  and  a  few  well- 
directed  shots,  dispelled  all  doubts  which  had  been 
entertained  concerning  resistance,  and  the  ad 
vanced  guard  was  at  once  withdrawn  out  of  range, 
while  the  general  returned  to  the  grove  of  San  Do- 

*  General  Taylor's  Official  Report.  Executive  Document,  No.  4,  House 
of  Representatives,  second  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  p.  88. 

t  Letter  to  Secretary  Marcy.  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of 
Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  422. 


/•/«  C£  P.    20 1.~  VOL .  /  . 


•  Q--.    »..  ; 


* 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  £01 

mingo,  some  three  miles  from  the  city,  where  the 
army  was  halted  and  the  attack  was  arranged. 

During  the  afternoon  reconnoitering  parties  were 
sent  to  examine  the  direct  approaches  arid  the  de 
fenses  on  the  east,  and  one  party  over  the  country 
to  the  north  of  the  city,  with  a  view  of  discovering 
a  route  by  which  the  obstacles  presented  by  the 
citadel  and  eastern  fortifications  could  be  turned, 
and  an  attack  be  made  directly  against  the  com 
manding  elevations  immediately  to  the  south  and 
west.  Of  these,  the  Loma  d'Independencia,  with 
the  fortifications  of  the  Obispado,  were  the  most 
prominent,  as  well  as  nearest  the  town  ;  and  it 
was  evident  that  there  was  the  key  to  the  city  and 
fortifications  of  Monterey.  The  reconnoitering  of 
ficers  returned  in  the  evening,  and  from  their  re 
ports  it  was  deemed  to  be  practicable  to  turn  the 
works  in  either  direction,  by  the  north  or  south. 
But  the  northern  reconnaissance  had  been  conduct 
ed  so  far  by  Major  Mansfield  that  it  was  known 
that  the  road  was  practicable  in  that  direction, 
and  it  was  deemed  probable  that  a  position  might 
be  gained  whence  to  attack  the  Loma  d'Indepen 
dencia,  if  not  one  upon  the  Saltillo  road  in  rear 
of  the  city.  On  the  morning  of  the  20th,  the  plan 
of  attack  was  determined  upon  and  its  execution 
ordered. 

General  Worth  was  directed  to  move  his  divis 
ion  through  the  corn-fields  to  the  north  of  the  town, 
to  turn  the  positions  of  the  enemy,  to  penetrate,  if 
possible,  to  the  Saltillo  road,  to  cut  his  line  of  re- 


202  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

treat,  and  intercept  re-enforcements  from  the  inte 
rior,  should  any  such  appear,  and  to  storm  and  car 
ry  every  work  and  position  on  the  west  of  Monte 
rey  which  it  was  practicable  to  carry.  Some  in 
tention  was  entertained  of  moving  Butler's  divis 
ion  to  the  south  of  the  town ;  but  the  order  was 
not  issued,  and,  with  Twiggs's  division,  Butler's 
kept  its  camp  at  the  wood  of  San  Domingo. 

Worth  marched  with  his  division  and  Colonel 
Hays's  regiment  of  Western  Texan s  at  two  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon,  and,  turning  to  the  right  a  short 
distance  from  the  wood,  traversed  the  corn-fields  to 
the  north  of  the  town.  His  march  was  necessarily 
slow,  but  he  reached  the  Pesqueria  Grande  road 
a  short  time  before  sundown,  and  halted  his  divis 
ion  on  the  west  of  it,  while  in  person  he  proceeded 
to  reconnoiter  further  in  the  direction  of  the  Saltil- 
lo  road.  Supported  by  a  squadron  of  Texans,  his 
party  proceeded  by  a  path  leading  from  the  road  of 
Pesqueria  Grande  to  that  of  Saltillo,  which  wound 
around  the  base  of  the  mountains  of  the  Sierra,  ris 
ing  directly  upon  its  right.  On  the  left,  cultivated 
fields,  covered  with  a  dense  growth  of  corn,  and 
divided  by  hedges  and  ditches,  extended  to  the  base 
of  the  Loma  d'Independencia,  distant  some  twelve 
hundred  yards  from  the  nearest  point  of  the  path. 
By  ascending  the  eminences  on  the  right,  Worth 
obtained  a  view  of  the  continuation  of  the  path  to 
the  j  unction  with  the  Saltillo  road,  of  the  positions 
of  the  Loma  de  Federacion,  and  of  Fort  Soldado  on 
its  extended  crest. 


Jt* 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  £03 

While  he  was  engaged  in  the  reconnaissance,  the 
enemy,  who  had  early  observed  his  whole  move 
ment,  and  had  occupied  the  summit  of  the  Loma 
d'Independencia  with  a  strong  battalion,  brought 
up  a  howitzer  from  the  Obispado  to  a  sand-bag  bat 
tery  upon  the  summit,  and  opened  fire  upon  the 
reconnoitering  party.  A  strong  corps  of  infantry 
at  the  same  time  descended  the  hill,  skirted  its 
base,  and  struck  across  the  fields  with  the  apparent 
intention  of  cutting  it  off.  Worth  descended  from 
the  eminence  which  he  had  occupied,  and  was  re 
turning  to  his  division,  when  the  Mexican  skir 
mishers,  running  forward,  opened  a  rattling  fire  of 
musketry  and  escopetas.  The  Texans,  not  very 
well  disciplined,  were  unused  to  receiving  even  a 
distant  discharge  without  reply,  and  soon  became 
restive.  In  spite  of  the  orders  of  the  general  and 
staff,  they  quickened  their  pace,  passed  the  general, 
and  fell  back  upon  the  division  at  a  gallop,  in  con 
fusion,  but  without  loss. 

The  main  body  of  the  troops  wa,s  moved  a  short 
distance  in  advance  from  the  road  of  Pesqueria 
Grande,  where  it  was  halted  and  bivouacked. 
The  night  set  in  dark  and  rainy,  and  in  the  diffi 
cult  positions  any  movement  on  either  side  was  ap 
parently  impracticable.  Nevertheless,  a  few  Mex 
ican  skirmishers,  attracted  by  the  noise  made  by 
the  Texans,  who  were  in  front,  crept  up  and  deliv 
ered  their  fire,  which,  though  ineffectual,  put  a  stop 
to  the  shouting,  and  brought  the  Rangers  to  their 
arms.  But  the  skirmishers  retired  immediately, 


2Q4  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

and  for  the  rest  of  the  night  the  division  was  un 
disturbed. 

"While  these  movements  were  progressing,  recon- 
noitering  officers  had  been  in  observation  of  the 
eastern  front  of  the  town,  and  observed  the  Mexi 
can  re-enforcements  directed  to  the  Obispado,  and 
the  occupation  of  the  Loma  d'Independencia.  To 
prevent  an  accumulation  of  the  Mexican  force  upon 
Worth's  command,  Taylor  drew  out  Butler's  and 
Twiggs's  divisions,  and  displayed  them  in  front  of 
the  city  until  dark,  at  the  same  time  sending  word 
to  Worth  that  his  movement  was  observed.^  The 
enemy  made  no  other  demonstration  than  that 
of  re- enforcing  his  western  positions,  and  although 
Worth  at  the  time  was  entirely  detached,  and  some 
five  miles  from  the  main  army,  no  effort  was  made 
to  intercept  the  communication.  The  officer  who 
bore  General  Taylor's  note  reached  him  shortly  aft 
er  dark  with  a  small  escort,  and  returned  with  his 
answer,  giving  the  result  of  his  reconnaissance, 
and  of  his  determination  to  press  on.  Worth  had 
seen  the  action  of  the  enemy  before  the  receipt  of 
the  dispatch,  but,  in  answer  to  it,  he  stated  that 
he  believed  that  his  further  advance  would  be  dis 
puted  in  force,  and  recommended  that  a  strong 
diversion  should  be  made  on  the  east  of  the  city. 
The  suggestion  was  adopted  by  General  Taylor.^ 

To  assist  in  the  demonstration  to  be  made  on 


*  General  Taylor's  Official  Report.    Executive  Document,  No.  4,  House  of 
Representatives,  second  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  p.  83. 
t  Idem  ibidem. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  £05 

the  following  morning,  the  siege-mortar  and  twen 
ty-four  pounder  howitzers  were  placed  in  position 
upon  the  right  of  the  main  road,  whence  to  annoy 
the  citadel.^  It  could  hardly  have  been  expected 
to  effect  any  thing  more  than  an  annoyance,  for 
the  distance  selected  was  over  twelve  hundred 
yards  from  the  works,  and  so  much  had  been  said 
about  the  want  of  transportation  that  the  chief 
ordnance  officer  had  neglected  to  transport  a  plat 
form  for  the  mortar,  and  none  charged  with  loca 
ting  it  availed  themselves  of  the  timber  in  the 
wood  of  San  Domingo  to  construct  one.  The  mor 
tar  was  accordingly  placed  on  tolerably  firm  soil 
at  the  bottom  of  a  quarry  pit.  The  howitzers,  for 
which  the  range  was  too  great  for  effect,  were 
planted  in  its  vicinity;  and  in  this  manner  every 
thing  in  the  shape  of  siege  artillery  which  was 
with  the  American  army  was  disposed  of. 

On  the  following  morning  the  dispositions  for 
the  demonstration  in  favor  of  Worth's  movement 
were  commenced  at  early  dawn.  Lieutenant- 
colonel  May  was  sent  to  re-enforce  him  with  the 
battalion  of  the  second  dragoons,  and  soon  after 
Governor  Henderson,  with  the  regiment  of  Eastern 
Texans,  marched  for  the  same  object.  Twiggs's 
division,  under  command  of  Lieutenant-colonel 
Garland,  was  ordered  forward  to  the  position  of 
the  batteries,  leaving  one  company  from  each  reg 
iment  as  a  camp  guard.  Upon  its  arrival,  the  fourth 

*  General  Taylor's  Official  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  4,  House 
of  Representatives,  second  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  p.  83. 


206 


THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 


regiment  of  infantry  was  detached  to  cover  the  bat 
tery,  and  Garland  was  directed  to  move  with  his 
remaining  troops,  the  first  and  third  regiments  of 
infantry,  a  battalion  of  Maryland  and  District  of 
Columbia  volunteers,  and  Bragg's  field  battery,  to 
ward  the  lower  part  of  the  town,  to  make  a  strong 
demonstration,  and,  if  thought  practicable,  to  carry 
any  of  the  small  forts  with  which  he  might  fall  in.^ 
Major  Mansfield  and  other  engineer  officers  accom 
panied  his  column,  and  were  charged  with  select 
ing  and  designating  points  of  attack.  Butler's  di 
vision  was,  at  the  same  time,  ordered  forward  from 
the  camp  to  the  batteries,  which,  as  Garland  moved 
off,  commenced  their  fire.  They  made  no  impres 
sion  upon  the  citadel  whatever,  for  the  range  was 
too  great  for  the-  howitzers,  and  the  mortar,  being 
without  a  platform,  was  driven  so  far  into  the 
ground  by  the  recoil  of  two  or  three  discharges, 
that  it  became  perfectly  useless.  After  a  few  ex 
periments  at  this  novel  kind  of  mortar  practice, 
the  attempt  was  given  up,  and  its  fire  ceased  from 
that  direction  altogether.  The  howitzers  contin 
ued  a  desultory  cannonade,  but  the  Mexicans  re 
plied  from  the  citadel  with  heavier  metal  and  bet 
ter  aim ;  and  although  neither  party  did  much  dam 
age  to  the  other  in  this  quarter,  yet  it  was  evident 
that  the  American  batteries  were  hardly  effective 
even  for  annoyance. 

When  Garland's  division  moved  from  the  posi- 

*  General  Taylor's  Official  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  4,  House 
of  Representatives,  second  Session  of  the  29th  Congress,  p.  84. 


THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO.  £07 

tion  of  the  batteries,  Major  Mansfield,  with  Bother 
reconnoitering  officers,  having  two  companies  of 
infantry  as  the  immediate  escort,  advanced  into 
the  suburbs  of  the  town  in  search  of  a  point  of  at 
tack,  and,  after  a  short  reconnaissance,  sent  a  re 
quest  to  Garland  to  come  forward.  Whether  he 
intended  that  he  should  come  forward  in  person, 
to  examine  the  position,  or  that  he  should  move 
up  his  troops  to  engage  them,  Garland  understood 
him  in  the  latter  sense.  While  Mansfield  had 
been  employed  in  reconnaissance,  Garland  had 
halted  the  main  body  of  his  command  out  of  range. 
Upon  receiving  the  message,  he  moved  forward  in 
line,  keeping  to  the  left  of  the  main  road.^  By 
following  the  route  which  Mansfield  had  pursued, 
he  gave  his  right  flank  to  the  citadel,  while  Fort 
Teneria  was  upon  his  left  and  front.  The  latter 
of  these  works  soon  opened  heavily  upon  the  com 
mand,  and  the  citadel  followed  its  example  with 
a  destructive  enfilading  fire.  Still  the  Americans 
moved  steadily  forward  until  reaching  the  scatter 
ed  buildings  and  inclosures  of  the  suburb,  which 
broke  their  formation ;  but,  although  in  confusion, 
the  advance  was  rapidly  continued,  for  it  was 
thought  that  Fort  Teneria  might  be  turned,  and 
taken  in  reverse.  The  Mexican  fire  from  both  cit 
adel  and  Fort  Teneria  was  kept  up  with  vigor,  and 
as  the  command  approached  the  rivulet  through 
the  suburb,  the  masked  breast- works  on  its  south 
ern  bank  received  it  with  another  destructive  fire, 

*  Henry's  Campaign  Sketches,  p.  194. 


208  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

which  increased  the  confusion.  Neither  officers 
nor  men  knew  any  thing  of  their  position.^  Mans 
field,  who  had  led  the  assault  when  the  troops  had 
reached  him,  although  wounded,  pressed  on,  point 
ing  out  positions  for  attack,  and  there  was  no  lack 
of  hrave  officers  to  lead  or  brave  men  to  follow ; 
but  from  the  gardens,  from  the  neighboring  house 
tops,  as  well  as  from  the  masked  breast- works,  an 
unseen  foe  pelted  the  troops  with  musketry,  while 
the  heavy  fire  from  Fort  Teneria  and  the  citadel 
kept  rolling  in  on  their  flanks.  Movements  against 
a  seemingly  practicable  point  only  brought  a  great 
er  slaughter,  and  after  many  officers  and  men  had 
fallen,  still  ignorant  of  their  locality,  the  troops 
paused,  and  finally  took  shelter  in  a  neighboring 
street,  t'  Although  the  mass  of  the  command  had 
kept  boldly  to  its  work  during  the  assault,  the 
greater  portion  of  the  battalion  of  Maryland  and 
District  of  Columbia  volunteers  had  early  left  its 
colors  and  fled  beyond  the  range  of  fire.  The  lieu 
tenant-colonel,  Watson,  three  officers,  and  some 
seventy  men,  remained  to  sustain  the  honor  of  their 
corps ;  and  Watson  fell. 

In  the  mean  while,  Bragg's  battery  had  been 
advanced  into  the  suburb,  and  had  opened,  but  a 
few  discharges  proved  the  inefficiency  of  his  guns 
in  the  position.  His  men  and  horses  fell  rapidly 
under  the  fire  of  the  unseen  enemy,  and  against 
the  heavier  metal  of  Fort  Teneria  in  embrasure 
he  was  powerless ;  and,  finally,  this  first  attempt 

*  Henry's  Campaign  Sketches,  p.  194.  t  Idem,  p.  195. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


209 


at  a  demonstration  was  consummated  by  the  whole 
command  being  ordered  to  fall  back  out  of  ranged 
But  this  movement  was  not  effected  without  fur 
ther  loss,  for  a  body  of  lancers,  of  which  many  hov 
ered  about  the  field,  came  down  on  two  detached 
companies,  killed  two  officers  and  many  men,  and 
drove  the  remainder,  in  confusion,  to  the  main  body. 

The  fortunes  of  the  day  had  thus  far  been  en 
tirely  with  the  Mexicans ;  but,  in  the  confusion 
of  the  assaults,  two  companies  of  the  first  infantry, 
under  Captains  Backus  and  Lamotte,  had  extend 
ed  to  the  left,  and  seized  a  tannery,  which  shel 
tered  them  from  the  enemy's  fire,  and  in  the  yard 
of  which  was  a  shed  looking  directly  into  the  gorge 
of  Fort  Teneria.  A  distillery  in  the  vicinity  had 
been  fortified  with  sand-bag  parapets,  and  was 
strongly  garrisoned  by  the  enemy,  who  opened 
thence  a  heavy  fire  upon  Backus's  command.  La 
motte  had  fallen  wounded,  and  as  it  was  imprac 
ticable  to  retire  with  any  security  while  the  ene 
my  held  the  distillery,  attention  was  first  given  to 
that  point.  After  a  sharp  firing,  the  Mexicans  re 
tired  from  the  azotea,  and  Backus  was  about  to 
retreat  and  rejoin  the  main  body  of  the  division, 
for  he  had  just  learned  that  it  had  been  ordered 
back  out  of  range. f 

When  the  discharges  of  artillery  and  the  rapid 
fire  of  small  arms  about  Fort  Teneria  had  an- 

*  Henry's  Campaign  Sketches,  p.  195. 

t  Idem,  p.  195,  196,  and  Official  Report  of  General  Taylor.  Executive 
Document,  No.  4,  House  of  Representatives,  second  Session  of  the  twenty- 
ninth  Congress,  p.  85. 

I.— O 


210  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

nounced  to  General  Taylor  that  Garland  had  be 
come  warmly  engaged,  he  ordered  the  fourth  regi 
ment  of  infantry  and  three  regiments  of  Butler's 
division  to  move  at  once  by  the  left  flank  in  the 
direction  of  the  conflict,  and  support  the  assault. 
The  first  Kentucky  regiment  remained  to  guard  the 
battery.^ 

In  the  confusion  of  affairs,  but  three  companies 
of  the  fourth  received  the  order  at  first,  and  these 
moved  at  once  boldly  to  the  assault,  and  direct 
upon  Fort  Teneria.  Coming  rapidly  forward,  they 
opened  a  fire  of  musketry  upon  that  work;  but 
every  gun  was  turned  upon  them,  and  one  third 
of  the  officers  and  men  fell  at  the  first  discharge; 
the  remainder  staggered  and  fell  back  for  support.! 

General  Butler  had  meanwhile  ordered  forward 
Quitman's  brigade,  and  advanced  with  the  Ohio 
regiment  of  Hamer's  in  the  direction  of  the  con 
flict.  The  movement  of  these  troops  was  also  un 
der  the  flank  fire  of  the  citadel,  from  which  they 
suffered  much  annoyance ;  but,  feeling  their  way, 
they  gradually  advanced.  General  Butler,  follow 
ing  the  route  of  Garland's  command,  entered  the 
suburb,  and,  having  advanced  several  squares,  met 
Major  Mansfield,  who  still  lingered  upon  the  field, 
and  from  him  learned  of  the  failure  of  the  attack 
and  the  impracticable  nature  of  the  Mexican  posi- 
tion.$  Taylor  in  the  mean  while  had  come  up, 

*  Official  Report  of  General  Taylor.     Executive  Document,  No.  4,  House 
of  Representatives,  second  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  p.  85. 
t  Idem     Idem,  p.  85.         t  Gen.  Butler's  Official  Report.    Idem,  p.  91. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  211 

and,  learning  the  state  of  affairs  in  that  quarter, 
ordered  a  retrograde  movement;  but  it  had  not  been 
commenced  when  information  of  success  about  Fort 
Teneria  caused  the  order  to  be  rescinded.^ 

For  when  the  fire  of  the  fourth  infantry  had 
opened  in  its  front,  Backus  had  determined  to  hold 
on  to  his  position.  Occupying  the  roof  of  the  shed, 
his  men  poured  a  stream  of  musketry  into  the 
gorge  of  the  lunette,  which  told  with  effect  upon 
the  crowded  mass  of  the  Mexican  garrison,  and 
some  portion  of  it  commenced  a  precipitate  retreat. 
The  companies  of  the  fourth  having  fallen  back, 
there  was  for  a  time  no  assaulting  force  in  front  of 
the  work,  and  the  greater  number  of  the  garrison 
remained  until  Quitman's  brigade,  which,  although 
suffering  severely  from  the  fire  of  the  citadel,  ad 
vanced  rapidly  against  the  position.  When  with 
in  one  hundred  yards  the  volunteers  broke  into  a 
run,  rushed  forward  with  loud  shouts,  and  entered 
the  lunette  over  the  parapet.  The  garrison,  gall 
ed  by  Backus's  fire,  fled  before  their  assault,  aban 
doning  the  armament  of  five  guns  and  their  am 
munition,  and  the  volunteers  followed  so  fast  that 
no  time  was  afforded  for  resistance  from  the  distil 
lery,  in  which  thirty  persons  were  captured. 

So  soon  as  the  event  was  known,  fragments  of 
the  different  regiments,  and  Bragg's  and  Rldge- 
ly's  field  batteries,  were  collected  about  the  cap 
tured  work.  General  Taylor  determined  to  hold 

*  General  Taylor's  Official  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  4,  House 
of  Representatives,  second  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  p.  85. 


. 


212 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


Ms  position  in  the  town,  and  attempts  were  made 
to  advance.  General  Butler  first  led  the  Ohio  regi 
ment  to  the  left  of  the  former  attack,  with  the  in 
tention  of  assaulting  Fort  Diablo ;  but  that  work 
was  stoutly  defended,  and  could  not  immediately 
be  taken.  Butler  accordingly  fell  back,  but  not 
until  he  had  been  wounded  and  lost  many  men.^ 
Meanwhile  Taylor  had  ordered  the  main  force 
of  the  first  division  (still  under  Garland,  although 
General  Twiggs  had  come  up  from  the  camp  to 
the  captured  work)  to  extend  to  the  right  and  en 
deavor  to  penetrate  the  town,  with  the  idea  of 
making  way  by  an  extended  circuit  to  the  rear  of 
Fort  Diablo. f  This  was  attempted,  and,  although 
severely  cut  up  by  the  fire  of  the  Mexicans  as 
they  crossed  the  streets,  especially  from  the  tete 
du  pont  of  La  Purisima,  the  troops  passed  beyond 
the  bridge  head,  and,  although  in  confusion,  enter 
ed  the  yards  of  the  street  next  the  rivulet,  driving 
the  Mexicans  from  the  adjacent  houses ;  but  fur 
ther  advance  was  impracticable.  Directly  in  front- 
lay  a  street  swept  by  the  fire  of  the  tete  du  pont, 
and  beyond,  the'  deep  ditches  and  high  banks  of 
the  rivulet;  while  the  Mexicans  occupied  the  para 
pet  of  the  bridge  and  a  low  wall  which  extended 
on  the  southern  bank,  whence  they  plied  their 
musketry  with  unceasing  vigor.  But  still  the  of 
ficers,  though  falling  with  the  men  at  every  mo- 

*  General  Taylor's  Official  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  4,  House 
of  Representatives,  second  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  p.  85. 
t  Idem.    Idem,  p.  85. 


THE    WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  213 

ttient,  called  on  them  to  maintain  their  ground, 
while  they  searched  in  vain  for  a  practicable  point 
to  pass  the  stream.  Captain  Ridgely  brought  up 
a  section  of  his  battery,  but  his  fire  was  ineffectual 
against  that  of  the  heavy  metal  of  the  enemy  from 
behind  his  parapets,  and  the  battle  in  this  quarter 
continued  without  any  advantage  to  the  Ameri 
cans.  The  Mexicans  were  nevertheless  pressed 
closely,  and  a  heavy  battalion  of  infantry,  from  the 
interior  of  the  town,  was  sent  to  support  the  garri 
son  of  the  tete  du  pont.  It  came  down  the  street 
leading  to  the  bridge,  but  before  it  could  gain 
shelter  it  had  to  pass  under  the  American  fire  from 
the  houses  and  yards  on  the  northern  bank  of  the 
stream,  which  was  delivered  with  so  much  effect 
that  the  column  was  driven  back  into  the  town. 
The  Mexican  artillery  was  then  placed  in  position 
to  bear  upon  the  Americans,  and,  opening  from  the 
distance,  beat  through  the  walls  of  the  houses  and 
yards,  whence  they  delivered  their  fire,  and  render 
ed  the  position  untenable.  After  a  continued  oc 
cupation  of  the  exposed  point,  the  attempt  to  pass 
the  rivulet  was  given  up  as  impracticable,  and  the 
troops  were  withdrawn  to  Fort  Teneria. 

While  the  various  operations  had  taken  place  in 
the  suburbs,  the  Mexican  lancers  had  made  many 
demonstrations  of  attacking  the  American  troops 
in  rear  and  cutting  up  the  camp  guard  at  the  wood 
of  San  Domingo,  though  none  of  the  demonstra 
tions  had  been  serious  except  that  upon  the  detach 
ed  companies  of  Garland's  retreating  command. 


214  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

The  main  body  of  the  lancers  had  coine  down  at 
one  time  upon  the  Ohio  and  Mississippi  regiments, 
which  had  heen  withdrawn  from  Fort  Teneria,  but 
those  regiments  had  fallen  back  against  a  chapar 
ral  fence,  whence  they  had  delivered  a  fire,  and  the 
lancers  had  retreated.  Bragg's  battery  was  sent  in 
that  direction  from  the  captured  work,  and  a  few 
discharges  effectually  dispersed  them.  The  cap 
tured  guns  of  Fort  Teneria  were  served  from  time  to 
time  upon  Fort  Diablo,  until  one  of  the  howitzers 
was  brought  forward  from  the  first  position  of  the 
batteries.  But  the  principal  operations  of  the  day 
upon  the  eastern  front  of  Monterey  were  finished. 
During  the  afternoon  the  main  body  of  the  troops 
remained  in  and  about  the  captured  work,  collect 
ing  the  dead  and  wounded,  and  strengthening  the 
position.  The  enemy  made  no  direct  attempt  to 
dislodge  them,  but  kept  up  a  cannonade  from  Fort 
Diablo  whenever  any  were  exposed,  which  was  re 
plied  to  from  the  howitzer  and  with  musketry.  A 
movement  of  lancers  on  the  southern  bank  of  the 
San  Juan  beyond  the  town  was  opposed  by  Bidge- 
ly's  battery,  and  a  few  shots  drove  them  back. 
When  night  fell,  the  first,  third,  and  fourth  infan 
try  and  Bidgely's  guns  were  detailed  to  guard  the 
captured  work,  and  the  remaining  troops  were  or 
dered  to  the  camp  at  the  wood  of  San  Domingo. 

The  operations  upon  the  eastern  side  of  Monte 
rey  of  the  20th  of  September  had  resulted  in  the 
capture  of  Fort  Teneria,  and  the  repulse  of  the 
American  troops  in  their  first  attempt  upon  that 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


215 


work,  in  the  advance  upon  Fort  Diablo,  and  in  the 
attempt  to  turn  it  by  passing  the  rivulet  to  the 
right  of  the  bridge  of  La  Purisima.  The  strong 
demonstration  had  been  effected,  and  one  point  of 
Mexican  defense  had  been  gained.  But  394  had 
fallen,  killed  or  wounded,  including  one  general  of 
ficer,  eight  field  officers,  seven  captains,- and  eight 
een  subalterns.  The  effect  of  the  operations,  not 
withstanding  the  partial  success,  had  been  to  damp 
en  the  spirits  of  both  officers  and  men,  and  to  weak 
en  their  moral  force.  The  confused  nature  of  the 
movements,  the  ground  over  which  they  extended, 
and  the  necessity  of  passing  and  repassing  under 
the  flank  fire  of  the  citadel,  had  made  the  duties 
of  the  day  not  only  severe  in  the  actual  conflict, 
but  harassing  and  fatiguing  throughout. 

The  movement  of  the  cavalry  to  the  support  of 
General  Worth  had  not  been  effected.  Lieutenant- 
colonel  May  arrived  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Loma 
d'Independencia  in  the  morning,  but,  from  the  fire 
of  the  guns  upon  its  summit,  he  judged  that  to  pass 
it  with  cavalry  would  be  impracticable.  Neither 
did  he  conceive  that  he  could  with  safety  charge 
through  the  streets  of  the  suburbs  west  of  the  cita 
del,  as  he  had  instructions  to  do  from  General  Tay 
lor  ;  and,  when  Governor  Henderson  came  up  with 
the  Eastern  Texan  regiment,  May  came  under  his 
command.  Henderson  suspended  any  movement 
until  he  could  communicate  with  the  command 
ing  general,  and  received  orders  soon  after  to  re 
turn  to  the  main  body  of  the  army.  But  the  cav- 


216  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

airy  arrived  too  late  to  take  any  active  part  in  the 
operations  of  the  day  upon  the  east. 


The  Mexican  reveille  aroused  Worth's  division 
at  daylight  on  the  morning  of  the  21st,  and  it  was 
immediately  prepared  for  the  advance.  The  small 
train  which  accompanied  it  was  parked  in  an  in- 
closure  of  adobe  walls  surrounding  the  scattered 
huts  in  the  vicinity  of  the  bivouac,  and  the  fifth 
regiment  of  infantry,  with  one  section  of  Mackall's 
battery,  was  detailed  as  its  guard.  The  remainder 
of  the  division  moved  on  by  the  path  which  had 
been  reconnoitered  the  previous  evening. 

Hays's  regiment  of  mounted  Texans  marched  in 
advance,  in  close  order,  over  the  ground,  which  at 
some  places  afforded  room  for  the  extension  of  cav 
alry,  and  again  narrowed  down  to  a  defile.  In  its 
rear,  Captain  C.  F.  Smith's  battalion  of  light  in 
fantry  was  deployed  as  skirmishers  across  the  road 
covering  the  front  of  the  division,  which  marched 
in  close  formation. 

As  the  advanced  Texans  neared  the  Saltillo 
road,  upon  turning  a  spur  of  the  mountains  they 
came  upon  the  Mexican  regiment  of  Guanajuato 
lancers,  which,  with  its  supporting  infantry,  occu 
pied  the  junction  of  the  roads,  and  was  in  readi 
ness  to  dispute  the  passage.  The  Mexican  force 
numbered  in  all  near  1500  men,  and  the  cavalry 
at  once  commenced  forming  for  a  charge.  The 
Texans  halted,  deployed,  moved  down  to  the  left 
of  the  pail:,  and  entered  a  corn-field,  where  two 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  £17 

companies  dismounted,  and  took  post  in  ambush 
behind  the  thick  fence  of  the  field.  Captain 
M'Culloch's  company,  not  having  received  the  or 
der  for  this  movement,  advanced  in  a  scrambling 
charge  to  meet  the  enemy,  who  by  this  time  had 
formed,  and  was  coming  down  with  lances  in  rest 
at  a  sweeping  gallop.  A  short  conflict  ensued, 
and  the  Texans,  having  inflicted  some  loss  upon 
the  enemy,  fell  back,,  with  two  men  severely 
wounded.  The  lancers  pursued,  and,  turning  the 
hill,  came  upon  Smith's  battalion,  which  was  still 
advancing  in  open  order.  The  skirmishers  opened 
a  scattering  fire,  but  the  lancers  came  on  with  ap 
parent  good  will  and  determination  until  they  had 
presented  their  flank  to  the  T  elans  in  the  corn 
field,  when  the  rifles  were  opened  with  deadly  ef 
fect.  Thirty  saddles  were  emptied  at  the  instant. 
Lieutenant  Hays  brought  up  a  gun,  with  which 
he  poured  in  a  fire  of  canister  over  the  heads  of  the 
skirmishers,  the  first  brigade  deployed  across  the 
road  and  advanced,  the  Texans  kept  up  their  rifle 
practice,  and,  finally,  the  lancers,  sorely  cut  up, 
gave  back,  and,  in  spite  of  the  efforts  of  their  offi 
cers,  were  soon  in  full  flight.  The  Texans,  the 
light  battalion,  and  Duncan's  guns  pursued,  and 
prevented  many  fugitives  from  gaining  the  Saltillo 
road.  These  attempted  to  escape  over  the  mount 
ain  on  the  right,  but  were  soon  shot,  with  the  ex 
ception  of  the  lieutenant  colonel,  Don  Juan  Na- 
jira,  who  had  led  the  charge.  In  spite  of  wounds, 
he  refused  to  surrender,  and  struggled  on,  until,  at 


213  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

length,  he  too  fell  from  his  horse,  and  rolled,  dead, 
down  the  slope  of  the  mountain. 

The  Mexican  infantry  fell  back  without  firing, 
and  Worth  continued  his  march  to. the  Saltillo 
road.  Here  he  halted,  sent  the  light  battalion 
through  the  fields  to  the  west  of  the  Lo'ma  de  Fed- 
eracion,  advanced  the  artillery  battalion  and  a  par 
ty  of  the  Texans  along  the  road  to  the  west,  located 
a  battery  at  the  junction,  and  sent  the  remainder 
of  his  force  to  the  rear,  to  increase  the  escort  of  the 
train  which  was  ordered  forward. 

"While  it  was  advancing,  Duncan's  battery  was 
planted  on  the  slope  of  the  mountain  north  of  the 
Saltillo  road,  and  opened  fire  upon  the  Mexican 
infantry,  a  portion  of  which  had  retreated  up  the 
Loma  de  Federation.  The  enemy  brought  up  two 
nine  pounders  from  Fort  Soldado  and  replied,  kill 
ing  one  or  two  horses.  The  range  was  too  great  for 
light  six  pounders,  and  the  American  battery  was 
withdrawn  to  the  road.  When  there,  the  Mexican 
fire  against  it  was  so  depressed  as  to  be.  almost 
harmless.  But  the  train  was  exposed,  in  its  ad 
vance,  to  the  fire  from  the  Loma  de  Federacion 
and  from  the  Loma  d'Independencia  (the  enemy 
having  increased  his  battery  on  the  summit  of  the 
latter  by  a  twelve  pounder),  which  killed  an  officer 
and  five  men  of  the  escort.  To  secure  it,  as  well 
as  to  take  up  a  position  which  could  be  easily  de 
fended  from  an  attack  from  front  or  rear,  it  was 
advanced,  when  it  came  out  on  the  Saltillo  road, 
to  a  sugar-house  some  hundred  yards  to  the  west, 


THE   WAR-WITH  MEXICO.  £19 

and  beyond  range.  ^  The  house  was  immediately 
crenelled  for  musketry,  and  occupied  by  two  com 
panies.  The  field  batteries,  were  drawn  back  to 
the  position,  and  planted  to  sweep  both  approach 
es.  The  wagons  and  pack  mules  were  parked  in 
a  field  below  the  road,  covered  by  their  fire,  and 
the  second  brigade,  facing  to  the  east,  stretched  up 
the  side  of  the  mountain.  The  first  brigade,  which, 
while  this  position  had  been  taken,  had  been  de 
ployed,  facing  to  the  east,  in  a  corn-field  beneath 
the  Loma  de  Federacion,  and  the  light  battalion, 
which  had  returned  without  meeting  an  enemy, 
were  drawn  back.  The  artillery  battalion  was 
posted  in  advance  of  the  train,  the  eighth  infant 
ry,  in  column,  along  the  road  between  the  two  bat 
teries,  and  parties  of  Texans  were  thrown  out  in 
front  and  reai^  while  their  main  body  took  post  in 
rear  of  the  second  brigade. 

The  first  object  of  the  movement  had  been  gain 
ed,  and  the  division  was  in  strong,  position  on  the 
Saltillo  road,  in  rear  of  Monterey.  Worth's  atten 
tion  was  immediately  directed  to  the  assault  of  the 
Loma  de  Federacion,  and  a  select  party  was  de 
tailed  for  the  service.  Four  companies  of  the  ar 
tillery  battalion,  under  Captain  Smith,  with  a  like 
number  of  Texans  (who  were  dismounted  for  the 
service),  under  Major  Chevalier,  in  all 'number 
ing  three  hundred  effectives,  composed  the  party. 
Smith  had  the  direction  of  the  movement,  as  Chev- 

*  General  Worth's  Official  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  4,  House 
of  Representatives,  second  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  p.  103. 


220 


WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 


alier,  at  Worth's  request,  had  waived  his  rank  in 
favor  of  the  regular  officer,  and  at  twelve  o'clock 
the  command  left  the  position  at  the  sugar-house. 
It  moved  through  the  corn-fields,  in  the  direction  of 
the  hill,  for  some  time  without  heing  observed  ;  but 
as  it  approached  the  River  San  Juan  the  enemy  on 
the  summit  discovered  the  movement,  and  at  once 
opened  a  plunging  fire  of  grape  and  canister.  The 
elevation  of  the  hill  was,  however,  too  great  for 
the  effective  use  of  artillery,  and  the  shot,  for  the 
most  part,  flew  harmlessly  over  the  heads  of  the 
assailants,  who  moved  on,  crossed  the  San  Juan, 
and,  having  occupied  the  rocks  around  the  base  of 
the  hill,  were  halted  to  allow  a  reconnaissance.  In 
the  mean  time  the  enemy  had  advanced  a  strong 
battalion  from  Fort  Soldado,  which  commenced  a 
noisy  fire  from  the  summit,  but  the  assailants  were 
protected  by  the  rocks,  and  the  fire  was  still  harm 
less.  To  obtain  a  more  effective  aim,  a  cloud  of 
skirmishers  descended  the  slope,  and  the  whole 
hill-  side  was  soon  covered  by  the  smoke  of  their 
ftmsketry.  Finding  so  large  a  force  opposed  to  him, 
Captain  Smith  delayed  the  assault,  to  allow  time 
for  the  approach  of  support.  Worth  had,  from  the 
position  at  the  sugar-house,  observed  the  state  of 
affairs,  and  sent  the  seventh  regiment  of  infantry 
to  sustain  the  assault,  and  soon  after  ordered  Col 
onel  P.  F.  Smith  to  follow  with  the  fifth  regiment, 
and,  if  practicable,  to  carry  Fort  Soldado.  The  sev 
enth,  keeping  to  the  right  of  Captain  Smith's  route, 
arrived  on  the  west  of  the  hill  before  that  officer 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

knew  of  its  approach,  and  a  small  party  was  thrown 
in  advance  to  divert  the  attention  of  the  enemy. 
A  note  directed  to  Captain  Miles,  who  command 
ed  the  seventh,  fell  into  the  hands  of  Smith,  who, 
being-  thus  informed  of  his  vicinity,  at  once  made 
his  dispositions,  and  commenced  the  ascent. 

The  hill- side  was  rocky  and  difficult,  and  the 
Mexican  skirmishers,  still  keeping  up  an  uninter 
rupted  fire,  occupied  the  crags  and  bushes  of  one 
half  the  distance  from  the  summit.  The  Ameri 
can  regulars  advanced  by  the  heads  of  companies, 
and  on  either  flank  the  Texans,  in  loose  order,  plied 
their  rifles  with  deadly  effect.  The  Mexicans  fell 
back  upon  the  hill  before  the  advance,  the  regu 
lars  deployed  and  opened  fire,  the  pace  increased, 
and  as  the  Americans  rushed  with  a  shout  over  the 
crest,  the  enemy  was  in  full  flight  to  Fort  Soldado. 
One  gun  had  been  removed  from  the  position,  arid 
the  other,  which  had  been  overturned  in  the  rocky 
path,  was  abandoned.  The  Americans,  coming  on 
in  pursuit,  pelted  the  fugitives  in  their  retreat, 
seized  and  righted  the  abandoned  gun,  and  direct 
ed  it  against  the  redoubt. 

Colonel  Smith,  having  arrived  with  the  fifth  in 
fantry  at  the  base  of  the  hill  during  the  assault, 
ordered  the  seventh  regiment  to  advance.  The 
two  regiments,  moving  along  the  western  slope, 
came  up  at  a  charging  pace,  and  entered  over 
the  low  parapet  of  Fort  Soldado  before  the  Mexi 
cans  had  recovered  from  the  confusion  of  the  re 
treat  from  the  Loma  de  Federacion.  They  fled 


222  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

with  precipitation  down  the  hill  toward  the  city, 
leaving  their  nine  pounder  in  the  work,  and  par- 
ties  of  Americans,  of  different  regiments,  shouting 
and  firing, 'followed  after.  But  the  Mexican  bat- 
teries  in  front  of  the  Obispado  opened  to  cover  the 
retreat,  and  the  pursuers  were  quickly  recalled, 
while  the  captured  guns  were  turned  on  the  Mexi 
can  works  and  replied. 

The  fifth  regiment  was  extended  along  the  ridge 
to  the  southeast,  the  seventh  remained  at  Fort 
Soldado,  and  Captain  Smith's  command  retained 
the  position  .which  it  had  carried  on  the  summit 
of  the  Loma  de  Federacion.  So  soon  as  the  posi 
tion  had  been  captured,  that  at  the  sugar-house 
was  abandoned  by  the  remaining  troops  of  the  di 
vision,  which,  with  the  artillery  and  train,  moved 
up  to  the  gorge  at  the  foot  of  the  captured  hill,  and 
bivouacked  for  the  night. 

At  that  moment  the  scene  was  beautifully  grand. 
A  heavy  storm  was  just  rising  over  the  high  peaks 
of  the  Sierra  Madre,  while  the  cannonade  between 
the  hills  of  Federacion  and  Independencia  envel 
oped  each  height  in  smoke ;  the  Mexican  troops 
crowned  the  summit  of  their  hill  above  the  cloud ; 
Worth's:  division,  with  its  train,  was  taking  posi 
tion  in  the  defile ;  and,  to  heighten  the  effect,  the 
echoes  of  the  artillery  rolled  in  a  thousand  rever 
berations  through  the  valley.  But  the  night  soon 
set  in  with  a  heavy  rain,  the  cannonade  ceased, 
and  the  whole  was  shrouded  in  darkness. 

The  effect  of  the  operations  of  the  20th  on  the 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  £23 

west  of  Monterey  had  been  to  close  the  retreat  of 
the  enemy,  to  heat  him  severely  in  two  attacks,  and 
to  secure  an  important  position  which  looked  into 
the  rear  of  the  town.  This  had  been  accomplish 
ed  with  but  little  loss  to  the  American  soldiers,  and 
their  spirits  rose  with  their  uninterrupted  success ; 
while  the  Mexicans  had  seen  their  cavalry  shame 
fully  beaten,  and  the  positions  on  the  Loma  de  Fed- 
eracion  wrested  from  them  with  comparative  ease ; 
and  their  confidence  could  have  been  in  no  way  in 
creased  by  the  events  of  the  day  upon  the  west. 


On  the  morning  of  the  22d  the  garrison  of  Fort 
Diablo  reopened  a  fire  upon  the  American  troops 
about  the  captured  work,  which  it  kept  up  through 
out  the  day,  whenever  any  were  exposed  to  view. 
The  fire  was  occasionally  returned,  but  no  offen 
sive  operation  was  undertaken  on  that  day  by  the 
American  forces  on  the  east  of  Monterey.^  At  mid 
day  General  Quitman's  brigade  marched  from  the 
camp,  under  the  flank  fire  of  the  citadel,  to  relieve 
the  guard  of  Fort  Teneria.  This,  in  its  turn,  was 
exposed  to  the  same  fire,  and,  in  its  march  to  camp, 
lost  several  men  in  killed  and  wounded.  Dur 
ing  the  afternoon  it  was  reported  that  the  enemy 
was  assembling  in  force  upon  the  plain,  and  the 
troops  in  camp  were  drawn  out  under  arms  ;  but  it 
proved  to  be  a  false  alarm.  To  oppose  any  demon 
stration  which  might  be  made  by  the  cavalry, 

*  General  Taylor's  Official  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  4,  House 
of  Representatives,  second  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  p.  86. 


224  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

Bragg's  battery  was  put  in  position,  where  it  re 
mained  until  nightfall. 

About  the  position  of  Fort  Teneria,  the  occa 
sional  cannonade  was  kept  up  on  both  sides ;  but, 
in  general,  Mexicans  as  well  as  Americans  were 
quiet,  and  appeared  to  await  the  result  of  the  op 
erations  upon  the  west,  which  had  early  in  the  day 
been  continued  so  successfully  on  the  part  of  the 
Americans  that  the  fall  of  Monterey  was  no  longer 
problematical. 


During  the  night  of  the  2 1st  Worth  had  organ 
ized  a  party  of  three  companies  of  the  artillery  bat 
talion  and  three  companies  of  the  eighth  infantry 
under  Lieutenant-colonel  Childs,  and  two  hundred 
Texans  under  Colonel  Hays,  for  the  assault  of  the 
Loma  d'Independencia.  The  direction  of  affairs 
was  given  to  Childs,  as  it  had  been  to  Smith  in  the 
attack  upon  the  opposite  height ;  and,  to  favor  the 
operation,  Colonel  Smith  was  directed  to  advance 
a  party  from  Fort  Soldado  in  the  direction  of  the 
enemy  at  the  commencement  of  the  assault.  At 
three  o'clock  in  the  morning  Childs  marched  from 
the  bivouac  at  the  defile,  and,  having  secured  the 
services  of  some  Mexican  guides,  silently  took  po 
sition  at  the  northwestern  base  of  the  hill.  There 
three  companies  under  Captain  Vinton,  and  a 
party  of  Texans,  were  detached  to  gain  the  north 
eastern  base,  and  to  ascend  from  that  direction. 
The  weather  was  rainy  and  dark,  no  pickets  had 
been  posted  by  the  Mexicans  around  the  base,  and 


THE    WAR   WITH    MEXICO.  £25 

the  positions  were  accordingly  taken  without  ex 
citing  their  attention.  (Childs  waited  until  Vin- 
ton's  party  had  time  to  arrive  at  the  northeast,  and 
at  the  first  hreak  of  day  commenced  the  ascent. 
He  met  with  no  resistance  until  near  the  summit, 
when  the  enemy,  being  aroused,  delivered  a  volley 
which  cut  down  the  leading  files  of  his  command; 
hut  the  soldiers  answered  with  a  cheer,  and  deliv 
ering  their  fire,  directed  by  the  Mexican  flashes, 
rushed  on.  Vinton's  party,  which  on  the  other  side 
had  nearly  arrived  at  the  summit,  commenced  the 
charge  with  a  shout,  and  the  Mexicans,  bewildered 
and  beaten,  fled  down  the  hill  to  the  Obispado. 
They  carried  with  them  the  howitzer  which  had 
been  in  battery  upon  the  summit,  and  attempted 
to  secure  the  twelve  pounder ;  but,  in  the  confusion 
of  the  retreat,  this  was  impracticable,  and  they 
therefore  cast  it, down  the  declivity,  breaking  its 
wheels,  and  rendering  it  for  the  time  useless.  While 
the  assault  continued,  the  attention  of  the  garrison 
of  the  Obispado  had  been  attracted  by  the  noisy 
cheers  of  three  companies  of  the  seventh  infantry, 
which  descended  from  Fort  Soldado,  and  in  that 
manner  announced  their  advance.  The  Mexican 
guns  opened  upon  them  with  grape,  but  the  fire,  de 
livered  in  the  darkness,  was  harmless,  and  the  object 
having  been  gained,  the  party  retired  up  the  hill. 
When  the  action  about  the  Loma  d'lndependen- 
cia  had  fairly  commenced,  Worth  sent  Lieutenant- 
colonel  Staniford  with  three  companies  of  the  first 
infantry  to  the  support  of  Childs.  Staniford  ar- 
L— P 


226  THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO. 

rived  at  the  base  of  the  hill  soon  after  the  summit 
had  been  gained,  and  made  the  ascent  without 
other  opposition  than  the  distant  flank  fire  of  the 
Obispado.  The  dispositions  for  holding  the  posi 
tion  had  already  been  made.  Four  companies, 
under  Captain  Vinton,  were  posted  in  the  advance, 
among  the  rocks-  on  each  declivity,  each  wing  be 
ing  accompanied  by  a  party  of  Texans.  The  re 
maining  troops  occupied  the  summit  of  the  hill 
about  the  captured  Mexican  battery. 

Although  daylight  had  fairly  broken,  a  mist 
hung  about  the  whole  position,  which  rendered  a 
reconnaissance  of  the  Obispado  for  a  time  imprac 
ticable.  A  party  of  officers  attempted  it,  and  ap 
proached  in  the  obscurity  to  within  a  few  yards, 
when  the  mist  suddenly  rose  and  discovered  them 
to  the  enemy.  He  put  a  stop  to  the  reconnaissance 
by  a  heavy  discharge  of  canister  and  musketry, 
which  sent  the  officers  back  to  the  position  of  the 
advanced  pickets. 

In  the  mean  while  the  fifth  regiment  had  been 
ordered  down  from  the  position  near  Fort  Soldado, 
and,  ascending  in  the  rear  of  the  hill,  had  re-en 
forced  the  troops  upon  the  summit,  making  the 
whole  force  present  upon  the  Loma  d'lndependen- 
cia  of  near  1000  men.  The  imposing  appearance 
of  the  Obispado,  when  viewed  from  a  distance,  had 
led  to  an  exaggerated  estimate  of  its  strength, 
and,  in  consequence,  Worth  ordered  that  its  assault 
should  not  be  immediately  attempted.  The  troops 
therefore  held  their  position  during  the  morning 


THE   WAR   WITH   MEXICO.  £27 

under  the  continued  fire  of  the  Mexican  garrison, 
from  which  they  were  partially  sheltered,  and  sus 
tained  but  little  loss.  The  enemy  made  several 
demonstrations  of  an  intention  of  assaulting  and 
retaking  the  summit,  but  all  of  them  were  com 
menced  with  but  little  vigor,  and  were  quickly  re 
pulsed  by  the  fire  of  the  advanced  companies. 

To  assist  in  the  contemplated  assault,  Lieutenant 
Roland  was  sent  with  a  twelve  pounder  howitzer 
to  the  base  of  the  hill,^  and  it  having  been  raised 
with  much  exertion  to  the.  summit,  an  epaulement 
was  constructed  with  the  sand-bags  of  the  Mexican 
work,  and  the  howitzer  placed  in  battery  against 
the  Obispado.  A  few  shots  were  sent  into  the  win 
dows  and  embrasures  of  the  ruin,  and  the  Mexican 
garrison  at  once  commenced  preparations  for  retreat. 
The  cannonade  was,  however,  continued,  and  a 
straggling  fire  kept  up  between  the  American  ad 
vance  and  the  enemy,  until  about  one  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon.  At  that  time  a  strong  body  of  cavalry, 
with  an  infantry  support,  took  position,  with  the 
apparent  intention  of  charging  up  the  ridge  and 
striking  a  vigorous  blow  for  the  victory.  Its  ad 
vance  was  commenced  at  a  brisk  pace,  but  the  ar 
rangements  had  been  made  to  receive  it.  Lieuten 
ant  Bradford's  and  Ayers's  companies  lay  on  either 
side  of  the  ridge,  along  which  was  the  only  prac 
ticable  ascent  for  cavalry.  As  the  Mexicans  ad 
vanced,  each  closed  to  the  left  and  right,  faced 

*  General  Worth's  Official  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  4,  House  of 
Representatives,  second  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  p.  105. 


228  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

quickly  to  the  front,  and  delivered  its  fire.  It  was 
without  much  physical  effect,  delivered  as  it  was 
in  haste  and  at  a  depression,  hut  nevertheless  the 
lancers  turned  from  it  and  fled.  Ayers,  springing 
through  his  company,  called  upon  the  soldiers  to 
follow  him,  hut  no  general  direction  had  heen  given 
for  the  advance,  and  for  a  moment  they  hesitated. 
Vinton,  however,  soon  ordered  them  forward,  and 
his  command,  with  the  Texans,  ran  down  the  hill. 
As  the  movement  progressed,  Childs  endeavored 
to  check  it,  as  it  was  in  direct  violation  of  Worth's 
order;  hut  the  soldiers  were  too  near  the  walls, 
and  Stamford,  yielding  to  the  requests  of  the  offi 
cers  ahout  him,  sent  from  the  summit,  first  a  sup 
port  of  four  companies,  and  then  gave  the  order  for 
the  whole  force  to  advance,  and  in  a  mass  it  poured 
down  the  hill  toward  the  Ohispado. 

The  advanced  companies  meanwhile  had  enter 
ed.  Ayers  led  through  an  emhrasure,  while  Brad 
ford  kept  to  the  right,  and,  passing  on  the  west  side 
of  the  ruin,  entered  the  priest-cap.  The  main  body 
of  the  garrison  had  already  left  the  position,  and 
those  who  remained  made  hut  feeble  resistance. 
The  guns  had  been  spiked,  but  the  vent  of  a  how 
itzer  was  soon  cleared,  and,  before  the  fugitives  had 
reached  the  suburbs  of  the  city  at  the  foot  of  the 
hill,  its  fire  was  directed  on  their  rear ;  and,  as  the 
main  body  of  the  American  force  arrived,  parties 
of  soldiers  pushed  down  the  hill  in  pursuit,  using 
their  muskets  and  rifles  until  the  enemy  had  gain 
ed  the  shelter  of  the  city. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  229 

From  the  bivouac  at  the  defile  Worth  had  ob 
served  the  fall  of  the  Obispado,  and  having  order 
ed  forward  the  troops  still  at  that  position,  he  came 
up  at  speed,  followed  by  Duncan's  battery.  The 
guns  came  quickly  up  the  hill,  and  were  planted 
at  once  in  front  of  the  priest-cap.  Worth,  after  a 
short  observation  of  a  flag  upon  the  citadel,  which 
had  been  taken  by  some  as  one  of  truce,  ordered 
them  to  be  opened,  and  the  retreating  enemy  was 
still  further  annoyed  as  he  passed  the  Plaza  de  la 
Capilla  on  his  way  to  the  citadel.  So  soon  as  he 
had  passed  beyond  range,  the  fifth  infantry  was  or 
dered  to  return  to  the  heights  of  the  opposite  ridge, 
the  train  of  the  division  was  brought  up  and  park 
ed  beneath  and  to  the  west  of  the  Obispado,  and 
the  positions  were  taken  for  the  night. 

The  Loma  d'Independencia,  with  the  Obispado, 
completely  commanded  the  western  portion  of 
Monterey,  and  their  possession  insured  the  en 
trance  into  the  town.  The  important  advantages, 
like  those  of  the  preceding  day,  gained  by  Worth's 
division,  had  cost  comparatively  but  little.  The 
armament  captured  in  the  Obispado  was  of  two 
nine  pounders,  a  six-inch  howitzer,  besides  the 
twelve  pounder  which  had  been  thrown  down  the 
declivity,  all  having  a  full  supply  of  ammunition, 
and  quite  sufficient  for  the  defense  of  the  position 
against  any  ordinary  attack  from  the  town  front, 
in  view  of  which  the  place  had  been  originally 
fortified.  The  importance  of  the  capture  was  so 
well  appreciated  by  the  Mexican  general,  that  dur- 


230  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

ing  the  night  he  withdrew  his  troops  from  the  bat- 
teries  on  the  east  of  the  city,  and  advanced  a  col 
umn  of  four  thousand  men  with  a  view  to  its  re 
covery.  His  reconnoitering  officers,  however,  on 
coming  out  of  the  town,  fell  in  with  the  American 
pickets  and  drew  their  fire.  The  first  brigade,  and 
Duncan's  and  Mackall's  artillery  men,  which  were 
posted  ahout  the  Obispado,  sprang  to  their  arms 
with  a  cheer,  which  was  taken  up  and  replied  to 
by  the  guard  on  the  summit  of  the  hill,  as  well  as 
the  second  brigade  on  the  opposite  height  of  Fed- 
eracion.  The  preparation  for  battle  being  thus 
sternly  manifested,  the  Mexican  general  gave  up 
his  intention  of  attack,  if,  indeed,  he  had  ever  seri 
ously  entertained  it,  and  fell  back  with  his  troops 
to  the  Grand  Plaza  of  the  city. 


On  the  morning  of  the  23d  active  operations  were 
resumed  upon  the  east,  for  at  dawn  of  day  Quit- 
man,  from  Fort  Teneria,  observed  the  abandoned 
works  in  his  vicinity,  and,  having  promptly  seized 
them,  sent  information  to  the  commanding  general. 
Taylor  at  once  ordered  the  troops  in  camp  under 
arms,  and  gave  directions  to  Quitman  to  enter  the 
city  at  his  discretion,  making  his  way  through  the 
houses  and  gardens,  and  sheltering  his  men  as  he 
could.*1  Quitman  ordered  Colonel  Davis,  with  the 
Mississippi  regiment  of  rifles,  to  advance,  who  pro- 

*  General  Quitman's  Official  Report.  Executive  Document,  No.  4,  House 
of  Representatives,  second  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  p.  94,  and 
General  Taylor's  Official  Report.  Idem,  p.  87. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  231 

ceeded  cautiously,  and  for  some  time  without  op 
position.  Having  approached  within  short  dis 
tance  of  the  interior  barricades,  the  Mexicans  open 
ed  a  heavy  fire  of  grape  from  the  "barricades  and 
musketry  from  the  house-tops,  upon  which  the 
troops  were  ordered  under  cover  of  the  houses. 
Quitman  then  brought  forward  such  portion  of  the 
Tennessee  regiment  as  could  he  spared  from  the 
guard  of  the  captured  works,  and,  spreading  his 
troops  over  several  squares,  commenced  an  advance 
through  and  over  the  buildings.  While  this  was 
progressing,  Captain  Ridgely,  from  Fort  Teneria, 
served  a  captured  gun  upon  the  Cathedral,  about 
which  the  Mexicans  were  thickly  posted,  until  the 
advancing  troops  had  gained  a  position  which  in 
tercepted  his  fire.  The  regiment  of  Eastern  Tex- 
ans  had  been  ordered  up  by  General  Taylor,  and, 
led  by  Governor  Henderson,  entered  the  city,  dis 
mounted,  at  eleven  o'clock  in  the  morning.  Join 
ing  with  Davis's  riflemen,  the  two  regiments  used 
their  rifles  with  good  effect,  gradually  driving  back 
the  enemy  in  the  direction  of  the  Plaza ;  and  the 
practicability  of  fighting  in  a  town,  which  had  been 
before  a  matter  of  some  doubt  in  the  mind  of  Gen 
eral  Taylor,^  having  been  demonstrated,  Bragg's 
battery,  with  the  third  regiment  of  infantry  in 
support,  was  ordered  from  the  camp  to  participate 
in  the  battle.  The  enemy  still  held  possession  of 
the  citadel,  whence  he  kept  up  his  flank  fire  upon 

*  General  Taylor's  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  4,  House  of  Rep 
resentatives,  second  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  p.  87. 


232  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

the  passing  troops  ;  but  this  time,  the  road  being 
clear  of  obstruction,  the  battery  passed  the  field  of 
fire  at  speed,  without  loss,  while  the  infantry,  mak 
ing  a  wide  circuit,  kept  out  of  range,  and  joined  the 
guns  in  the  city. 

The  troops  in  the  town  had  meantime  gained 
a  street  which  led  to  the  Cathedral,  but  it  was  bar 
ricaded  near  that  building  ;  the  Mexicans  were  in 
force,  and  defended  the  position  so  stoutly  that  a 
speedy  advance  in  that  direction  was  impractica 
ble.  As  soon  as  the  guns  came  up,  a  light  six 
pounder  was  opened  upon  the  barricade,  but  it 
made  little  or  no  impression,  although  served  with 
great  rapidity.  But  by  this  time  the  want  of  con 
cert  with  Worth  had  become  apparent  to  General 
Taylor,  and  for  that  reason,  and  because  Quitman's 
command  had  been  on  duty  the  previous  night,  he 
ordered  the  troops^  to  abandon  the  town,  and  fall 
back  to  the  works  upon  its  southeastern  verge, 
which  they  did,  and,  soon  after,  those  which  had 
been  engaged  returned  again  to  the  camp.  Ha- 
mer's  brigade  and  Webster's  battery  took  post  in 
Forts  Teneria  and  Diablo  and  the  intervening 
buildings,  relieving  the  command  of  General  Quit- 
man,  which  had  occupied  them  on  the  previous 
night.  Two  shells,  thrown  from  Webster's  battery, 
finished  the  demonstrations  of  hostility  on  the  east 
of  Monterey,  for  no  further  conflict  took  place,  as 
the  Mexicans  made  no  attempt  to  occupy  the  por- 

*  General  Taylor's  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  4,  House  of  Repre 
sentatives,  second  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  p.  87. 


THE    WAR   WITH   MEXICO.  £33 

tions  of  the  town  which  had  been  won  by  the  Amer 
icans  only  to  be  abandoned. 


Before  the  troops  on  the  east  of  the  city  had  be 
come  closely  engaged,  the  twelve  pounder,  which 
had  been  thrown  down  the  hill-side  on  the  previ 
ous  morning,  was  brought  up  to  the  priest-cap  in 
front  of  the  Obispado.  Its  broken  wheels  were  re 
placed,  and,  with  the  captured  howitzer,  it  was 
served  upon  the  town,  of  which  the  whole  western 
portion  was  apparently  deserted.  But,  with  the 
Mexican  ammunition,  no  elevation  would  give  a 
range  to  the  Plaza,  at  which  point  the  mass  of  the 
Mexican  force  was  concentrated,  and  the  fire  was 
soon  discontinued.  A  captured  nine  pounder  had, 
however,  been  dragged,  by  a  party  of  the  fifth  in 
fantry,  along  the  ridge  southeast  from  Fort  Solda- 
do  to  a  position  which  looked  into  the  square,  and 
from  its  high  command  the  shot  were  sent  directly 
into  the  midst  of  the  enemy. 

During  the  cannonade  a  flag  was  displayed  at 
the  foot  of  the  Loma  d'Independencia,  the  bearer 
of  which  conveyed  to  General  Worth  a  communi 
cation  from  the  governor  of  the  city,  asking  per 
mission  for  the  women  and  children  to  leave  the 
town ;  but  as  Worth  had  no  authority  to  grant  or 
refuse  the  request,  he  transmitted  it  to  General 
Taylor.  It  was  not  received  by  him  until  late  in 
the  day,  and,  made  at  the  period  of  the  operations 
at  which  it  was,  was  deemed  inadmissible,  and  of 
course  refused. 


234  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

The  heavy  firing  of  the  enemy  from  the  vicinity 
of  the  Cathedral  first  announced  to  the  troops  of 
Worth's  command  the  advance  of  their  comrades 
into  the  eastern  portion  of  the  city,  and,  believing 
that  it  had  heen  intended  by  General  Taylor  that 
he  should  co-operate,^  General  Worth  at  once  pre 
pared  to  advance  into  the  town  from  the  west.  He 
first  sent  a  select  command  of  four  companies  and 
two  guns  to  the  mills  of  Santa  Catarina,  a  strong 
position  one  league  toward  Saltillo,  to  obstruct  the 
approach  of  any  re-enforcement  to  the  enemy,  of 
which  rumors  were  still  frequent.  A  company  of 
the  fifth  infantry  was  left  in  position  with  the  nine 
pounder  upon  the  ridge  of  Federacion,  but  the  divi 
sion,  with  these  exceptions,  was  concentrated  about 
the  Obispado.  The  different  commands  having 
been  furnished  with  picks  and  crows  from  a  quan 
tity  captured  in  Fort  Soldado,  and  the  western  por 
tion  of  the  town  having  been  reconnoitered,  the  ad 
vance  was  ordered,  and  the  movement  commenced. 

Eight  companies,  under  Lieutenant  -  colonel 
Childs,  deployed  as  skirmishers  across  the  width  of 
the  town,  entered  first,  and,  passing  through  the  scat 
tered  houses,  and  climbing  over  the  garden  walls, 
advanced,  without  opposition,  as  far  as  the  Plaza  de 
la  Capilla.  Lieutenant  Mackall  followed  with  a 
section  of  his  battery,  and,  throwing  the  guns  into 
position  at  the  angles  of  the  square,  drove  back  a 
party  of  lancers  which  had  come  down,  apparent- 

*  General  Worth's  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  4,  House  of  Repre 
sentatives,  second  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  p.  105. 


THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO. 

ly  in  observation,  to  a  barricade  a  short  distance 
from  the  Plazuela  del  Came,  the  market  square 
of  the  town.  A  portion  of  the  seventh  infantry 
came  lip  under  Captain  Holmes,  and,  with  some 
companies  of  Childs's  command  and  one  of  the 
guns,  moved  along  the  street  on  the  right,  and 
seized  the  barricade.  The  other  gun  of  the  sec 
tion,  the  remainder  of  Childs's  command,  and  the 
main  bodies  of  the  third  and  seventh  infantry,  took 
the  parallel  street  on  the  left,  and,  under  a  rat 
tling  fire  from  the  house-tops,  gained  the  Plazuela 
del  Came. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  ten-inch  mortar,  which  had 
been  so  unfortunately  served  on  the  eastern  side, 
and  had  been  sent  to  Worth's  position,  arrived  at 
the  Obispado,  and  was  at  once  sent  forward  to  the 
Campo  Santo,  and  preparations  were  made  to  place, 
it  in  battery.  Two  companies  were  located  in  the 
position  for  its  protection ;  and,  haying  taken  care 
to  secure  his  communication  by  breaking  in  the 
doors  of  houses  and  the  entrances  to  the  inclosures 
along  the  route  through  the  city,  with  his  staff  and 
Duncan's  battery  Worth  came  up  to  the  barricade. 
He  directed  thence  a  fire  of  artillery  upon  a  sand 
bag  parapet  which  crowned  a  house  some  distance 
in  advance,  which  soon  beat  through  it,  and  mo 
mentarily  stopped  a  fire  which  the  Mexican  troops 
had  delivered  from  that  direction. 

The  attack  upon  the  eastern  side  having  been 
suspended,  General  Ampudia  was  at  liberty  to 
throw  the  strength  of  his  force  against  Worth's  ap- 


236  TUE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

proach,  and,  in  a  short  time,  the  Mexican  troops  oc 
cupied  the  harricades  and  houses  which  still  inter 
vened  hetween  the  assailants  and  the  Plaza,  and 
swept  the  streets  with  showers  of  grape  and  mus 
ketry.  But  it  was  too  late,  for  the  assailants  had 
already  gained  a  secure  lodgment  in  the  heart  of 
the  city,  and,  when  the  Mexican  fire  hecame  de 
structive,  they  took  to  cover  in  the  houses,  and 
commenced  cutting  their  advance  through  the 
walls.  Hays's  regiment  was  dismounted,  and  en 
tered  the  town,  where  it  was  stationed  in  parties  on 
the  house-tops  in  the  front.  The  Texans  used  their 
rifles  with  effect,  while  the  troops  of  the  line  pressed 
on  slowly  through  the  huildings ;  and  in  this  man 
ner,  as  on  the  eastern  side,  the  enemy  was  grad 
ually  driven  back  toward  the  Grand  Plaza. 

So  soon  as  the  Mexican  fire  had  hecome  heavy 
in  the  streets,  two  of  Duncan's  guns,  and  one  of 
Mackall's,  were  withdrawn  to  the  Campo  Santo. 
A  section  of  the  former  hattery  had  meanwhile 
been  placed  at  the  foot  of  a  cross  street,  under  cov 
er,  to  command  a  ford  across  the  San  Juan,  oppo 
site  the  Plaza ;  and  a  gun  of  the  latter  was  left  in 
position  in  the  Plazuela  del  Carne.  During  the 
advance  the  troops  had  entered  a  yard  inclosing  the 
beef  cattle  and  sheep  which  formed  part  of  the 
commissariat  of  the  Mexican  army,  and  they  were 
at  once  secured  and  driven  back  to  the  Obispado. 

When  the  action  in  the  town  had  fairly  com 
menced,  the  command  which  had  been  sent  to  the 
mills  of  Santa  Catarina  was  ordered  to  return,  and, 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

coming  up  toward  evening,  it  took  post  in  reserve 
in  the  Plaza  de  la  Capilla.  The  conflict  had  con 
tinued  in  the  front,  with  heavy  rolling  volleys 
down  the  streets  on  the  part  of  the  Mexicans, 
whenever  a  party  of  Americans  or  a  single  staff 
officer  was  exposed ;  but  the  fire  of  the  assailants 
was  kept  up  in  dropping  shots  of  rifles  and  muskets 
from  house-tops  and  windows.  As  night  closed  in, 
the  mortar,  which  had  been  firmly  planted  in  the 
Campo  Santo,  opened,  and  the  artillerists  soon  get 
ting  the  range,  dropped  the  shells  into  the  Plaza. 
The  enemy  replied  from  the  citadel  with  a  six-inch 
howitzer ;  but  his  aim  was  bad,  and  few  shells  fell 
even  within  the  Plaza  de  la  Capilla.  Neverthe 
less,  the  light  artillery  was  drawn  back  for  security. 
Having  determined  to  hold  his  position  in  the 
town,  and  to  continue  the  advance  through  the 
night,  Worth,  before  returning  in  person  to  the 
Obispado,  stationed  the  four  companies  in  reserve 
at  points  along  the  road  to  keep  open  the  commu 
nication.  But  in  the  night  the  advance  was  neces 
sarily  slow  in  the  darkness,  and  the  mortar  threw 
but  one  shell  into  the  Plaza  each  half  hour  to  an 
noy  the  enemy.  The  Mexican  howitzer  from  the 
citadel  as  regularly  replied,  though  without  any 
effect  upon  the  Americans. 


At  daylight  on  the  morning  of  the  24th  an  aid- 
de-camp  of  the  Mexican  commander  presented  him 
self,  with  a  flag,  at  Fort  Diablo.  He  bore  a  letter 


238  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

to  General  Taylor,  which  had  been  written  by 
Ampudia  on  the  previous  evening,  but  of  which 
the  danger  of  approaching  the  American  lines  had 
prevented  the  delivery.  In  it  the  Mexican  general 
submitted  propositions  for  evacuating  the  town, 
taking  with  him  all  the  arms  and  munitions  of  war 
which  it  contained.  General  Taylor,  who  had 
intended  on  the  previous  evening  to  proceed  to 
Worth's  head-quarters  to  concert  a  combined  at 
tack,  and  had  during  the  night  sent  orders  to  the 
latter  to  suspend  the^  advance  until  his  arrival, 
promptly  refused  the  offer,  and  demanded  the  sur 
render  of  the  whole  Mexican  army  as  prisoners  of 
war,  and  of  all  the  public  property  in  the  place. 
He  required  an  answer  to  his  communication  by 
twelve  o'clock  on  that  day,  to  be  delivered  at  Gen 
eral  Worth's  head-quarters,  whither  he  started  in 
person.^ 

Having  received  the  order  of  General  Taylor, 
and  been  informed  by  the  Mexican  general  of  the 
proposed  negotiations,  Worth's  attack  had  been 
discontinued  early  in  the  morning ;  but  he  did  not 
cease  his  preparations  for  battle.  During  the  night 
the  troops  had  occupied  a  house  upon  the  Plazuela 
del  Carne,  the  upper  story  of  which  was  the  high 
est  in  the  town,  and  from  which  all  the  azoteas 
could  be  swept  to  the  Grand  Plaza.  A  six  pound 
er  was  dragged  up  the  staircases,  and  placed  in 
battery  at  an  embrasure  cut  through  the  walls ;  the 

*  Correspondence.     Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representa 
tives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  348,  349. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


239 


howitzer  which  had  been  captured  in  the  Obispa- 
do  was  brought  down,  with  a  full  supply  of  am 
munition,  and  planted  in  the  yard  of  the  same 
building,  whence  it  was  directed  likewise  upon 
the  Plaza.  The  light  guns  were  distributed  at  dif 
ferent  points  of  the  city,  commanding  the  fords  of 
the  river  and  the  approaches  from  the  citadel,  while 
officers  searched  for  advantageous  positions  for 
the  infantry,  to  be  occupied  upon  the  renewal  of 
the  engagement.  The  commissaries  traversed  the 
streets  with  wagons,  seizing  all  articles  of  subsist 
ence  which  could  be  found  in  that  part  of  the  town 
already  occupied,  and  transported  them  to  Arista's 
house,  on  the  verge  of  the  city,  at  the  foot  of  the 
Loma  dTndependencia. 

The  activity  in  the  American  positions  was  no 
ticed  by  General  Ampudia,  and  he  sent  word  to 
Worth  that  he  considered  it  as  a  violation  of  the 
spirit  of  the  existing  truce,  and  required  him  to 
desist  from  his  preparations ;  but  Worth  at  once  re 
fused,  and  in  a  short  time  had  every  thing  in  readi 
ness  to  renew  the  attack  so  far  as  his  division  was 
concerned.  Ampudia  soon  after  requested  an  in 
terview  with  the  American  general-in- chief,  and, 
when  informed  that  it  would  be  some  time  before 
his  arrival,  desired  to  see  General  Worth.  An  in 
terview  took  place,  but  every  thing  was  delayed 
until  the  arrival  of  General  Taylor,  who  came  at 
about  eleven  o'clock,  accompanied  by  his  staff,  and 
many  officers  of  the  first  and  volunteer  divisions. 
At  a  preliminary  interview,  he  refused  to  open  a 


240  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

negotiation  unless  it  was  with  a  view  to  arrange 
terms  of  capitulation.  The  Mexican  general  re 
quested  time  for  consideration,  and  he  was  allow 
ed  until  one  o'clock,  at  which  hour  General  Tay 
lor  declared  that,  unless  the  basis  demanded  was 
agreed  to,  he  should  renew  the  assault ;  hut  before 
one  General  Ampudia  signified  his  acceptance  of 
the  basis,  and  a  conference  took  place. 

It  was  announced  by  the  Mexican  general  that 
he  had  received  official  information  that  the  new 
Mexican  government  had  consented  to  receive  com 
missioners  for  th«  negotiation  of  peace,  and  had  al 
ready  appointed  commissioners  on  the  Mexican 
side ;  and  that,  by  the  change  of  government,  he 
was  released  from  obedience  to  his  former  orders 
to  defend  the  city.  Under  these  circumstances, 
and  being  actuated,  as  he  said,  by  a  desire  to  pre 
vent  the  further  effusion  of  blood,  he  renewed  his 
proposition  for  an  arrangement  upon  the  terms  set 
forth  in  his  note  of  the  previous  evening.  General 
Taylor,  as  before,  refused  to  entertain  any  such 
proposition,  which  he  might  very  well  have  con 
sidered  as  a  demonstration  of  bad  faith,  as  the 
negotiation  had  been  opened  upon  the  implied 
promise  of  the  Mexican  general  to  capitulate ;  and 
he  was  upon  the  point  of  breaking  off  the  confer 
ence,  when  the  governor  of  the  city  proposed  the 
appointment  of  a  mixed  commission  for  the  con 
sideration  of  the  matter.  To  this,  after  some  hesi 
tation,  General  Taylor  consented,  and  named  Gen 
eral  Worth,  Governor  Henderson,  and  Colonel 


THE    WAR   WITH   MEXICO. 

Davis  on  his  part,  and  Ampudia  designated  Gen 
erals  Ortega,  Requena,  and  the  Governor  Llano.  . 

Having  been  verbally  instructed,  the  American 
commissioners  demanded  the  surrender  of  Monte 
rey,  all  the  arms  and  munitions  of  war,  and  all 
other  public  property.  Tfiey  proposed  to  allow  the 
Mexican  army  to  retire  without  parole,  the  officers 
retaining  their  side  arms,  beyond  a  fine  extending 
through  the  pass  of  the  Rinconada,  the  city  of 
Linares,  and  »San  Fernando  on  the  coast ;  and  that 
General  Taylor  should  agree  not- to  advance, be 
yond  the  line  for  eight  weeks,  or  until  the  respect 
ive  governments  could  be  heard  from.- 

The  Mexican  commissioners  refused  the  proposi 
tion,  and  insisted  upon  the  retention  of  arms  and 
artillery.  They  declared"  that  they  considered  'this 
as  necessary  for  their  national 'honor;  but,  as  the 
American  officers  had  gone^tothe  limit  of  their  In-, 
stractions,  the  commission  rose  and  reported  the* 
disagreement. 

Upon  this,  General  Ampudia  (in  the  mean  while* 
insisting  upon  retaining  the  small  arms,  as  a  point 
in  which  the  honor  of  his  nation  was  involved) 
reiterated  his  great  desire  of  .putting  an  end  to  the 
bloodshed,  and  offered  .to  concede  his  artillery. 
After  some  hesitation,  General  Taylor  yielded  the 
point  with  reference  to  the  small  arms,  and,  with 
modified  instructions,  the  commission  reassembled. 

The  Mexican  commissioners,  however,  insisted 
that  it  wajs  a  disgrace  to  their  artillery  arm  to  sur 
render  all  the  guns,  inasmuch  as  the  corps  of  their 
I.-Q 


242  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

army  retained  their  full  equipment,  and  would  not 
consent  to  the  terms  which  their  general  had  offer 
ed.  The  commission  therefore  rose  again  and  re 
ported. 

General  Taylor,  upon  receiving  the  report,  an 
nounced  that  the  conference  was  at  an  end,  and 
rose  to  leave  the  room.  He  was  stopped  by  one 
of  the  Mexican  commissioners,  who  entered  into  a 
conversation  with  him,  and,  at  the  same  time,  by 
Taylor's  permission,  Worth  entered  into  conversa 
tion  with  Ampudia. 

The  result  was  the  reassembling  of  the  commis 
sion,  and  the  final  agreement  upon  terms  of  capit 
ulation,  by  which  the  Mexican  army  was  to  be 
allowed  to  retain  one  field  battery.  With  the  mod 
ifications,  the  terms  were,  in  general,  that  the  Mex 
ican  army  should  evacuate  the  town,  taking  with 
it  aR  the  small  arms,  six  field  pieces  with  twenty- 
one  rounds  of  ammunition,  and  all  the  cavalry 
horses.  All  other  material  of  war  and  public  prop 
erty  were  to  be  surrendered  to  the  United  States 
forces,  and  the  armistice,  first  proposed  on  the  part 
of  General  Taylor,  was  agreed  to> 

The  Mexican  commissioners  were,  however,  tar 
dy,  in  executing  the  articles,  and  insisted  strongly 
upon  such  a  wording  of  the  instrument  as  should 
induce  the  belief  that  their  act  was  voluntary,  and 
one  of  policy,  and  not  the  legitimate  result  of  the 
operations  before  the  town.  Their  wishes  were 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of 
the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  349,  350. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  243 

negatived  by  the  American  commissioners,  who 
declined  to  alter  the  wording  of  their  demands  fur 
ther  than  had  already  been  done ;  but  they  allow 
ed  three  articles  to  be  added,  which  prescribed  the 
method  of  turning  over  and  receiving  the  pub 
lic  property  to  be  surrendered,  stipulated  that  all 
doubts  should  be  construed  on  principles  of  liber 
ality  to  the  retiring  army,  and  that  the  Mexican 
flag,  when  struck,  should  be  saluted  by  its  own 
battery.  Still  the  Mexican  commissioners  and  gen 
eral  struggled  for  delay,  and  started  many  points 
which  had  been  either  previously  disposed  of  or 
were  entirely  out  of  consideration.  To  allow  room 
for  enlarging  upon  his  good  conduct  in  the  oper 
ations,  Ampudia  desired  that  the  Spanish  copy 
should  differ  materially  from  the  English;  but  this 
was  refused,  and  the  English  copy  having  been 
left  to  be  literally  translated,  the  commission  broke 
up  for  the  night. 

The  troops  of  both  armies,  meanwhile,  remained 
quiet  in  their  respective  positions.  On  the  follow 
ing  morning  the  commission  met  again,  and  the 
Mexican  officers  still  endeavored  to  gain  some  new 
concession ;  but  a  peremptory  demand  was  made 
that  the  articles  of  both  the  English  and  Spanish 
copies  should  be  signed  by  the  Mexican  commis 
sioners  and  general,  which  was  at  length  complied 
with,  and  the  agreement  was  complete.^ 

*  The  facts  in  relation  to  the  negotiation  of  the  convention  are  principally 
derived  from  the  letter  of  Colonel  Davis  and  its  accompanying  memoranda, 
of  dates  of  January  6th,  1847,  and  October  7th,  1846,  put  forth  originally  in 
defense  of  the  measure,  and  published  in  the  Washington  Union. 


244  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

During  the  morning  of  the  25th  the  Mexican 
garrison  evacuated  the  citadel,  and  on  successive 
days  the  divisions  of  the  army  marched  to  Saltillo, 
taking  with  them,  however,  six  twelve  pounder 
guns,  which,  in  accordance  with  article  eighth  of 
the  convention,  were  liberally  construed  into  a 
light  field  battery.'  On  the  28th  the  last  Mexican 
corps  left  the  town,  and  Worth's  division  occupied 
the  principal  points  throughout  its  extent.  The 
remainder  of  the  American  army  kept  its  camp  in 
the  wood  of  San  Domingo. 

In  the  different  operations  which  resulted  in  the 
fall  of .  Monterey, .  the  American  army  had  lost 
twelve  officers  and  one  hundred  and  eight  men 
killed,  and  thirty-one  officers  and  three  hundred 
and  thirty-seven  men  '  wounded;  Of  this  loss,  by 
fair  trie  greater. portion  had  Been  incurred  upon  the 
2 1st, -in  the  attack  upon  the  eastern  fronts  of  the. 
city;  ipr  not  more -than  fifty-five  of  the  whole  num 
ber  w.ere  included  in  Worth's  divisibn,  and  the  loss 
in  the  street. fight  on  the  23d  had  been  but  small. 

The  number  of  Mexicans  who  fell  can  hardly  be 
estimated  with  a-ny  thing  like  accuracy.  The  op 
erations  were  so  varied,  and  the  points  of  attack  so 
numerous)  that  it  is  probable  it  was  never  accurate 
ly  'known;  and,  moreover,  the  irregulars  deserted, 
when  ill  fortune  befell  the  Mexican  arms,  in  great 
nunxbers  ;  but  it  can  be  safely  set  down  at  over  one 
thousand  men. 

When  General  Ampudia  had  arrived  at  Saltillo, 
h6  issued  a  proclamation  to  the  people  of  the  three 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.      .  245 

departments  under  his  command,  which -was. TG- 
iriafkable,  not  only  for  its  peculiar  style,  but  forcer- 
tain  declarations,  which  proved  with  how  much, 
good  faith- he  had  acted  when  he  had  negotiated 
the  convention  of  Monterey. 

He  announced  his  defeat,  arid  made  most  hum-, 
ble  apologies  foy  his  incapacity,  a  knowledge  •  of 

.  which,  he  stated,  had  induced  him  to  request  Gen* 
eral  Almonte  to  relieve  him. in  the  command. .  Aft 
er  a,  short  hut  false  account 'of  the  operations,  in 
which  the  valor  of  his  troops  was  highly  extolled, 
and  his  defeat  attributed  to  unfortunate  accidents, 
he  boasted  of  having  compelled  the  enemy  to  grant 
terms  which  saved  the  honor  of  the  army  and  the 
nation,  as  well  as  his  troops,  with  their  arms  .and 

•equipments.  He  concluded  by  assuring  his  coun 
trymen  of  the  little  importance  of  the  loss  of  Mon 
terey,  inciting  them  to  a  continued  hostility  to  the 
invaders,  and  with  a  piece  of  flattery  to  Santa  An 
na,  "the  favorite  general  of  the  Mexicans,"  who,  it 
was  announced,  was  on  his  way  to  take  direction 
of  affairs  in  person. 

Having  thrown  this  forth  to  make  his  peace  with 
the  new  dictator  and  the  people,  he  very  soon  re 
ceived  orders  to  march  his  command  to  San  Luis, 
and  on  the  18th  of  October  he  evacuated  Saltillo, 
leaving  the  country  in  that  vicinity  protected  only 
by  the  stipulations  of  the  convention.  Ampudia 
was  successful  in  conciliating  Santa  Anna,  and 
that  being  the  case,  the  opinion  of  the  Mexican 
people  was  of  small  consequence.  But  the  inflam- 


«>'"  V"  -4      •% 

a»    •'   '  ».  '>  \       '*'     ,*•          •  f.  V     ' 

v>  *   "f  -  A-    •  »  '  ^*  f>^v    '<<£' 

**        ,4       •     .f_ 

246  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

matory  nature  of  his  proclamation,  and  the  decla 
rations  of  the  hostile  intentions  of  Santa  Anna,  did 
not  increase  any  friendly  feeling  which  might  have 
been  entertained  for  him  personally  by  General 
Taylor  or  other  Americans^  when  compared  with 
his  statements  made  in  conference  at  Monterey. 


The  desire  of  the  President  of  the  United  States 
for  the  movement  on  Monterey  was  made  known 
to  General  Taylor  in  the  dispatches  of  Secretary 
Marcy  of  the  1st  of  June  and  the  9th  of  July,  hoth 
written  before  the  receipt  at  Washington  of  any 
letters  from  General  Taylor,  which  gave  his  views 
in  extcnso  of  the  proper  object  of  military  opera 
tions.  In  the  first  of  these  dispatches,  however, 
was  propounded  the  question  whether  the  opera 
tions  from  the  base  of  the  Rio  Grande  should  look 
to  the  city  of  Mexico,  or  be  confined  to  the  under 
taking  of  cutting  off  the  northern  provinces.  And 
in  the  second,  the  views  of  General  Taylor  were 
requested  concerning  an  expedition  from  another 
base,  which  was  to  look  to  the  capital  as  the  neces 
sary  end  of  military  movements,  should  Mexico 
persist  in  her  obstinacy.  In  both,  much  was  nec 
essarily  left  to  the  general  commanding  in  the  field ; 
and  the  object  of  the  movement  upon  Monterey,  in 
the  opinion  of  the  government,  so  far  as  can  be 
judged  of  from  the  written  dispatches,  was,  first, 
to  seize  an  important  point  in  the  enemy's  country 
with  a  view  to  cutting  off  the  northern  provinces, 
or  of  gaining  some  distance  upon  the  high  road  to 


V  -  t 


THE    WAR    WITH   MEXICO.  £47 

.£.  '/* 

Mexico.  But  as  doubts  arose  as  to  the  practica 
bility  of  the  advance  from  that  direction,  and  it 
was  contemplated  on  the  9th  of  July  to  move  on 
the  capital  from  the  hase  of  Vera  Cruz,  its  object 
must  then  have  been  considered  simply  to  inflict 
a  blow  upon  the  enemy,  and  to  employ  the  force 
then  upon  the  Rio  Grande  in  offensive  operations 
during  the  sickly  season  upon  the  Gulf  coast ;  for 
in  all  the  letters  of  Mr.  Marcy,  the  wish  of  the 
President  was  manifested  that  the  war  should  be 
vigorously  prosecuted,  which  was  a  necessary  pol 
icy  for  effect  both  at  home  and  abroad.  The  wish 
es  of  the  government,  thus  manifested,  necessarily 
had  much  weight  with  General  Taylor;  but,  before 
any  communication  on  the  subject  had  reached 
him  from  Washington,  he  contemplated  the  same 
movement.  In  the  discretion  which  was  allowed 
him,  as  well  as  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  the  origin 
and  responsibility  of,  as  well  as  the  greater  share 
of  any  merit  which  may  attach  to  the  general  di 
rection  of  the  operations  about  Monterey,  belongs 
to  him,  and  the  object  which  he  had  in  view  is 
the  next  subject  for  remark. 

May  21st,  he  wrote  to  the  adjutant  general 
that,  with  certain  additional  means,  "operations 
might  be  carried  on  in  the  valley  of  the  San  Juan 
toward  Monterey,  the  first  city  of  importance  in 
that  direction."*  On  the  3d  of  June  he  wrote 
again  to  the  adjutant  general,  and  spoke  of  estab- 

*  Correspondence.     Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representa 
tives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  300. 


248  THE. WAR  WITH'MEXICO.  . 

lishing  depots  in  ad vance  on  the  route  to  Monte 
rey,  which,  he  said,  "  I  shall  lose  no  time  in  doing, 
as  soon  as  proper  transports  arrive,  unless  I  receive 
counter  instructions  from  the  department."^  But 
in  none  of  his  early  letters  is  the  movement  upon 
Monterey  treated  of  as  being  a  step  in  view  of  any 
other  end  than  its  capture  and  occupation,  and,  as 
it  necessarily  was,  a  blow  upon  the  enemy,  who 
might  have  been  expected  to  be  more  willing  to 
accede  to  terms  of  peace  after  having  lost  an  im 
portant  town  in  the  north  of  Mexico.  The  desire 
of  General  Taylor,  at  the  time  of  writing,  like  that 
of  the  authorities  at  Washington,  appears  to  have 
been  for  immediate  action  of  some  sort,  and  Mon 
terey,  "  the  first  city  of  importance  in  that  direc 
tion,"  was  the  object  of  his  attention,  so  far  as  can 
be  ascertained  from  his  communications  to  the  ad 
jutant  general. 

In  his  answers  to  the  dispatches  of  Mr:  Marcy  of 
the  8th  of  June  and  the  9th  of  July,  the  expedition 
was  treated  of  as  one  of  experiment  upon  the  agri 
cultural  capacity  of  the  valley  of  the  San  Juan, 
and  future  movements  of  the  army  in  that  direc 
tion  were  made  to  depend  very  much  upon  the  re 
sult  of  that  experiment.  The  force  with  which  he 
intended  to  move  was  distinctly  stated  to  be  of 
about  six  thousand  men ;  and  the  manifest  pur 
pose  of  the  expedition,  so  far  as  it  related  to  future 
operations,  then  was,  to  ascertain  their  practicabili- 

*  Correspondence.     Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representa 
tives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  305. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  £49 

ty.  On  the  part  of  the  general,  then,  the .  moye- 
ment  was  one  of  experiment. 

War  is  of  itself  an  experiment,  but  "  the  art  of 
war  is  not  conjectural"  However  much  may  be 
left  to  chance  and  to  circumstances  by  authorities 
at  the  distance  of  some  thousand  miles  from  the 
scene  of  hostilities,  yet  it  is  never  proper  that  the 
same  course  of  action  should  be  adopted  on  the 
part  of  the  general  in  the  field.  But,  since  Gener 
al  Taylor  moved  from  Camargo  with  about  the 
numerical  force  which  he  had  contemplated  .when 
he  wrote  his  answers  to  the  letters  of  the  8th  of 
June  and  the  9th  of  July,  and  without  any  distinct 
knowledge  of  the  force  or  position  of  the  enemy,  as 
is  apparent  from  the  information  contained  in  his 
letter  to  Mr.  Marcy  from  Marin,  it  can  not  but  be 
deemed  that,  on  his  part,  the  whole  operation  was 
an  experiment,  undertaken,  it  is  true,  with  a  force 
determined  upon  important  military  considerations, 
but  without  any  reference  to  the  strength  of  the 
enemy. 

In  a  subsequent  letter  to  General  Gaines,.  which 
that  officer  took  the  pains  to  have  set  forth  in  the 
newspapers,  General  Taylor  stated  that,  in  moving 
upon  Monterey  with  inadequate  means  and  a  small 
force,  he  was  actuated  by  a  desire  of  saving  the 
credit  of  the  administration,  which  could  not  but 
be  benefited  by  his  success,  while  he  took  the 
whole  responsibility  of  failure.  How  far  the  credit 
of  the  administration  would  have  been  benefited 
by  the  result  of  an  illy  organized  and  illy  provided 


250  THE   WAR   WITH   MEXICO. 

expedition,  may  well  be  considered  questionable, 
and  certainly  the  general  could  hardly  have  hoped 
to  gain  permanent  reputation  from  it.  But  in  giv 
ing  this  as  a  reason  for  the  advance,  when  his  own 
declarations  and  the  circumstances  under  which  it 
took  place  are  considered,  it  may  well  be  believed 
that  General  Taylor  does  scant  justice  to  the  per 
tinacity  of  purpose,  both  in  general  and  in  detail, 
which  is  one  of  his  distinguishing  characteristics. 
He  had  early  expressed  his  determination  to  ad 
vance  with  a  force  of  about  six  thousand  men ;  he 
knew  comparatively  nothing  of  the  strength  and 
position  of  the  enemy,  and  progressed  even  to  with 
in  fifteen  hundred  yards  of  Monterey  before  he  had 
made  up  his  mind  as  to  the  certainty  of  a  struggle 
for  its  occupation.  If  there  were  to  be  no  opposi 
tion,  certainly  a  column  of  about  six  thousand  men 
was  one  of  quite  sufficient  strength  to  undertake 
the  expedition,  and,  inasmuch  as  it  was  success 
ful,  it  may  perhaps  be  considered  that  it  was  in 
reality  sufficient.  Various  comments  have  been 
made  upon  the  operations  at  Monterey,  and  espe 
cially  the  convention  which  was  entered  into,  all 
of  which  have  been  met  by  the  statement  of  diffi 
culties  arising  in  the  want  of  force,  of  artillery,  and 
subsistence  of  the  American  army  before  the  town ; 
and,  on  the  part  of  those  defending  the  measures, 
it  'has  been  admitted  that  the  strength  of  the  com 
mand  was  inadequate  to  the  task  which  it  in  a 
inanner  accomplished.  It  has  been  attempted  to 
lay  whatever  blame  may  attach  to  this  inadequacy 


THE   WAR   WITH   MEXICO. 

at  the  door  of  the  authorities  of  Washington,  and 
the  secretary  of  war  and  the  quarter-master  general 
have  heen  called  upon  to  support  a  full  share.  But 
if  the  force  which  moved  upon  Monterey  was  in 
adequate  to  its  capture,  the  responsibility  must  rest 
with  General  Taylor,  for  it  is  a  settled  maxim  in 
war,  "that  a  general  has  no  right  to  shelter  his 
mistakes  under  cover  of  his  government,  the  authori 
ties  of  which  are  distant  from  the  scene  of  opera 
tions,  and  must  consequently  be  ill  informed  or 
wholly  ignorant  of  the  actual  state  of  things."* 

The  principal  difficulty  which  has  been  stated 
in  excuse  for  the  inadequacy  of  the  force  was  the 
want  of  transportation,  and  the  blame  of  this  want 
has  been  thrown  upon  the  quarter-master  general. 
In  reply  to  the  accusation,  he  has  stated  that  Gen 
eral  Taylor  made  but  few,  if  any,  requisitions  upon 
him ;  that  he  was  in  ignorance  of  these  wants ;  and 
that  whatever  was  furnished,  was  furnished  main 
ly  upon  his  own  responsibility.  But,  whatever  may 
be  said  in  extenuation  of  the  error  in  moving  upon 
Monterey  with  a  force  of  about  six  thousand  men, 
the  facts — that  it  was  the  number  originally  con 
templated  by  General  Taylor ;  that  it  was  determ 
ined  by  the  uncertainty  of  supporting  a  larger  force 
in  the  valley  of  the  San  Juan ;  that,  in  addition  to 
the  want  of  transportation,  that  uncertainty  was 
always  previous  to  the  operations  assigned  by  Gen 
eral  Taylor  as  a  reason,  and  that  it  was  doubtful 
in  his  mind  whether  there  would  be  any  opposition 

*  Napoleon. 


252  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  . 

at  the  place1 — show  that  the  responsibility  of  the 
movement  .rests  upon  himself;,  certainly  that  of  the 
general  operations  abou't  the  city  is  his  entirely.  . 
As  the  whole  expedition  had  been  experimental 
from  the  commencement,  so,  also,  were  each  of  the 
separate  operations  against  the 'town  oh  the  part 
of  General  Taylor,  and  the-  first  of  these,  in  point 
of  time  as  well  as  of  importance,  was  of  exceeding 
delicacy.  I  speak  of.  Worth's  movement  -to  gain 
the  Saltillo  road,  and  to  attack  in  rear  of.  Mon 
terey;  for  "  nothing  is  so  rash  or  contrary  to  .prin 
ciple  as  to  make  a  flank  marsh  before  an  enemy  in 
position,  especially  when  this  army  occupies  heights 
at  the  foot  of  which  you  are  forced  to  defile"*  This 
was  precisely  the  movement  of  Worth's  division 'to 
gain  the  rear  of  Monterey,  and  its  delicacy  and 
danger  were  obvious  to  all.  That  General  Taylor 
appreciated  them  is  apparent  from  the  care  which 
he  took  to  display  his  divisions  on  the  east  during 
the  afternoon  of  the  20th,  and  to  infornl  Worth  of 
the  movements  of  the  enemy  in  town,  and  from  the 
demonstration  which  he  made  on  the  morning  of 
the  21st  to  favor  it.  With  this  appreciation  of  the 
dangef  of  the  operation,  the  only  reasons  which  can 
be  seen  why  it  was  ordered  as  it  was  are  in  the 
character  of  the  enemy.  It  is  true  that  the  road 
was  reconnoitered  and  the  route  discovered  to  be 
practicable  ;  but  the  very  reconnaissance  might 
have  showed  the  danger  of  the  movement,  and  the 
fact  that  Worth,  upon  gaming  the  Saltillo  road, 

*  Napoleon. 


THE    WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  253 

would  be  isolated,  if  the  enemy  chose  to  make  him 
so,  at  a  distance  of  more  than  five  miles  from  the 
main  army.  He  occupied  a  defile  in  rear  of  the 
town,  but  in  the  march  he  had  left  a  defile  in  his 
rear  also,  and  the  safety  of  his  position  could  only 
have  depended  upon  the  inactivity  of  the  enemy, 
his  own  genius,  and  the  bravery  of  his  troops. 
Having  marched  from  the  wood  of  San  Domingo 
CHI  the  general  object  of  his  movement,  Worth, 
however,  exercised  an  independent  command,  and 
the  subsequent  operations  upon  the  west  were  his. 
That  the  attacks  upon  the  east  of  Monterey  on 
the  .morning  of  the.  21st  were  experimental  entire 
ly,  vand  intended  to  have -been  demonstrations  in 
favor  of  "Worth,  is  .apparent  from  General  Taylor's 
official  report,  and  from  the  nature  of  the  opera 
tions.  To  change  a  demonstration  into  a  positive 
attack  upon  the. discovery  of  an  important  advant 
age  is  certainly  an  evidence  of  genius,  but  it  cart 
hfrrdly  be  said  that  the  entanglement  of  a  corps  in 
a  position  of  which  nothing  is  known,  and  for  the 
purpose  of  attacking  an  uncertain  object,  is  demon 
strative  of  aught  else  than  heedless  bravery.  Upon 
whomsoever  the  responsibility  of, the  engagement 
of  Garland's  column  about  Fort  Teneria  may  .rest, 
.the  movement  from  the  first  was  one  -which  ex 
posed  it  to  imminent  hazard,  inasmuch  as  it  was 
•placed  under  the  flank  fire  of  the  citadel,,  about' 
which  the  enemy  was  in  force,  and  who,  with 
ordinary  good  conduct,  might  have  been  expected 
to  interrupt  the  communications.  The  attack  in 


254  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

town  was  in  keeping  with  the  commencement  of 
the  movement;  for,  by  passing  Fort  Teneria,  the 
left  flank  too  was  exposed ;  and  finally,  having  run 
on  to  the  masked  breast- works,  in  spite  of  the  ob 
stinate  bravery  of  officers  and  men,  it  resulted,  as 
such  attacks  generally  do$  in  a  repulse.  There 
can  be  no  doubt  that  the  American  general  antici 
pated  nothing  of  this  kind.  Although  he  brought 
up  his  remaining  troops  to  restore  the  battle  with 
promptitude,  he  not  only  placed  them  in  the  same 
predicament  with  Garland's  column,  and  exposed 
them  to  the  flank  fire  of  the  citadel,  but  gave  an 
opportunity  to  the  Mexican  cavalry  to  cut  up  his 
camp  guard,  which,  had  they  been  of  good  mate 
rial,  certainly  would  have  been  accomplished.  The 
nature  of  the  whole  movement  on  the  morning  of 
the  21st,  on  the  east  of  Monterey,  is  fully  apparent, 
from  the  fact  that,  after  having  brought  up  his 
whole  disposable  force,  the  resources  immediately 
at  the  disposal  of  General  Taylor  failed  him,  and 
he  had  ordered  a  retreat,  when  a  fortuitous  circum 
stance  gave  him  an  advantage,  and  something  to 
show  as  the  result  of  the  attack.  But,  had  not 
Backus  fortunately  occupied  the  tannery  in  the 
confusion  of  the  assault,  and  had  not  his  fire  coin 
cided  in  point  of  time  with  the  advance  of  Quit- 
man's  brigade,  it  is  more  than  probable  that  the  re 
sult  of  the  operations  on  the  east  of  Monterey  would 
have  been  told  in  few  words — that  the  American 
troops  had  been  beaten  back  at  all  points. 

The  future  operations  of  the  same  day  were  very 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  255 

much  of  the  same  nature  as  the  first.  They  have 
the  recommendation  of  having  heen  made  after  the 
partial  success ;  and,  although  unsuccessful  in  them 
selves,  and  hazardous,  they  undoubtedly  had  great 
effect  upon  the  enemy,  in  keeping  his  attention 
fixed  upon  the  east  of  the  town.  The  beneficial 
effect  of  the  operations  of  the  21st  ceased  there. 
The  demonstration  had  been  made,  though  at  great 
cost,  and  a  point  of  Mexican  defense  had  been 
gained.  But  its  occupation  entailed  the  necessity 
of  communicating  with  the  camp  under  the  flank 
fire  of  the  citadel,  a  distance  of  some  three  miles, 
which  was  certainly  hazardous  during  the  continu 
ance  of  the  operations. 

The  movements  on  the  west  of  Monterey,  though 
not  less  hazardous  than  those  on  the  east,  were 
characterized  by  a  caution  in  perfect  keeping  with 
their  importance  and  their  delicacy.  Moreover, 
having  been  commenced,  they  had  an  end  in  view 
which  was  worth  some  hazard — the  possession  of 
the  keys  to  the  whole  position  of  the  enemy.  The 
advance  on  the  morning  of  the  21st  was  careful, 
and  the  defile  past  the  hills  of  Independencia  and 
of  Federacion  was  cleared  of  the  enemy  before  the 
train  was  brought  forward.  A  secure  position  was 
obtained  before  any  detachment  was  made  for  the 
assault  of  any  position ;  and  those  assaults,  when 
made,  were  quickly  followed  up  and  supported.  It 
might  have  been  practicable  to  carry  the  Loma  de 
Federacion  immediately  after  the  retreat  of  the 
enemy  from  the  junction  of  the  roads,  and  its  im- 


256  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

mediate  assault  was  advised.  But  in  the  uncer 
tainty  which  existed  with  regard  to  Mexican  re- 
enforcements  from  Saltillo,  Worth  refused  to  adopt 
the  suggestion,  and,  though  he  lost  time,  he  gained 
security.  The  same  combination  of  prudence  and 
vigor  was  apparent  throughout  the  operations  of 
the  22d ;  and  the  chief  evidence  of  the  merit  of  the 
whole  course  of  action  on  the  west  is  the  fact  that 
the  loss  of  the  division  was  but  trifling  in  compari 
son,  while  the  positions  gained  insured  the  fall  of 
Monterey.  If  not,  why  were  the  forts  on  the  east 
abandoned  by  the  enemy  on  the  night  of  the  22d  ? 
The  American  troops  held  no  other  point  in  that 
vicinity  than  which  they  had  occupied  on  the 
previous  night,  and  had  made  no  other  demonstra 
tion  of  hostility  than  by  a  cannonade,  which  was 
inferior  to  that  of  the  enemy  from  Fort  Diablo. 

The  evacuation  of  the  forts  gave  an  opportunity 
for  the  attack  through  the  streets  on  the  23d,  but 
on  the  part  of  General  Taylor  it  was  experimental, 
as  he  states  in  his  report ;  and,  after  having  been 
pushed  to  close  vicinity  of  the  Plaza,  its  results 
were  given  up,  and,  except  in  the  moral  effect  upon 
the  enemy,  the  attack  was  useless.  Worth's  ad 
vance  was  of  an  entirely  different  nature.  He 
guarded  his  communications,  retained  all  the 
ground  which  he  gained,  and  continued  his  prep 
arations  for  .battle  with  the  ultimate  end  of  the  at 
tack  in  view  throughout.  Indeed,  it  is  hard  to  see 
in  what,  during  the  whole  series  of  his  movements 
upon  the  west,  he  neglected  any  thing  which  might 


)  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  £57 

conduce  to  the  safety  of  his  command  in  its  deli 
cate  position,  or  the  success  of  his  enterprise ;  and, 
notwithstanding  the  rashness  of  the  original  move 
ment,  his  success  justified  General  Taylor  in  or 
dering  it,  in  his  selection  of  the  commander  for  the 
hazardous  enterprise,  in  his  confidence  in  his  own 
troops,  and  in  his  appreciation  of  the  Mexicans  and 
their  commanders;  and  upon  these  must  rest, 
more  than  all  else,  the  credit  due  General  Taylor 
in  the  operations  about  Monterey. 

For  in  them  the  whole  theory  of  war  was  disre 
garded,  the  attack  was  made  without  knowledge, 
and  almost  without  consideration  of  the  enemy's 
position ;  and,  although  boldly  made  and  bravely 
persisted  in,  yet  was  attended  with  reverses  and 
loss  at  the  very  points  where  they  had  been  least 
anticipated.  It  was  ultimately  successful ;  and  the 
capture  of  Monterey,  effected,  as  it  was,  by  Gen 
eral  Taylor's  army  of  scarcely  6500  effectives,  in 
creased  the  reputation  of  American  troops  for  war 
like  prowess.  And,  whatever  may  be  said  of  the 
conduct  of  the  operations  on  the  part  of  the  com 
mander,  certainly  the  mass  of  the  army  failed  not 
in  its  duty  under  any  circumstances.  And,  in  gen 
eral,  to  this  good  conduct  on  the  part  of  subordinate 
officers  and  soldiers,  and  the  errors  of  the  Mexican 
commanders  (which  have  either  been  noticed  or 
are  too  obvious  to  require  remark),  the  success  of 
the  undertaking  is  attributable. 

The  final  subject  for  remark  in  these  operations 
is  the  convention  by  which  they  were  concluded ; 
L— R 


258  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

and,  although  its  nature  renders  it  necessary  that 
reference  should  be  made  to  communications  of 
later  date,  yet  it  is,  perhaps,  proper  to  speak  of  it 
in  the  present  connection. 

Of  all  the  military  acts  of  General  Taylor,  none 
were  openly  disapproved  of  by  the  authorities  at 
Washington,  and  none  have  been  severely  criticis 
ed  by  the  public  press,  with  the  exception  of  this 
convention.  The  refusal  of  the  new  Mexican  gov 
ernment,  under  General  Salas,  to  accept  the  offer 
of  negotiations,  was  received  in  Washington  in 
September,  and  on  the  22d  Mr.  Marcy  wrote  to 
General  Taylor,^  informing  him  of  the  fact,  and 
of  the  wish  of  the  President  that  the  war  should 
be  so  prosecuted  that  the  American  army  should 
be  in  the  most  threatening  position  possible,  in  or 
der  to  operate  upon  the  Mexican  Congress,  which 
was  to  meet  on  the  6th  of  December,  and  to  which 
the  proposition  for  negotiation  was  to  be  submitted. 
While  these  wishes  were  entertained  at  Washing 
ton,  the  next  news  from  the  army  brought  intelli 
gence  of  the  convention  of  Monterey  and  the  ac 
knowledged  suspension  of  hostilities  for  eight  weeks, 
a  period  which  extended  to  very  near  the  time  fixed 
upon  for  the  meeting  of  the  Congress.  It  was, 
therefore,  a  disappointment;  and  that  it  should 
have  been  regretted,  and  in  a  measure  disapproved 
of,  was  a  consequence.  Mr.  Marcy's  letter,  which 
informed  General  Taylor  of  the  views  of  the  Pres- 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of 
the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  341. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  259 

ident,  bore  date  on  the  13th  of  October,  and  treat 
ed  of  the  subject  in  the  following  paragraphs  :# 

"  In  relation  to  the  terms  of  the  capitulation  of 
Monterey,  the  President  instructs  me  to  say  that 
he  regrets  that  it  was  not  deemed  advisable  to  in 
sist  upon  the  terms  first  proposed.  The  circum 
stances  which  dictated  it  doubtless  justified  the 
change.  The  President,  uninformed  of  these  cir 
cumstances,  does  not  know  in  what  degree  the  re 
cent  change  in  the  government  of  Mexico  may  have 
contributed  to  the  result.  Certain  it  is,  however, 
that  the  present  rulers  of  that  country  have  not  as 
yet  given  any  evidence  that  they  ;  are  favorable  to 
the  interests  of  peace.'  Of  this  you  will  have  been 
informed  by  my  dispatch  of  the  22d  ultimo." 

"  The  government  did  not  contemplate,  as  you 
will  perceive  by  the  tenor  of  the  dispatches  from 
this  department,  that  there  probably  would  happen 
any  contingency  in  the  prosecution  of  the  war  in 
which  it  would  be  expedient  to  suspend  hostilities 
before  the  offer  of  acceptable  terms  of  peace." 

After  stating  the  objections  to  the  continuance 
of  the  armistice,  inasmuch  as  it  interfered  with 
the  plans  of  the  government  for  a  vigorous  prose 
cution  of  the  war,  with  the  view  which  was  enter 
tained  of  influencing  the  action  of  the  Mexican 
Congress,  he  continued  : 

"  The  government  is  fully  persuaded  that  if  you 
had  been  aware  of  the  special  reasons  disclosed  in 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of 
the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  355. 


260 


THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 


the  dispatch  of  the  22d  ultimo,  and  the  intentions 
of  the  government  still  entertained,  you  would  not 
have  acceded  to  the  suspension  of  hostilities  for 
even  the  limited  period  specified  in  the  articles  of 
capitulation;  but  as  its  continuance  depends  upon 
the  orders  of  your  government,  you  are  instructed 
to  give  the  requisite  notice  that  the  armistice  is  to 
cease  at  once,  and  that  each  party  is  at  liberty  to 
resume  and  prosecute  hostilities  without  restric 
tion." 

General  Taylor  replied  on  the  8th  of  November, 
and  defended  the  measure  in  the.  following  para 
graphs  : 

"  The  force  with  which  I  advanced  on  Monterey 
was  limited  by  causes  beyond  my  control  to  about 
6000  men.  With  this  force,  as  every  military  man 
must  admit  who  has  seen  the  ground,  it  was  en 
tirely  impossible  to  invest  Monterey  so  closely  as 
to  prevent  the  escape  of  the  garrison.  Although 
the  main  communication  with  the  interior  was  in 
our  possession,  yet  one  route  was  open  to  the  Mex 
icans  throughout  the  operations,  and  could  not  be 
closed,  as  were  also  other  minor  tracks  through  the 
mountains.  Had  we,  therefore,  insisted  on  more 
rigorous  terms  than  those  granted,  the  result  would 
have  been  the  escape  of  the  body  of  the  Mexican 
force,  with  the  destruction  of  its  artillery  and  mag 
azines,  our  only  advantage  being  the  capture  of  a 
few  prisoners  of  war  at  the  expense  of  valuable 
lives  and  much  damage  to  the  city.  The  consid 
eration  of  humanity  was  present  to  my  mind  dur- 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

ing  the  conference  which  led  to  the  convention, 
and  outweighed,  in  my  judgment,  the  doubtful  ad 
vantages  to  he  gained  hy  a  resumption  of  the  at 
tack  upon  the  town.  This  conclusion  has  heen 
fully  confirmed  hy  an  inspection  of  the  enemy's  po 
sition  and  means  since  the  surrender.  It  was  dis 
covered  that  his  principal  magazine,  containing  an 
immense  amount  of  pdwder,  was  in  the  Cathedral, 
completely  exposed  to  our  shells  from  two  direc 
tions.  The  explosion  of  this  mass  of  powder,  which 
must  have  ultimately  resulted  from  the  continu 
ance  of  the  homhardrnent,  would  have  heen  infin 
itely  disastrous,  involving  the  destruction  not  only 
of  the  Mexican  troops,  hut  of  non-comhatants,  and 
even  our  own  people,  had  we  pressed  the  attack." 

"In  regard  to  the  temporary  suspension  of  hos 
tilities,  the  fact  that  we  are.  not  at  this  moment 
(within  eleven  days  of  the  termination  of  the  pe 
riod  fixed  hy  the  convention)  prepared  to  move  for 
ward  in  force  is  a  sufficient  explanation  of  the  mil 
itary  reasons  which  dictated  this  suspension  of 
arms.  It  ^paralyzed  the  enemy  during  a  period 
when,  for  the  want  of  necessary  means,  we  could 
not  possibly  move."  *  #  * 

*  #  *  "  I  have  touched  the  prominent  military 
points  involved  in  the  convention  of  Monterey. 
There  were  other  considerations  which  weighed 
with  the  commissioners  in  framing,  and  with  my 
self  in  approving,  the  articles  of  the  convention. 
In  the  conference  with  General  Ampudia,  I  was 
distinctly  told  hy  him  that  he  had  invited  it  to 


262  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

spare  the  further  effusion  of  blood,  and  because 
General  Santa  Anna  had  declared  himself  favora 
ble  to  peace.  I  knew  that  our  government  had 
made1  propositions  to  that  of  Mexico  to  negotiate, 
and  I  deemed  that  the  change  of  government  in 
that  country  since  my  last  instructions  fully  war 
ranted  me  in  entertaining  considerations  of  policy. 
My  grand  motive  in  moving  forward  with  very  lim 
ited  supplies  had  been  to  increase  the  inducements 
of  the  Mexican  government  to  negotiate  for  peace. 
Whatever  may  be  the  actual  views  or  disposition 
of  the  Mexican  rulers,  or  of  General  Santa  Anna, 
it  is  not  unknown  to  the  government  that  I  had 
the  very  best  reasons  for  believing  the  statement 
of  General  Ampudia  to  be  true.  It  was  my  opin 
ion  at  the  time  of  the  convention,  and  it  has  not 
been  changed,  that  the  liberal  treatment  of  the  Mex 
ican  army  and  the  suspension  of  arms  would  exert 
none  but  a  favorable  influence  in  our  behalf."^ 

In  the  quoted  extracts  are  contained  the  only 
official  expressions  of  disapprobation  of  the  terms 
of  the  convention  on  the  part  of  the  President  and 
cabinet,  and  the  only  arguments  in  its  defense  of 
ficially  put  forth  by  General  Taylor. 

The  reasons  of  the  regret  of  the  authorities  at 
Washington  that  the  convention  had  been  agreed 
to  are  obvious,  and  have  been  before  mentioned. 
Whatever  may  have  been  the  diplomatic  policy  of 
the  country,  the  invariable  wish  of  the  President 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of 
the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  359. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  £63 

had  been  expressed,  that  the  war  should  be  vigor 
ously  prosecuted ;  and  when  this  action  had  just 
been  particularly  enjoined  as  a  measure  of  policy, 
to  find  that  it  was  interrupted  by  the  convention 
of  Monterey,  not  only  in  fact,  but  with  that  fact 
published  to  Mexico,  it  certainly  was  cause  of  re 
gret  ;  and  regret  was  all  which  was  expressed ;  and 
that,  too,  connected  with  an  avowal  of  confidence 
that,  had  the  general  been  more  fully  informed  of 
the  nature  of  things  at  the  time,  he  would  not  have 
agreed  to  the  convention.  It  may  well  be  ques 
tioned  whether  this  expression  of  regret  called  for 
any  defense  of  the  measure.  In  that  undertaken 
by  General  Taylor,  considerations  are  stated  as  hav 
ing  influenced  his  opinion  in  favor  of  it  which  might 
well  be  deemed,  by  many,  to  have  been  considera 
tions  on  the  other  side,  and  in  neither  criticism  nor 
defense  has  the  state  of  affairs  which  existed  at  the 
time  when  the  convention  was  agreed  to  been  fully 
set  forth. 

It  is  true  that  the  force  with  which  General  Tay 
lor  marched  on  Monterey  was  limited  to  about  six 
thousand  five  hundred  men,  and  it  is  no  less  true 
that  any  military  man  who  has  seen  the  ground 
will  promptly  admit  that  it  is  impossible,  with  that 
force,  so  completely  to  invest  the  whole  town  as  to 
preclude  the  escape  of  the  garrison.  But,,  on  the 
23d  of  September,  the  Mexican  force,  having  been 
driven  from  the  positions  on  the  west  and  one  upon 
the  east,  and  having  abandoned  the  remainder,  was 
concentrated  in  the  Grand  Plaza  and  at  the  citadel, 


264  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

the  greater  force  being  at  the  former  position.  On 
that  day  Quitman's  troops  and  others  advanced  to 
within  one  block  of  the  Plaza,  and  were  withdrawn 
at  the  very  time  Worth's  advanced  from  the  west 
to  within  one  block  likewise.  Had  Quitman's 
troops  remained,  the  Mexican  force  in  the  Plaza 
would  have  been  nearly  surrounded.  That  a  junc 
tion  might  have  been  effected  between  the  two 
commands  in  that  case  is  most  probable,  for  a  dra 
goon,  who  had  been  sent  with  a  note  to  Bragg, 
while  he  was  returning,  lost  his  route,  and  came 
through  the  town  to  the  position  of  Worth's  troops. 
Had  they  effected  the  junction,  the  main  force  of 
the  enemy  would  have  been  surrounded  on  three 
sides ;  Worth  had  two  guns  in  position  to  command 
the  fords  of  the  river,  and  if  two  more  had  been  put 
in  position  in  the  lunette  at  the  southern  angle  of 
the  town,  which  was  perfectly  practicable,  it  is  dif 
ficult  to  see  how  the  Mexican  army  could  have  ef 
fected  its  escape  intact  during  the  day.  Quitman's 
troops  were  not,  however,  in  position,  nor  could 
they  be  placed  in  position,  when  the  negotiation 
was  opened,  without  sending  a  staff  officer  a  cir 
cuit  of  seven  miles,  and  then  marching  them  three 
miles  from  the  camp  to  the  city.  And  why  ?  Be 
cause  their  operations  of  the  23d  were  an  experi 
ment,  and  on  account  of  the  want  of  concert  of  ac 
tion  ;  a  want  which  might  well  have  been  provid 
ed  against,  for,  when  information  reached  General 
Taylor  of  the  abandonment  of  the  works  on  the 
east  of  Monterey,  he  knew  that  Worth  held  the 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  265 

Obispado,  and  was  in  position  to  at  least  threaten 
the  city. 

Had  operations  been  recommenced  early  on  the 
24th,  even  in  the  positions  in  which  the  troops 
were,  the  affair  would  have  been  quickly  decided  ; 
and  a  consideration  which  General  Taylor  and 
others  have  urged  in  favor  of  the  convention  would 
have  hastened  the  result.  As  the  Cathedral,  con 
taining  the  principal  magazine  of  the  enemy,  was 
exposed  to  the  American  shells,  it  is  difficult  to  see 
how  a  knowledge  of  this  fact,  and  that  himself  and 
his  main  force  would  have  been  involved  in  com 
mon  destruction,  could  have  operated  with  the 
Mexican  general  to  induce  him  to  hold  out  for  bet 
ter  terms,  if  he  had  found  all  attempts  at  negotia 
tion  fruitless. 

By  the  negotiation,  however,  time  was  consum 
ed  until  it  became  near  night;  and  then,  indeed, 
inasmuch  as  there  was  no  force  upon  the  east,  the 
probability  of  the  escape  of  the  garrison  might 
have  been  considered. 

The  immediate  consideration  of  humanity  in  re 
spect  to  an  enemy  is  always  secondary,  whenever 
the  exercise  of  such  humanity  may  tend  to  prolong 
the  war,  for  it  never  fails,  in  such  case,  to  result 
in  a  manner  prejudicial  to  its  own  great  interests. 
Its.  policy,  in  the  present  instance,  may  well  be 
doubted.  General  Taylor  trusted,  in  some  degree, 
to  the  statement  of  Ampudia,  that  the  new  gov 
ernment  of  Mexico  had  appointed  commissioners 
to  treat  for  peace;  a  statement  which  he  might 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

well  have  distrusted ;  for,  had  Ampudia  known 
such  to  be  the  case,  why  did  he  choose  to  risk  a 
battle  for  nothing  ?  Why  did  he  not  seek  to  de 
lay  Taylor's  advance  by  diplomacy  and  the  an 
nouncement  of  the  fact  ?  But,  even  if  it  were  true 
that  commissioners  had  been  appointed,  it  can 
hardly  be  seen  why  it  was  believed  that  the  knowl 
edge  of  the  safety  of  7000  men,  organized  and 
equipped,. and  their  consequent  availability  in  fu 
ture  operations,  could  have  operated  to  increase  the 
inducements  of  the  Mexican  government  to  make 
peace. 

It  has  been  urged  by  one  of  the  commissioners 
that  the  moral  effect  of  the  capitulation  was  great 
er  than  if  the  enemy  had  made  his  escape,  having 
destroyed  his  magazines  and  artillery.^  It  may 
have  been  the  case,  but  it  certainly  was  not  great 
er  than  if  the  main  force  had  been  captured  or  de 
stroyed,  or  driven  in  confusion  before  the  assault 
of  the  Americans,  and  dispersed.  Besides,  had  not 
the  want  of  concert  of  action  induced  the  with 
drawal  of  Quitman's  troops,  and  had  the  original 
intentions  of  General  Taylor  been  carried  out  in 
respect  to  the  negotiation  of  the  convention,  the 
opportunity  for  the  escape  of  Ampudia's  troops 
would  never  have  been  allowed. 

General  Taylor's  original  opinions  were  not  in 
favor  of  the  terms  as  entered  into.  They  were  the 
result  of  long  discussions,  and  these,  in  military  op 
erations,  almost  invariably  "  terminate  in  the  adop- 

*  Colonel  Davis. 


THE    WAR   WITH  MEXICO.  £67 

tion  of  the  worst  course,  which  in  war  is  the  most 
timid,  or,  if  you  will,  the  most  prudent"*  And  the 
discussions  in  this  case  had  an  additional  feature 
in  their  disfavor,  that  they  were  participated  in  by 
the  enemy. 

The  consideration  which  was  urged  in  defense 
of  the  armistice  of  eight  weeks,  that  it  tied  the 
hands  of  the  enemy  during  a  period  when  the 
American  army  was  unahle  to  move,  was  hardly 
a  consideration  of  any  moment ;  for  it  presupposed 
that  the  Mexican  army  was  able  to  act,  and  that  a 
Mexican  general  would  be  bound  by  the  terms  of 
a  military  convention,  when  it  might  be  his  interest 
to  break  them.  If  the  Mexican  army  was  in  a  con 
dition  to  take  the  field,  the  policy  of  proclaiming 
eight  weeks  of  American  inactivity  may  well  be 
doubted,  and  all  history  told  the  practice  of  Mexi 
can  commanders  in  regard  to  terms  of  a  convention. 
Nothing  but  a  turn  of  affairs,  which  would  have 
rendered  it  a  matter  of  policy  on  their  part  to  act 
with  bad  faith,  was  necessary  to  dispel  any  depend 
ence  which  might  be  placed  upon  them ;  and,  more 
over,  Ampudia -could  communicate  with  San  Luis  in 
six  days ;  General  Taylor  could  communicate  with 
Washington  in  six  weeks ;  wherefore,  even  if  the 
enemy  acted  in  good  faith,  if  he  were  in  condition 
to  advance,  the  armistice  availed  nothing,  while  the 
fact  was  published  that,  having  taken  Monterey  aft 
er  a  hard  struggle,  General  Taylor  was  exhausted, 
and  that  he  would  be  inactive  for  eight  weeks,  dur- 

*  Napoleon. 


268  THE    WAR   WITH    MEXICO. 

ing  which  time  Mexico  had  a  respite  from  danger, 
and  could  prepare  at  leisure  for  future  operations. 

That,  in  view  of  all  these  considerations,  the 
agreement  to  the  convention  of  Monterey  was  the 
cause  of  regret  on  the  part  of  the  authorities  at 
Washington,  is  not  strange.  Strange  would  it 
have  been  if  it  had  not.  But,  however  much  they 
may  have  felt,  their  expressions,  as  put  forth  by 
Mr.  Marcy,  were  by  no  means  so  strong  as  those 
of  General  Taylor,  made  before  the  receipt  of  Mr. 
Marcy's  letter,  when  he  received  Ampudia's  procla 
mations  from  Saltillo,  and  learned  how  completely 
he  had  been  imposed  upon  by  the  Mexican. 

The  operations  at  Monterey  had  nevertheless 
an  effect  upon  the  progress  of  the  war ;  not  in  in 
creasing  the  inducements  to  the  Mexican  govern 
ment  to  make  peace — not  in  depriving  the  enemy 
of  resources  by  fulfilling  the  design  of  cutting  off 
the  northern  provinces,  but  in  carrying  the  theater 
of  war  from  the  frontiers  of  the  United  States,  and, 
as  was  afterward  apparent,  in  gaining  the  strong 
point  for  its  defense  against  a  Mexican  incursion. 

Another  effect,  and  by  no  means,  the  least,  was 
that  upon  the  American  people.  They  gave  them 
news  of  a  positive  military  character.  The  strug 
gle  had  been  severe,  the  captured  positions  were 
strong,  and  the  bravery  of  the  troops  was  a  subject 
of  national  congratulation.  The  newspaper  editors, 
poets,  and  critics  had  full  scope  for  the  employment 
of  their  genius,  which  they  failed  not  to  take  ad 
vantage  of,  and  for  a  long  time  enlarged  upon  the 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  £69 

operations  at  Monterey  in  such  a  manner  that  they 
could  hardly  be  recognized.  And,  among  other 
tales  of  romantic  character,  there  was  one  which 
gave  rise  to  many  pretty  sympathies  on  the  part 
of  the  friends  of  Mexico  in  the  United  States. 

Although  I  can  not  positively  deny  the  state 
ment  of  a  Mexican  woman  being  slain  while  in 
the  act  of  administering  succor  to  the  wounded 
on  the  field  of  battle,  yet  I  may  be  permitted  to 
doubt  its  veracity,  inasmuch  as  it  was  first  heard 
from  the  United  States,  and  as  the  Mexican  wom 
en  generally  found  about  such  scenes  were  much 
more  likely  to  have  murdered  and  robbed  the 
wounded  on  either  side  than  to  have  engaged  in 
any  act  of  kindly  ministry.  And  this  is  not  only 
the  result  of  observation,  but  is  in  keeping  with 
the  testimony  of  a  Mexican  general  officer.^ 

*  General  Requena.    Campaign  Sketches,  p.  107. 


270  THE    WAR   WITH    MEXICO. 

'^;,  .l^*'^***-' 

">  ' 

CHAPTER  VI. 

New  Mexico.  Object  of  Expedition  against  New  Mexico — Instructions  to 
Colonel  Kearney — His  Movement— Nature  of  the  New  Mexican  Govern 
ment — of  the  People — Preparations  for  Defense — Flight  of  Amijo — Kear 
ney  takes  Possession  of  Santa  Fe — Establishes  a  civil  Government — March 
es  to  California — Observations. 

California.  Fremont's  Expeditions — Controversy  with  General  Castro — 
March  to  the  North — Return — Affairs  at  Sonoma  and  with  De  la  Tone — 
Declaration  of  Californian  Independence — Instructions  of  Secretary  of  Na 
vy  to  Commodore  Sloat — He  takes  Possession  of  Monterey  and  San  Fran 
cisco — Proclamation — Correspondence  with  Mexican  Authorities — Suc 
ceeded  by  Commodore  Stockton — Organization  of  California  Battalion — 
Expedition  to  the  Ciudad  de  los  Angeles— Flight  of  Pico  and  Castro— Es 
tablishment  of  civil  Government. 

Chihuahua.  Object  and  Organization  of  Chihuahua  Expedition — Progresses 
to  Monclova — Is  given  up. 

Naval  Operations  in  Gulf  of  Mexico.  Blockade — Attempt  upon  Alvarado — 
Expedition  to  Tobasco. 

IN  organizing  an  expedition  against  the  depart 
ment  of  New  Mexico,  the  conquest  and  occupation 
of  that  department  was  at  first  looked  to  as  the 
only  object  of  the  movement.  Whether  it  was  in 
tended,  at  the  time  of  the  issue  of  the  first  orders 
relative  thereto,  that  the  conquest  and  occupation 
should  be  with  a  view  to  the  permanent  acquisition 
of  the  department,  or  whether  the  movement  was 
to  be  one  of  simple  attack  on  a  portion  of  the  Mex 
ican  republic,  does  not  immediately  appear  from 
the  published  correspondence  of  the  War  Depart 
ment.  From  the  nature  of  the  instructions  sub 
sequently  issued,  it  is  probable  that  it  was  at  first 
intended  to  be  for  the  latter  object  alone,  which 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  271 

it  might  very  well  have  been,  in  consideration  of 
the  represented  importance  of  Santa  Fe,  the  capi 
tal  of  the  department,  as  the  place  of  entry  in  the 
north  of  Mexico  for  a  trade  across  the  prairies  from 
the  United  States  to  the  amount  of  one  million  of 
dollars  annually. 

The  orders  for  the  organization  of  a  column  for 
the  service  were  issued  on  the  13th  and  14th  of 
May,  1846,  and  arrangements  made  at  that  time 
for  calling  forth  the  volunteers,. of  which  it  was  to 
he  principally  composed,  from  the  State  of  Missouri. 
While  the  organization  progressed,  the  policy  of  the 
administration  was  definitely  adopted  and  modi 
fied,  and  additional  instructions  were  given  to  Col 
onel  Kearney,  of  the  first  United  States  dragoons, 
who  had  been  selected  for  the  command  of  the  ex 
pedition. 

These  instructions  were  written  by  Mr.  Marcy 
on  the  3d  of  June,  and  the  end  of  the  expedition 
was  stated  to  be  the  occupation  of  Upper  California. 
Colonel  Kearney  was  directed,  after  having  taken 
possession  of  New  Mexico,  to  leave  a  garrison  at 
Santa  Fe,  and  with  the  remainder  of  his  force  to 
advance  into  that  country.  To  enable  him  to  take 
the  greater  portion,  an  additional  requisition  was 
made  on  the  Governor  of  Missouri  for  1000  mount 
ed  volunteers,  to  follow  on  his  route;  and  he  was 
authorized  to  raise  such  number  of  Mormons,  who 
were  preparing  to  emigrate  to  California,  as  he 
might  deem  proper,  provided  this  number  did  not 
exceed  one  third  of  his  entire  force ;  and  also,  upon 


272  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

his  arrival  in  the  proposed  theater  of  his  operations, 
to  accept  the  services  of  such  American  settlers  as 
might  offer  themselves.  In  regard  to  the  civil  gov 
ernment  of  the  conquered  provinces,  he  was  in 
structed  in  the  following  words : 

"  Should  you  conquer  and  take  possession  of 
New  Mexico  and  Upper  California,  or  considerable 
places  in  either,  you  will  establish  temporary  civil 
governments  therein,  abolishing  all  arbitrary  re 
strictions  that  may  exist,  so  far  as  it  may  be  done 
with  safety.  In  performing  this  duty,  it  would  be 
wise  and  prudent  to  continue  in  their  employment 
all  such  of  the  existing  officers  as  are  known  to  be 
friendly  to  the  United  States,  and  will  take  the 
oath  of  allegiance  to  them.  The  duties  at  the  cus 
tom-houses  ought  at  once  to  be  reduced  to  such  a 
rate  as  may  be  barely  sufficient  to  maintain  the 
necessary  officers,  without  yielding  any  revenue  to 
the  government.  You  may  assure  the  people  of 
those  provinces  that  it  is  the  wish  and  design  of 
the  United  States  to  provide  for  them  a  free  gov 
ernment,  with  the  least  possible  delay,  similar  to 
that  which  exists  in  our  territories.  They  will  then 
be  called  upon  to  exercise  the  rights  of  freemen  in 
electing  their  own  representatives  to  the  territorial 
Legislature.  It  is  foreseen  that  what  relates  to  the 
civil  government  will  be  a  difficult  and  unpleasant 
part  of  your  duty,  and  much  must  necessarily  be 
left  to  your  own  discretion."^ 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session 
of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  154. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  £73 

With  these  instructions,  Colonel  Kearney  took 
measures  for  insuring  the  organization  of  the  addi 
tional  force  of  volunteers  and  Mormons,  and  sent 
the  original  levy  "by  detachments  on  the  Santa  Fe 
trail  from  Fort  Leavenworth.  By  the  last  cff  July 
"  the  army  of  the  West"  was  concentrated  near 
Bent's  Fort,  on  the  Arkansas  River.  It  consisted, ' 
in  all,  of  ahout  1800  men — eight  companies  of 
United  States  dragoons,  nine  of  volunteer  cavalry, 
two  of  volunteer  artillery,  and  two  of  infantry. 

On  the  31st  of  July,  preparatory  to  his  advance 
into  the  Mexican  territory,  Colonel  Kearney  issued 
a  proclamation,  which  was  conciliatory  in  its  tone, 
but  positively  avowing  the  intentions  of  the  gov 
ernment  of  the  United  States.  It  was  said,  "  The 
undersigned  enters  New  Mexico  with  a  large  mili 
tary  force  for  the  purpose  of  seeking  union  with 
and  ameliorating  the  condition  of  its  inhabitants.'^ 
Though  the  effect  which  the  proclamation  might 
have  upon  the  inhabitants  of  the  country  was  un 
doubtedly  the  cause  of  its  issue,  and  the  further 
ance  of  the  policy  of  the  United  States  was  its  first 
object,  as,  indeed,  policy  is  the  first  consideration 
in  the  issue  of  all  such  papers,  yet  the  condition  of 
the  people  of  New  Mexico  needed  amelioration, 
and  it  could  hardly  have  been  worsted  in  any  man 
ner  by  its  permanent  occupation  by  the  forces  of 
the  United  States. 

The  government  of  the  department,  such  as  it 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of 
the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  168. 

I.— S 


274 


THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 


was,  was  administered  by  Armijo,  the  comman- 
dante  general  who  was,  in  reality,  nearly  absolute, 
although  his  authority  was  nominally  derived  from 
the  central  government  of  the  republic.  He  made 
use  of -his  power  for  the  exclusive  benefit  of  him 
self  and  the  few  ricos  of  the  province  who  support 
ed  him.  For  that  benefit  the  proceeds  of  the 
enormous  duties  of  the  custom-house  were  in  great 
part  appropriated.  The  character  of  Armijo  was 
a  compound  of  cunning,  cowardice,  and  rapacity, 
and  he  developed  these  elements  not  only  in  his 
government,  but  in  his  business  transactions ;  for, 
besides  being  both  a  civil  and  military  officer,  he 
was  also  a  merchant.  Law  of  a  certain  kind  ex 
isted  in  New  Mexico,  but  it  was  of  little  or  no  avail 
if  its  enforcement  prejudiced  in  any  degree  the  in 
terests  of  the  governor  or  of  his  adherents. 

The  population  was  a  medley  of  Indians,  New 
Mexicans,  some  few  of  Spanish  blood,  and  of  Amer 
icans.  The  New  Mexicans,  a  mixed  race  of  Span 
iards  and  Indians,  were  perhaps  the  most  worth 
less  of  all  the  population  of  the  republic.  They 
were  hardly  half  civilized,  and  lived  with  but  few 
restraints  of  morality  or  honor.  The  example 
which  for  a  long  series  of  years  had  been  set  them 
by  their  chiefs,  they  had  not  failed  to  follow,  and 
duplicity  and  villainy  were  apparent  in  most  of 
their  dealings.  Notwithstanding  their  isolated 
and  dangerous  situation,  in  the  vicinity  of  hostile 
Indian  tribes,  they  had  none  of  the  courageous  and 
warlike  characteristics  which  in  general  belong  to 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  £75 

borderers  of  all  nations.  They  were  abject  cow 
ards,  and,  like  all  cowards,  were  cruel  and  treach 
erous.  To  induce  them  to  commit  any  deed,  no 
matter  how  nefarious,  there  was  only  wanting  the 
prospect  of  impunity  and  the  hope  of  a  slight  re 
ward.^ 

The  Indians  of  the  Pueblos,  who  were  quite  as 
numerous  as  the  New  Mexicans,  were  fully  as 
civilized,  and  far  braver,  although,  as  far  as  hon 
esty  and  respectability  were  concerned,  they  might 
be  included  in  the  same  class.  The  mass  of  the 
inhabitants  professed  the  established  religion  of 
Mexico,  the  Roman  Catholic.  But  the  best  of 
them  were  profoundly  ignorant  and  superstitious, 
and  the  Indians  clung  to  many  of  the  idolatrous 
fancies  of  the  ancient  Aztecs,  which  could  hardly 
have  had  any  beneficial  effect  upon  the  supersti 
tions  of  the  recognized  Church.  The  priests,  who 
were  as  villainous  as  the  worst  of  the  population, 
exercised  an  extensive  influence  over  the  mass  of 
the  people,  and  did  not  fail  to  enforce,  so  far  as  in 
them  lay,  a  blind  obedience  to  their  dictates. 

When  Kearney's  approach  was  first  announced, 
many  ridiculous  stories  were  circulated  among  the 
people  of  the  country,  which  represented  his  troops 
to  be  barbarians  of  the  nature  of  their  ordinary  ene 
mies  of  the  Eutaw  and  Navajoe  Indians,  except 
that  they  were  perhaps  more  refined  in  cruelty. 
Endeavors  were  made  to  make  preparations  to  op 
pose  the  American  advance,  and  with  partial  suc- 

*  Mr.  Ruxton's  wort. 


276  THE  WAR  WITH 

cess.  Armijo  circulated  reports  of  the  speedy  com 
ing  of  re-enforcements,  and  it  was  said  and  believed 
that  General  Urrea,  with  many  thousand  men,  was 
on  his  march,  and  that  more  were  in  his  rear. 

Whether  the  central  government  of  Mexico  had 
ever  promised  to  send  re-enforcements  is  questiona 
ble  ;  for,  at  the  time  of  the  latest  communication 
with  the  capital,  Paredes  was  in  no  condition  to 
spare  troops  from  the  protection  of  his  own  authori 
ty  and  the  defense  of  the  frontier  against  General 
Taylor  for  the  purpose  of  guarding  a  country  so 
distant  and  unimportant  as  New  Mexico.  But,  if 
it  were  so,  none  ever  arrived.  Armijo,  however, 
collected  a  few  soldiers  of  the  Mexican  army,  a 
body  of  militia,  New  Mexicans  and  Indians,  which 
made  up  a  force  of  between  three  and  four  thou 
sand  men,  with  six  pieces  of  artillery,  and  took 
post  in  a  canon,  some  fifteen  miles  distant  from 
Santa  Fe,  to  dispute  the  advance  of  the  invaders. 

Exact  data  upon  which  to  rest  an  account  of  his 
proceedings  are  difficult  to  obtain,  but  they  are  not 
at  all  necessary ;  for  upon  Kearney's  near  approach 
he  called  a  council  of  war,  at  which,  it  is  said,  his 
second  in  command  and  other  officers,  all  worthy 
of  their  chief,  advised  a  retreat.  He  adopted  the 
advice,  broke  up  his  force,  collected  his  property, 
all  the  merchandise  which  he  had  in  the  town, 
and  struck  with  his  caravan  to  the  southward,  to 
render  ari  account  of  his  disgrace,  and  find  a  mark 
et  for  his  wares,  leaving  the  country  perfectly  open 
and  the  advance  of  the  enemy  unopposed. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  277 

In  the  mean  time  General  Kearney  had  advanc 
ed  into  the  Mexican  settlements,  and  on  the  14th 
of  August  reached  the  town  of  Vegas.  On  the 
morning  of  the  15th  he  took  the  first  step  in  estab 
lishing  the  civil  authority  of  the  United  States  by 
assembling  the  people  in  the  plaza  of  the  village, 
and  declaring  them  absolved  from  allegiance  to  the 
Mexican  government,  and  all  obedience  to  Gov 
ernor  Armijo.  He  caused  the  alcalde  and  two  cap 
tains  of  militia  to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance,  which 
they  did  without  demur,  although  with  no  good 
grace.  The  people  submitted  in  quiet,  and,  so  far 
as  the  oaths  of  allegiance  could  effect  it,  the  vil 
lage  of  Vegas  was  under  the  government  of  the 
United  States.* 

On  the  following  morning  the  same  scene  was 
enacted  at  the  village  of  San  Miguel,  of  which  the 
alcalde  and  civil  officers  took  the  oath  of  allegiance 
after  stipulating  that  their  religion  should  be  re 
spected. 

During  the  15th  and  16th  information  of  Armi- 
jo's  position  in  the  canon  was  received,  but  on  the 
17th  it  was  learned  that  he  had  broken  up  Jiis  force 
and  fled.  On  the  18th  the  American  command 
er  entered  and  took  possession  of  Santa  Fe,  being 
courteously  received  by  the  lieutenant  governor, 
Vigil,  who  had  remained  after  Armijo's  flight,  f 

General  Kearney  addressed  the  people  in  the 

*  Lieutenant-colonel  Emory's  Notes  of  Reconnaissance  in  New  Mexico 
and  California.  Executive  Document,  No.  7,  Senate,  first  Session  of  the  thir 
tieth  Congress,  p.  27.  t  Idem.  Idem,  p.  31. 


278  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

plaza  of  the  town  on  the  following  day,  and  repeat 
ed  the  conciliatory  expressions  wrhich  he  had  be 
fore  used  at  Vegas  and  San  Miguel,  and  which  had 
been  put  forth  in  his  proclamation  of  the  3d  of  Au 
gust.  The  mass  of  the  population  professed  to  be 
satisfied  with  the  change  of  government,  and  the 
chiefs  and  head  men  of  the  Pueblo  Indians  came 
in  soon  after  to  give  in  their  adhesion  and  express 
their  satisfaction  at  the  arrival  of  the  Americans.^ 

On  the  22d,  the  American  commander  issued  a 
second  proclamation,  in  which  he  declared  his  in 
tention  of  occupying  and  holding  the  department, 
with  its  original  boundaries,  on  both  sides  of  the 
Rio  Grande  ;  set  forth  the  military  force  which  en 
abled  him  to  do  it,  and  his  intention  to  protect  the 
inhabitants  against  the  incursions  of  hostile  In 
dians  ;  called  upon  all  who  had  taken  up  arms  to 
return  to  their  homes,  under  penalty  of  being  con 
sidered  enemies  and  traitors  ;  announced  the  inten 
tion  of  the  United  States  to  provide  a  free  govern 
ment  for  New  Mexico  with  the  least  possible  delay, 
and  concluded  by  absolving  all  persons  residing 
within  its  boundaries  from  allegiance  to  the  cen 
tral  Mexican  government,  and  claiming  them  as 
citizens  of  the  United  States. f 

Changes  in  the  government  of  the  newly-occu 
pied  territory  were  soon  introduced.  The  high  and 

*  Lieutenant-colonel  Emory's  Notes  of  Reconnaissance  in  New  Mexico 
and  California.  Executive  Document,  No.  7,  Senate,  first  Session  of  the  thir 
tieth  Congress,  p.  33. 

t  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of 
the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  170. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  279 

exorbitant  taxes  were  abolished  or  very  much  re 
duced,  many  infirm  and  corrupt  officers  were  re 
moved,  and  others,  principally  of  the  inhabitants, 
were  appointed  in  their  stead.^ 

Immediately  after  his  arrival,  Kearney  had  or 
dered  a  site  to  be  selected  for  the  erection  of  a  fort, 
for  the  protection  and  secure  occupation  of  Santa 
Fe.  On  the  23d  ground  was  broken  on  a  work 
computed  for  a  garrison  of  280  men,  at  a  point  upon 
a  commanding  eminence  within  six  hundred  yards 
of  the  heart  of  the  town.  While  the  work  was  in 
progress,  intelligence  was  received  that  re-enforce 
ments  had  met  Armijo  on  his  flight  to  the  south 
ward  ;  that  he  had  turned  back,  and,  having  arous 
ed  the  entire  population  of  the  southern  portion  of 
the  department,  was  marching  at  the  head  of  a 
large  force  in  the  direction  of  Santa  Fe.f 

Before  the  rumors  became  well  authenticated,  it 
had  been  intended  to  send  an  expedition  to  quiet 
any  disturbance  in  that  quarter,  and  upon  the  re 
ceipt  of  this  intelligence,  the  strength  of  it  was  in 
creased  to  700  men.$  On  the  3d  of  September  it 
marched,  under  Kearney's  own  command.  The 
•  greater  southern  portion  of  the  province  was  visit 
ed  ;  the  rumors  proved  to  be  false ;  and,  having  pro 
ceeded  as  far  as  Tome,  some  one  hundred  and  fifty 
miles  south  of  Santa  Fe,  the  command  returned. 
So  quiet  and  so  well  satisfied  with  the  change  had 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of 
the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  172-175. 

t  Emory.  Executive  Document,  No.  7,  Senate,  first  session  of  the  thirti 
eth  Congress,  p.  32.  t  Idem.  Idem,  p.  33,  36- 


280  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

the  inhabitants  appeared,  that  upon  his  return  on 
the  16th  of  September,  Kearney  announced  to  the 
government  that  there  could  no  longer  be  appre 
hended  any  organized  resistance  to  the  troops  in 
that  territory,  and  that  the  commander  of  them, 
whoever  he  might  be,  would  have  nothing  to  do 
but  to  secure  the  inhabitants  from  the  depredations 
of  the  Navajoe  and  Eutaw  Indians.* 

Believing  thus,  he  determined  to  leave  soon  for 
California,  taking  with  him  a  portion  of  the  troops, 
leaving  orders  for  the  Mormon  battalion  to  follow, 
and  for  any  surplus  force  which  might  be  present 
after  the  arrival  of  re-enforcements  to  proceed  south 
to  Chihuahua,  to  join  "the  army  of  the  Center," 
which,  under  General  Wool,  was  expected  to  be 
at  that  point,  f 

Previous  to  his  departure,  however,  he  establish 
ed  a  civil  government  for  the  territory,  resembling 
that  of  the  territories  of  the  United  States.  The 
organic  law  was  the  same  which  had  been  that  of 
the  Territory  of  Missouri.  Th,e  laws  for  the  gov 
ernment  of  the  territory  were  compiled  from  those 
of  Mexico,  of  Texas,  of  Texas  and  Coahuila,  and 
from  the  statutes  of  the  State  of  Missouri.  Hav 
ing  proclaimed  these  laws,  and  appointed  the  civil 
governor,  Bent,  and  executive  officers,  he  marched 
on  the  25th  of  September  en  route  for  California, 
fully  believing  that  the  authority  of  the  United 
States  was  firmly  established  on  a  secure  basis.! 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of 
the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  174.  t  Idem.  t  Idem,  p.  176-229. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  281 

His  command  consisted,  at  the  outset,  of  but  300 
dragoons,  as  the  Mormon  battalion  had  not  arrived 
at  the  time  of  his  departure  from  Santa  Fe ;  but 
on  the  6th  of  October,  having  left  the  Rio  Grande 
and  struck  west  for  the  ^Gila,  he  fell  in  with  a  mes 
senger,  from  ,whom  he  learned  the  events  which 
had  meanwhile  taken  place  in  California,  and 
that  the  country  had  been  subdued.  He  therefore 
sent  back  two  companies  of  dragoons  under  Major 
Sumner,  and  continued  on  with  the  remainder  of 
his  force. 


The  occupation  of  New  Mexico  having  been  ef 
fected  without  opposition,  the  military  operations 
lack  the  luster  which  well-contested  battles  give 
to  any  achievement.  They  bear  but  little  resem 
blance  to  the  regular  movements  of  masses  in  war; 
for  the  column  was  small,  and  the  preparations  and 
marches  were  regulated  by  the  nature  of  the  route 
and  of  the  territory  against  which  it  was  directed. 
The  expedition  had  little  to  do  with  the  great  ques 
tion  of  the  war,  as  was  fully  proved  in  the  result. 
It  was  at  first,  and  so  far,  against  New  Mexico 
alone,  and  neither  at  the  time  nor  subsequently 
was  any -physical  opposition  offered  on  the  part  of 
the  central  government;  but  the  speedy  organiza 
tion  of  the  force  and  the  celerity  of  the  march  from 
Fort  Leavenworth  to  Santa  Fe  are  remarkable.  In 
but  little  more  than  three  months,  the  orders  had 
been  issued  from  Washington,  the  force,  in  great 


282  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

part,  raised  and  organized;  a  march  of  near  one 
thousand  miles  had  been  accomplished,  and  the 
designated  territory  occupied ;  and,  within  one 
month  subsequently,  a  civil  government,  on  new 
principles,  had  been  established  upon  an  apparent 
ly  sure  foundation. 

The  conduct  of  General  Kearney  and  the  in 
structions  of  the  War  Department,  which,  in  a 
measure,  authorized  his  action  in  civil  policy,  have 
been  severely  commented  upon,  and  it  has  been 
asserted  that  such  action  was  in  violation  of  the 
principles  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 
It  is  hardly  to  be  believed  that  the  framers  of  that 
instrument  could  have  foreseen  such  a  contingen 
cy,  or  that  they  should  have  deemed  themselves 
called  upon  to  provide  for  it,  even  if  they  had ;  for 
the  right  of  any  power  to  establish  a  civil  govern 
ment  in  a  conquered  country  can  not  be  doubted. 
Indeed,  as  the  course  of  action  of  the  United  States 
had  been  determined  upon  by  the  executive,  and 
the  permanent  acquisition  of  New  Mexico  was  de 
signed,  it  was  a  duty  which,  according  to  learned 
writers,  devolved  upon  the  agents  of  their  govern 
ment.  Many  inconveniences  arise  in  the  consum 
mation  of  conquests  by  republics,  which  are  in 
some  degree  modified,  it  is  true,  in  the  case  of  the 
United  States  ;  but,  in  view  of  them,  high  authori 
ty  has  said,  that  "  when  a  republic  keeps  a  nation 
in  subjection,  it  should  endeavor  to  repair  the  in 
conveniences  arising  from  the  nature  of  its  situa 
tion  by  giving  it  good  laws  both  for  the  political 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  £83 

and  civil  government  of  the  people."*  This  was 
the  end  of  the  intention  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  set  forth  in  the  instructions  of  the 
Secretary  of  War  to  General  Kearney  in  reference 
to  the  government  to  be  established  in  New  Mex 
ico,  and  it  was  the  end  of  General  Kearney's  action. 
There  is  but  one  thing  in  which  it  can  be  seen  that 
he  overstepped  the  limit  of  his  instructions  or  of 
the  strictest  legality.  In  establishing  the  govern 
ment,  he  claimed  the  inhabitants  as  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  and  gave  to  them  rights,  as  such, 
which  could  be  legally  given  only  after  the  ac 
knowledged  acquisition  of  territory,  under  sanction 
of  the  treaty-making  power,  or  of  the  Congress  of 
the  United  States.  In  this  particular  he  exceeded 
his  instructions  ;  but  much  had  been  left  to  his  dis 
cretion,  and  it  might  well  have  been  a  measure  of 
policy  so  to  do,  as  he  knew  the  ultimate  designs 
of  the  President.  Certainly,  if  those  designs  were 
to  be  carried  out,  it  could  not  have  been  expected 
to  exercise  a  beneficial  effect  upon  the  state  of  the 
country  or  upon  American  interest  to  announce  to 
the  inhabitants  that  the  occupation  was  merely 
contingent,  and  that  every  thing  was  in  an  unset 
tled  state.  The  people,  having  in  view  the  evac 
uation  of  the  territory  and  the  return  of  Mexican 
dominion,  could  have  been  expected  to  do  nothing 
more  in  favor  of  the  American  cause,  certainly,  than 
to  hold  aloof,  if,  indeed,  they  did  not  take  a  position 
of  positive  hostility.  It  can  not  be  wondered  at 

*  Spirit  of  Laws.     Montesquieu,  book  x.,  chap.  viii. 


284  THE    WAR   WITH    MEXICO. 

that,  when  the  mass  of  the  people  and  their  leaders 
expressed  themselves  satisfied  with  the  change,  and 
hoped  that  the  occupation  of  the  American  army 
would  he  permanent,  General  Kearney  endeavored 
to  conciliate  their  good  will  hy  declaring  them  to 
he  citizens  of  the  United  States,  unmindful  of  the 
argument  which  might  be  brought  against  his  pro 
ceedings,  in  the  violation  of  the  strict  letter  of  le 
gality,  at  home. 

But  the  attempt  to  establish  a  free  civil  govern 
ment  in  New  Mexico  had  in  it  several  elements  of 
failure,  and  the  first  and  most  important  was  in 
the  nature  of  the  population.  With  a  half-civil 
ized,  vicious,  and  superstitious  people,  a  free  gov 
ernment  can  hardly  ever  be  successfully  adminis 
tered.  The  superstition  must  first  be  eradicated ; 
for  of  all  the  difficulties  in  the  advancement  of 
mankind,  experience  has  shown  it  to  be  the  most 
serious.  To  attempt  to  eradicate  it  by  force  is  al 
most  useless — certainly  useless  with  a  view  to  the 
establishment  of  free  institutions ;  for  the  people 
will  cling  to  it  with  all  the  pertinacity  of  martyrs, 
and  though  it  may  be  gone  in  outward  seeming, 
yet  it  remains  in  the  heart,  and  only  wants  an  op 
portunity  to  show  its  effect  in  hostility  to  the  new 
government,  however  beneficial  it  may  be,  for  the 
sake  of  the  tyranny  by  which  it  has  been  establish 
ed.  The  means  by  which  the  object  can  be  safely 
accomplished  are  to  be  found  in  civilization  and  in 
the  extension  of  knowledge,  and  these  require  time 
for  development  and  results. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  285 

The  change  from  the  tyrannical  and  feeble  gov 
ernment  of  Armijo  to  that  introduced  by  General 
Kearney  was  too  sudden  for  the  people,  and  the 
extension  of  the  elective  franchise  to  the  various 
leperos  and  Indians  who  composed  the  mass  of 
the  population  might  well  have  been  considered 
dangerous,  inasmuch  as,  in  their  vicious  ignorance, 
and  led  as  they  were  by  their  priests,  they  could 
know  neither  the  value  nor  the  use  of  liberty  in  its 
extended  sense. 

Another  element  of  difficulty  is  to  be  found  in 
the  nature  of  the  troops  left  to  occupy  the  territory. 
They  were  nearly  all  volunteers,  and  without  much 
discipline.  Some  had  accompanied  General  Kear 
ney  in  his  march  across  the  prairies,  and  what  they 
had  had  been  there  acquired.  But  the  body  of  the 
troops  were  the  new  levies  who  marched  in  his 
rear.  Had  circumstances  been  such  as  to  have 
caused  General  Kearney  to  remain  at  Santa  Fe,  to 
have  watched  the  development  of  the  government 
which  he  had  established,  and  to  have  controlled 
both  the  inhabitants  and  the  American  troops  in 
his  military  capacity,  the  subsequent  disorders 
might  have  been  prevented ;  but  the  troops  were 
left  under  officers  of  their  own  choice,  with  no  su 
perior  of  independent  rank  and  experience  over 
them,  and  what  discipline  they  had,  as  is  usually 
the  case  with  volunteers  in  garrison,  soon  became 
comparatively  nothing.  Santa  Fe  abounded  with 
gambling  houses,  grog-shops,  and  the  like,^  and 

*  Mr.  Buxton's  work. 


28(3  THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

the  licentious  conduct  of  the  volunteer  soldiery 
could  hardly  have  set  an  example  of  good  behavior 
to  the  half-civilized  inhabitants  of  the  country ; 
and,  although  in  perfect  keeping  with  their  own 
ordinary  practices,  may  well  have  given  deep  cause 
of  offense,  and  generated  a  hatred  toward  the  Amer 
icans. 


In  the  mean  time,  by  the  force  of  circumstances, 
and  through  the  action  of  persons  unprepared  for 
the  attempt,  and  that  of  the  American  naval  squad 
ron  in  the  Pacific,  the  conquest  and  occupation  of 
California  had  been  effected  with  a  rapidity  which 
could  in  no  way  have  been  anticipated. 

John  C.  Fremont,  second  lieutenant  of  Topo 
graphical  Engineers,  had  made  two  exploring  ex 
peditions  to  the  west  of  the  Rocky  Mountains,  and 
for  his  services  on  those  occasions  had  been  brevet 
ed  a  captain.  In  the  autumn  of  1845  he  started 
again,  for  the  purpose  of  continuing  his  explora 
tions,  and  of  discovering,  if  possible,  a  new  route 
to  Oregon,  to  the  south  of  the  one  usually  traversed 
by  emigrants.  His  operations  were  not  of  a  war 
like  nature,  although  his  party  was  necessarily 
armed  for  protection  against  the  Indians  who  in 
fested  those  regions,  and  for  hunting  purposes.  In 
the  latter  part  of  January,  1846,  he  arrived  within 
one  hundred  miles  of  Monterey,  in  California.  As 
his  animals  needed  recruiting,  he  determined  to 
halt  in  the  valley  of  the  San  Joaquin,  which  he 


THE    WAR    WITH   MEXICO.  287 

had  previously  explored,  and  which  afforded  game 
and  grass,  the  great  requisites  for  the  encampment 
of  western  travelers.  To  avoid  collision  and  the 
compromise  of  his  government,  knowing  the  rela 
tions  which  existed  with  Mexico  when  he  had  left 
the  United  States,  which  might  cause  his  move 
ments  to  he  looked  upon  with  suspicion,  he  left  his 
party  and  proceeded  in  person  to  Monterey.  There 
he  applied  to  the  commandante,  General  De  Castro, 
for  permission  to  remain  in  the  valley  of  the  San 
Joaquin  during  the  winter.  After  explanation  of 
his  objects,  and  some  demur  on  the  part  of  De  Cas 
tro,  it  was  granted,  and  Fremont  rejoined  his  party 
with  the  intention  of  moving  it  to  the  desired  posi 
tion.  De  Castro,  however,  took  immediate  steps  to 
raise  the  province  against  him;  and  hardly  had  Fre 
mont  arrived  in  the  valley  with  his  party,  when  he 
received  information  of  his  proceedings.  Mr.  Lar- 
kin,  the  United  States  consul  at  Monterey,  sent  to 
warn  him  of  his  danger,  and  a  number  of  Amer 
icans,  who  had  settled  in  the  country,  offered  to  as 
sist  him  in  his  defense.  Fearful  of  compromising, 
them  and  his  government,  Fremont  declined  their 
aid,  and,  with  rare  determination  and  bravery,  he 
marched  his  small  party  of  sixty-two  backwoods 
men  to  within  thirty  miles  of  Monterey,  took  a 
position  on  the  Sierra  Nevada,  whence  he  had  a 
fair  prospect  over  much  of  the  surrounding  coun 
try,  hoisted  the  American  flag,  and  prepared  for  re 
sistance.  But  an  approach  was  all  that  De  Castro 
attempted ;  and,  having  remained  some  time,  and 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

finding  no  probability  of  an  attack,  Fremont  start 
ed  in  the  month  of  March  for  Oregon.^ 

Of  Fremont's  proceedings  De  Castro  complained 
in  a  letter  to  the  Mexican  Secretary  of  War  and 
Marine,  and  in  the  spring  of  1846  the  Mexican 
journals  of  the  capital  proclaimed  the  arrival  of  his 
small  party  as  an  irruption  of  Northern  barbarians 
into  the  department  of  California.  The  news  came 
to  that  city  in  time  to  increase,  with  the  aid  of  the 
exaggerations  of  the  Mexican  comnlandante  gen 
eral  and  the  fervid  imaginations  of  the  journalists, 
the  feeling  of  hostility  to  the  Americans,  which  was 
then  causing  the  revolutions  in  the  Mexican  gov 
ernment. 

The  great  objection  to  Fremont's  movement  was 
stated  to  be  the  fact  of  his  taking  up  a  defensive 
position  and  hoisting  the  American  flag.  These 
were  used  in  arguments  to  prove  the  designs  of  the 
United  States  upon  the  territory,  and  declared  to  be 
a  cause  of  war,  by  which  the  Mexicans  hoped  to 
vindicate  the  integrity  of  their  soil,  but  which,  in 
fact,  only  afforded  an  opportunity  to  their  adversa 
ries  to  carry  out  their  views,  if,  indeed,  they  had 
been  seriously  entertained  at  that  time. 

It  is  difficult  to  perceive  in  what  Fremont's  ac 
tion  can  be  deemed  unjustifiable.  The  uninhabit 
ed  state  of  the  country  in  the  north  of  California, 
and  the  permission  given  by  the  commandante  gen 
eral,  gave  and  confirmed  his  right  to  winter  in  the 
valley  of  the  San  Joaquin ;  and  the  taking  up  of 

*  Colonel  Benton's  letter  to  the  President.    Union,  Nov.  9th,  1846. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


289 


position  and  the  raising  of  the  national  standard 
were  the  consequences,  and  not  the  cause  of  De 
Castro's  action.  The  first  was  a  necessary  meas 
ure  of  self-defense,  justifiable  under  any  circum 
stances;  and  the  second,  if  not  of  defense,  of  an 
honorahle  pride  in  making  that  defense  under  the 
banner  of  his  country. 

Upon  Fremont's  departure,  De  Castro  occupied 
his  camp,  and,  picking  up  his  leavings,  proclaimed 
a  victory,  boasted  of  his  spoils,  and  of  having  sti 
fled  a  dangerous  conspiracy;  all  of  which  he  duly  set 
forth  in  his  dispatches  to  the  Mexican  government 
Meanwhile  Fremont  pursued  his  way  unmolested. 
But  his  progress  to  the  north  was  interrupted  by 
natural  obstacles  and  the  hostility  of  the  Tlamath 
Indians,  who  killed  and  wounded  five  of  his  men.* 

On  the  9th  of  May  he  was  overtaken  by  Lieu 
tenant  Gillespie,  of  the  marines,  who  bore  a  letter 
of  introduction  from  the  secretary  of  state,  Mr. 
Buchanan,  and  private  letters  from  Senator  Ben- 
ton.  In  none  were  contained  any  explicit  instruc 
tions  for  his  course  of  action,  but  from  certain  enig 
matical  passages  in  a  letter  from  Senator  Benton, 
Fremont  inferred  that  the  government  desired  that 
he  should  ascertain  and  counteract  any  schemes 
which  foreigners  might  have  in  relation  to  the  Cal- 
ifornias.  As  Gillespie  had  crossed  the  continent 
from  Vera  Cruz  to  Mazatlan,  Fremont  considered 
the  intimation  of  moment,  and  was  at  no  loss  to 
account  for  the  obscurity  of  the  passages  in  the 

*  Colonel  Benton's  letter  to  the  President. 

I.— T 


290  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

danger  which  had  existed  of  the  letters  falling  into 
Mexican  hands.  In  connection  with  verbal  in 
formation  from  Gillespie,  the  intimation  had  a  pow 
erful  influence  on  his  future  action,  and  he  at  once 
determined  to  return  to  the  settled  vicinity  of  the 
Sacramento.^ 

Whether  it  had  been  intended  by  Senator  Ben- 
ton  that  any  thing  should  be  so  construed  as  to  in 
duce  the  attempt  to  subvert  Mexican  authority  in 
California,  or  whether  the  whole  object  of  Lieuten 
ant  Gillespie's  mission  was  to  cause  precautionary 
measures  to  be  taken  against  British  schemes  for  the 
acquisition  of  the  territory,  is  a  question  of  doubt. 
But,  in  either  case,  that  Fremont's  action  was  un 
premeditated,  up  to  the  time  of  the  receipt  of  the 
letters,  there  can  be  no  question ;  for,  had  he  pre 
viously  contemplated  the  subversion  of  Mexican 
authority,  he  would  hardly  have  given  himself  the 
fatigue  and  danger  of  his  march  to  the  north. 

Upon  arriving  at  the  Bay  of  San  Francisco,  he 
learned  that,  after  his  retreat  from  the  position  on 
the  Sierra  Nevada,  Be  Castro  had  taken  steps  for 
expelling  the  American  settlers  from  the  territory, 
and  that  he  was  then  at  Sonoma,  on  the  opposite 
side  of  the  bay,  preparing  an  expedition.  Under 
all  these  circumstances,  hemmed  in  himself,  in  no 
immediate  condition  to  return  to  the  United  States, 
the  settlers  compromised  and  about  to  become  the 
objects  of  hostility  to  a  barbarous  people,  and  be- 

*  Lieutenant-colonel  Fremont's  Defense.    Executive  Document,  No.  53, 
Senate,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  376. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  £91 

ing  disgusted  with  the  conduct  of  the  Mexican 
authorities,  early  in  June  Fremont  determined  to 
act,  and  put  a  stop  to  their  proceedings  by  over 
throwing  Mexican  authority  in  California. 

On  the  llth  he  commenced  by  seizing  a  drove 
of  two  hundred  horses  on  the  way  to  De  Castro's 
camp,  setting  free  the  party  which  conducted  them. 
On  the  15th  he  surprised  Sonoma,  the  rendezvous 
of  the  Mexican  forces,  captured  General  Vallejo 
and  other  officers,  nine  pieces  of  brass  cannon,  two 
hundred  and  fifty  stand  of  muskets,  and  a  quan 
tity  of  ammunition  and  military  stores.  Leaving 
fourteen  men  to  garrison  the  point,  he  proceeded 
to  the  settlements  on  the  Rio  de  los  Americanos, 
some  distance  in  the  interior.  There  he  increased 
his  force  from  the  settlers,  and,  having  heard  that 
De  Castro  meditated  an  attack  upon  Sonoma,  he 
started  with  ninety  men  on  the  23d  of  June  to  re 
turn.  By  rapid  traveling,  he  reached  Sonoma  on 
the  25th,  at  two  o'clock  in  the  morning.  De  Cas 
tro's  advance  of  eighty  dragoons,  under  a  Captain 
de  la  Torre,  had  already  crossed  the  bay,  but  it  was 
soon  attacked  by  twenty  Americans,  and  fled  after 
a  short  conflict.  Fremont  captured  all  the  boats 
in  which  the  crossing  had  been  effected.  Three 
of  De  la  Torre's  men  were  shot  in  retaliation  for 
the  butchery  of  two  Americans,  who  had  been 
taken  prisoners  by  the  Mexican  troops  and  cut  to 
pieces  with  their  knives.  Having  suffered  these 
losses,  De  Castro  retreated  to  the  south. 

On  the  4th  of  July  Fremont  called  the  Ameri- 


292  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

can  settlers  together  at  Sonoma,  and  advised  them, 
as  their  only  safety,  to  declare  independence  of 
Mexico,  and  to  prosecute  the  war.  His  advice  met 
with  a  ready  response,  and  the  revolutionary  flag 
was  at  once  displayed.^  But,  meanwhile,  the 
events  of  the  war,  of  the  existence  of  which  Fre 
mont  had  heen  ignorant,  had  hecome  known  to 
Commodore  Sloat,  the  commander  of  the  Pacific 
squadron,  and  that  officer  had  commenced  taking 
possession  of  the  towns  upon  the  coast. 

The  instructions  under  which  Sloat  commenced 
action  had  heen  given  with  a  view  to  the  contin 
gency  of  war,  and  were  written  as  early  as  the  24th 
of  June,  1845.  In  a  letter  of  Mr.  Bancroft,  secre 
tary  of  the  navy,  of  that  date,  to  Commodore  Sloat, 
is  the  following :  "  It  is  the  earnest  desire  of  the 
President  to  pursue  the  policy  of  peace,  and  he  is 
anxious  that  you,  and  every  part  of  your  squadron, 
should  he  assiduously  careful  to  avoid  any  act 
which  could  "be  construed  into  an  act  of  aggression. 

"  Should  Mexico,  however,  be  resolutely  bent  on 
hostilities,  you  will  be  mindful  to  protect  the  per 
sons  and  interests  of  citizens  of  the  United  States 
near  your  station;  and  should  you  ascertain  be 
yond  a  doubt  that  the  Mexican  government  has 
declared  war  against  us,  you  will  employ  the  force 
under  your  command  to  the  best  advantage.  The 
Mexican  ports  on  the  Pacific  are  said  to  be  open 
and  defenseless.  If  you  ascertain  with  certainty 
that  Mexico  has  declared  war  against  the  United 

*  Colonel  Benton's  letter  to  the  President. 


THE    WAR   WITH   MEXICO. 


293 


States,  you  will  at  once  possess  yourself  of  the  port 
of  San  Francisco,  and  blockade  or  occupy  such  oth 
er  ports  as  your  force  may  permit."^ 

At  Mazatlan,  on  the  7th  of  June,  1846,  the  com 
modore  learned  of  the  commencement  of  hostili 
ties,  and,  leaving  a  sloop  of  war  at  that  port,  he 
sailed  at  once  for  the  coast  of  California.  He  ar 
rived  at  Monterey  on  the  2d  of  July,  and,  after  hav 
ing  examined  the  defenses  and  localities  of  the 
town,  summoned  it  on  the  7th.  The  Mexican  cap 
tain  of  artillery  who  commanded  it  evacuated  the 
place,  with  the  few  soldiers  which  constituted  the 
garrison,  having  declined  to  go  through  the  formal 
ities  of  a  surrender,  inasmuch  as  he  had  no  orders 
to  do  so.f  On  the  same  day,  250  seamen  and  ma 
rines  landed  and  took  possession,  and  hoisted  the 
American  flag. 

In  the  proclamation  which  the  commodore  pub 
lished,  the  intention  of  the  United  States  to  take 
and  hold  possession  of  the  territory  was  distinctly 
declared,  and  the  privileges  and  benefits  which 
might  be  expected  from  the  change  of  governments 
were  prominently  set  forth.  $  Such  an  avowal  of 
policy  on  the  part  of  the  naval  commander  was,  to 
say  the  least,  premature,  for  the  letter  of  instruc 
tions  of  the  24th  of  June  was  all  his  authority. 
Time  had  not  elapsed  to  allow  the  transmission  of 
dispatches  from  Washington  to  his  squadron  since 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session 
of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  231. 

t  Executive  Document,  No.  4,  House  of  Representatives,  second  Session 
of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  p.  643.  t  Idem,  p.  644,  645. 


294  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

the  commencement  of  hostilities,  and  he  must, 
therefore,  have  believed  such  to  have  been  the  de 
termination  of  the  government,  instead  of  knowing 
it  from  positive  instructions.  But  the  course  of  con 
duct  was  calculated  to  facilitate  the  occupation  of 
the  country,  which  he  was  directed  to  accomplish, 
and,  as  he  avowed,  in  the  absence  of  explicit  in 
structions,  he  chose  rather  to  be  blamed  for  doing 
too  much  than  too  little. ^ 

Captain  Montgomery,  in  obedience  to  instruc 
tions  from  the  commodore,  took  possession  of  Yer- 
ba  Buena,  on  the  Bay  of  San  Francisco,  on  the  9th. 
He  immediately  commenced  preparations  for  secur 
ing  the  bay  by  planting  the  cannon  which  were 
found  in  the  country,  erecting  temporary  forts,  and 
organizing  volunteer  guards.  In  these  proceedings 
some  distrust  was  felt  of  English  action,  and  it  was 
to  a  degree  anticipated  that  the  British  squadron 
might  interfere  to  prevent  the  consummation  of  the 
measures  of  occupation  ;  but  the  British  admiral  ar 
rived  at  the  newly-captured  ports,  and  sailed  with 
out  interference  or  remonstrance! — a  disappoint 
ment  to  the  Mexican  party  in  the  country,  which 
had  anticipated  the  speedy  and  effective  aid  of  his 
naval  force. 

The  news  of  the  acts  of  the  naval  commander, 
and  of  the  seizure  of  Monterey,  Yerba  Buena,  and 
other  small  places,  was  received  by  the  revolution- 

*  Correspondence  of  Commodore  Sloat  and  Captain  Montgomery.  Ex 
ecutive  Document,  No.  4,  House  of  Representatives,  second  Session  of  the 
twenty-ninth  Congress,  p.  648.  t  Idem.  Idem,  p.  641,  677. 


THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO.  £95 

ists  soon  after  their  declaration  of  independence. 
The  American  flag  was  at  once  substituted  for  the 
standard  of  revolt,  and  Fremont  proceeded  with  his 
party  to  Monterey. 

When  Commodore  Sloat  commenced  his  opera 
tions,  he  had  sent  a  summons  to  both  the  governor, 
Pico,  and  General  De  Castro,  calling  upon  them  to 
surrender  their  authority,  and  inviting  them  to  meet 
him  at  Monterey  for  the  purpose  of  arranging  terms. 
De  Castro's  reply  was  to  the  effect  that  he  would 
submit  the  demand  to  the  governor  and  assembly  of 
the  department ;  .but  added,  that  if  the  matter  rest 
ed  on  his  responsibility,  he  should  not  fail  to  main 
tain  the  Mexican  sovereignty  to  the  last.^  Nev 
ertheless,  upon  the  approach  of  Fremont  and  his 
party,  he  retreated  to  the  capital  of  California,  the 
Ciudad  de  los  Angeles. 

During  the  progress  of  these  events  Commodore 
Stockton  had  arrived  from  the  United  States,  and 
in  consequence  of  ill  health,  Commodore  Sloat  re 
linquished  to  him  the  command  of  the  Pacific 
squadron  about  the  29th  of  July.  Previous  to  this 
Fremont  had  arrived  with  his  volunteer  force  at 
Monterey,  and  communicated  with  Sloat  in  regard 
to  future  movements.  The  commodore  did  not  con 
template  any  active  operations  on  shore,  notwith 
standing  his  summons  to  Pico  and  De  Castro,  but 
limited  himself  to  holding  the  sea-ports  already  oc- 

*  Correspondence  of  Commodore  Sloat  with  Pico  and  Castro.  Executive 
Document,  No.  4,  House  of  Representatives,  second  Session  of  the  twenty- 
ninth  Congress,  p.  646-649. 


296 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


cupied,  and  he  announced  to  the  commander  at 
San  Francisco  that  the  campaign  would  he  consid 
ered  at  an  end  whenever  Captain  Fremont  and  his 
party  should  leave  for  the  United  States.  The  sub 
ject  of  the  intended  course  of  action  was  spoken  of 
hy  Fremont  and  Lieutenant  Gillespie  of  the  ma 
rines  to  Commodore  Stockton  hefore  he  succeeded 
to  the  command  of  the  squadron.  He  declined  giv 
ing  any  opinion  at  the  time,  hut  as  Fremont  had 
in  consideration  the  propriety  of  returning  to  the 
United  States,  it  was  suggested  that  he  should  de 
lay  his  departure  for  a  few  days,  when  Stockton 
would  prohahly  succeed  to  the  command.^ 

Being  in  anticipation  of  resistance  on  the  part 
of  the  armed  Californians,  and  fearful  lest  they 
should  gain  strength  and  confidence  hy  American 
inactivity,  Stockton  urged  upon  Commodore  Sloat 
that  if  he  intended  to  relinquish  the  duty  on 
account  of  ill  health,  he  should  do  so  at  once. 
Though  the  latter  did  not  immediately  comply,  he 
placed  under  Stockton's  command  the  sloop  of 
war  Cyane,  from  which  had  heen  drawn  the  great 
er  part  of  the  force  on  shore.  Upon  this  Stockton 
communicated  with  Fremont  and  Gillespie,  and 
under  his  authority  the  volunteer  force  which  they 
had  raised  was  organized  into  a  hattalion,  of  which 
Fremont  was  appointed  the  major  and  Gillespie  a 
captain,  f 

*  Testimony  of  Commodore  Stockton.  Trial  of  Lieutenant-colonel  Fre 
mont.  Executive  Document,  No.  33,  Senate,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth 
Congress,  p.  178.  t  Idem.  Idem,  p.  180. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  297 

In  the  mean  time,  information  had  heen  receiv 
ed  at  Monterey  of  the  junction  of  De  Castro  with 
the  governor,  Pico,  and  that  they  were  at  the  time 
in  the  vicinity  of  Ciudad  de  los  Angeles,  at  the 
head  of  a  force  of  about  700  men.  In  consequence, 
the  newly-organized  battalion  was  embarked-upon 
the  sloop  of  war  Cyane,  and  on  the  24th  sailed 
for  San  Diego,  where  it  was  to  land,  procure  a  re 
mount,  and  to  intercept  the  communications  of  the 
Mexican  force  with  Sonora. 

A  few  days  after,  Sloat  having  left  for  the  Unit 
ed  States,  Stockton  sailed  down  the  coast  as  far  as 
San  Pedro,  taking  possession,  as  he  passed,  of  the 
small  town  of  Santa  Barbara.  Upon  his  arrival  at 
San  Pedro,  he  landed  a  party  of  sailors  and  ma 
rines,  and,  having  mounted  a  few  ship  guns  on 
cart  wheels,  prepared  to  advance  on  Ciudad  de  los 
Angeles.  While  at  San  Pedro,  commissioners  ar 
rived  from  De  Castro,  offering  negotiations,  which 
Stockton  declined.  In  return  for  the  refusal,  De 
Castro  announced  to  hinij  in  extravagant  language, 
that  he  meant  to  defend  the  territory.^  Commu 
nications  having  been  opened  with  Fremont,  that 
officer  was  ordered  to  join  the  advance  en  route, 
and  the  little  column  was  directed  on  Los  Angeles. 
The  same  day  information  was  received  that  the 
enemy  had  abandoned  his  camp,  which  had  been 
intrenched,  distant  three  miles  from  the  town  ; 

*  Testimony  of  Commodore  Stockton.  Trial  of  Lieutenant-colonel  Fre 
mont,  Executive  Document,  No.  33,  Senate,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth 
Congress,  p.  181. 


298  THE    WAK  WITH  MEXICO. 

that  his  troops  had  dispersed  over  the  country, 
while  the  governor  and  commandante  general  had 
taken  the  route  to  Sonera. 

Having  heen  joined  by  Fremont,  on  the  13th  of 
August  Stockton  entered  the  capital  of  California, 
and  took  possession  of  the  government  house,  with 
out  a  show  of  opposition. 

On  the  17th  he  issued  a  proclamation  announc 
ing  his  conquest  of  the  department  and  the  milita 
ry  possession  of  the  United  States,  and  promising 
a  government  similar  to  that  of  the  American  ter 
ritories  as  soon  as  it  could  be  established.^ 

Soon  after,  he  ordered  the  establishment  of  a  gov 
ernment,  of  which  he  constituted  himself  the  chief. 
It  could  hardly  be  called  a  free  government,  for 
the  legislative  power  was  vested  in  the  governor 
and  a  legislative  council  of  seven  members,  to  be 
appointed  by  himself  for  the  first  two  years,  after 
which  the  members  were  to  be  elected 'by  the  peo 
ple.  But  the  government  was  only  temporary  in 
its  nature,  and  the  decree  by  which  it  was  estab 
lished  bore  upon  its  face  that  it  was  to  continue 
only  until  changed  by  authority  of  the  government 
of  the  United  States,  f  Such  as  it  was,  it  was,  for 
a  tune,  quietly  submitted  to,  and,  to  all  appear 
ance,  the  occupation  of  the  territory  was  firmly  es 
tablished. 

In  the  mean  time,  with  a  view  to  the  prosecu 
tion  of  the  adopted  policy,  though  necessarily  in 

*  Executive  Document.  No.  4,  House  of  Representatives,  second  Session  of 
the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  p.  669.  t  Idem.    Idem,  p.  271,  272. 


THE    WAR    WITH   MEXICO.  £99 

ignorance  of  the  events  which  had  transpired,  the 
authorities  at  Washington  had  dispatched  a  com 
pany  of  artillery  hy  sea,  around  Cape  Horn,  to  Cal 
ifornia.  Its  transport  conveyed  full  supplies  of 
arms  and  munitions  of  war,  and  implements  for 
engineer  service.  Soon  after,  a  regiment  of  volun 
teers  was  raised  in  the  city  of  New  York,  especial 
ly  for  California  service,  of  which  the  men  were  to 
serve  during  the  war,  and  to  receive  their  discharge 
at  such  point  as  the  regiment  might  be  found  at  its 
termination,  provided  it  was  within  the  limits  of 
the  territory  of  the  United  States.  But  neither  of 
these  corps  arrived  in  California  in  time  to  partici 
pate  in  the  active  measures  of  conquest  or  occu 
pation. 


The  expedition  against  Chihuahua  was  contem 
plated  at  Washington  soon  after  the  first  news  of 
the  commencement  of  hostilities  on  the  Rio  Grande 
was  received.  The  end  of  the  expedition,  although 
not  explicitly  set  forth  in  any  published  official 
correspondence  of  the  government  of  the  United 
States,  could  hardly  have  been  other  than  to  fur 
ther  the  scheme  of  cutting  off  the  northern  prov 
inces  of  Mexico,  the  population  of  which  various 
persons  then  in  Washington  represented  as  being 
exceedingly  dissatisfied  with  the  central  govern 
ment,  and  ripe  for  revolt.  The  country  was  not 
well  known,  the  only  direct  route  by  which  trav 
elers  and  merchants  from  the  United  States  usual- 


300  THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO. 

ly  proceeded  being  that  from  Fort  Leavenworth, 
by  Santa  Fe,  to  Chihuahua.  That  presented  many 
difficulties,  besides  the  length  of  the  march  from 
Fort  Leavenworth ;  and  Port  Lavaca,  in  Texas, 
was  early  selected  as  the  point  of  starting  for  the 
expedition. 

That  it  was  for  some  time  contemplated  at  Wash- 
ington  to  continue  the  cordon  across  the  continent, 
and  to  cut  off  the  northern  provinces,  and  that  it 
was  deemed  that  this  expedition  was  in  part  to 
effect  such  object,  is  evident  from  the  inquiries 
made  of  General  Taylor  concerning  the  route  from 
Chihuahua  to  the  port  of  Guyamas,  on  the  Pacific. 
But  the  whole  expedition  was  an  experiment  on 
the  part  of  the  government,  as,  indeed,  isolated  op- 
erations  of  war  generally  are,  and  General  Wool, 
who  was  to  command  it,  was  placed  under  the  or 
ders  of  General  Taylor,  in  order  that  such  disposi 
tions  might  be  made  as  the  service  should  require, 
either  for  the  furtherance  of  his  own  movements 
or  for  the  continuation  of  the  cordon  across  the 
continent.^ 

The  point  of  concentration  of  the  troops  of  Wool's 
command  was  San  Antonio  de  Bexar,  in  Texas. 
Taylor's  instructions  to  Wool  were  not  issued  un 
til  the  14th  of  August,  and,  from  the  nature  of 
things,  they  were  exceedingly  indefinite.  Taylor 
considered  him,  although  nominally  under  his  or- 
. 

*  The  Adjutant  General  to  General  Wool.  Executive  Document.  No.  GO, 
House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  328,  and 
the  Secretaiy  of  War  to  General  Taylor.  Idem,-  p.  324. 


THE    WAR   WITH  MEXICO.  3  Q  ^ 

ders,  as  being  charged  with  the  conduct  of  a  sep 
arate  expedition;^  and  the  letter  of  Major  Bliss, 
assistant  adjutant  general  to  General  Wool,  of  the 
14th  of  August,  contained  nothing  positive  but  an 
order  to  march  on  Chihuahua,  with  such  portion 
of  his  force  as  could  be  subsisted  en  route.  The 
remainder  of  the  letter  was  filled  with  suggestions, 
and  with  such  information  of  the  proposed  route  as 
General  Taylor  possessed ;  but  all  things  save  the 
destination  were  left  to  the  discretion  of  General 
Wool.f 

Having  made  arrangements  for  the  concentra 
tion  of  his  command  at  San  Antonio,  on  the  8th  of 
August,  Wool,  in  person,  left  Port  Lavaca.  His 
forces  consisted  of  five  companies  of  United  States 
dragoons,  one  of  light  artillery  (six  pieces),  three 
of  the  sixth  infantry,  one  regiment  of  Arkansas 
cavalry,  two  of  Illinois  infantry,  and  one  company 
of  Kentucky  infantry — in  all,  about  3000  men.  Of 
these  different  corps,  two  companies  of  dragoons 
had  been  stationed  at  San  Antonio  from  the  time 
of  the  occupation  of  Texas,  and  their  commander, 
Colonel  Hartley,  growing  restive  in  the  inactivity 
of  the  station,  had  raised  a  volunteer  force  of  Tex- 
ans  and  Indians,  and  made  an  abortive  attempt  to 
pass  the  border  and  foray  in  Mexico ;  but  it  had 
been  a  failure,  and  his  regular  troops  returned  to 
San  Antonio.  The  Arkansas  troops,  the  companies 

*  General  Taylor  to  the  Adjutant  General,  October  15th,  1846.  Executive 
Document,  No  60.,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Con 
gress,  p.  351.  t  Major  Bliss  to  General  Wool.  Idem,  p.  410. 


302  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

of  the  sixth  infantry,  and  the  remaining  regular  dra 
goons,  had  made  the  march  hy  land  from  the  Ar 
kansas  frontier.  Washington's  battery  had  march 
ed  through  the  country  from  Carlisle  harracks  in 
Pennsylvania.  The  volunteer  infantry  and  the  ma 
terial  of  the  train  had  heen  brought  by  water  trans 
port  from  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi  to  Port  La- 
vaca,  whence  they  were  brought  up  to  San  Antonio. 
The  train  which  had  been  organized  for  the  expe 
dition  was  immense,  in  comparison  with  the  num 
ber  of  troops  which  were  to  compose  it;  and  the 
appropriation  of  the  means  of  land  transport  for  it, 
under  the  direction  of  General  Wool,  while  he  was 
in  person  at  New  Orleans,  doubtless  caused  some 
of  the  embarrassment  so  grievously  complained  of 
at  a  subsequent  period  by  General  Taylor. 

On  the  8th  of  October  Wool  arrived  with  his  ad 
vanced  division  at  the  Presidio  Rio  Grande.  On 
the  llth  he  passed  the  river  by  a  flying  bridge, 
and,  having  thrown  up  a  temporary  tete  du  pont 
and  redoubt  to  protect  the  passage  of  the  rear,  col 
umn,  which  was  following  with  additional  sup 
plies,  he  garrisoned  the  works  with  two  companies, 
and  moved  in  advance.  There  were  but  few  Mex 
ican  troops  in  his  front,  and  what  there  were  of 
militia  and  cavalry  of  the  Presidio  fled  rapidly  be 
fore  him  or  dispersed.  On  the  24th  he  reached 
Santa  Rosa,  a  point  whence  three  routes  led  to 
Chihuahua.  Of  the  three,  however,  two  were  but 
mule  trails,  impassable  for  wagons  or  artillery,  and, 
from  the  scarcity  of  water  and  subsistence,  were 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  393 

impracticable  for  any  kind  of  military  movement. 
The  third  led  southward,  through  Monclova  and 
Parras,  turned  to  the  north  in  the  State  of  Durango, 
and  thence  continued  to  Chihuahua.  It  was  an 
immense  circuit,  hut  the  only  route  by  which  the 
destination  of  the  column  could  be  reached  from 
the  east,  and  it  was  therefore  chosen.  . 

On  the  29th  the  column  arrived  at  Monclova, 
the  former .  capital  of  the  State  of  Coahuila  and 
Texas,  and  immediate  measures  were  taken  to  es 
tablish  a  depot,  for  the  reason,  as  it  was  said,  and 
a  very  evident  one,  that  it  was  out  of  the  question 
to  depend  longer  for  supplies  upon  the  United 
States  by  the  route  from  Fort  Lavaca  or  the  Rio 
Grande.  From  this  point  a  communication  was 
opened  with  Monterey  ;  and  with  a  view  of  obtain 
ing  authority  to  penetrate  further  to  the  south, 
General  Wool  asked  of  General  Taylor  what  was 
to  be  gained  by  going  to  Chihuahua.  General 
Taylor's  opinion  and  action  were  set  forth  in  his  let 
ter  to  Mr.  Maircy  of  November  9th,  three  days  be 
fore  the  receipt  of  the  secretary's  dispatch  of  Octo 
ber  22d,  in  which  he  stated  that  he  was  free  to 
answer  "  nothing  at  all  commensurate  with  the 
excessive  length  of  his  line  of  operations,"  and  also 
that  he  had  ordered  General  Wool  to  remain  at 
Monclova,  where  he  could  obtain  subsistence,  until 
the  disposition  of  his  column  could  be  determined 
upon.^ 

*  General  Taylor  to  the  Adjutant  General.     Executive  Document,  No.  60, 
House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  361. 


.      4  ,    g  V 

3Q4  THE   WAR   WITH  MEXICO. 

In  the  mean  while,  however,  doubts  as  to  the 
anticipated  benefit  to  the  American  cause  in  the 
prosecution  of  the  war  through  the  expedition  to 
Chihuahua  had  arisen  at  Washington,  and  in  the 
letter  of  Mr.'Marcy  of  the  22d  (before  referred  to), 
it  was  suggested  that  the  column  should  be  united 
with  the  forces  on  the  Rio  Grande  or  at  Monterey, 
where  it  would  be  available  for  other  and  more 
active  operations,  either  on  the  Gulf  coast  or  on 
the  line  already  pursued  ;  but  the  matter  was  left 
entirely  to  the  discretion  of  the  general.^ 

As  Taylor  had  already  taken  action  so  far  as  to 
order  the  suspension  of  the  movement,  and  these 
views  coincided  with  his  own,  the  receipt  of  the  dis 
patch  decided  the  matter,  and  soon  after  Wool  was 
ordered  to  locate  himself  at  Parras.  On  the  24th  of 
November  he  broke  up  from  Monclova  and  march 
ed,  leaving  a  guard  of  250  men  over  the  newly- 
established  depot.  On  the  5th  of  December  he 
reached  his  designated  post,  and  the  Chihuahua 
expedition  was  abandoned — the  so-called  "  army  of 
the  center"  became  merged  in  that  of  occupation. 

The  expedition,  undertaken  as  it  was  upon  in 
accurate  data,  and  without  any  proper  knowledge 
of  the  proposed  theater  of  operations,  was  without 
any  benefit  to  the  American  cause.  Indeed,  so  far 
as  it  wasted  material  and  money  in  the  expedition, 
it  was  a  positive  injury,  for  the  country  through 
which  it  marched  was  comparatively  worthless. 

*  The  Secretary  of  War  to  General  Taylor.     Executive  Document,  No 
60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  365. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  305 

In  that  fact  was  the  cause  of  the  failure  of  the 
scheme  of  cutting  off  the  northern  provinces  of 
Mexico ;  for,  detached  and  worthless  to  the  central 
government  as  they  were,  to  attempt  to  reduce  its 
power  or  to  conquer  its  obstinacy  by  their  isolation 
was  like  lopping  the  decayed  and  topmost  branch 
es  of  a  tree  to  bring  it  to  the  ground. 


The  operations  of  the  American  naval  squadron 
in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  for  some  time  after  the  com 
mencement  of  the  war  were  confined  to  keeping  up 
a  blockade,  which  had  been  established  immediate 
ly  after .  the  first  acts  of  positive  hostility.  The 
duty  was  one  which,  although  it  afforded  but  lit 
tle  opportunity  for  the  display  of  that  action  which 
is  alone  popular  in  war,  and  which  gives  fame  to 
those  engaged,  yet  required  no  small  degree  of 
vigilance  and  activity. 

The  United  States  having  no  part  in  the  great 
European  contests  of  the  period  of  the  French  rev 
olutions,  had,  almost  from  the  first,  contended  for 
a  liberal  construction  .of  the  law  of  blockade,  for 
the  advantage,  at  the  time,  of  their  own  commerce. 
In  order  to  establish  the  precedent  and  custom  of 
the  law,  and  to  act  in  consistency  with  their  former 
demands  upon  other  nations,  they  were  obliged,  now 
that  for  the  first  time  they  were  called  upon  to  en 
force  a  blockade,  to  allow  their  demanded  construc 
tion,  which  they  did.  According  to  this,  it  was 
necessary,  to  render  a  vessel  subject  to  seizure  and 
L— U 


306  THE    WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

condemnation,  that  she  should  first  be  warned  off 
by  one  of  the  vessels  of  the  blockading  squadron 
before  the  port  which  she  attempted  to  enter. 
Should  she  effect  an  entrance  without  such  warn 
ing,  she  was  free  to  depart  without  molestation  or 
hinder  ance. 

The  nature  of  the  Mexican  ports,  especially  of 
the  principal  one,  Vera  Cruz,  was  such  as  to  ren 
der  the  enforcement  of  such  a  blockade  a  matter 
of  exceeding  difficulty.  Heavy  north  winds  pre 
vail  in  the  Mexican  Gulf  throughout  the  year  to  a 
greater  or  less  extent,  though  their  particular  vio 
lence  is  during  the  winter  months.  In  these,  a 
neutral  vessel  could  enter  the  harbor  of  Vera  Cruz 
by  the  northern  channel,  and  cast  anchor  in  the 
port  or  fasten  to  rings  in  the  Castle  of  San  Juan 
d'Ulloa,  while  the  vessels  of  the  blockading  squad 
ron  were  forced  to  take  shelter  under  the  islands  to 
the  southward.  Under  such  circumstances,  several 
neutral  vessels  ran  the  blockade  with  impunity, 
notwithstanding  the  exertions  of  the  naval  officers. 

But  upon  a  country  like  Mexico,  where  the  or 
dinary  articles  of  foreign  commerce  are  in  a  great 
measure  prohibited,  and  where  most,  if  not  all,  the 
resources  for  subsistence  are  entirely  interior,  the 
blockade  could  have  been  effective  only  so  far  as  it 
deprived  her  of  the  moral  aid  which  she  would 
have  derived  from  an  unrestricted  intercourse  with 
foreign  nations,  and  prevented  the  introduction  of 
arms  and  munitions  of  war ;  for  the  revenue  which 
Mexico  had  at  any  time  derived  from  her  imports 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  307 

had  been  trifling  in  comparison  with  her  expenses, 
and  it  was  hardly  equal  to  the  expense  of  keeping 
up  the  blockading  squadron. 

In  effect  upon  Mexican  military  power,  the  naval 
operations  were  not  very  positive,  for  at  no  time 
did  Commodore  Connor  deem  his  squadron  of  suf 
ficient  strength  to  attack  the  Castle  of  San  Juan 
d'Ulloa.  From  its  ramparts  the  Mexican  garrison, 
confident  in  the  strength  of  the  repaired  works, 
looked  with  but  little  apprehension  of  the  issue. 
Indeed,  had  the  garrison  consisted  of  good  and 
brave  artillerists,  it  is  doubtful  whether  any  naval 
force  could  have  accomplished  its  capture,  armed 
as  it  was  at  that  time. 

In  the  months  of  July  and  August,  the  attention 
of  Commodore  Connor  was  directed  to  the  port  of 
Alvarado,  sixty  miles  to  the  south'  of  Yera  Cruz, 
as  several  small  Mexican  vessels  of  war  had  taken 
shelter  in  the  river  which  there  emptied  into  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  as  a  small  commerce  was  oc 
casionally  carried  on  through  it. 

A  few  days  of  settled  weather  having  occurred 
in  the  early  part  of  August,  he  proceeded  thither 
with  the  small  vessels  of  his  squadron.  Arriv 
ing  off  the  port  on  the  7th  of  August,  he  threw  a 
few  shot  from  his  flag  ship  at  the  fort  which  com 
manded  the  entrance.  The  crew  of  a  launch,  sent 
in  to  reconnoiter,  also  exchanged  musketry  with  a 
party  of  Mexicans,  which  had  taken  position  to  op 
pose  a  landing,  but  the  firing  had  little  effect  on 
either  side.  The  demonstration,  however,  aroused 


308  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

the  Mexican  population  of  the  vicinity,  and  mili 
tia  from  Tlacotalpam  and  other  villages  flocked  in 
to  resist  the  invasion  in  the  course  of  the  following 
days.  But,  in  the  mean  time,  the  attempt  was 
given  up  by  the  American  commodore,  on  account 
of  the  swollen  state  of  the  river,  and  the  return  of 
bad  weather  in  the  night.^ 

Another  attempt  to  effect  an  entrance  was  made 
on  the  15th  of  October,  with  no  better  success. 
Some  small  vessels  entered  the  river  and  engaged 
the  batteries  at  its  mouth,  but  the  steamer,  hav 
ing  the  second  division  in  tow,  grounded  on  the 
bank,  and  left  them  without  support.  The  Mis 
sissippi  steamship,  which  it  had  been  intended 
should  cannonade  the  batteries,  was  unable  to  ap 
proach  near  enough  to  do  any  injury  to  the  enemy, 
and,  under  all  these  circumstances,  the  flotilla  was 
withdrawn. 

The  same  disposition  which  had  been  manifest 
ed  by  the  Mexicans  in  the  neighborhood  on  the 
former  occasion  was  manifested  on  this,  and,  as  the 
American  force  withdrew,  they  congratulated  them 
selves  upon  a  most  brilliant  victory.  The  event 
was  the  subject  of  special  congratulation  in  the 
city  of  Mexico,  for  it  was  almost  the  only  sem 
blance  of  success  which  had  resulted  from  any 
Mexican  •  operations,  either  in  offense  or  defense. 
The  officers  who  had  been  in  command  were  es 
pecially  extolled  for  bravery  and  good  conduct,  and 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  4,  House  of  Representatives,  second  Session 
of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  p.  630,  631. 


:.* 


THE    WAR    WITH   MEXICO.  309 

it  was  proposed  to  confer  upon  the  town  of  Alva- 
rado  the  title  of  Heroic. 

The  result  could  not  have  been  other  than  mor 
tifying  to  the  American  commodore,  though  he  sus 
tained  no  loss,  and  the  object  of  the  expedition,  was 
of  but  little  importance.  Certainly,  if  he  had  been 
successful,  at  that  immediate  period  his  success 
could  have  had  no  effect  upon  the  operations  of 
the  war. 

Having  returned  to  Anton  Lizardo,  on  the  16th 
Commodore  Connor  sent  an  expedition,  composed 
of  the  Mississippi  steamer  and  all  the  small  vessels 
of  the  squadron,  under  command  of  Commodore 
Perry,  against  the  towns  on  the  River  Tobasco. 

The  flotilla  arrived  off  the  mouth  of  the  river  on 
the  23d,  and,  having  left  the  Mississippi  at  anchor 
outside,  the  commodore  entered  with  the  small  ves 
sels,  seized  the  town  of  Frontera,  and  captured  two 
Mexican  steamers  and  a  schooner.  On  the  next 
morning  he  proceeded  up  the  river  with  the  great 
er  portion  of  his  force,  and  reached  Tobasco  with 
out  opposition  on  the  25th.  Five  merchant  ves 
sels  in  the  port  were  captured,  and  the  town  was 
summoned  to  surrender.  But  the  Mexican  author 
ities  were  stubborn,  and  replied  to  the  summons 
that  the  American  commander  might  open  fire 
whenever  he  pleased.  He  accordingly  did,  and 
soon  after  sent  a  party  of  sailors  and  marines  ashore, 
between  whom  and  the  townspeople  an  irregular, 
spattering  fire  was  exchanged  for  some  time,  with 
but  little  effect.  The  guns  of  the  flotilla  were,  dur- 


J.    ... 

310  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

ing  its  continuance,  worked  upon  the  town  until 
near  night,  when  the  firing  ceased,  and  the  party 
ashore  was  re-embarked. 

On  the  following  morning  the  Mexicans  opened 
a  fire  of  musketry  from  the  shore,  which  was  re 
turned  from  the  flotilla  by  a  cannonade.  In  the 
midst  of  the  fire  a  white  flag  was  shown,  and  a 
communication  from  the  foreign  merchants  was 
presented  to  the  commodore,  praying  for  a  suspen 
sion  of  hostilities,  as  most  of  the  property  in  the 
town  which  was  subject  to  damage  belonged  to 
them.  In  consideration  of  their  representations, 
Perry  agreed  to  take  no  further  hostile  action,  pro 
vided  he  was  not  attacked  from  the  shore  as  he 
was  leaving  the  place.  But,  while  he  was  mak 
ing  preparations  for  dropping  down  the  stream,  one 
of  his  prizes  grounded,  and  the  Mexicans,  having 
occupied  two  houses  on  the  hank  in  its  vicinity, 
commenced  a  fire  which  mortally  wounded  Lieu 
tenant  Morris,  and  wounded  three  seamen.  The 
guns  of  the  flotilla  were,  in  consequence,  reopen 
ed,  and  their  fire  continued  until  that  of  the  Mex 
icans  was  silenced. 

No  further  opposition  was  experienced,  and,  hav 
ing  cleared  the  river,  the  whole  flotilla,  with  all 
the  prizes  of  any  value,  arrived  in  safety  at  Anton 
Lizardo.^ 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  4,  House  of  Representatives,  second  Session 
of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  p.  632,  633. 


THE    WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Views  of  American  Authorities  at  Washington — Intended  Expedition  against 
Tampico— 111  Feeling  of  General  Taylor  toward  the  War  Department- 
Its  Cause — His  Recommendation  of  taking  up  a  defensive  Line — Observa 
tions — Termination  of  Armistice — Advance  to  Saltillo — Occupation  of  Tam 
pico — Action  of  General  Patterson— Movement  on  Victoria — Taylor's  Views 
and  Intentions — Observations — False  Alarms  at  Saltillo — Concentration  of 
Force  at  that  Point — Occupation  of  Victoria. 

WHILE  the  army  of  occupation  was  slowly  pro 
gressing  toward  Monterey,  and  in  the  absence  of 
any  concerted  plan  of  operations,  the  attention  of 
the  war  department  was  given  to  the  prosecution 
of  the  war  upon  the  Gulf  coast.  The  immediate 
subject  under  consideration  was  the  propriety  of  an 
expedition  against  Tampico,  with  a  view  to  its 
seizure  for  use  in  future  operations.  On  the  2d  of 
September  Mr.  Marcy  addressed  a  letter  to  Gener 
al  Taylor,  in  which  the  views  which  he  then  en 
tertained  were  expressed,  and  various  advantages 
to  be  hoped  from  the  expedition  were  suggested.^ 
The  letter,  however,  contained  no  positive  direc 
tions,  and  General  Taylor's  views  upon  the  practi 
cability  and  advantage  of  the  expedition  were  re 
quested.  This  dispatch  was  intercepted  by  the 
enemy,  and  had  effect,  although  not  in  the  manner 
which  might  have  been  anticipated. 

In  his  dispatch  of  the  22d  of  September,  which 

*  Official  Correspondence.     Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Rep 
resentatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  339. 


312  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

communicated  the  refusal  of  the  new  Mexican 
government  to  enter  upon  negotiations,  Mr.  Marcy 
again  wrote  on  the  subject,  and  the  instructions  set 
forth  were  of  a  more  positive  character.  Having 
stated  the  course  of  action  which  had  been  determ 
ined  upon  at  Washington  (that  of  vigorously  prose 
cuting  the  war),  the  propriety  of  discontinuing  the 
policy  of  conciliation  of  the  inhabitants,  which  had 
so  far  been  persisted  in,  and  of  raising  contribu 
tions  for  the  support  of  the  war,  was  presented  to 
the  consideration  of  the  general,  and  he  was  in 
structed  to  raise  them,  if  in  that  method  he  could 
obtain  supplies  for  his  army.  But,  in  regard  to  the 
expedition  against  Tampico,  it  was  stated  that  the 
determination  of  the  war  department  was  fixed, 
unless  the  organization  and  force  of  the  expedition 
should  interfere  with  General  Taylor's  arrange 
ments,  and  weaken  his  effectual  strength.  The 
officers  for  its  command  were  designated,  and,  in 
order  to  prevent  delay,  instructions  were  sent  di 
rect  to  General  Patterson,  then  at  Camargo,  to  pre 
pare  as  far  as  possible  for  the  movement.^ 

This  dispatch  was  received  by  General  Taylor 
on  the  10th  of  October,  while  he  was  at  Monterey 
making  arrangements  for  the  supply  of  his  army, 
and  determining  plans  for  future  operations  and 
action.  The  subject  matter  was  the  cause  of  in 
dignation  against  the  war  department,  inasmuch  as 
direct  instructions  had  been  given  to  an  officer  un- 

*  Official  Correspondence.     Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Rep 
resentatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth   Congress,  p.  341-343. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  3^3 

der  his  command  to  prepare  for  an  expedition  to  be 
composed  in  great  part  of  his  troops.  In  the  viola 
tion  of  a  general  rule,  the  cause  was  undoubtedly 
a.  just  one ;  for  "  nothing  is  so  important  in  war 
as  an  undivided  command"*  and,  under  all  or 
dinary  circumstances,  any  thing  which  militates 
against  the  principle  can  produce  nothing  but  evil. 
The  meddling  on  the  part  of  the  war  department 
had  no  good  effect  in  this  case,  inasmuch  as  it 
created  ill  feeling  on  the  part  of  the  commanding 
general,  and  the  proposed  expedition  was  delayed 
by  his  orders.  But  it  had  its  origin  in  the  want 
of  an  understanding  with  the  general,  and  of  a  set 
tled  plan  of  operations ;  and  as  the  general  had 
been  unable  to  extend  his  views  beyond  the  ex 
perimental  march  to  Monterey,  had  postponed 
every  thing  until  his  arrival  at  that  place,  had  ex 
pressed  serious  doubts  as  to  the  practicability  of 
advancing  beyond,  and  had,  moreover,  stated  that 
he  had  a  surplus  force  at  his  disposal,  some  portion 
of  the  blame  of  the  interference  might  well  have 
been  laid  to  the  force  of  circumstances  and  the 
nature  of  his  own  dispatches.  In  the  reply  to  Mr. 
Marcy's  letter  of  July  9th,  written  on  the  1st  of 
August,  after  having  suggested  the  various  diffi 
culties  and  doubts  which  occurred  to  his  mind  in 
the  adoption  of  the  course  suggested  by  the  secre 
tary,  General  Taylor  had  written  as  follows :  "  I 
have  already  had  occasion  to  represent  to  the  de 
partment  that  the  volunteer  force  ordered  to  report 

*  Napoleon. 


314  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

to  me  here  is  much  greater  than  I  can  possibly  em 
ploy — at  any  rate,  in  the  first  instance :  the  influx 
of  twelve  months'  volunteers  has  even  impeded  my 
operations,  by  engrossing  all  the  resources  of  the 
quarter-master's  department  to  land  them  and 
transport  them  to  healthy  positions.  This  circum 
stance,  in  connection  with  the  possibility  of  an  ex 
pedition  against  — : — ,  leads  me  to  regret  that  one 
division  of  volunteers  had  not  been  encamped,  say 
at  Pass  Christian,  where  it  could  have  been  in 
structed  until  its  services  were  required  in  the 
field."* 

From  the  usual  time  required  for  communica 
tion,  this  letter  must  have  reached  Washington 
between  the  15th  and  20th  of  August,  and  no  other 
correspondence  was  received  from  General  Taylor 
on  the  subject  of  the  general  operations  of  the  war 
for  some  months.  Wherefore,  it  is  not  surprising 
that  the  war  department,  having  been  informed  of 
its  error  in  sending  out  too  large  a  number  of  troops, 
should  have  sought  to  give  employment  to  the  sur 
plus,  and  relieve  the  commanding  general  and  his 
quarter-master's  department  of  some  portion  of  their 
burden.  Suggested  as  the  movement  had  been  in 
the  dispatch  of  September  2d,  it  can  hardly  be 
wondered  at  that,  when  the  refusal  to  negotiate 
had  been  received  from  the  new  Mexican  govern 
ment,  and  it  had  been  determined  to  prosecute  the 
war  with  vigor,  as  a  measure  of  policy,  positive  in- 

*  Official  Correspondence.     Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Rep 
resentatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  337. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  3^5 

stmctions  were  given  for  the  preparations  to, be 
made.  The  violation  of  the  rules  of  war  and  of 
the  service,  in  communicating  directly  with  the 
commander  of  troops  which  were  lying  idle  in  de 
pot,  could  not  have  been  considered  very  flagrant. 

But  when  the  dispatch  reached  General  Taylor's 
head-quarters,  his  views  had  undergone  a  decided 
change.  He  had  marched  upon  Monterey  with 
the  force  with  which  he  had  originally  intended, 
had  driven  the  enemy  from  many  of  his  positions, 
had  negotiated  a  convention,  agreed  to  an  armis 
tice  of  eight  weeks,  and  had  enjoyed  two  weeks' 
observation  upon  the  agricultural  capacity  of  the 
country.  But  the  bloody  struggle  which  had  tak 
en  place  on  the  eastern  side  of  Monterey,  the  va 
rious  checks  which  had  there  been  encountered, 
and  the  fortuitous  circumstances  which  had  in  so 
great  a  measure  contributed  to  the  success — in  fact, 
the  whole  course  of  the  operations,  so  different  from 
that  which  had  been  anticipated,  while  they  had 
changed  his  position,  must  have  exercised  no  small 
influence  upon  his  intentions  and  views.  In  three 
letters,  which  contained  replies  to  the  subjects  al 
luded  to  in  the  secretary's  letter,  he  said  nothing 
definite  about  the  capacity  of  the  country  around 
Monterey  to  support  6000,  or  any  other  number  of 
troops,  to  ascertain  which  the  movement  had  been 
made,  and  much  less  did  he  say  any  thing  about 
a  surplus  force  on  the  Rio  Grande. 

The  first  of  these  three  letters  was  written  on  the 
12th  of  October,  and  contained  only  a  reason  for 


316  THE   WAR   WITH  MEXICO. 

not  at  once  proceeding  with  the  Tampico  expedi 
tion,  on  account  of  the  terms  of  the  convention  of 
Monterey.^ 

The  second  bore  date  on  the  15th,  and  was  writ 
ten  for  the  purpose  of  giving  other  and'  more  de 
tailed  views  in  relation  to  the  same  subject,  for  the 
information  of  the  general-in-chief  and  the  secreta 
ry  of  war.  It  was  said,  "  Such  a  point  has  been 
reached  in  the  conduct  of  the  war  and  the  progress 
of  our  arms  as  to  make  it  proper  to  place  my  im 
pressions  and  convictions  very  fully  before  the  gov 
ernment.''!  In  pursuance  of  this  design,  the  letter 
set  forth  that  he  considered  General  Wool  to  be 
virtually  independent  of  his  command,  and  that 
the  force  under  that  officer  formed  no  part  of  the 
estimate  for  future  operations.  After  a  statement 
of  the  facts  as  regarded  the  topography  of  the  coun 
try,  General  Taylor  treated  of  the  movement  upon 
San  Luis,  and  stated  that  the  column  which,  in  his 
belief,  would  be  requisite  to  enable  him  to  advance, 
should  consist  of  at  least  20,000  men,  of  which  one 
half  should  be  regulars.  The  forces  under  his  com 
mand  were  rapidly  enumerated  with  a  view  to  the 
contingency,  and,  according  to  the  enumeration,  he 
could  command  no  more  than  10,000  after  having 
left  3000  to  cover  his  communications.  With  this 
statement  of  requisite  and  present  force,  he  pro 
ceeded  to  give  his  views  in  relation  to  the  proper 

*  Official  Correspondence.     Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Rep 
resentatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  350. 
t  Idem.     Idem,  p.  351. 


1 

THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  3^7 

future  operations  of  the  war,  which  will  be  best  un 
derstood  from  his  own  language. 

"  The  department  maybe  assured  that  the  above 
views  have  not  been  given  without  mature  reflec 
tion,  and  have  been  the  result  of  experience  and 
careful  inquiry.  It  will  be  for  the  government  to 
determine  whether  the  war  shall  be  prosecuted. by 
directing  an  active  campaign  against  San  Luis  and 
the  capital,  or  whether  the  country  already  gained 
shall  be  held  and  a  defensive  attitude  assumed. 
In  the  latter  case,  the  general  line  of  the  Sierra 
Madre  might  very  well  be  taken ;  but  even  then, 
with  the  enemy  in  force  in  my  front,  it  might  be  im 
prudent  to  detach  to  Tampico  sa  large  a  force  as 
three  or  four  thousand  men,  particularly  of  the  de 
scription  required,  for  that  operation.  If  the  co-op 
eration  of  the  army,  therefore,  be  deemed  essential 
to  the  success  of  the  expedition  against  Tampico, 
I  trust  that  it  will  be  -postponed  for  the  present." 

*  *  *  "It  may  be  expected  that  I  should  give 
my  views  as  to  the  policy  of  occupying-a  defensive 
line,  to  which  I  have  above  alluded.  I  am  free  to 
confess  that,  in  view  of  the  difficulties  and  expense 
attending  a  movement  into  the  heart  of  the  coun 
try,  and  particularly  in  view  of  the  unsettled  and 
revolutionary  character  of  the  Mexican  govern 
ment,  the  occupation  of  such  a  line  seems  to  me  to 
be  the  best  course  that  can  be  adopted.  The  line 
taken  might  either  be  that  on  which  we  propose  to 
insist  as  the  boundary  between  the  republics — say 


318  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

the  Eio  Grande — or  the  line  to  which  we  have  ad 
vanced,  viz.,  the  Sierra  Madre,  including  Chihua 
hua  and  Santa  Fe.  The  former  line  could  be  held 
with  a  much  smaller  force  than  the  latter ;  but  even 
the  line  of  the  Sierra  Madre  could  be  held  with  a 
much  smaller  force  than  would  be  required  for  an 
active  campaign.  Monterey  controls  the  great  out 
let  from  the  interior.  A  strong  garrison  at  this 
point,  with  an  advance  at  Saltillo,  and  small  corps 
atMonclova,  Linares,  Victoria,  and  Tampico,  would 
effectually  cover  the  line."^ 

The  contemplated  movement  upon  the  Mexican 
capital  by  the  southern  route  was  briefly  noticed, 
and  25,000  men,  of  which  10,000  should  be  regu 
lar  troops,  was,  in  his  opinion,  the  minimum  force 
with  which  it  should  be  undertaken.  The  letter 
concluded  with  a  severe  animadversion  upon  the 
conduct  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  in  corresponding 
directly  with  General  Patterson,  and  against  it 
General  Taylor  earnestly  protested. 

The  third  letter  in  reply  was  written  on  the  26th, 
and  informed  the  department  that  the  project  of 
raising  contributions  upon  the  country  was  imprac 
ticable.! 

These  communications  were  not  received  at 
Washington  until  late  in  the  month  of  November. 
During  the  interval  several  letters  were  sent  from 
the  War  Department  to  General  Taylor,  including 

*  Official  Correspondence.     Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Rep 
resentatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  353. 
t  Idem.    Idem,  p.  354. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

that  of  October  13th,  disapproving  of  the  armistice, 
and  ordering  its  close.  Nearly  all  of  them  had 
reference  to  the  movement  upon  Tampico,  or  a  de 
tached  expedition  to  Vera  Cruz,  the  organization 
of  which  at  Washington  was  the  subject  of  Gen 
eral  Taylor's  animadversion.  General  Taylor's 
letters  in  the  following  months  were  in  explana 
tion  of  his  movements,  and  in  deprecation  of  the 
interference  with  his  command,  which  was  in  some 
degree  continued.  The  different '  papers  will  be 
noticed  in  other  places,  and  in  their  order* 

But,  before  the  receipt  of  General  Taylor's  dis 
patch  of  October  15th,  important  changes  had  been 
made  at  Washington,  and  General  Scott  had  been 
ordered  to  the  field.  In  consequence,  the  views  of 
none  of  the  correspondents  were  carried  out  in  full, 
and  the  papers  are  in  themselves  more  interesting, 
as  showing  the  opinions  of  the  different  authorities 
upon  military  operations,  and  in  regard  to  each 
other,  than  as  having  any  positive  effect  upon  the 
movements  of  the  war.  They  are,  besides,  demon 
strative  of  the  difficulties  which  attend  the  prosecu 
tion  of  military  operations  by  the  authorities  of  any 
nation,  when  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  art 
are  disregarded  by  either  government  or  generals. 


The  reasons  for  the  action  of  the  authorities  at 
Washington,  which  caused  the  main  object  of  the 
war  to  be  neglected,  while  attention  was  given  to 
partial  operations,  and  the  latest  of  these  in  con 
ception  to  be  ordered  independent  of  the  general 


320  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

commanding  in  the  field,  have  been  noticed  from 
time  to  time.  They  are  to  be  attributed  to  the  ar 
dent  desire  for  the  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war, 
and  the  want  of  concert  with  General  Taylor,  and 
to  the  views  set  forth  in  the  letters  of  that  officer. 
However  much  energy  of  thought  or  talent  was 
displayed  in  the  plans,  and  in  the  celerity  with 
which  they  were  proposed  as  fast  as  they  were  ob 
jected  to,  and  laid  aside  on  account  of  the  want  of 
coincidence  in  General  Taylor's  views,  yet  the  at 
tempt  to  direct  detailed  operations  from  a  distance 
of  over  one  thousand  miles  could  have  been  suc 
cessful  under  hardly  any  circumstances,  and  the 
result  proved  it.  The  absence  of  ulterior  object  in 
the  views  -of  military  operations  presented  by  Gen 
eral  Taylor  prior  to  the  capture  of  Monterey,  is 
fully  apparent  in  the  extracts  from  his  correspond 
ence  which  have  been  quoted.  But,  at  the  time  of 
writing  his  letter  of  October  15th,  he  had  been  suc 
cessful  in  the  operations  which  he  had  previously 
undertaken;  he  had  conquered  the  Mexican  army 
in  strong  defensive  positions,  in  force  one  half 
greater  than  his  own,  in  a  manner  which,  inas 
much,  as  the  struggle  had  been  severe,  and  the 
bravery  of  his  troops  had  been  conspicuously  dis 
played,  had  reflected  glory  on  the  American  arms, 
and  to  a  degree  enhanced  his  reputation  as  a  mili 
tary  commander ;  he  had  enjoyed  time  for  observa 
tion,  and  in  that  letter  was  presented  the  first  def 
inite  recommendation  of  future  policy. 

The  considerations  of  the  length  of  the  route  to 


THE  WAR  WITH   MEXICO.  32! 

San  Luis  de  Potosi,  stated  in  that  letter,  had  been 
in  great  part  known,  and  in  a  degree  considered, 
before  the  march  on  Monterey.  And  if  the  topog 
raphy  of  the  country  and  the  length  of  the  route 
were  to  be  reasons  for  abandoning  the  project  of 
moving  upon  Mexico  by  that  route,  why  were  they 
not  considered  at  an  earlier  date  ?  The  other  con 
sideration  presented  was  the  small  amount  of  force 
which  General  Taylor  had  at  his  disposal.  Al 
though  in  his  previous  letters  he  had  stated  that  it 
would  be  sufficient,^  October  15th  it  was  deemed 
to  be  too  small  by  half,  inasmuch  as  he  was  in  pos 
session  of  information  that  General  Santa  Anna 
was  concentrating  a  force  at  San  Luis,  Unless 
General  Taylor  had  based  his  military  plans  upon 
anticipated  results  of  doubtful  diplomatic  action, 
and  believed  that,  in  consequence  of  Santa  Anna's 
return  to  Mexico,  of  which  he  had  been  informed, 
his  advance  would  be  entirely  unopposed,  it  is  dif 
ficult  to  see  any  reason  for  the  difference  in  the 
views  which  he  expressed  on  the  1st  of  August  and 
on  the  15th  of  October.  Whoever  exercised  the 
chief  Mexican  authority,  it  might  have  been  ex 
pected,  so  long  as  the  war,  continued,  that  a  force 
would  be  concentrated  at  San  Luis.  But,  what 
ever  reasons  may  have  been  found  in  the  latter 
consideration  for  halting  near  Monterey,  much 

*  "  If  a  column  (say  10,000  men)  can  be  sustained  in  provisions  at  Saltillo, 
it  may  advance  thence  upon  San  Luis  de  Potosi,  and,  I  doubt  not,  would 
speedily  bring  proposals  for  peace." — General  Taylor  to  the  President.  Ex- 
eoutive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thir 
tieth  Congress,  p.  337. 

I.— X 


322  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

more  cogent  had  been  presented  in  the  length  of 
the  route  and  the  difficulties  of  the  country ;  and 
when  the  subject  was  resumed  on  the  15th  of  Oc 
tober,  with  but  little  additional  information,  ex- 
cept  that  derived  from  experience  at  Monterey, 
General  Taylor  recommended  the  abandonment 
of  the  idea  of  moving  on  the  capital  of  Mexico 
from  the  northern  base  of  operations. 

The  requisite  conditions  necessary  for  the  move 
ment  by  Vera  Cruz,  proposed  by  him,  rendered  such 
an  expedition  impracticable  at  the  time .  Ten  thou 
sand  regulars  were  stated  to  be  requisite.  The  Uni 
ted  States  hardly  had  that  number  in  service,  and 
General  Taylor  had  then  no  intention  of  dispensing 
with  any  large  body  of  that  description  of  force 
from  his  own  command. 

The  recommendation  which  he  made  of  taking 
up  a  defensive  line  was  considered  by  many  distin 
guished  men  as  having  merit.  If  it  were  intended 
to  appropriate  the  soil  of  the  country  between  the 
Rio  Grande  and  the  Sierra  Madre,  and  hold  it  as 
the  property  of  the  United  States  until  increased 
population  should  render  it  valuable,  it  would  then 
have  been  a  question  how  large  an  amount  of  force 
should  have  been  employed  for  the  purpose.  r 

If  it  were  intended  that  the  army  should  retire  to 
the  Rio  Grande,  it  would  have  been  as  well  to  have 
published  to  Mexico  and  to  the  world  that,  notwith 
standing  American  preparations  and  the  bravery  of 
American  soldiers,  the  United  States  gave  up  the 
contest,  and  were  confessedly  unable  to  carry  on  a 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  323 

foreign  war.  It  would  have  been  a  retreat  without 
military  cause  and  without  honor,  and  the  com 
parison  between  the  preparations  and  the  action 
of  the  American  government  would  have  been  a 
lasting  subject  for  the  ridicule  of  other  nations. 

If  by  holding  a  defensive  line  it  were  expected 
to  force  Mexico  to  make  peace,  a  slight  reference 
to  her  action  in  regard  to  Texas  might  have  shown 
how  fallacious  was  the  anticipation.  And  if  the 
line  of  the  Sierra  Madre  were  taken,  the  question 
arose,  In  what  manner  would  the  occupation  injure 
the  resources  of  the  central  government  ?  Certain 
ly  they  could  not  have  been  effected  by  the  occu 
pation  of  the  line  of  the  Rio  Grande.  At  the  time 
of  making  the  recommendation,  General  Taylor 
knew  that  the  Mexican  general-in-chief  had  order 
ed  the  complete  abandonment  of  the  country ;  for 
he  stated  that,  on  the  date  of  his  letter,  the  last  de 
tachment  of  Ampudia's  force  was  to  leave  Saltil- 
lo.^  If  the  Mexican  general  thought  no  exertion 
necessary  to  defend  the  country,  he  could  hardly 
have  deemed  it  valuable.  If  he  could  have  collect 
ed  any  resources  from  it,  wherefore  did  he  abandon 
it  six  weeks  before  the  termination  of  the  armistice, 
until  which  time  he  was  at  liberty  to  hold  undis 
turbed  possession  of  a  great  portion  ? 

The  next  question  for  consideration  was  whether 
the  occupation  of  the  country  was  a  benefit  to  the 
United  States  in  a  military  point  of  view.  If  it 

*  Official  Correspondence.     Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Rep 
resentatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  351. 


324  THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO. 

were  of  none  to  Mexico,  it  would  have  been  fair  to 
suppose  that  it  would  be  of  none  to  them,  and,  as 
if  to  furnish  a  conclusive  argument  against  his  own 
recommendation,  eleven  days  after  it  was  made, 
General  Taylor  wrote  that  this  same  country  was 
"poor"*  and  that  it  was  impracticable  to  obtain 
any  subsistence  or  material  without  purchasing  at 
the  prices  of  the  country. 

The  dispatch  of  the  Secretary  of  War  of  October 
13th  having  been  received,  which  ordered  the  term 
ination  of  the  armistice,  the  execution  of  the  scheme 
of  taking  up  a  defensive  line  was  nevertheless  com 
menced.  On  the  6th  of  November  an  officer  was 
dispatched  to  Saltillo  with  a  note  addressed  to  Gen 
eral  Santa  Anna,  then  at  San  Luis  de  Potosi,  inform 
ing  him  that,  by  the  order  of  the  United  States  gov 
ernment,  the  armistice  would  be  at  an  end  on  the 
13th  of  the  month.  In  the  mean  time,  preparations 
were  made  for  throwing  forward  a  corps  to  Saltillo, 
which  it  had  been  intended  should  march  from 
Monterey  on  the  12th.  But,  having  learned  that  a 
bearer  of  dispatches  was  on  the  way  to  his  head 
quarters,  General  Taylor  postponed  the  movement 
for  a  day,  and  received  a  communication  from  the 
'Secretary  of  War,  dated  October  22d.f 

It  related  to  an  expedition  against  Vera  Cruz, 
and  made  known  the  intention  of  the  President 
to  send  a  force  of  four  thousand  men  to  that  place, 

*  Official  Correspondence.     Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Rep 
resentatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  354. 
t  Idem.     Idem,  p.  375. 


THE   WAR   WITH  MEXICO. 


325 


which  was  deemed  to  be  sufficient  for  success, 
with  the  co-operation,  of  the  navy,  provided  the 
expedition  could  he  kept  secret  until  the  descent 
was  made.  It  was  helieved  that  of  the  four  thou 
sand  troops,  fifteen  hundred  or  two  thousand  ought 
to  be  regulars,  and  these  were  to  be  drawn  from 
General  Taylor's  command. 

The  other  portions  of  the  letter  were  extensive, 
but  related  to  matters  which  were  either  unim 
portant  in  themselves  or  had  been  in  a  measure 
settled  at  a  previous  period,  either  by  the  force  of 
circumstances  or  the  action  of  the  general.  In  re 
gard  to  the  Yera  Cruz  expedition,  views  and  in 
tentions  were  given  in  detail  and  extent,  arid  it 
was  intended  that  the  expedition  should  be  an 
nounced  as  destined  for  Tampico.^  Events,  how 
ever,  prevented  the  adoption  of  this  plan.  In  re 
ply  to  the  letter,  General  Taylor  wrote  on  the  12th 
of  November,  and  with  reason,  that  the  force  pro 
posed  to  be  sent  was  in  his  opinion  entirely  too 
small  for  the  object.  Ten  thousand  men  he  con 
ceived  to  be  the  minimum  with  wjiich  to  invest 
and  hold  Vera  Cruz,  .with  a  view  to  holding  the 
position.  At  this  time,  having  settled  his  plans 
for  occupying  a  line,  he  believed  that,  after  com 
pleting  his  dispositions,  he  could  spare  four  thou 
sand  troops,  of  which  three  thousand  might  be 
regulars,  from  his  force.  He  proposed  to  make  the 
movement  upon  Tampico  after  securing  the  posi- 

*  Official  Correspondence.     Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Rep 
resentatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  363-366. 


326  THE    WAR, WITH    MEXICO. 

tions  immediately  in  advance  of  Monterey,  by  the 
route  through  the  interior  of  the  country,  and  it 
was  believed  that  no  delay  would  be  produced  by 
it  if  his  views  were  adopted.^  But  his  views  were 
not  adopted,  more  than  were  the  plans  proposed  in 
the  secretary's  letter  fulfilled. 

On  the  13th  of  November  General  Taylor  march 
ed,  with  two  squadrons  of  dragoons  and  General 
Worth's  command  (Duncan's  battery,  artillery  bat 
talion,  and  fifth  and  eighth  regiments  of  infantry), 
for  Saltillo.  While  en  route,  he  received  General 
Santa  Anna's  answer  to  the  communication  which 
he  had  addressed,  announcing  the  termination  of 
'the  armistice.  Its  remarkable  point  was  that  which 
replied  to  the  hope  which  General  Taylor  had  ex 
pressed  of  a  speedy  restoration  of  peace,  and  he 
was  informed  that  he  "ought  to  discard  all  ideas 
of  peace  while  a  single  North  American  treads,  in 
arms,  the  territory  of  this  republic,  or  while  hostile 
squadrons  remain  in  front  of  her  ports."  This  avow 
al  of  the  policy  and  determination  of  his  govern 
ment  was,  however,  closed  by  General  Santa  An 
na,  as  it  usually  had  been  in  other  cases,  by  shift 
ing  the  responsibility  upon  the  extraordinary  Mex 
ican  Congress  which  was  to  meet  on  the  6th  of 
December.! 

On  the  morning  of  the  16th,  as  the  column  ap 
proached  Saltillo,  and  within  a  few  miles  of  the 

*  Official  Correspondence.     Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Rep 
resentatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  375. 
t  General  Santa  Anna  to  General  Taylor.     Idem,  p.  438. 


THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO.  327 

town,  a  messenger  placed  a  protest  against  the  occu 
pation  of  the  State  of  Coahuila  in  the  hands  of  Gen 
eral  Taylor.  It  was  signed  by  the  governor,  who 
had  been  elected  on  the  previous  day,  and  had  but 
time  to  perform  this  one  official  act.  He  stated 
that  his  intentions  were  good  for  resistance,  but, 
inasmuch  as  he  possessed  no  means  of  supporting 
them  in  arms,  he  had  fled  early  in  the  morning, 
leaving  behind  him  this  exponent  of  his  ill  tem 
per.^  No  attention  was  paid  to  the  protest,  and 
Worth's  troops  at  once  occupied  the  city. 

Having  made  arrangements  for  subsistence,  and, 
from  Saltillo,  issued  the  order  for  General  Wool  to 
take  post  at  Parras,  Taylor  returned  to  Monterey 
to  complete  his  arrangements  for  taking  up  his  de 
fensive  line. 

About  this  time  possession  of  TampTco,  which 
was  to  have  been  one  of  the  objects  of  his  movement, 
had  been  gained.  The  dispatch  of  the  Secretary  of 
War  of  September  2d,  and  which  had  been  inter 
cepted  by  the  Mexicans,  had  announced  to  Santa 
Anna  that  Tampico  was  about  to  become  a  point  of 
attack.  In  the  pursuit  of  his  policy,  he  ordered  its 
abandonment ;  and,  having  destroyed  and  secreted 
the  guns  and  public  stores  in  the  place,  the  garri 
son  retreated  beyond  the  mountains.  In  the  mean 
time,  Commodore  Connor,  at  Anton  Lizardo,  had 
been  preparing  to  attack  the  place  with  his  flotilla. 

*  General  Taylor  to  the  Adjutant  General.  Jose  Maria  d'Aguirre  to  Gen 
eral  Taylor.  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first 
Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  377,  378. 


328  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

It  arrived  off  the  bar  of  the  Panuco  on  the  14th, 
arid  on  the  following  morning  entered  the  river  in 
safety.  Qn  approaching  the  town,  a  deputation 
from  the  Ayuntamiento  came  on  hoard  with  pro 
posals  for  its  surrender.'*  The  town  was  at  once 
occupied,  and  the  news  having  been  communicated 
to  General  Patterson,  then  at  Camargo,  employed 
in  preparing  for  the  expedition,  under  the  direc 
tions  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  that  officer  immedi 
ately  dispatched  six  companies  of  artillery,  under 
Lieutenant-xolonel  Belton,  to  hold  it.  These  were 
quickly  followed  by  a  regiment  of  Alabama  volun 
teers,  and  Patterson  soon  after  ordered  the  Illinois 
brigade,  then  at  Matamoras,  to  take  transpdrt  for 
Tampico,  intending  to  proceed  thither  in  person, 
and  assume  the  command.! 

His  movements  were,  however,  soon  checked, 
for  Taylor,  having  received  information  of  his  in 
tentions,  at  once'  sent  counter  orders,  as  far  as  re 
lated  to  the  Illinois  brigade  and  himself.  The 
movement  of  the  six  companies  of  artillery  was  ap 
proved,  and  that  of  the  Alabama  regiment  was  per 
mitted.  With  a  rebuke  for  his  unauthorized  ac 
tion  to  so  full  an  extent,  Patterson  was  ordered  to 
march,  with  a  regiment  of  Tennessee  horse  and  the 
Illinois  brigade,  from  Matamoras,  to  join  General 

*  Commodore  Connor  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy.  Executive  Docu 
ment,  No.  ,1,  House  of  Representatives,  second  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Con 
gress,  p.  1172. 

t  Official  Correspondence.  General  Patterson  and  Major  Bliss.  Execu 
tive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirti 
eth  Congress,  p.  383-385. 


•fl 


THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO.  .329 

Taylor  at  Victoria,  whither  he  was  about  to  pro 
ceed  from  Monterey.^  The  arrangements  for  that 
movement  had  been  completed  before  General  Tay 
lor  had  learned- of  the  occupation  of  Tampico,  but 
that  occasioned  little  modification  of  his  plans. 

On  the  8th  of  December  he  -wrote  to  the  adju 
tant  general  that  in  a  few  days  he  expected  to 
leave  for  Victoria,  and  proceeded  to  give  at  length 
the  dispositions  which  he  had  made,  and  whiqh  he 
contemplated,  for  the  occupation  and  defense  of 
the  line.  These  were,  in  general,  to  stretch  his 
forces  from  Parras  to  Tampico,  a  line  of  over  six 
hundred  miles,  occupying  Saltillo  and  Victoria  as 
intermediate  positions,  and  keeping  a  reserve  at 
Monterey.  He  proposed  to  continue  the  use  of  the 
Rio  Grande  as  the  channel  of  communication  and 
supply  for  the  western  portion  of  his  line,  but  to 
establish  a  depot  at  Soto  la  Marina  whence  to 
supply  Victoria.  After  having  distributed  his  for 
ces  along  the  cordon,  and  placed  any  surplus  which 
he  might  have  in  position  to  receive  the  orders  of 
the  government,  and  completed  his  examination 
of  the  passes  of  the  mountains,  he  intended,  unless 
otherwise  instructed,  to  return  with  a  portion  of 
the  regular  troops,  and  establish  his  head-quarters 
in  advance  of  Saltillo,  ^hich,  he  wrote,  "  after  all, 
I  consider  to  be,  our  most  important  point." 

This  disposition  had  many  disadvantages  in  a 

*  Official  Correspondence.  General  Patterson  and  Major  Bliss.  Execu 
tive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirti 
eth  Congress,  p.  383-385. 


330  THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO. 

strictly  military  point  of  view,  which  did  not  alto 
gether  escape  the  notice  of  General  Taylor.  In 
his  letter  of  the  8th,  he  wrote  concerning  them  in 
the  following  language : 

"It  will  be  seen  at  once  that  San  Luis  Potosi  is 
a  position  almost  equally  distant  from  the  points 
of  this  line. '  This  would  give  a  force  at  San  Luis 
a  very  great  advantage  over  us,  were  it  not  for  the 
nature  of  the  country  and  the  communications ; 
the  region  between  San  Luis  and  the  mountains 
being  scantily  supplied  with  water  and  subsistence, 
and  the  road  by  Saltillo  and  Monterey  being  the 
only  practicable  route  for  artillery  across  the  mount 
ains.  Without  artillery,  the  Mexican  troops  are 
not  at  all  formidable,  and  I  think  have  but  little 
confidence  in  themselves.  I  therefore  consider  the 
positions  of  Saltillo  and  Parras  as  of  prime  import 
ance.  With  an  intermediate  post  at  Patos,  and  the 
means,  by  a  good  road,  of  rapidly  uniting,  if  neces 
sary,  I  deem  the  columns  of  Brigadiers  General 
Wool  and  Worth  quite  equal  to  hold  that  flank  of 
the  line."  *  *  * 

•%%•%"  Tampico  is  now  garrisoned  by  eight 
strong  companies  of  artillery  and  the  Alabama  re 
giment  of  volunteers,  say  1000  effectives.  I  con 
sider  this  force  quite  sufficient  to  hold  the  place, 
controlling,  as  we  do,  the  harbor.  Between  Tam 
pico  and  this  place  (Monterey)  Victoria  offers  itself 
as  an  important  position  to  be  held  by  us.  It  is 
the  capital  of  the  State  of  Tarnaulipas  ;  it  is  situat 
ed  at  the  debouchee  of  the  pass  of  the  mountains, 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


331 


arid  it  has  a  post,  Soto  la  Marina,  where  we  shall 
probably  be  able  to  establish  a  convenient  depot. 
It  also  threatens  the  flank  of  the  Mexican  army, 
should  it  advance  from  San  Luis.  These  consid 
erations  attracted  my  attention  to  Victoria  before 
the  surrender  of  Tampico ;  but  I  now  deem  it  more 
than  ever  important,  for  I  have  every  reason  to 
believe  that  a  corps  of  observation  is  in  that  quar 
ter,  under  the  orders  of  General  Urrea,  having  its 
head-quarters,  perhaps,  at  Tula,  and  sending  for 
ward  advanced  parties  as  far  as  Victoria.  I  have 
therefore  changed  nothing  in  my  original  purpose 
of  moving  on  Victoria,  believing  it  important  to  oc 
cupy  that  point,  and  knowing  that  any  surplus 
force  would  then  be  in  position  for  the  ulterior  views 
of  the  government,  should  any  further  operations 
on  the  Gulf  coast  be  ordered."^ 

This  disposition,  by  which  the  American  army 
was  stationed  at  points  equidistant  from  San  Luis, 
certainly  gave  a  force  at  that  point  an  advantage, 
unless  it  was  neutralized  by  the  nature  of  the  coun 
try,  and  it  is  questionable  whether  it  was.  Gen 
eral  Taylor  had  said,  on  the  15th  of  October,  in  ref 
erence  to  the  dispositions  which  he  was  about  to 
make,  that  it  was  enough  for  his  argument  in  favor 
of  the  views  then  presented  to  know  that  a  heavy 
force  was  collecting  in  his  front.  With  this  in  view, 
as  that  force  certainly  had  not  been  diminished 
during  the  interval,  and  the  declaration  made  on 

*  Official  Correspondence.     Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Rep 
resentatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  379. 


332  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

the  8th  of  Decemher  that  he  considered  Saltillo, 
after  all,  the  most  important  point  of  the  line,  a 
glance  at  the  nature  of  the  country  about  that  point 
and  of  the  dispositions  which  he  had  made  may 
not  he  misplaced.  Worth,  with  a  force  of  1200  men 
and  eight  guns,  for  his  artillery  had  been  increased 
by  Captain  Taylor's  field  battery,  was  located  at 
Saltillo,  and  Wool,  with  near  3000  men  and  six 
guns,  at  Parras,  to  his  southwest.  The  only  com 
munication  between  these  points  which  was  prac 
ticable  for  trains  or  artillery,  led  from  Saltillo  along 
the  road  to  San  Luis  de  Potosi,  as  far  as  the  haci- 
encja  of  La  Encantada,  and  thence  by  the  road  to 
Zacatecas  to  San  Juan  de  la  Vaqueria,  whence 
there  was  a  direct  route  to  Parras.  It  was  one 
day's  march  for  infantry  from  Saltillo  to  La  Encan 
tada,  and  full  four  days  from  that  point  to. Parras. 
For  the  two  corps  to  effect  a  junction  in  case  of 
threatened  attack  by  a  superior  force,  that  junction 
must  have  been  made  at  La  Encantada,  or  Wool 
would  be  obliged  to  pass  it  en  route  to  Saltillo. 
Now  the  whole  country  in  advance  of  La  Encanta 
da,  in  the  direction  of  San  Luis,  was  open  to  the 
enemy,  and  traversed  by  parties  of  his  cavalry.  At 
any  time  he  could  advance  within  one  day's  long 
march  of  that  point  without  the  possibility  of  the 
commander  at  Saltillo  being  informed  of  his  move 
ment,  as  was  afterward  fully  demonstrated.  If  this 
were  the  case  with  reference  to  Saltillo,  it  was  cer 
tainly  so  with  reference  to  Parras,  even  had  there 
been  an  intermediate  post  at  Patos,  a  point  some 


THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO.  333 

distance  from  San  Juan  de  la  Vaqueria.  Where 
fore,  in  case  Santa  Anna  did  choose  to  advance  and 
attempt  to  seize  the  salient  point  of  concentration, 
Worth  would  have  been  obliged  to  move  up  to  La 
Encantada,  and  maintain  himself  at  that  point,  or 
in  advance  of  it,  with  his  small  force  against  the 
Mexican  army  for  at  least  three  days,  or  Wool  was 
cut  off  beyond  the  possibility  of  succor.  >  The  first 
of  these  was  a  hazardous  undertaking,  to,  say  the 
least — if  I  do  not  say  impracticable,  it  is  because  of 
the  remembrance  of  the  deeds  of  American  soldiers. 
The  second  speaks  for  itself;  and  if  Wool  had  been 
able  to  maintain  himself,  it  would  have  been  by 
the  hard  fighting  of  his  troops  and  through  his  own 
efforts,  certainly  not  on  account  of  any  merit  in  the 
general  dispositions.  Monterey,  three  days'  march 
in  rear  of  Saltillo,  was  four  from  La  Encantada, 
wherefore  re-enforcement  could  arrive-  from  that 
point  no  sooner  than  from  Parras. 

It  was  known  by  General  Taylor  that  Gener 
al  Santa  Anna  would  have  many  difficulties  to 
overcome  before  he  could  prepare  an  expedition. 
While,  therefore,  if  he  wished  to  draw  resources 
from  the  country  about  Parras,  it  might  have  been 
safe  to  have  allowed  this  disposition  to  remain  for 
a  short  period,  each  succeeding  day  made  the  situ 
ation  of  the  force  at  either  point  more  precarious. 
He  depended  to  a  degree  upon  the  scarcity  of  wa 
ter  along  the  line  of  his  enemy's  march.  If  this 
were  sufficient  to  check  a  movement,  certainly  Sal 
tillo  was  not  the  most  important  point  in  the  line, 


334  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

As  was  afterward  apparent,  the  whole  nature  of 
that  route  was  not  understood.  But  whatever  re 
sources  it  had  were  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

While  this  state  of  things  existed  along  the 
western  portion  of  the  line,  General  Taylor,  having 
tarried  some  twenty  days  at  Monterey,  a  period  of 
just  ahout  sufficient  length  for  General  Santa  Anna 
to  have  heen  accurately  informed  of  the  disposition, 
and  to  have  prepared  to  take  advantage  of  it,  com 
menced  his  movement  upon  Victoria ;  and  the  pro 
priety  of  that  may  he  remarked  upon. 

If  a  permanent  garrison  were  located  at  Victoria, 
it  -would  have  been  isolated,  for  it  was  at  least 
nine  days'  march  from  Monterey  and  Camargo, 
twelve  from  Matamoras,  and  ten  from  Tampico. 
The  only  object  which  could  have  in  reality  been 
accomplished  by  the  occupation  was  to  cover  the 
passes  in  the  mountains,  which  were  not  practica 
ble  for  artillery,  without  which  it  was  considered 
that  Mexican  troops  were  not  at  all  formidable, 
and  to  secure  the  communications  from  the  Rio 
Grande  to  Monterey  from  the  annoyance  of  parties 
of  Mexican  cavalry  coming  through  the  passes.  To 
have  been  effective,  these  parties  must  have  passed 
unsupported  and  far  from  support  in  close  prox 
imity  to  permanent  American  garrisons  in  any 
case ;  for  it  was  out  of  the  question  to  keep  up  the 
land  communication  between  Monterey  and  Tam 
pico.  Whether,  therefore,  the  advantage  to  be 
gained  by  occupying  Victoria,  and  keeping  open 
communications  with  it  from  any  other  point,  and 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  335 

establishing  a  new  depot  at  Soto  la  Marina,  was 
at  all  commensurate  with  the  trouble  of  the  under 
taking,  even  if  Saltillo  and  Parras  had  been  secure, 
is  very  questionable.  As  for  the  proposed  threat 
on  the  Mexican  flank  should  Santa  Anna  advance, 
it  was  without  reason.  If  the  Mexican  troops 
could  not  pass  the  mountains  with  artillery,  the 
Americans  could  not.  If  the  contingency  had  aris 
en,  and  the  attempt  been  made,  the  small  body 
of  American  troops  would  have  presented  itself 
upon  the  Mexican  line,  close  to  its  base,  having 
first  been  obliged  to  force  the  Tula  pass,  which,  if 
Santa  Anna  had  any  prudence,  would  have  been 
found  guarded.  If  successful,  it  could  have  ac 
complished  nothing ;  for  if  Santa  Anna  beat  the 
American  army  about  Saltillo,  it  was  gone ;  if 
Santa  Anna  was  beaten,  it  was  exposed  to  be  run 
over  in  the  retreat,  unless  it  retired  precipitately 
beyond  the  mountains.  In  either  case,  had  the 
event  happened,  it  Could  have  been  much  better 
employed  with  the  army  near  Saltillo.  The  threat 
of  such  an  impracticability  certainly  could  have 
had  little  effect  in  any  event. 


The  force  with  which  General  Taylor  proposed 
to  move  from  his  head-quarters  at  Monterey  upon 
Victoria  consisted  of  Twiggs's  division  of  regulars, 
increased  by  the  seventh  regiment  of  infantry, 
Quitman's  brigade  of  volunteers,  and  Bragg's  and 
Sherman's  field  batteries.  The  second  regiment  of 


336  THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO. 

United  States  infantry,  and  the  second  Tennessee 
volunteers,  were  prdered  to  march  from  Camargo 
to  join  the  main  column  at  Mo'ntemorelos ;  and  all 
these,  with  Patterson's  command,  composed  the  en 
tire  strength  of  the  force  to  be  concentrated  at  the 
capital  of  Tamaulipas. 

Twiggs.  moved  from  Monterey  on  the  12th,  and 
on  the  13th  Quitman's  brigade  followed.  On  the 
17th  the  advance  reached  Montemorelos,  and  ef 
fected  the  junction  with  the  two  regiments  from 
Camargo.  Taylor  arrived  with  Quitman's  force 
on  the  following  day,  and  intended  to  move  on  the 
19th  with  the  whole  corps  for  Victoria;  but  that 
evening  information  was  received  which  delayed 
the  contemplated  advance  in  force. 

Worth  had  employed  himself  at  Saltillo  in  col 
lecting  subsistence  and  iii  making  reconnaissances 
during  the  interval  between  his  occupation  of  the 
point  and  Taylor's  movement  on  Victoria.  Becom 
ing  acquainted  with  the  country,  he  became  aware 
of  his  situation,  totally  exposed,  with  a  force  of  but 
1200  men  and  eight  guns,  and  he  knew  that  an 
advanced'  corps  of  Mexican  cavalry  was  within 
sixty  miles  of  him.  Under  these  circumstances, 
his  pickets  intercepted  a  courier  bearing  a  com 
munication,  supposed  to  be  from  the  acting  govern 
or  of  Coahuila  to  the  commander  of  the  Mexican 
advance,  in  which  it  was  suggested  that,  could  he 
appear  at  Saltillo  in  the  course  of  a  few  days  after 
the  receipt  of  the  note,  he  would  encounter  but 
900  American  effectives,  and  that  in  his  opera- 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  337 

tions  he  might  count  upon  the  assistance  of  the 
townspeople.  Information  of  this  was  at  once  sent 
to  Wool  at  Parras,  and  to  Butler  at  Monterey. 

Wool,  who  had  heen  marching  from  Port  Lava- 
ca  to  Parras  in  search  of  a  battle,  and  who,  in  his 
desire  of  adventure  and  fame,  had  only  wished  to 
abandon  the  Chihuahua  expedition  in  order  to 
penetrate  with  his  single  corps  still  further  south 
in  direction  of  Durango  and  Zacatecas,^  hailed  the 
news  as  the  harbinger  of  glory  to  be  acquired,  as 
he  was  senior  to  Worth.  He  at  once  broke  up  his 
camp  at  Parras,  and  marched  with  the  greatest 
celerity  toward  Saltillo,  pushing  his  artillery  and 
cavalry  at  the  rate  of  forty  miles  a  day.  Butler, 
too,  of  whose  information  Wool  knew  nothing,  hav 
ing  ordered  forward  two  regiments  of  volunteers 
from  Monterey,  and  having  sent  the  information 
to  General  Taylor,  started  in  person  for  the  ex 
pected  scene  of  action. 

General  Taylor,  also  wishing  to  be  in  at  the  bat 
tle,  turned  back  at  once  from  Montemorelos  with 
Twiggs's  division.  On  the  29th  he  arrived  in  per 
son  at  Monterey,  and  started  for  Saltillo  on  the 
following  morning.  Having  proceeded  a  few  miles 
on  his  route,  he  met  a  messenger  with  the  intelli 
gence  that  the  stampede  was  over,  that  Wool  and 
Butler  were  close  to  Saltillo,  and  believing  that 
the  force  then  about  that  point  was  quite  sufficient 
for  security,  he  again  countermarched  Twiggs's  di 
vision,  and  returned  upon  the  Victoria  expedition. 

*  Appendix  to  Capt.  Carleton's  History  of  the  Battle  of  Buena  Vista,  p.  174. 

L— Y 


338  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

The  alarm  had  had  the  beneficial  effect  of  break 
ing  up  the  false  disposition  of  the  troops  about  the 
right  flank  of  the  proposed  line,  and,  if  it  had  been 
got  up  for  that  very  purpose,  would  have  been  a 
good  stroke  of  policy.  The  hurried  movements,  the 
vexations  and  annoyances  which  were  its  conse 
quences,  might  have  demonstrated  some  of  the  in 
conveniences,  if  not  the  dangers,  of  the  contem 
plated  defense  of  the  line,  by  detached  garrisons,  at 
great  distances. 

Meanwhile  Wool  had  come  down  toward  the 
valley  of  La  Encantada,  where  he  arrived  on  the 
21st.  Hearing  that  Butler  was  at  Saltillo,  he  at 
once  turned  to  the  soutlr  and  encamped  at  Agua 
Nueva,  but  he  did  not  by  this  maneuver  escape  from 
Butler's  command.  While  he  was  at  Agua  Nueva 
another  alarm  arose,  and  on  the  morning  of  the 
25th  he  sent  information  to  Butler  that  it  was  re 
ported  that  Santa  Anna's  advance  of  ten  thousand 
cavalry  was  in  sight  beyond  the  pass  in  his  front, 
that  a  large  force  of  infantry  was  within  supporting 
distance,  and  that  an  attack  might  be  expected  on 
that  day  or  the  following  morning.  This  informa 
tion  threw  the  garrison  of  Saltillo  into  immediate 
activity,  and  a  field  of  battle  on  the  plains  south  of 
and  above  the  town  was  selected,  to  which  Wool 
was  ordered  to  fall  back.  But  it  was  soon  ascer 
tained  that  the  rumor  had  its  origin  in  the  move 
ment  of  the  regiment  of  Arkansas  cavalry,  which 
had  been  sent  out  from  Agua  Nueva,  and  had  rais 
ed  such  a  cloud  of  dust  that  some  frightened  em- 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  339 

ployees  of  the  subsistence  department  had  mistaken 
it  for  the  reported  Mexican  advance,  and  the  alarm 
was  over. 

Soon  after  Wool  was  ordered  to  fall  back  to  a 
position  nearer  Saltijlo,  and  to  break  up  his  large 
train  for  the  use  of  the  main  army.  In  obedience 
to  the  first,  he  chose  his  encampment  at  a  point 
near  the  hacienda  of  San  Juan  de  la  Buena  Vista, 
on  account  of  its  advantages,  it  being  in  rear  and 
in  close  vicinity  of  a  strong  position  for  defense.^ 
He  was  then  within  four  miles  of  Saltillo,  which 
was  considered  too  near,  and  on  the  following  day 
he  was  ordered  to  advance  again  to  the  position 
of  La  Encantada. 

The  movement  to  Victoria  was  accomplished. 
On  the  29th  of  December,  Quitman,  who  had  con 
tinued  the  march  when  Taylor  countermarched  at 
Montemorelos,  occupied  the  town  without  resist 
ance,  as  Urrea's  cavalry  corps  fell  back  on  Tula 
upon  his  approach.  General  Taylor  arrived  with 
Twiggs's  division  on  the  4th  of  January,  and  Patter 
son  joined  on  the  same  day.  The  expedition  had 
been  made  throughout  without  any  encounter  with 
the  enemy,  except  that  of  a  detachment  of  dragoons, 
under  Lieutenant-colonel  May,  which  had  its  rear 
guard  and  baggage  cut  off  by  a  mob  of  peons,  while 
engaged  in  examining  the  mountain  passes.  The 
whole  force  concentrated  at  Victoria  was  of  over 
five  thousand  men.  But  nothing  had  been  accom 
plished  except  the  concentration,  and  it  was  not 

*  Appendix  to  Capt.  Carleton's  History  of  the  Battle  of  Buena  Vista,  p.  178. 


340  THE    WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

long  before  "  the  state  of  supplies"^  rendered  a 
movement  from  the  newly-occupied  town  neces 
sary. 

By  this  time,  however,  General  Taylor  had 
learned  that  General  Scott  was  in  the  country,  and 
he  proposed  waiting  his  instructions. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

General  Scott  proceeds  to  the  Theater  of  War — Expedition  against  Vera  Cruz 
— Official  Correspondence — Withdrawal  of  Troops  from  the  Northern  Line 
of  Operations — Observations. 

IN  the  month  of  November  Major-general  Scott 
sailed  for  Brazos  San  Jago,  for  the  purpose  of  su 
perintending  the  organization  and  embarkation  of 
the  forces  which  were  to  compose  the  strength  of 
the  expedition  against  Vera  Cruz,  which  he  was 
to  command..  Prior  to  his  departure  from  Wash 
ington,  the  President  had  made  (under  the  provis 
ions  of  the  act  of  May  13,  1846)  requisitions  for 
nine  new  regiments  of  volunteers,  including  one 
of  Texas  horse.  The  particular  arrangements  and 
preparations  of  the  expedition  belong  to  another 
portion  of  this  work,  and  will  only  be  spoken  of  in 

*  "  But,  owing  to  the  state  of  supplies,  it  became  necessary  to  move  the 
command,  and  a  movement  was  accordingly  ordered  in  the  direction  of  Tarn- 
pico." — General  Taylor  to  Lieutenant  Scott,  A.  D.  C.,  Victoria,  July  I5tk, 
1847.  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session 
of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  861. 


THE    WAR   WITH,MEXICO.     , 

this  place  so  far  as  they  affected  the  disposition  of 
forces  and  the  operations  on  the  northern  line. 

In  a  letter  to  General  Taylor,  written  at  New 
York  on  the  25th  of  November,  General  Scott  in 
formed  that  officer  of  his  approach,  and  of  the  ne 
cessity  of  drawing  from  his  command  large  bodies 
of  troops,  which  would  reduce  him  to  the  necessity 
of  acting  on  the  defensive.^  On  the  20th  of  De 
cember  he  again  wrote,  from  New  Orleans,  at 
greater  length,  upon  the  subject  of  the  proposed 
expedition ;  and,  although  his  letter  failed  of  effect, 
as  it  miscarried,  it  is  yet  interesting  in  those  para 
graphs  which  set  forth  the  views  which  the  gener- 
al-in-chief  then  entertained.  They  are,  in  greater 
part,  the  following : 

"The  particular  expedition  I  am  to  conduct  is 
destined  against  Vera  Cruz,  and,  through  it,  the 
castle  of  San  Juan  d'Ulloa,  so  as  to  open,  if  we  are 
successful,  a  new  and  shorter  line  of  operations 
upon  the  capital  of  Mexico." 

"The  first  great  difficulty  is  to  get  together  in 
time,  and  afloat,  off  the  Brazos,  a  sufficient  force  to 
give  us  a  reasonable  prospect  of  success  before  the 
usual  period,  say  the  end  of  March,  for  the  return  of 
the  black  vomit  on  the  coast  of  Mexico."  *  ^  # 

*  *  •%  "To  make  up  the  force  for  the  new  ex 
pedition,  I  foresee  that  I  shall,  as  I  intimated  in 
my  letter,  of  which  I  inclose  a  copy,  be  obliged  to 

*  General  Scott  to  General  Taylor,  November  25th,  1846.  Executive  Doc 
ument,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Con 
gress,  p.  373. 


342  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

reduce  you  to  the  defensive  at  the  moment  when 
it  would  he  of  the  greatest  importance  to  the  suc 
cess  of  my  expedition  that  you  should  he  in  strength 
to  maneuver  offensively  in  the  direction  of  San  Luis 
Potosi,"  &c.  *'*  * 

#  #  #  "Including  the  regulars  and  volunteers 
at  Tampico,  or  on  their  way  thither,  I  may  now 
say  that  I  shall  want  from  you,  say  Worth's  divis 
ion  of  regulars,  made  up  to  4000  men;  two  field 
hatteries,  say  Duncan's  and  Taylor's,  and  500  reg 
ular  cavalry,  hesides  500  volunteer  cavalry,  and  as 
many  volunteer  foot  as  you  can  possibly  spare, 
leaving  you  a  sufficient  force  to  defend  Monterey 
and  maintain  your  communications  with  Camar- 
go,  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande,  and  Point  Isabel. 
The  whole  of  this  force  will  be  needed  at  the  lat 
ter  points  by  the  middle  of  January."^ 

Upon  arriving  at  Brazos  San  Jago,  General  Scott 
heard  of  the  rumor  of  a  menaced  attack  upon  Sal- 
tillo,  and  of  General  Taylor's  return  to  Monterey. 
In  consequence,  he  proceeded  up  the  Rio  Grande 
to  Camargo,  with  the  intention  of  joining  the  army, 
should  the  rumored  advance  of  Santa  Anna  be  true, 
and,  in  any  event,  to  be  within  easy  communicat 
ing  distance.!  Before  he  arrived  at  Camargo,  he 
learned  that  the  alarm. had  been  false,  and  that 
General  Taylor  had  returned  to  Victoria.  He  there 
fore  addressed  a  communication  to  General  Butler, 

*  General  Scott  to  General  Taylor,  November  25th,  1846.     Executive  Doc 
ument,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Con 
gress,  p.  839.  t  General  Scott  to  Mr.  Marcy.     Idem,  p.  844. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  343 

the  second  in  command,  on  the  3d  of  January,  in 
which  he  stated  his  intention  of \embarking  troops 
from  Tampico  and  Brazos  San  Jagb  for  Vera  Cruz, 
explained  his  object,  and  communicated  his  esti 
mates  and  orders  as  follows : 

"Of  the  number  of  troops  at  Tampico,  and  as 
sembled  at  or  in  march  for  Victoria— regulars  and 
volunteers — I  can  form  only  a  very  imperfect  esti 
mate,  having  seen  ho  returns  of  a  late  date.  My 
information  as  to  the  forces  at  Saltillo,  Monterey, 
&c.,  &c.,  is  not  much  better.  I  estimate,  howev 
er,  the  whole  force  now  under  Major-general  Tay 
lor's  orders  to  be  about  17,000 — seven  of  regulars 
and  ten  of  volunteers.  Two  thousand  regulars  and 
five  of  volunteers  I  suppose — the  whole  standing 
on  the  defensive — to  be  necessary  to  hold  Monte 
rey,  Serralvo,  Camargo,  Reynosa,  Matamoras,  Point 
Isabel,  the  Brazos,  the  mouth  of  the  Rib  Grande, 
and  Tampico.  I  do  not  enumerate  Saltillo  and 
Victoria,  because  I  suppose  they  may  be  abandon 
ed  or  held  without  hurting  or  improving  the  line 
of  defense  I  have  indicated.  I  wish  to  give  no  def 
inite  opinion  as  to  either,  or  as  to  the  other  smaller 
points  mentioned  above,  but  to  leave  them  open  to 
the  consideration  of  Major-general  Taylor,  or,  in 
the  first  instance,  in  his  absence,  to  yourself,  as 
you  are,  no  doubt,  in  possession  of  his  more  recent 
views."  #  #  * 

*  *  *  «  You  will  therefore,  without  waiting  to 
hear  from  Major-general  Taylor,  and  without  the 
least  unnecessary  delay,  in  order  that  they  may 


344 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


be  in  time  as  above,  put  in  movement  for  the  mouth 
of  the  Rio  Grande  the  following  troops  : 

"About  500  regular  cavalry  of  the  first  and 
second  regiments  of  dragoons,  including  Lieutenant 
Kearney's  troop." 

"  About  500  volunteer  cavalry  —  I  rely  upon  you 
to  select  the  best." 

"  Two  field  batteries  of  regular  light  artillery, 
(say)  Duncan's  and  Taylor's,"  and 

"  Four  thousand  regulars  on  foot,  including  ar 
tillery  acting  as  infantry  —  the  whole  under  Brevet 
Brigadier-general  Worth  ;"  *  #.  * 

"In  addition^  put  in  movement  for  the  same 
point  of  embarkation  (the  Brazos),  and  to  be  there 
as  above,  4000  volunteer  infantry." 

"  Deduct  from  the  above  numbers,  of  regulars 
and  volunteers,  as  follows  : 

"  The  troops  at  Victoria  and  at  Tampico,  less 
the  garrison  (say  500)  for  the  latter  place,  and  the 
escort  that  Major-general  Taylor  may  need  back 
to  Monterey  ;  and  also  one  of  the  volunteer  regi 
ments  at  Matamoras,  I  having  ordered  Colonel 
Curtis's  -regiment  to  remain  there,  notwithstand 
ing  the  arrival  of  Colonel  Drake's  to  relieve  him. 
Make  no  other  deductions,  unless  pressed  by  the 
enemy  in  great  force."  *  *  # 

"P.S.  I  expect  to  be  personally  at  Tampico,  to 
superintend  that  part  of  my  expedition  which  is  to 
embark  there,  toward  the  end.  of  this  month." 

"  The  whole  of  the  eight  regiments  of  new  foot 
volunteers  will  be  up  with  the  Brazos,  I  hope,  by 


THE  WAR  WITH  -MEXICO.  345 

that  time.  Major-general  Taylor  may  rely  upon 
threej  if  not  four  of  them,  for  his  immediate  com 
mand,  and  make  your  calculations  now  for  him 
accordingly."^ 

A  copy  of  this  letter  was  sent,  with  one  to  the 
same  effect  directed  immediately  to  General  Taylor, 
to  Victoria,  through  Monterey,  and  on  the  6th  other 
copies  were  sent  to  that  general  from  Matamoras. 

Butler  received  his  dispatches  on  the  8th  at  Sal- 
tillo,  and  at  once  took  steps  for  carrying  the  orders 
into  effect.  Worth's  command,  with  the  addition 
of  five  companies  of  dragoons,  and  three  companies 
of  the  sixth  infantry  from  General  Wool's  column, 
then  at  Agua  Nueva  and  Encantada,  was  put  in 
motion  for  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande.  The  ad 
vance  left  Saltillo  on  the  following  morning,  and 
Worth,  with  the  rear  guard,  on  the  10th.  The 
fourth  regiment  of  infantry  joined  en  route  at 
Monterey,  and,  hy  rapid  movement,  on  the  22d  the 
advanced  corps  had  arrived  at  the  mouth  of  the 
river,  f 

The  dispatches  for  General  Taylor,  being  sent 
through  Butler,  were  carried  to  Saltillo  ;  from 
thence,  on  the  evening  of  their  receipt,  they  were 
sent  by  Lieutenant  Eichey,  with  an  escort  of  ten 
dragoons,  toward  Victoria.  But,  having  passed 
Monterey,  and  arrived  on  the  llth  at  the  small 
town  of  Villa  Gran,  Bichey  separated  himself  from 


*  General  Scott  to  General  Butler.     Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House 
of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  849. 
t  Generals  Butler  and  Worth  to  Scott.     Idem,  p.  858-861. 


346  THE   WAR'  WITH   MEXICO. 

his  escort  and  entered  the  town  for  the  purpose  of 
purchasing  provisions.  He  was  lassoed,  murder 
ed,  his  dispatches  were  seized,  and  at  once  trans 
mitted  to  General  Santa  Anna. 

On  the  14th  General  Taylor  received  those  sent 
by  Matamoras,  and,  having  already  ordered  forward 
Twiggs's  division  in  the  direction  of  Tampico,  on  the 
15th  and  16th.  Patterson's  division  marched  for  the 
same  placet  General  Taylor  returned  to  Monte 
rey  with  May's  squadron  of  dragoons,  Bragg's  and 
Sherman's  field  batteries,  and  the  Mississippi  regi 
ment  of  volunteers.  Victoria  was  abandoned,  and 
the  defensive  position  which  General  Taylor  had 
been  preparing  to  occupy  since  the  capture  of  Mon 
terey  was  restricted  to  the  Hue  from  the  mouth  of 
the  Rio  Grande  to  Monterey  and  Saltillo. 

To  be  deprived  of  so  large  a  number  of  his  troops 
was  a  severe  blow  to  General  Taylor.  Having  re 
ceived  no  other  intimation  of  the  intended  action 
than  that  contained  in  the  letter  of  General  Scott 
from  New  York,  and  as  he  was  left  to  defend  his 
position  with  a  force  so  much  inferior  to  that  which 
he  had  stated  to  be  in  his  opinion  sufficient  for  the 
purpose,  he  was  led  to  believe  that  there  were  mo 
tives  of  a  personal  nature  which  had  influenced 
the  government  and  the  general-in-chief  in  making 
so  complete  a  change  in  his  dispositions.  In  his 
reply  of  the  15th  (directed  to  General  Scott  in  per 
son)  to  the  letters  which  ordered  the  withdrawal 

*  General  Taylor  to  Lieutenant  Scott.     Executive  Document,  No.  60, 
House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  861.    ' 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


347 


of  the  troops  from  his  command,  he  commented 
bitterly  upon  the  action. 

"  Had  you,  general,  relieved  me  at  once  from  the 
whole  command,  and  assigned  me  to  duty  under 
your  order,  or  allowed  me  to  retire  from  the  field, 
he  assured  that  no  complaint  would  have  heen 
heard  from  me ;  hut  while  almost  every  man  of 
the  regular  force,  and  half  the  volunteers  (now  in 
respectable  discipline),  are  withdrawn  for  distant 
service,  it  seems  that  I  am  expected,  with  less 
than  a  thousand  regulars,  and  a  volunteer  force 
partly  of  new  levies,  to  hold  a  defensive  line  while 
a  large  army  of  twenty  thousand  men  is  in  my 
front" 

*  *  *  "  I  can  not  misunderstand  the  object 
of  the  arrangements  indicated  in  your  letters.  I 
feel  that  I  have  lost  the  confidence  of  the  govern 
ment,  or  it  would  not  have  suffered  me  to  remain 
up  to  this  time  ignorant  of  its  intentions,  with  so 
vitally  affecting  interests  committed  to  my  charge. 
But,  however  much  I  may  feel  personally  mortified 
and  outraged  by  the  course  pursued,  unprecedent 
ed,  at  least,  in  our  own  history,  I  will  carry  out  in 
good  faith,  while  I  may  remain  in  Mexico,  the 
views  of  my  government,  though  I  may  be  sacri 
ficed  in  the  effort."* 

General  Scott  replied  on  the  26th  of  January 
from  Brazos  Santiago,  and  in  explanation  of  his 
measures,  and  in  giving  his  views  of  the  proper 

*  General  Taylor  to  General  Scott.     Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House 
of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  863. 


348  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

course  to  be  adopted  for  the  defense  of  the  line, 
wrote  as  follows : 

"  If  I  had  been  within  easy  reach  of  you  at  the 
time  I  called  for  troops  from  your  line  of  operations, 
I  should,  as  I  had  previously  assured  you,  have  con 
sulted  you  fully  on  all  points,  and  probably  might 
have  modified  my  call  both  as  to  number  and 
description  of  the  forces  to  be  taken  from  or  to  be 
left  with  you.  As  it  was,  I  had  to  act  promptly, 
and  to  a  considerable  extent  in  the  dark.  All  this, 
I  think,  will  be  apparent  to  you  when  you  shall 
review  my  letters. 

"  I  hope  I  have  left,  or  shall  leave  you,  including 
the  new  volunteers  who  will  soon  be  up,  a  com 
petent  force  to  defend  the  head  of  your  line  (Mon 
terey),  and  its  communications  with  the  depot  in 
the  neighborhood.  To  enable  you  to  do  this  more 
certainly,  I  must  ask  you  to  abandon  Saltillo,  and 
to  make  no  detachments,  except  for  reconnaissances 
and  immediate  defense,  much  beyond  Monterey. 
I  know  this  to  be  the  wish  of  the  government, 
founded  on  reasons  in  which  I  concur ;  among 
them,  that  the  enemy  intends  to  operate  against 
small  detachments  and  posts."^ 

This  suggestion,  to  retire  from  Saltillo  and  con 
fine  the  defense  to  the  line  from  the  Rio  Grande 
to  Monterey,  had  been  made  at  the  instance  of  the 
Secretary  of  War,  who  had  some  anxiety  in  respect 
to  the  state  in  which  the  northern  line  would  be 

*  General  Scott  to  General  Taylor.     Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House 
of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  864. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  349 

left  by  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  from  it,  and 
had  written  on  the  4th  of  January  to  General  Scott, 
recommending  the  subject  to  his  consideration,  and 
that  care  should  be  taken  to  guard  against  any 
surprise  or  disaster  in  that  quarter.^  But,  having 
dispatched  the  letter,  from  which  the  above  quoted 
extract  is  taken,  to  General  Taylor,  on  the  4th  of 
February  General  Scott  wrote  to  Mr.  Marcy  con 
cerning  the  progress  of  his  preparations,  and  his 
views  of  the  course  which  would  be  pursued  by 
Santa  Anna.  These  were  entirely  at  variance 
with  the  anticipations  of  the  secretary,  as  is  ap 
parent  from  the  course  of  action  recommended  for 
General  Taylor. 

"  It  is  now  believed,  on  the  authority  of  a  letter 
not  official,  that  my  dispatches  to  the  same  gen 
erals,  Taylor  and  Butler  (of  the  3d  ultimo),  being 
sent  off  by  the  latter,  at  Saltillo,  to  the  former,  then 
marching  toward  Victoria,  by  Second  Lieutenant 
Rlchey,  fifth  infantry,  and  ten  mounted  men, 
were  met  by  a  party  of  the  enemy,  and  all  captured 
or  killed.  If  Lieutenant  Eichey  (reported  as  being 
slain)  had  not  time  to  destroy  the  dispatches  about 
his  person,  which  is  highly  improbable,  General 
Santa  Anna,  at  San  Luis  de  Potosi,  had  them,  no 
doubt,  in  four  days  after  their  capture.  It  is  con 
sequently  more  than  possible  that  before  this  time 
the  greater  part  of  the  Mexican  army  lately  assem 
bled  at  San  Luis  de  Potosi  has  reached  Vera  Cruz 

*  Mr.  Marcy  to  General  Scott.     Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of 
Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  389,  391,  and  872. 


350  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

or  its  vicinity.  Major-general  Taylor's  mind  has, 
no  doubt,  ere  this,  arrived  at  the  same  conclusion, 
and  I  shall  write  to  suggest  to  him,  at  his  own  dis 
cretion,  the  advantage  of  maneuvering  offensively 
in  the  direction  of  San  Luis  de  Potosi,  after  being 
partially  re-enforced  with  some  of  the  new  regi 
ments  of  volunteers,.  The  suggestion  would  be  un 
necessary  but  for  j;he  intimations  he  has  received 
to  stand  on  the  defensive.^ 

"  Another  painful  rumor,  generally  credited, 
reached  me  yesterday;  the  capture,  at  Encarna- 
cion,  some  sixty  miles  in  advance,  of  Saltillo,  of 
Majors  Borland  and  Gaines,  and  about  eighty  men 
of  the  Arkansas  and  Kentucky  mounted  volunteers. 
The  private  letter,  from  a  highly  intelligent  officer 
at  Saltillo,  represents  that  not  a  shot  was  fired  by 
either  party." 

The  future  correspondence  of  G-eneral  Scott  has 
no  important  reference  to  the  operations  or  the 
state  of  affairs  in  the  north  of  Mexico,  and,  with 
out  •  any  further  intelligence  from  General  Taylor, 
on  the  15th  of  February  he  sailed  for  Vera  Cruz, 
by  way  of  Tampico  and  Lobos  Island. 

When  General  Taylor  arrived  at  Monterey,  he 
addressed  a  communication  to  the  adjutant  gen 
eral,  in  which  he  complained  of  the  conduct  of  the 
War  Department  in  not  having  at  least  notified 
him  of  the  intended  changes.  The  letter,  which 
bore  date  January  27th,  was  lengthy,  but  referred 

*  General  Scott  to  Mr.  Marcy.  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of 
Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  876. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  35^ 

principally  to  his  personal  relations.  The  only 
paragraph  in  the  whole  which  spoke  of  the  state 
of  aifairs  with  reference  to  present  security,  and 
which  was  important,  as  it  expressed  his  opinion, 
was  that  in  which  he  said,  "  the  force  with  which 
I  am  left  in  this  quarter  will  doubtless  enable  me 
to  hold  the  positions  now  occupied."^  Nor  was 
this  expression  of  opinion  changed  or  modified  in 
the  subsequent  dispatches  of  General  Taylor.  On 
the  30th  he  received  news  of  the  capture  of  the 
scouting  parties  in  advance  of  Saltillo,  and  even 
then  he  experienced  no  apprehension  of  serious  dan 
ger,  f  But  on  the  31st  he  marched  for  that  point 
with  May's  squadron  of  dragoons,  Bragg' s  and  Sher 
man's  hatteries,  and  the  Mississippi  volunteers. 


In  the  sketch  of  the  correspondence,  and  in  the 
extracts  from  official  letters  which  have  been  quot 
ed,  are  contained  the  orders  and  the  expressions  of 
then  existing  opinions  of  Generals  Scott  and  Tay 
lor  with  reference  to  the  change  in  the  dispositions 
of  the  troops  and  the  withdrawal  of  the  greater 
force  from  the  north  of  Mexico.  The  subject  has 
been  much  discussed,  has  been  the  cause  of  much 
personal  ill  feeling,  and  the  action  has  received,  at 
least,  its  due  share  of  public  censure.  General  Tay 
lor's  idea  that  he  was  about  to  be  sacrificed  or  com 
pelled  to  resign  has  been  entertained  by  many  since 

*  General  Taylor  to  the  Adjutant  General.     Executive  Document,  No.  60, 
House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  1102. 
t  Idem.    Idem,  p.  1106,  1110. 


352  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

the  result  of  the  operation  has  been  made  known, 
and  the  conduct  of  General  Scott  and  the  War  De 
partment  has  been  reprobated  without  scruple  by 
many  persons  not  very  capable  of  forming  an  opin 
ion  upon  the  subject,  and  who,  if  General  Taylor 
had  been  sacrificed,  would  hardly  have  considered 
him  a  needless  victim. 

The  policy  of  holding  a  defensive  line,  by  station 
ing  a  large  force,  in  detachments,  along  the  Sierra 
Madre,  has  been  spoken  of,  and  certainly  it  did  not 
meet  the  views  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States.  General  Taylor  considered  an  advance 
upon  San  Luis,  through  Monterey  and  Saltillo, 
nearly,  if  not  quite,  impracticable  ;*  and  although 
General  Jessup  and  others  had  surmised  that  San 
ta  Anna  might  be  led  to  believe  that  an  expedition 
was  on  foot  to  attack  San  Luis  from  Tampicof  (no 
very  great  compliment  to  the  Mexican's  sagacity), 
yet  two  hundred  miles  of  mule  paths,  impractica 
ble  for  artillery,  prevented  such  a  movement.  As 
movement  from  Monterey  or  Tampico  was  imprac 
ticable,  or  required  such  immense  preparation  as  to 
render  it  inexpedient,  and  as  the  alternative  pro 
posed  by  General  Taylor,  of  holding  an  unproduct 
ive  country,  at  great  expense,  until  by  some  freak 
the  Mexican  government  should  make  peace,  met 
with  no  approbation,  it  is  difficult  to  see  what 
course  could  have  been  adopted,  in  reason,  other 

*  General  Taylor  to  the  Adjutant  General,  October  15,  1846.  Executive 
Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth 
Congress,  p.  351-354. 

t  General  Jessup  to  the  Secretary  of  War.    Idem,  p.  568. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


353 


than  to  have  withdrawn  a  large  portion  of  the 
troops,  and  commenced  operations  from  a  new 
base,  whence  a  practicable  route  led  to  the  .capital 
of  Mexico.  As  the  old  line  led  to; nothing,  and  as 
active  operations  might  be  discontinued  upon  it,  at 
least  for  a  time,  the  want  of  troops  induced  the  ne 
cessity  of  reducing  the  force  upon  it  to  that  abso 
lutely  required  for  defense ;  for,  whatever  force 
General  Scott  might  have  required  in  his  first  op 
eration  of  establishing  the  new  base,  it  was  certain 
that  the  masses  could  be  more  advantageously  em 
ployed  in  advancing  upon  the  capital  by  the  short 
er  line  than  in  looking  at  it  from  Monterey,  Victo 
ria,  or  Saltillo. 

In  his  anxiety  concerning  his  own  expedition, 
and  in  his  haste,  General  Scott  made  an  incorrect 
estimate  of  General  Taylor's  strength,  and,  in  num 
bers  and  description  of  force,  drew,  perhaps,  rather 
more  than  was  prudent;  but,  whether  his  action 
was  prudent  or  not,  General  Taylor  stated  a  short 
time  subsequently  that  "  the  force  with  which  he 
was  left  would  doubtlqss  enable  him  to  hold  the 
positions  then  occupied."^  If  it  were  sufficient  for 
that  end,  it  was  sufficient  for  ajl  which  could  have 
been  desired. 

It  was  sufficient  for  every  important  object  which 
General  Taylor  had  in  view,  for  every  point  which 
he  had  taken  possession  of  was  occupied  at  the  time 
of  his  writing  the  opinion,  except  Parras  and  Vic- 

*  General  Taylor  to  the  Adjutant  General.     Executive  Document,  No.  60, 
House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  1102. 

I.— Z 


354  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

toria.  The  alarms  about  Saltillo  had  long  before 
caused  the  evacuation  of  Parras,  and  he  had  acqui 
esced  in  the  evacuation.  And  before  the  receipt 
of  General  Scott's  order,  the  "state  of  supplies"* 
had  compelled  him  to  commence  moving  his  com 
mand  from  Victoria,  if  that  place  were  of  any  im 
portance  to  the  American  occupation,  which  is  very 
questionable. 

It  was  sufficient  for  .all  which  General  Scott  de 
sired,  for  the  forces  in  the  north  of  Mexico  were  in 
secure  position,  and  as  for  the  diversion  on  that 
flank,  which  he  considered  of  "the  greatest  im 
portance,"^  it  followed  as  a  natural  consequence 
of  the  disposition,  as  he  might  have  foreseen,  though 
he  did  not. 

Both  generals  kept  their  views  fixed  upon  their 
own  positions,  with  but  little  reference  to  the  effect 
of  the  failure  or  disasters  which  might  befall  the 
one  upon  the  public  service,  and  neither  the  one 
nor  the  other  made  his  arrangements  with  any 
proper  anticipation  of  the  movements  of  the  enemy. 

"Nothing  is  of  more  consequence  to  a  general 
than  the  gift  of  penetrating  the  designs  of  his  ene- 
mie$r\  If  either  of  the  American  generals  pos 
sessed  this  gift,  they  certainly  failed  to  make  any 
proper  use  of  it  at  this  juncture.  General  Taylor 
never  had  professed  to  be  guided  in  any  great  de 
gree  by  the  proposed  movements  of  Mexican  com- 

*  General  Taylor  to  Lieutenant  Scott.     Executive  Document,  No.  60, 
House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  861. 
t  General  .Scott  to  General  Taylor.     Idem,  p.  839.  \  Folard. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


355 


manders,  and  he  had  paid  but  little  attention  to 
the  strength  of  their  armies  prior  to  the  capture  of 
Monterey,  Information  respecting  the  capacity  of 
the  country  to  support  6000  men  or  more  had  been 
his  .avowed  object  in  marching  upon  that  town. 
After  he  had  occupied  it,  he  announced  as  a  prin 
ciple  of  his  operations,  "  that  the  task  of  beating 
the  enemy  is  among  the  least  difficult  which  we  en 
counter  ,  the  great  question  of  supplies  necessarily 
controls  all  the  operations  in  a  country  like  this"* 
though  twenty-four  days  before  he  had  stated  that 
it  was  sufficient  for  his  argument  in  favor  of  a  de 
fensive  line  "  to  know  that  a  heavy  force  is  assem 
bling  in  our  front"^  With  these  views,  he  had 
taken  possession  of  a  poor  country,  and  scattered  his 
troops  so  as  to  leave  at  Saltillo,  "  the  most  import 
ant  point,"  a  force  much  less  than  that  which  re 
mained  there  even  after  the  withdrawal  of  the 
troops  by  General  Scott.  And,  notwithstanding 
his  subsequent  complaints,  he  expressed  the  opin 
ion  that  he  could  hold  the  points  "at  present  occu 
pied,'^  and  soon  after,  in  reference  to  Santa  Anna's 
movement  in  the  direction  of  Saltillo,  that  he  con 
sidered  it ."  improbable."§ 

General  Scott  did  profess  to  pay  attention  to  the 
position  and  movements  of  the  enemy,  and  when 
he  .learned  the  disclosure  of  his  intentions  to  Santa 

*  General  Taylor  to  the  Adjutant  General,  November  8, 1846.  Executive 
Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth 
Congress,  p.  360.  t  Idem,  October  15,  1846.  Idem,  p.  351. 

t  Idem,  January  27,  1847.    Idem,  p.  1102. 

§  Idem,  February  14,  1847.    Idem,  p.  1113. 


356  THE    WAR   WITH    MEXICO. 

Anna,  he  came  to  an  erroneous  conclusion,  that  the 
Mexican  was  going  to  oppose  him.  Both  com 
manders  were  wrong ;  though,  entertaining  the 
opinions  which  they  did,  if  any  blame  for  desiring 
a  larger  portion  of  the  army  attaches  to  either,  it 
must  in  some  measure  to  General  Taylor ;  for  he 
believed  25,000  men  to  be  necessary  for  an  advance 
on  Mexico  by  way  of  Vera  Cruz  ;#  he  knew  that 
Scott  had  not  half  that  number ;  and  if  Santa 
Anna's  advance  on  Saltillo  was  improbable,  as  he 
said,  what  use  had  he  for  a  greater  force  than  was 
necessary  for  him  to  hold  the  positions  at  present 
occupied,  other  than  to  guard  against  a  doubtful 
contingency,  while  Scott  incurred  the  greater  and 
positive  danger  ? 

There  were  certain  facts  and  circumstances 
which  did  control  Santa  Anna's  action,  and  which 
might  well  have  been  considered  by  the  American 
generals,  although  their  written  conclusions  were 
in  no  way  based  upon  them.  The  Mexicans  are 
the  most  impressionable  people  in  the  world,  un 
less  their  Spanish  progenitors  may  be  considered 
their  equals.  Certainly,  in  that  national  character 
istic,  there  exists  a  strong  resemblance.  The  morale 
of  the  Mexican  army  was  at  the  lowest  degree,  and 
had  a  corresponding  influence  on  the  people.  As 
the  first  object  was  to  gain  confidence,  Mexico's 
first  want  was  a  victory.  Every  thing  might  be 

*'  General  Taylor  to  the  Adjutant  General,  October  15,  1846.  Executive 
Document^  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth 
Congress,  p.  353. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  357 

hoped  from  such  an  event  on  the  part  of  Mexico, 
and  all  which  could  be  feared  was  to  have  been 
anticipated  on  the  part  of  the  United7  States.  Had 
the  Mexican  army  once  beaten  an  American  army, 
the  result  would  have  been  such  as  followed  the 
battle  of  Baylen ;  the  only  important  one  where 
Spaniards  were  successful  in  the  war  with  the 
French  in  their  peninsula,  and  then  only  through 
the  surprising  errors  of  the  French  general.  But 
from  that  time  Spanish  energy  was  aroused.^ 
Spaniards  had  conquered  at  Baylen,  and  that  one 
victory  flattered  their  obstinate  pride  and  induced 
them  to  continue  the  struggle.  Their  country, 
mountain  and  valley,  swarmed  with  guerillas;  ar 
mies  were  raised  with  the  most  surprising  rapidity ; 
and,  though  beaten  again  and  again,  were  only  dis 
persed  to  reappear  in  stronger  force.  Baylen  was 
and  still  is  the  cry  of  Spaniards  in  their  remem 
brance  of  former  and  hope  of  future -success. 

Such  might  have  been  the  anticipated  effect  of 
a  victory  of  the  Mexican  general  over  either  Tay 
lor,  who  had  been  thus  far  the  terror  of  Mexico,  or 
Scott,  the  general-in-chief  of  the  American  army. 
When  the  immense  importance  of  the  victory  is 
considered,  it  can  not  be  doubted  that,  when  it 
had  once  been  gained,  and  the  nation  fairly  arous 
ed  by  the  cheering  news,  then,  and  not  till  then, 
would  geographical  points  of  defense  have  formed 
principal  topics  for  the  consideration  of  Santa  Anna. 

*  Napier's  Peninsular  War,  chap,  viii.,  book  i.,  p.  77,  rol.  i.,  Carey  & 
Hart's  edition,  1842. 


358  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

Had  these  been  remembered  by  the  American 
commanders,  there  would  have  been  no  difficulty 
in  deciding  whether  the  Mexican  president  would 
have  marched  to  Vera  Cruz  to  oppose  the  landing 
of  a  large  force,  composed  in  great  part  of  the  vet 
erans  of  the  line  of  the  American  army,  or  moved 
in  the  direction  which  he  had  long  observed,  espe 
cially  when  the  American  troops  were  reduced  to 
one  third  of  fcheir  former  strength,  and  the  regular 
force  of  all  arms  to  less  than  a  thousand  men.  So 
long  as  the  prospect  of  success  was  brighter  in  the 
north  than  the  south,  so  long  was  it  certain  that 
Santa  Anna  (unless  his  genius  was  underrated) 
would  attack  there ;  and  the  diversion  which  Gen 
eral  Scott  considered  of  so  much  importance,  was 
made  on  General  Taylor's  part  the  moment  his  po 
sition  oifeied  more  probabilities  of  successful  attack 
than  that  which  Scott  was  about  to  take ;  unless, 
indeed,  it  were  believed  that  the  Mexican  general 
would  refrain  from  attacking  either,  in  which  case 
it  made  small  difference  about  the  strength  of  ei 
ther  division. 

Had  General  Scott  intended  to  detain  Santa 
Anna  in  the  north  by  offensive  operations  toward 
San  Luis,  he  should  have  left  with  Taylor  a  force 
at  least  as  formidable  as  his  own.  Had  he  intend 
ed  to  induce  Santa  Anna  to  march  from  San  Luis 
across  a  difficult  country,  and  to  attack  strong  posi 
tions  with  a  view  to  his  effectual  defeat,  the  dis 
positions  which  were  made  were  those  best  calcu 
lated  for  such  an  effect,  with  but  few  exceptions. 


r  - 
THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  359 

But  General  Scott  intended  the  former  course  to 
be  pursued  by  General  Taylor,  and  made  the  prop 
er,  dispositions  for  the  latter,  as  the  result  fully 
proved.  The  only  question  of  doubt  which  can 
arise  is  as  to  whether  the  force  which  he.  left  with 
General  Taylor  was  in  reason  sufficient  to  enable 
him  to  maintain  himself.  Reference  might  be  made 
to  results ;  but,  as  I  am  speaking  of  what  should 
and  might  have  been  considered,  I  must  refer  to 
facts  known  to  exist  at  the  time  when  the  orders 
and  suggestions  for  the  dispositions  were  issued. 

"  Moral  force  is  to  physical  force  as  three  to  one 
in  war."*  A  maxim  which  has  guided  the  move 
ments  of  Napoleon  and  Wellington  might  well 
have  entered  into  the  calculations  of  the  necessary 
force  for  the  defense  of  the  northern  line  in  Mexi 
co.  The  Mexican  war  had  thus  far  fully  exempli 
fied  the  truth  of  the  maxim,  had  increased  the  mor 
al  force  of  American  soldiers,  and  corresponding 
ly  decreased  that  of  Mexican  generals  and  troops. 
Santa  Anna's  army  was  known  to  consist  of  be 
tween  20,000  and  30,000  men;  but  it  was  hardly 
possible  that  he  could  bring  many  more  than  20,000 
into  the  field  after  a  long  march  from  San  Luis  to 
Saltillo  or  Monterey. 

To  oppose  this  army,  General  Taylor  had  some 
7500  men  of  all  arms,  stretched  from  Agua  Nueva 
to  Matamoras.  All  the  larger  positions  in  the  rear 
were  fortified  in  a  manner,  and  so  long  as  the  main 

*  Napier's  Peninsular  War,  chapter  vi.,  book  ix.,  p.  113,  vol.  ii.,  Carey 
&  Hart's  edition,  1842. 


360  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

body  of  the  force  was  at  or  in  advance  of  Monte 
rey,  "  which  controlled  the  great  outlet  from  the  in 
terior,"^  they  were  accessible  only  to  corps  coming 
through  the  Tula  pass  without  artillery,  without 
which  Mexican  troops  were  considered  "  not  at  all 
formidable."  At  Agua  Nueva,  at  Angostura,  at  the 
pass  of  Los  Muertes,  at  the  pass  of  the  Klnconada, 
at  the  gorge  near  the  Loma  de  Federacion,  and  at 
Monterey,  were  defensive  positions  in  defiles  strong 
enough  to  compensate  for  any  ordinary  numerical 
deficiency.  But  few  of  them  could  be  turned,  and 
those  only  by  difficult  and  circuitous  movements. 
With  5000  men  at  or  in  advance  of  Monterey, 
what  more  could  have  been  desired  to  insure  the 
successful  defense  of  the  northern  line,  except  say 
two  regiments  of  the  veterans  of  the  army,  to  give 
steadiness  to  the  volunteers  composing  the  princi 
pal  part  of  the  force  ? 

If  this  view  be  correct,  then,  in  spite  of  the  par 
tial  views  of  the  American  generals,  confined,  as 
they  were,  to  their  own  particular  operations,  and 
of  their  erroneous  conclusions  in  regard  to  Santa 
Anna's  actions,  arrived  at  after  a  knowledge  of  his 
full  information  of  their  movements,  and  still  en- 
tertained  after  his  advanced  corps  of  cavalry  had 
carried  off  two  parties  of  American  troops,  the  force 
of  circumstances,  and  the  conduct  about  which 
there  has  been  so  much  complaint,  had  made  the 
disposition  of  the  American  forces  nearly  that  which 

*  General  Taylor  to  the  Adjutant  General.    Executive  Document,  No.  60, 
House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  353. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  3  g  J, 

was  most  proper  and  most  effective.  If  there  were 
any  thing  to  regret,  it  would  appear  to  be  that  the 
force  of  circumstances,  or  some  other  agent,  had  not 
brought  it  about  sooner.  In  that  case,  some  three 
months  of  inactivity  would  have  been  cut  off,  and 
any  augmentation  of  Santa  Anna's  army  at  San 
Luis  during  that  period  would  have  been  prevent 
ed.  But,  as  it  was,  Scott  was  on  his  way  to  Vera 
Cruz  to  open  a  practicable  line  of  operations,  while 
Taylor  held  Saltillo,  Monterey,  and  the  posts  on 
the  Rio  Grande,  with  a  force  which  was,  as  the 
result  showed,  and  as  he  declared  in  his  letter  to 
the  adjutant  general  of  January  27th,  competent. 

As  for  the  belief  of  General  Taylor  that  he  was 
to  be  intentionally  sacrificed,  which  he  has  ex 
pressed  in  various  private  letters,  and  which  have 
been  set  out  in  the  newspapers,  it  was  the  same  as 
to  believe  that  the  government  was  about  to  sacri 
fice  itself  by  sacrificing  him,  7000  men,  all  the 
public  property  on  the  line,  and  letting  any  Mex 
ican  force,  which  must  have  been  large  if  capable 
of  beating  him,  without  hinderance  over  the  fron 
tiers  of  Texas  into  the  United  States. 

That  he  had  lost  in  a  measure  "  the  confidence 
of  his  government"  is  more  than  probable.  Let 
reference  be  made  to  the  correspondence  of  General 
Taylor  with  the  War  Department,  and  it  will  be 
seen  that  from  the  very  commencement  of  hostili 
ties  to  the  time  when  General  Scott  was  ordered 
to  the  field,  a  period  of  more  than  five  months,  not 
one  plan  of  operations  or  suggested  course  of  action, 


362 


THE  WAR  WlfH  MEXICO. 


having  in  direct  view  the  object  of  the  war,  had 
been  received  from  General  Taylor,  and  that  all 
which  had  been  made  by  the  Secretary  of  War, 
which  were  necessarily  liable  to  objections,  made 
as  they  were  at  more  than  a  thousand  miles  from 
the  scene  of  operations,  had  been  met  by  state 
ments  of  difficulties  and  delays,  unaccompanied 
by  any  suggestions  for  overcoming  them.  Under 
such  circumstances,  it  is  not  surprising  that  he 
should  have  lost  some  portion  of  the  confidence 
which,  after  his  surprising  victories  of  Palo  Alto 
and  Resaca  de  la  Palma,  may  have  been  'reposed 
in  him  as  a  great  commander,  and  that  the  govern 
ment,  tired  of  proceeding  upon  false  principles  of 
action,  should  have  done  the  best  it  could,  by  send 
ing  General  Scott  to  the  field  to  control  the  opera 
tions  as  general-iii-chief  of  the  army. 


CHAPTER  DL 

Action  of  Mexican  Authorities — General  Santa  Anna — His  Difficulties — His 
Policy— Efforts  of  the  Mexican  Government  to  raise  Men,  Material,  and 
Money — State  of  Things  in  the  Capital — Scheme  of  sequestrating  Church 
Property — Opposition  of  the  Clergy — Meeting  of  Mexican  Congress — Elec 
tion  of  Santa  Anna  and  Gomez  Farias — Consideration  of  American  Proposal 
to  negotiate — Of  Scheme  of  sequestrating  Church  Property — Is  adopted — 
Fails — Movements  of  General  Santa  Anna  upon  receipt  of  intercepted 
American  Dispatches — Strength  of  his  Army — Advance  to  Encarnacion. 

THE  action  of  Mexican  authorities  for  a  long 
period  subsequent  to  the  fall  of  Monterey  was  pure 
ly  preparatory.  On  the  8th  of  October  General 


THE    WAR   WITH   MEXICO.  3^3 

Santa  Anna  arrived  at  San  Luis  de  Potosi  with 
the  troops  which  had  marched  from  Mexico,  and 
at  once  set  about  the  task  of  organizing. the  large 
army,  of  which  the  levy  had  been  ordered.  His 
great  difficulty  was  in  the  want  of  money,  but  he 
obviated  it  temporarily  by  a  forced  loan  and  the 
pledge  of  a  portion  of  his  private  property.  His- 
communications  to  the  Mexican  government,  writ 
ten  while  on  his  way  to  San  Luis  and  soon  after 
his  arrival,  all  professed  a  fixed  determination  to 
prosecute  the  war  with  vigor  and  energy.  In  them 
he  congratulated  his  countrymen  on  the  increase 
of  moral  force  which  the  Mexican  troops  had  ac 
quired  by  their  good  conduct  at  Monterey,  which 
had  compelled  General  Taylor  to  grant  such  favor 
able  terms  of  capitulation.  But  while  he  did  this, 
he  did  not  lose  the  opportunity  of  publishing  his 
own  sagacity,  and,  admitting  that  the  loss  of  Mon 
terey  was  a  disaster,  he  regretted  that  his  advice 
had  not  been  followed  by  Ampudia,  and  the  place 
given  up  without  a  conflict.^  Not  without  reason 
did  he  regret  it,  and  the  reasons  which  induced  the 
advice  and  for  his  subsequent  course  are  obvious. 
No  man  knew  his  own  countrymen  better  than 
Santa  Anna.  In  his  long  schooling  of  military 
and  political  intrigue,  he  had  studied  them  under 
all  circumstances.  He  knew  the  capacity  of  Mexi 
can  troops  for  successful  action  against  their  north 
ern  adversaries  from  bitter  experience  in  Texas, 

*  Official  Correspondence  of  Santa  Anna  with  the  Secretary  of  War  and 
Marine,  published  in  Diario  del  Gobeirno.  ' 


304  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

and  as  their  moral  force  had  not  been  increased  by 
the  result  of  the  battles  on  the  Rio  Grande,  it  was 
his  policy  not  to  hazard  a  battle  until  his  numeri 
cal  strength  was  sufficient  to  compensate  the  de 
ficiency  ;  which  was  much  more  evident  after  the 
result  of  the  operations  of  Monterey,  his  published 
congratulations  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding. 
With  a  people  of  the  impressionable  character  of 
the  Mexicans,  a  victory  was  of  the  highest  im 
portance  if  the  war  were  continued,  and  it  might 
have  been  hoped  that  it  would  arouse  the  spirit  of 
the  nation  to  resistance,  while  at  the  same  time  it 
would  increase  the  power  and  popularity  of  the 
general.  In  pursuance  of  this  policy,  it  was  use 
less  to  attempt  any  partial  operation  of  defense, 
and  he  therefore  drew  Ampudia's  corps  from  Sal- 
tillo  to  San  Luis,  which  was  nearer  the  center  of 
resources.  Upon  learning  of  the  contemplated  at 
tack  upon  Tampico,  he  ordered  its  evacuation, 
which  was  in  keeping  with  his  former  action.  By 
these  movements  he  had  given  up  the  whole  coun 
try  north  and  east  of  the  Sierra  Madre  without  a 
struggle.  But  he  had  put  three  hundred  miles  of 
comparatively  desert  country,  on  the  direct  route 
from  Saltillo  to  San  Luis,  between  himself  and 
General  Taylor,  of  which  the  water  tanks  could 
be  destroyed  to  impede  the  advance  of  his  enemy, 
and.  which,  for  that  purpose  as  well  as  to  secure 
his  own  movement,  should  he  choose  to  make  one, 
were  guarded  by  strong  corps  of  his  cavalry.  As 
for  Tampico,  it  was  an  isolated  position,  with  only 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  355 

one  road  to  the  capital,  which  led  through  the  Tula 
pass,  which  was  rocky  and  difficult  in  the  extreme, 
and  it  was  of  hut  little  importance  in  the  blockaded 
state  of  the  Gulf  coast.  Having  withdrawn  the 
garrison,  he  placed  -  strong  corps  of  infantry  and 
cavalry,  under  Valencia  and  Urrea,  to  guard  the 
pass,  the  advance  of  the  latter  general  being  at  its 
eastern  extremity.  Santa  Anna  was  then  safe  from 
immediate  molestation,  and  could  complete  the  or 
ganization  of  his  army  at  his  leisure,  and  at  the 
same  time  pay  attention  to  affairs  at  the  capital. 
The  course  which  he  adopted  may  have  been  in 
duced  by  political  reasons,  but  in  view  of  all  cir 
cumstances  it  can  hardjy  be  doubted  that  it  was 
wise  in  a  military  point  of  view.  Whether  Santa 
Anna  designed  to  control,  if  possible,  the  various 
discordant  elements  of  Mexican  action,  and  direct 
them  in  such  a  manner  as  to  bring  about  a  peace, 
is  a  question  which  he  alone  possesses  the  power 
of  answering,  and  his  reputation  for  veracity,  when 
declaring  his  motives  or  intentions,,  is  not  so  un 
doubted  as  to  render  his  explanation,  even  at  this 
time,  reliable. 

It  has  been  surmised  by  some  that  it  was  his 
policy  to  remain  upon  the  defensive  at  San  Luis, 
and  await  the  action  of  the  Mexican  Congress, 
which,  in  the  accumulated  difficulties  to  be  over^ 
come  in  the  prosecution  of  the  war,  might  take  into 
consideration  the  proposals  of  the  American  govern 
ment  ;  while,  in  order  to  shield  himself  from  the 
charges  to  which  the  varied  speculations  of  Ameri- 


366  THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO. 

can  editors  had  given  rise,  of  wanting  patriotism 
and  of  being  in  league  with  the  American  govern 
ment,  he  should  give  his  parole  support  to  the  war, 
.and  with  seeming  reluctance  assent  to  the  meas 
ures  of  Congress,  as  being  those  which  had  been 
decreed  in  its  wisdom,  and  with  which  he  had 
nothing  to  do  but  to  acquiesce.  In  support  of  this 
surmise  there  was,  his  knowledge  of  American 
strength,  his  opposition  to  proposed  schemes  for 
raising  money,  and  his  invariable  practice  of  in 
trigue  in  every  political  or  military  matter  in  which 
he  was  engaged.  But  if  he  entertained  such  views 
— and  he  may  have  done  so,  notwithstanding  his 
loudly  proclaimed  desire  for  war — he  neglected 
nothing  by  which  he  might  prepare  for  the  altern 
ative. 

The  exertions  of  the  acting  president,  Salas,  and 
his  cabinet  were  strenuously  put  forth  for  raising 
men  and  material  of  war.  Men  could  be  had  by 
forced  enlistments.  The  amount  of  material,  such 
as  it  was,  which  was  in  the  country,  was  large,  and 
both,  being  collected  with  rapidity,  were  thrown  in 
advance  to  San  Luis.  According  to  Mexican  ac 
counts,,  the  force  at  that  point  in  the  month  of  No 
vember  numbered  25,000  bayonets  and  lances,  and 
fifty-two  pieces  of  artillery,  with  immense  stores 
of  ammunition,  and  5000  men  were  on  the  march 
thither. ' 

In  view  of  this  preparation,  many  Mexicans  in 
dulged  the  hope  of  a  signal  triumph.  At  that 
period  the  advance  of  the  Mexican  army  was  not 


THE  WAR  V^ITH  MEXICO.  357 

contemplated,  and  it  was  predicted  that  at  San 
Luis  would  be  the  last  great  battle,  and  that  it 
would  result  in  the  complete  overthrow  of  the 
North  Americans.  But  in  the  midst  of  all  their 
strength,  and  in  the  fullness  of  their  preparations, 
there  were  some  who  feared  that  the  fortunes  of 
war  would  be  against  them  even  there.  The  of 
ficers  who  had  gained  experience  at  Palo  Alto, 
Resaca,  and  Monterey,  had  but  little  confidence, 
and  imparted  their  spirit  in  some  degree  to  their 
comrades.  Santa  Anna  strove  to  check  the  spread 
of  the  demoralization ;  and  in  December,  for  open 
ly  expressing  his  opinion  of  the  superiority  of  the 
American  troops,  General  Requena  was  disgraced 
and  ordered  away  from  the  army. 

Notwithstanding  the  large  army  which  had  been 
collected,  the  government  of  Mexico  was  still  em 
barrassed  by  the  want  of  money,  and  to  raise  it 
was  the  greatest  difficulty  to  be  overcome.  Vari 
ous  shifts  were  resorted  to  for  the  purpose.  Calls 
were  made  upon  different  states  and  upon  individ 
uals.  The  government  journals  adopted  the  motto 
of  "  Ser  o  no  ser"  and  were  filled  with  articles 
exhorting  Mexicans  to  give  their  contributions,  in 
hearty  support  to  the  war  for  the  defense  of  their 
country's  nationality.  Some  means  in  money  and 
in  kind  were  contributed,  but  in  comparison  with 
the  expenses  they  were  trifling ;  and  while  other 
plans  were  under  consideration,  by  which  the  sup 
ply  could  be  increased,  the  political  strife  between 
the  Puros  and  Moderados  kept  the  capital  in  a  state 
of  ferment. 


368  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

As  early  as  the  14th  of  October,  the  insane  and 
inconsistent  populace  were  openly  crying  for  a  pro- 
nunciamiejito,  on  the  ground  that  Salas  wished  to 
perpetuate  his  power.  Successive  attempts  at  in 
surrection  were  made,  but  were  quelled  by  the  ap 
pearance  and  protestations  of  Salas,  backed  by  his 
adviser  and  sponsor,  Valencia  Gomez  Farias,  the 
great  Puro  of  Mexico. 

Among  the  various  projects  for  raising  money, 
the  most  popular  and  apparently  the  most  feasible 
was  the  sequestration  of  the  property  of  the  Church 
for  the  benefit  of  the  nation  and  the  support  of  the 
war.  It  was  not  long  considered  before  the  clergy 
became  alarmed,  and  its  members  used  their  pow 
erful  influence  to  defeat  it.  For  this  action  they 
were  accused  in  the  government  journals  of  a  want 
of  patriotism,  of  aiding  and  abetting  the  monarch 
ists,  and  of  fomenting  the  discords  which  were 
daily  becoming  more  evident  and  dangerous  ;  and 
not  without  some  reason;  for,  although  the  Mexi 
can  priests  entertained  no  good  feeling  toward 
the  northern  heretics,  yet  they  entertained  still  less 
for  those  who  would  attempt  all  which  Americans 
could  do,  the  sequestration  of  their  property,  and 
when  the  measure  was  proposed,  of  course  they 
fomented  an  opposition.  As  for  the  monarchical 
preferences  of  the  great  dignitaries  of  the  Church, 
they  were  too  well  known  to  admit  of  a  denial. 

An  attempt  was  soon  made  to  carry  the  plan 
partially  into  effect.  The  government  required  a 
contribution  from  the  property  of  the  secular  and 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  359 

regular  clergy  to  the  amount  of  two  millions  of  dol 
lars,  and  issued  drafts,  in  all  amounting  to  that 
sum,  on  the  different  bishops  of  the  country.  The 
prelates  were  not  able  to  pay  immediately,  even 
had  they  been  willing ;  for,  although  the  Church 
was  possessed  of  immense  estates,  yet  they  afford 
ed  no  great  moneyed  revenue  in  proportion  to  their 
value.  Their  answers,  therefore,  pleaded  their  in 
ability  and  desired  delay,  and,  in  the  mean  while, 
the  mass  of  the  clergy  continued  exertions  for  the 
defeat  of  the  measure  in  the  Congress  which  was 
about  to  assemble. 

It  met  on  the  6th  of  December,  and  to  it  were 
referred  the  various  questions  affecting  the  nation. 
The  great  question,  of  course,  was  that  of  the  war, 
and  upon  it  the  message  of  General  Salas  and  the 
speeches  of  the  ministers  all  spoke  strongly,  and 
all  advocated  its  continuance.  Salas  was  loud  in 
his  arguments  in  favor  of  its  justice,  and  the  abso 
lute  necessity  of  carrying  it  on.  The  different  min 
isters  all  seconded  his  views,  but  all  agreed  that  its 
continuance  depended  upon  the  speedy  procure 
ment  of  the  money  necessary  for  supplying  and 
paying  the  army,  and  all  referred  to  the  Minister 
of  Finance.  He  applauded  his  colleagues,  and 
agreed  with  them  in  their  views ;  but,  when  he 
came  to  dwell  upon  the  state  of  the  treasury,  con 
fessed  that  the  nation  was  utterly  bankrupt,  and 
that  he  was  without  means  of  raising  a  dollar. 
The  matter  having  been  thus  placed  before  the 
Congress,  that  body  proceeded  to  the  election  of  a 

I— A  A 


370  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

president  and  vice-president,  and  the  choice  fell 
upon  Santa  Anna  and  Gomez  Farias.  The  man 
agement  of  executive  business  devolved  upon  Fa 
rias,  Santa  Anna  being  allowed,  by  decree,  to  re 
main  in  command  of  the  army. 

The  next  business  before  the  body  was  the  con 
sideration  of  the  propriety  of  carrying  on  the  war. 
The  feeling,  originally  strong  in  favor  of  it,  had 
been  cherished  in  the  political  intrigues  of  the 
Santanistas,  and  any  effect  which  the  successes 
of  American  arms  might  have  had  was  completely 
neutralized. 

As,  through  circumstances,  the  intended  policy 
of  the  United  States,  of  placing  their  troops  in  a 
threatening  attitude,  to  operate  upon  the  Congress, 
had  utterly  failed,  the  only  thing  which  was  to  be 
feared  at  the  moment  of  consideration  was  poverty. 
The  American  troops  were  in  detached  positions ; 
no  preparations  were,  to  the  knowledge  of  the  Mex 
ican  functionaries,  in  progress  for  an  attack  upon 
any  vital  point  of  the  body  of  their  republic,  and 
the  American  general  was  at  the  time  engaged  in 
an  expedition  against  an  unimportant  and  unde 
fended  town,  in  order  to  complete  his  arrangements 
for,  defending  a  line.  Santa  Anna's  large  army 
occupied  San  Luis ;  his  cavalry  occupied  the  di 
rect  road  thence  to  Saltillo ;  Valencia's  and  Urrea's 
corps,  numbering  near  five  thousand  men,  guarded 
the  Tula  pass  ;  and,  even  if  apprehensions  then  ex 
isted  of  an  advance  upon  the  capital  by  way  of 
Veia  Cruz  or  Alvarado,  confident  reliance  was 


THE    WAR   WITH  MEXICO.  37^ 

placed  upon  the  strength  of  the  fortifications  of  the 
ports  and  of  the  passes  along  the  road.  Moreover, 
such  a  contingency  was  distant,  and  it  was  Mexi 
can  nature  not  to  provide  for  it  until  it  arose.  Cal 
ifornia,  New  Mexico,  Nueva  Leon,  Coahuila,  and 
Tamaulipas  had  been  lost ;  hut  they  had  never  af 
forded  many  resources  to  the  central  government, 
and  it  was  hoped  that  the  loss  would  he  only  tem 
porary,  for  the  Whig  party  in  the  United  States 
had  come  forth  in  hold  opposition  to  the  measures 
of  their  government.  Its  prominent  men  had  de 
nounced  the  war  as  unjustifiable  and  wicked;  and 
although  the  intention  to  require  territory  from 
Mexico  as  indemnity  for  the  expenses  of  the  war 
had  not  been  openly  avowed  by  the  administra 
tion,  yet  much  opposition  had  been  proclaimed  in 
anticipation  of  such  avowal  by  the  Whigs,  and  es 
pecially  by  the  Abolitionists.  The  elections  in  the 
fall  of  1846  had  been  favorable  to  the  Whig  party, 
and  showed  that  the  war  was  unpopular  with  a 
large  portion  of  the  American  people.  All  these 
circumstances  were  fully  known  in  Mexico,  and 
the  results  of  the  elections  and  the  speeches  of  the 
prominent  opposition  leaders  were  published  as  in 
centives  to  the  Mexicans  to  continue  hostilities. 
It  was  not  considered  by  their  great  men  prepos 
terous  to  hope,  that  when  the  American  Congress 
elect  commenced  its  functions,  all  the  conquered 
territory  would  be  returned  to  them.  Under  all 
these  considerations,  with  no  immediate  danger 
threatening  their  capital,  the  great  center  of  their 


372  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

resources,  and  when  the  surprising  avidity  with 
which  Mexicans  seize  upon  data  which  may  serve 
as  a  foundation  for  judgments  favorable  to  them 
selves  is  remembered,  it  is  not  strange  that  the 
Mexican  Congress  should  have  determined  to  pros 
ecute  the  war.  Accordingly,  it  was  decreed  that 
no 'proposition  for  peace  should  be  entertained  un 
til  every  hostile  foot  had  cleared  the  Mexican  soil, 
and  every  vessel  of  war  which  lined  her  coast 
should  be  withdrawn.^ 

Having  taken  this  ground,  the  next  thing  to  be 
done  was  -to  raise  money,  and  with  this  in  view, 
the  question  of  the  sequestration  of  the  Church 
property  to  a  large  amount  was  brought  before  the 
Congress,  It  there  met  powerful  opposition,  how 
ever,  as  the  priesthood  had  exerted  all  its  influence 
against  it  in  anticipation.  Santa  Anna  was  not  in 
favor  of  the  measure ;  nevertheless,  from  time  to 
time,  he  kept  up  his  importunities  for  money ;  and 
while  asserting  his  patriotism,  and  his  desire  of 
presenting  trophies,  won  from  the  American  army 
in  the  struggle  for  maintaining  Mexican  independ 
ence,  to  his  government,  yet  he  urged  the  want  of 
funds  as  his  excuse  for  not  moving  forward,  and 
asserted  the  utter  impracticability  of  continuing 
the  war  without  speedy  and  efficient  assistance 
from  Congress.  If  it  be  true  that  at  this  period  he 
was  at  heart  in  favor  of  peace,  his  opposition  must 
have  had  its  origin  in  a  reluctance  to  have  the-  last 
impediment  to  his  active  advance  removed,  and 

*  Diario  Official  del  Gobierno,  December,  1846. 


THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO.  373 

the  fear  lest  popular  opinion  should  force  him  to 
offensive  operations  before  he  was  fully. prepared, 
and  which  must  indefinitely  postpone  any  negoti 
ation.  In  his  published  and  official  correspondence 
it  does  not  appear  that  he  strongly  expressed  a  be 
lief  that  the  measure  would  not  answer  the  purpose 
proposed,  and  was  therefore  impolitic. 

But,  although  not  supported  by  him,  and  in  spite 
of  opposition,  the  project  was  taken  up  on  the  7th 
of  January,  1847,^  and,  after  a  short  but  fiery  dis 
cussion,  it  became  a  law  by  a  .decided  vote.  The 
government  was  empowered,  "in  order  to  raise  fif 
teen  millions  for  the  support  of  the  national  war 
against  the  United  States,  to  hypothecate  or  sell  in 
mortmain  the  CJiurch  property  which  might  be 
necessary  to  obtain  that  sum."  During  the  debate 
upon  the  measure,  it  was  asserted  by  the  function 
aries  of  the  administration  that  the  fate  of  the  na 
tion  depended  upon  the  prompt  action  of  Congress,, 
and  that,  if  the  project  were  not  speedily  adopted, 
the  army  would  at  once  disband  and  march  to  the 
capital,  to  light  up  the  blaze  of  civil  war.f 

Whether  this_  apprehension  was  at.  that  particu 
lar  time  well  founded  was  doubted  by  many,  but 
it  was  certainly  a  fact  that  the  .army  wag. suffering 
from  the  want  of  money,  and  the  assertion  of  its 
contemplated  action  shows  that  the  measure  was 
favorably  looked  upon  by  a  large  number  of  the 
troops.  It  was,  moreover,  a  powerful  argument 

*  Monitor  Republicano,  January  9th,  1847. 

t  Diario  Official  del  Gobierno,  January  9th,  1847. 


*•' 

374  THE    WAR   WITH   MEXICO. 

in  favor  of  this  first  blow  at  the  priesthood ;  and  as 
the  Puros  and  their  leader,  Farias,  entertained  the 
most  determined  hostility  against  that  class,  the 
argument  was  quickly  seized  and  made  use  of. 
But,  having  obtained  the  power,  it  was  by  no  means 
an  easy  thing  to  carry  the  proposed  sale  into  effect. 
The  whole  body  of  the  clergy  protested  against  it 
as  sacrilegious,  and  large  masses  of  the  lower  class, 
who,  while  it  had  been  under  consideration,  were 
most  clamorous  in  favor  of  the  measure,  supported 
the  protest.  Santa  Anna  gave  his  consent  with 
great  reluctance.  In  a  letter  to  Rejon,  Minister 
of  Relations,  he  stated  that  he  had  uniformly  op 
posed  the  measure,  and  now  only  assented  to  it  on 
account  of  the  urgent  necessities  of  the  country.^ 
The  matter  was  at  once  discussed  in  the  different 
states,  and  but  one,  and  that  one  Oajaca  (in 
fact,  the  principality  of  Don  Juan  Alvarez),  gave, 
through  its  government,  a  decided  declaration  in 
its  favor. 

But,  in  spite  of  difficulties,  the  government  ap 
peared  determined  to  carry  the  measure  through, 
and  took  the  first  step  by  seizing  a  factious  priest, 
who  'was  stirring  up  an  insurrection  in  the  capital, 
and  easting  him  into  prison.  A  few  more  exam 
ples  stifled  the  outcry  in  that  city,  and  the  clergy 
were  compelled  to  work  in  secret.  Few  purchasers, 
however,  could  be  found  for  the  property,  even 
when  seized  or  mortgaged  under  the  law.  It  con 
sisted  almost  entirely  of  real  estate,  and,  where  the 

*  Diario  Official  del  Gobierno. 


THE    WAR   WITH    MEXICO.  375 

clergy  exercised  so  powerful  an  influence,  it  was 
manifestly  unsafe  for  any  capitalist  to  advance 
money  upon  it,  much  more  to  purchase  it,  notwith 
standing  the  repeated  concessions  of  the  govern 
ment.  The  law  authorized  the  disposal  of  scrip, 
secured  hy  the  property,  at  the  rate  of  77  per  cent, 
cash,  no  paper  or  credit  being  allowed.  But  the 
government,  being  unable  to  find  purchasers,  re 
duced  the  price,  remitting  60  per  cent,  to  them, 
taking  pay  at  once,  one  half  in  paper  and  one  half 
in  specie,  and  even  proposed  to  make  contracts  for 
the  sale  of  the  property  on  more  ruinous  terms, 
losing  '75  per  cent,  of  the  actual  value.  The  at 
tempts  at  sale  were  nevertheless  fruitless,  and  no 
great  quantity  of  money  was  raised  either  by  the 
issue  of  scrip  or  the  sale  of  the  property ;  and,  on 
account  of  the  immediate  failure  of  the  project,  and 
the  manifested  opposition,  the  Congress  was  in 
duced  to  consider  modifications  of  the  law  which 
might  render  it  less  obnoxious.  But  nothing  was 
effected  by  their  deliberations,  and  the  members 
proposed  to  break  up  early  in  February,  leaving  the 
government  to  obtain  resources  as  best  it  might. 

Santa  Anna  had,  meanwhile,  remained  in  his 
defensive  positions  at  San  Luis  de  Potosi  and  Tula, 
until,  by  the  receipt  of  the  intercepted  dispatch  of 
General  Scott  to  General  Taylor,  he  was  informed 
of  the  plans  and  movements  of  the  enemy.  Victo 
ry,  which,  since  the  war  was  to  be  prosecuted,  was 
the  first  great  want  of  the  Mexican  nation,  and 
consequently  the  great  object  of  his  desires,  he  be- 


376  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

lieved  to  be  within  his  grasp ;  and,  contrary  to  all 
the  anticipations  of  General  Scott,  he  acted  the 
wiser  part,  and  attempted  to  seize  it  in  that  direc 
tion  where  it  was  immediately  presented.  Leav 
ing  the  castle  of  San  Juan  d'Ulloa  and  the  city  of 
Vera  Cruz  to  the  care  of  the  government  and  the 
exertions  of  their  garrisons,  and  trusting  to  the  spir 
it  of  the  nation,  which,  aroused  by  his  anticipated 
victory,  would  induce  energy  in  the  prosecution  of 
the  war  for  future  defense,  he  at  once  directed  all 
his  energies  upon  the  task  of  preparation  for  an  ad 
vance.  It  was  one  of  great  difficulty,  for  he  was 
without  money.  All  the  funds  which  had  been 
raised,  and  many  of  his  private  resources,  by  which 
he  had  supported  many  expenses,  were  exhausted, 
and  it  was  useless  to  anticipate  relief  from  the  gov 
ernment  at  the  capital.  In  his  difficulty,  the  state 
government  of  San  Luis  de  Potosi  came  to  his  aid, 
and  its  Congress  authorized  the  governor  to  raise 
a  forced  loan  on  forty-eight  hours'  notice,  the  pro 
ceeds  of  which  were  to  be  applied  to  the  commis 
sariat  of  the  army.^  This  loan  was  in  a  measure 
successful,  and,  being  thus  relieved,  Santa  Anna 
commenced  his  movement. 

Upon  the  receipt  of  the  information  of  the  de 
signs  of  General  Scott,  he  had  re-enforced  General 
Mtnon's  corps  of  cavalry,  which  was  in  advance  to 
ward  Saltillo ;  and,  as  the  execution  of  those  de 
signs  would  cause  Taylor  to  evacuate  the  country 
about  Victoria,  he  ordered  Urrea  to  proceed  with  his 

*  Santa  Anna's  Official  Report  of  the  Battle  of  Angostura. 


THE  WAR  WITH.  MEXICO.        377 

cavalry  through  the  Tula  pass,  and  operate  upon 
the  line  of  American  communications.  With  Va 
lencia,  who  had  commanded  at  Tula,  he  had  had  a 
quarrel,  and  that  officer  had  temporarily  retired  from 
the  army.  The  infantry  and  artillery  of  the  com 
mand,  which  had  been  stationed  at  that  point,  were 
withdrawn  and  incorporated  with  the  main  army. 
On  the  26th  of  January;  1847,  Santa  Anna  issued 
his  order  of  march  for  his  whole  force,  which  was 
stated  in  the  Mexican  accounts  as  follows : 

Men. 

Sappers  and  artillerists,  with  19  guns  and  1  howitzer  .  .  .  650 
1st,  3d,  4th,  5th,  10th,  and  llth  regiments  of  the  line,  1st 

and  3d  light  troops 6240 

4th  light  troops,  mixed,  of  Santa  Anna ;  1st,  active,  of  Celaya, 

of  Guadalaxara,  of  Lagos,  of  Queretaro,  and  of  Mexico  .  3200 

General  Parrodi's  command  from  Tula 1000 

Artillery 250 

Mejia's  division 4000 

Adding  to  this  Minon's  cavalry,  about  2000,  his 
whole  strength,  exclusive  of.  Urrea's  command, 
amounted  to  23,340  bayonets  and  lances,  with 
twenty  pieces  of  artillery. 

The  artillery  moved  on  the  27th,  and  was  fol 
lowed  by  the  infantry  on  the -2  8th,  29th,  and  30th. 
By  easy  marches  the  Mexican  army  progressed  in 
the  direction  of  Saltillo,  and  on  the  19th  of  Febru 
ary  was  concentrated  at  Encarnacion,  a  hacienda 
some  sixty  miles  to  the  south  of  Saltillo,  and  here 
Santa  Anna  prepared  for  battle. 


378  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


CHAPTER  X. 

American  Force  about  Saltillo — Capture  of  Borland's,  Gaines's,  and  Heady's 
Commands — Arrival  of  General  Taylor — Movement  in  Advance  to  Agua 
Nueva — Reconnaissances  to  La  Hedionda  and  Encarnacion — Retreat  to 
Buena  Vista — Advance  of  Santa  Anna  from  Encarnacion — Pass  of  Angos 
tura — Affair  of  the  22d  of  February — Movement  of  Minon's  Cavalry — Sal 
tillo — BATTLE  OF  BUENA  VISTA — Mexican  Retreat  to  Agua  Nueva — Com 
munications — Position  of  Santa  Anna — His  Retreat  toward  San  Luis — Tay 
lor's  Advance  to  Agua  Nueva — Expedition  to  Encarnacion-^-Urrea's  Oper 
ations  on  American  Communications — His  Retreat — Observations. 

FOR  some  days  after  the  departure  of  Worth's 
command,  affairs  remained  quiet  about  Saltillo. 
The  force  there  present  consisted  of  Lane's  brigade 
of  Indiana  troops,  M'Kee's  regiment  of  Kentuckians, 
a  battalion  of  Kentucky  horse,  and  General  Wool's 
original  command,  diminished  by  the  five  compa 
nies  of  dragoons  and  three  companies  of  the  sixth 
infantry  which  had  marched  with  Worth  for  the 
mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande. 

General  Butler  retained  his  head-quarters  at  Sal 
tillo.  Wool,  however,  was  drawn  back  from  La  En- 
cant  ada  to  Buena  Vista,  and,  some  rumors  having 
arisen  that  the  Mexican  army  was  on  the  advance 
from  San  Luis  de  Potosi,  on  the  18th  of  January 
he  sent  Major  Borland,  with  thirty-three  men  of  the 
Arkansas  cavalry,  to  reconnoiter  as  far  as  Encarna 
cion,  where  the  enemy  was  reported  to  be  in  force.3* 

*  General  Wool  to  Major  Bliss,  January  27th,  1847.  Executive  Document, 
No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress, 
p.  1106. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  3,79 

Upon  arriving  at  Encarnacion  on  the  19th,  Bor 
land  found  no  enemy.  He  halted,  and  sent  back 
to  his  colonel  for  a  re-enforcement,  in  order  to  con 
tinue  his  reconnaissance  to  Salado;  but,  having 
been  joined  by  Major  Gaines  and  Captain  Clay, 
with  a  party  of  thirty-five  of  the  Kentucky  caval 
ry,  he  decided  to  continue  it,  without  further  or 
ders  or  other  re-enforcement,  on  the  next  morn 
ing.^  Having  no  fear  of  an  enemy,  even  ordinary 
precautions  to  guard  against  surprise  were  neglect 
ed,  and  during  the  night  a  heavy  mist  hung  over 
the  plain  which  surrounded  the  hacienda,  com 
pletely  concealing  the  movements  of  any  approach 
ing  force. 

The  position  of  the  party  had  been  communi 
cated  by  inhabitants  of  the  country,  or  advanced 
Mexican  scouts,  to  General  Minon,  who  command 
ed  the  advanced  corps  of  Mexican  cavalry,  and  that 
officer  made  his  arrangements  to  insure  its  capture. 
Making  a  rapid  movement  with  more  than  one 
thousand  men  from  Matehuala,  he  arrived  before 
day,  on  the  morning  of  the  20th,  at  Encarnacion. 
His  force  was  disposed  about  the  hacienda  in  such 
a  manner  as  to  intercept  every  avenue  of  escape, 
and,  when  the  morning  revealed  their  situation,  the 
American  officers  deemed  it  impracticable  to  cut 
their  way  through.  They  accordingly  surrendered, 
and  the  whole  number,  two  majors,  two  captains, 

*  General  Wool  to  Major  Bliss,  January  27th,  1847.  Executive  Document, 
No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress, 
p.  1106. 


380 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


one  subaltern,  and  sixty-six  non-commissioned  of 
ficers  and  privates,  became  prisoners  of  war  with 
out  firing  a  shot.  Minon  at  once  retired  with  his 
prisoners  in  the  direction  of  San  Luis  de  Potosi, 
and  thence  they  were  sent  to  the  city  of  Mexico. 

This  Mexican  success  .was  soon  followed  by  an 
other.  On  the  morning  of  the  2  6th,  C  aptain  Heady, 
of  the  Kentucky  cavalry,  who  had  been  sent  with 
seventeen  troopers  to  examine  the  pass  of  Paloinas 
Adentro,  which  entered  the  valley  from  the  east, 
some  five  miles  to  the  north  of  Saltillo,  fell  in  with 
a  large  force  of  irregular  Mexican  cavalry,  under 
Lieutenant-colonel  Cruz>  He  too  surrendered 
without  resistance,  and  his  party  was  likewise  sent 
off  to  San  Luis. 

But  one  man  of  all  those  made  prisoners  return 
ed.  Captain  Henrie,  of  Texas,  who  had  accom 
panied  Borland  as  a  volunteer,  believed,  as  he  had 
been  a  prisoner  in  Mexican  hands  during  the  Texan 
war  and  had  effected  his  escape,  that  he  would  be 
put  to  death  upon  recognition.  He  attempted  and 
made  good  his  flight  from  the  guards  which  sur 
rounded  the  prisoners.  Mounted  on  a  thorough 
bred,  he  broke  from  their  midst,  and,  notwithstand 
ing  the  fire  which  was  poured  after  him,  escaped 
unhurt  to  the  rear. .  But,  keeping  to  the  right  of 
the  main  road  to  avoid  detached  parties,  the  greater 
distance  and  the  want  of  water  broke  down  his 

*  General  Wool  to  General  Taylor,  January  29th,  1847.  Executive  Docu 
ment,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Con 
gress,  p.  1107. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  33^ 

mare,  and  left  him  on  foot  many  miles  from  the 
American  advanced  pickets  at  Agua  Nueva.  With 
out  arms,  without  food  or  drink,  and  in  danger  of 
being  murdered  by  the  people  of  the  country  should 
he  approach  their  ranches  to  obtain  then},  he  nev 
ertheless  made  his  way  to  the  neighborhood  of  the 
advanced  American  positions,  and,  after  three  days 
of  suffering,  fell  in  with  a  reconnoitering  party  from 
Agua  Nueva. 

These  were  the  occurrences  which  induced  Gen 
eral  Taylor  to  change  his  head-quarters  to  Saltillo. 
He  arrived  there  on  the  2d  of  February,  and  find 
ing  every  thing  quiet  in  his  immediate  front,  and 
that  Minon  had  fallen  back  to  his  old  position  at 
Matehuala,  he  still  believed  that  there  would  be 
no  advance  in  force,  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  in 
that  direction.^  Under  this  impression,  he  per 
mitted  General  Butler  to  leave  the  field  and  re 
turn  to  the  United  States.  But,  finding  that  the 
confidence  of  the  volunteers  had  been  in  some  de 
gree  affected  by  the  recent  captures,  and  that  the 
inhabitants  of  Saltillo,  in  anticipation  of  an  attack 
by  the  Mexican  army,  had  in  many  cases  fled 
from  their  homes,  he  determined  to  leave  a  select 
garrison  at  Saltillo,  and  to  take  post  with  his  main 
force  at  Agua  Nueva,  eighteen  miles  in  advance. 
Accordingly,  on  the  5th,  he  moved  to  that  point 
with  the  force  which  had  accompanied  him  from 

*  General  Taylor  to  the  Adjutant  General,  February  4th,  1846.  Executive 
Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth 
Congress,  p.  1108. 


382  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

Monterey.  He  also  had  military  reasons  for  the 
measure  ;  for,  although  he  had  neither  anticipation 
nor  positive  information  of  Santa  Anna's  intention 
to  advance,  he  believed  it  to  be  the  best  policy  to 
hold  the  southern  extremity  of  the  defile  through 
the  Sierra  Madre,  rather  than  the  northern  at  Mon 
terey,  as  had  been  recommended  by  General  Scott ; 
for  at  that  point,  it  was  considered,  the  enemy, 
should  he  approach,  must  fight  in  the  field  against 
strong  natural  positions,  or  starve,  while,  if  Monte 
rey  were  held  as  the  advanced  post  of  the  Ameri 
can  army,  he  could  establish  himself  at  Saltillo 
and  maneuver  at  his  leisure.^  The  main  force 
was,  therefore,  soon  after  drawn  out  to  Agua  Nue^ 
va,  and  encamped  near  strong  defensive  positions. 
There  a  depot  was  established,  and  filled  as  rap 
idly  as  possible  from  the  rear  and  the  country 
around  Parras.  The  different  volunteer  corps  of 
the  army  were  put  under  instruction,  and,  in  the 
short  time  which  remained  to  them,  made  some  im 
provement  in  their  drill.  Although  nothing  was 
ascertained  by  the  reconnoitering  officers  which 
could  corroborate  the  various  flying  rumors  of 
the  Mexican  advance,  the  troops  were  kept  in  con 
stant  readiness  to  meet  the  enemy.  By  the  20th 
of  February,  however,  it  was  ascertained  that  Mi- 
non's  cavalry  had  advanced,  and  was  then  some 
where  to  the  left  of  Agua  Nueva.  This  informa- 

*  General  Taylor  to  the  Adjutant  General,  February  7th,  1846.  Executive 
Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth 
Congress,  p.  1109. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  333 

tion,  in  connection  with  the  various  rumors,  in 
duced  General  Taylor  to  turn  his  attention  to  that 
quarter;  for  on  that  flank  were  roads  hy  which  his 
position  at  Agua  Nueva  could  be  turned,  leading 
from  Encarnacion  through  the  rancho  of  La  Hedi- 
onda,  and  to  the  main  road  to  Saltillo  at  La  Eii- 
cantada,^  and  through  the  pass  of  Palomas  Aden- 
tro  to  the  north  of  the  town. 

On  the  20th  he  sent  a  strong  party >  consisting 
of  a  squadron  of  the  first  and  one  of  the  second 
dragoons,  a  section  of  light  artillery,  and  a  corps 
of  volunteer  cavalry,  making  up,  in  all,  a  force  of 
over  four  hundred  men,  under  Lieutenant-colonel 
May,  with  orders  to  reconnoiter  the  country  in  that 
direction,  and  to  ascertain  whether  the  enemy  might 
not  be  advancing  in  force  by  La  Hedionda,  with,  a 
view  of  striking  the  main  road  at  La  Encantada, 
or  of  penetrating  by  the  pass  of  Palomas  Adentro. 

On  the  same  day  he  sent  a  small  party,  under 
Major  M'Culloch,  a  partisan  officer  of  great  expe 
rience,  to  the  front,  to  observe  the  road  leading  di 
rect  from  Encarnacion.t 

May's  command  arrived  at  La  Hedionda  about 
three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  and  thence  small 
parties  were  sent  out  in  different  directions,  to  scour 
the  country  in  its  vicinity.  Signal  fires  were  soon 
after  lit  up  on  the  different  neighboring  hills,  and 

*  General  Taylor's  Official  Report,  March  6th,  1846.  Executive  Document, 
No.  1,  Senate,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  132,  and  Carleton's 
History  of  the  Battle  of  Buena  Vista,  p.  12. 

t  General  Taylor's  Official  Report,  March  6th,  1846.  Executive  Document, 
No.  1,  Senate,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  132. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

far  to  the  east  clouds  of  dust  arose,  which  indicat 
ed  a  movement  of  troops  in  that  direction.  To  ob 
tain  a  better  view,  Lieutenant  Sturgis  and  an  or 
derly  dragoon  were  sent  to  the  summit  of  a  range 
of  hills  which  rose  to  the  north  of  the  rancho ;  but 
they  fell  in  with  a  picket  of  the  enemy,  by  which 
they  were  fired  upon  and  captured.  The  reports 
of  the  escopetas,  the  various  signal  fires  which  had 
been  lit  up,  and  the  heavy  clouds  of  dust,  were  con 
clusive  proofs  of  the  vicinity  of  the  enemy ;  but, 
as  several  of  his  parties  had  not  returned  when 
night  came  on,  May  determined  to  remain  in  his 
position.  Having  made  dispositions  for  defense 
by  barricading  the  little  street  of  the  rancho  with 
cotton  bags,  he  lingered  until  about  ten  o'clock, 
when  a  man,  dressed  like  a  common  peon,  gave 
him  information  that  Minon  was  within  a  short  dis 
tance  beyond  the  ridge;  that  Santa  Anna,  with 
20,000  men,  had  been  at  Encarnacion  on  that 
morning,  and  would  attack  General  Taylor  on  the 
following  day.^  By  this  time  all  parties  had  come 
in  but  one,  and  without  any  delay  the  signal  was 
given  to  mount.  As  the  detachment  took  the  road 
to  Agua  Nueva,  from  all  the  different  peaks  occu 
pied  by  Mexican  sentinels  the  signal  fires  blazed 
up  again  to  announce  the  movement.  Marching 
in  expectation  and  in  readiness  for  instant  action, 
the1  command  kept  in  the  saddle  throughout  the 
night,  and  before  day-break  joined  the  army  at 
Agua  Nueva.  The  party  which  had  failed  to  join 

*  Carleton's  History  of  the  Battle  of  Buena  Vista,  p.  16. 


THE  .WAR  WITH -MEXIpO.  335 

at. La  Hedionda  came  in  soon  after.  The  intelli 
gence  which  the  Mexican  had  communicated  at 
the  rancho  was  soon  confirmed. 
.  M'Culloch.had  left  the  camp  at  Agua-  Nueva 
with  only  his  second  lieutenant,  Alston,  four  pri 
vates,  and  Lieutenant'  Clark,  of  the  Kentucky 
troops,  who  volunteered,  at  four  .o'clock  in  the  aft- 
ernopn.  Six  miles  in  .advance  of  Agua  Nueva,  at 
the  station  of  a  picket  guard,  lie  fell  in.  with  a  Mex 
ican  .deserter,  whom  he  sent  in  to  General  Taylor, 
and  proceeded  on,-  Keeping  off  the  .main  road,  he 
arrived-  at  midnight  in  sight  of  Kncarnaciori,  and, 
in  fact,  the  enemy  was  there  in  large  force.  After . 
a  close  reconnaissance,  he  sent  back  his.  whole  par 
ty  except  one  man,  and  with  him  .awaited  the- dawn 
of  day,  to  ascertain  with  more  accuracy  the  num 
bers  of  the  enemy.  He  passed,  by  night,  inside 
the  Mexican  pickets,  arid,  keeping  on  the  side  •  of . 
the  mountain,  to  the  east,  when  day  broke  he  fin 
ished  his  daring  reconnaissance,  made  -his  escape 
through  the  lines,  and  arrived  at  Agua  Nueva  dur 
ing  the 'afternoon  of  the  21st,  without  hinderance 
or  disaster.^ 

,  <  Upon  the  receipt  of  certain  information  that 
Santa  Anna  was  in  force  at  Encarnacion,  on.  the 
morning  of  that  day  General  Taylor  had  determ 
ined,  to  fallback  at  once  toihe  hacienda  ofBuena 
Vista;  for  he  feared  being  turned  by, his  left,  and 
that- the  enemy  might  gain  his  r^ar'at  La  Encarita- 
da  if  he  remained  at  Agua  Nueva,  while  the  strong 

*  Scouting\Expeditions  of  M'Culloch's  Rangers,  p.. 235. 

I.— BB 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

position  in  vicinity  of  Buena  Vista  could  be  turned 
only  by  the  difficult  and  almost  impracticable  pass 
of  Palomas  Adentro.  He  had,  therefore,  on  the 
morning  of  the  21st,  broken  up  his  camp  at  Agua 
Nueva,  and  moved  the  main  body  of  his  force  at 
once  to  the  new  position.  His  depot  of  stores  was 
removed  as  far  as  practicable  during  the  afternoon 
and  evening.  The  regiment  of  Arkansas  cavalry 
was  left  to  protect  the  trains  and  the  transporta 
tion  until  the  last  moment,  when  Colonel  Yell  had 
orders  to  fire  the  hacienda  and  all  the  stores  which 
he  was  unable  to  remove.  During  the  night,  two 
companies  of  dragoons  and  a  battalion  of  Kentucky 
horse  were  sent  back  from  Buena  Vista  to  re-enforce 
the  Arkansas  volunteers,  which  arrived  at  Agua 
Nueva  near  midnight.  Soon  after,  the  advanced 
pickets  in  the  pass  were  driven  in  in  such  haste 
that  they  waited  not  to  see  whether  their  enemy, 
who  had  approached  and  delivered  a  scattering 
fire,  was  of  horse  or  foot.  The  alarm  being  given, 
the  torch  was  at  once  applied  to  the  buildings,  the 
stores,  and  several  large  stacks  of  unthreshed  grain, 
and  the  whole  train  of  wagons  started-at  once  with 
extreme  haste  to  Buena  Vista.  The  troopers  re 
mained  until  the  stores  had  been  consumed,  when 
they  also  retired,  and  arrived  at  dawn  of  day  at  the 
selected  field  of  battle.* 

Upon  arriving  at  Encarnacion,  Santa  Anna  had 
reorganized  his  army  and  settled  his  plan  for  at 
tack.  Believing  that  General  Taylor  was  at  Agua 

*  Carleton's  History  of  the  Battle  of  Buena  Vista,  p.  25. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  337 

Nueva,  he  had  three  roads  upon  which  to  operate : 
the  direct  route  through  the  denies,  the  road  to  the 
right  by  La  Hedionda,  through  Guachuchil  to  La 
Encantada,  or  to  the  left  by  the  Punta  de  Santa 
Elena,  through  San  Juan  de  la  Vaqueria  to  the 
same  point.  Either  of  the  two  last  turned  the  po 
sition  of  Agua  Nueva,  but  were  considered  imprac 
ticable,  as  they  would  increase  the  march  by  two 
or  three  days,  through  a  country  destitute  of  provi 
sions  and  forage,  and,  to  a  great  degree,  of  water ; 
wherefore  he  decided  to  move  by  the  direct  route, 
and  made  his  arrangements  to  surprise  General 
Taylor  in  his  position  at  Agua  Nueva.  His  orders 
were  issued  on  the  20th  for  the  march  to  be  con 
tinued  on  the  following  day. 

General  Ampudia,  with  four  light  battalions, 
was  placed  in  the  advance,  supported  by  a  bat 
talion  of  sappers.  A  company  of  marksmen  and 
three  sixteen  pounders,  with  their  ammunition, 
marched  next,  followed  by  General  Pacheco's  di 
vision  of  the  van.  Lombardini's  division  of  the 
center  followed,  accompanied  by  five  twelve  pound 
ers,  with  their  ammunition.  Five  eight  pounders 
and  Ortega's  division  marched  in  the  rear.  Each 
division  of  infantry  took  with  it  an  extra  supply 
of  688,000  rounds  of  musket  ammunition.  The 
cavalry,  in  escort  of  the  general  ammunition  train 
and  the  baggage  of  the  army,  followed  in  the 
rear.* 

*  Mexican  General  Orders,  20th  and  21st  of  February.     Executive  Docu 
ment,  No.  1,  Senate,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  156. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

&        *  '       "    ,       •       K-'  '  «" 

In  this  order  the  Mexican  army  began  its  march 
about  noon  to  traverse  the  thirty-six  miles  of  desert 
between  Encarnacion  and  Agua  Nueva.  Every 
precaution  was  taken  that  the  troops  should  be 
supplied  with  water  for  the  long  night  march,  for 
it  was  intended  to  halt  during  the  night  in  the 
desert,  and  to  continue  the  movement  without 
noise,  signal,  or  beat  of  drum,  so  as  to  arrive  and 
fall  on  General  Taylor  at  Agua  Nueva  at  early 
dawn  on  the  22d.^ 

The  whole  disposition  was  deemed  by  General 
Santa  Anna  to  be  excellent,!  but  it  had  one  ele 
ment  of  failure ;  it  was  based  on  the  anticipation 
of  error  in  the  action  of  his  adversary,  which  can 
never  be  relied  upon  with  security.  His  intentions 
were,  so  far  as  related  to  his  own  movements,  en 
tirely  fulfilled,  except  in  the  firing  of  the  advanced 
skirmishers  of  Ampudia's  corps,  which  that  gener 
al  excused  by  stating  that  he  believed  the  Amer 
icans  to  have  mistaken  his  for  Minon's  troops. 
Upon  arriving  at  Agua  Nueva  on  the  morning  of  the 
21st,  instead  of  coming  upon  Taylor  by  surprise 
as  he  had  anticipated,  Santa  Anna  found  that  place 
abandoned,  and  the  battle  ground  changed  to  an 
unknown  spot.  But  as  he  believed  that  General 
Taylor's  movement  from  Agua  Nueva  was  a  flight 
frpm  his  overwhelming  force,  and,  as  he  had  ordered 
Minon  to  penetrate  by  a  route  over  the  mountains 

*  Mexican  General  Orders,  20th  and  21st  of  February.     Executive  Docu 
ment,  No.  1,  Senate,  first  Sessipn  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  156. 
t  Santa  Anna's  Official  Report  of  the  Battle  of  Angostura. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  339 

or  that  of  Palomas  Adentro  to  the  rear  of  the  Amer 
ican  position,  and  occupy  the  hacienda  of  Buena 
Vista,  he  hoped  that  his  cavalry  would  arrest  the 
march  in  retreat,  or  make  such  diversion  as  would 
allow  time  for  him  to  come  up  and  fall  on  with  the 
main  body  of  the  Mexican  army,  and  he  resolved 
to  proceed.^ 

Wherefore  he  ordered  the  cavalry  from  rear  to 
front,  and,  having  halted  at  Agua  Nueva  only  long 
enough  to  allow  his  soldiers  time  to  supply  them 
selves  with  water,  he  pushed  the  whole  force  for 
ward  in  pursuit.  During  the  morning  of  the  22d 
his  cavalry  came  in  sight  of  Taylor's  army,  though 
not  in  disorderly  retreat,  as  had  been  anticipated, 
for  it  was  just  then  taking  up  position  for  battle  in 
the  pass  of  La  Angostura. 

This  position,  which  General  Wool  had  select 
ed,!  and  General  Taylor  had  adopted  for  his  bat 
tle  ground,  was  indeed  of  remarkable  strength. 
The  whole  distance  from  Saltillo  to  La  Encantada 
is  through  a  valley  ranging  from  one  and  a  half  to 
four  miles  in  width.  On  either  side  rugged  mount 
ains,  inaccessible  for  any  but  light  troops,  rise  from 
two  to  three  thousand  feet,  confining  operations  of 
masses  to  the  narrow  plain.  From  La  Encantada 
a  small  stream  runs  northward  toward  Saltillo, 
keeping  its  course  nearest  the  western  side  of  the 
valley,  but  leaving  room  for  wide  cultivated  fields 

*  Santa  Anna's  Official  Report  of  the  Battle  of  Angostura, 
t  Correspondence.     Appendix  to  Carleton's  History  of  the  Battle  of  Bue 
na  Vista,  p.  176-183. 


4.-.  tt^.5 
,-**.  I 


~v 


39Q  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

on  the  slopes  of  the  mountains.  The  road  runs 
along  its  eastern  bank,  and  the  ground  between  it 
and  the  eastern  barrier  is  cut  up  by  deep  and  wide 
ravines,  which  set  into  the  high  ground,  extending 
from  its  vicinity  toward  the  steep  ascents.  At  La 
Angostura,  one  and  a  half  miles  from  Buena  Vista, 
and  eight  from  Saltillo,  the  high  lands  extend  so 
far  toward  the  rivulet  that  room  is  barely  left  for 
the  passage  of  the  road- way.  On  the  east  of  the 
road  are  high  and  rugged  banks,  and  on  the  west 
is  the  perpendicular  bank  of  the  rivulet.  The  de 
file  was  protected  from  being  turned  on  the  right 
by  a  net- work  of  impassable  ravines,  which  the 
stream  had  worn  in  the  soil.  These  crossed  each 
other  in  various  directions,  and  south  of  the  defile 
some  hundred  yards  the  system  branched,  one 
branch  running  to  the  west  toward  the  mountains, 
while  the  other  continued  along  the  road.  As  the 
ravines  extended  to  the  mountains  on  the  west,  the 
right  was  nearly  secure  (though  perhaps  it  might 
have  been  turned  near  the  mountain),  and  the  bat 
tle  would  most  probably  be  fought  by  an  enemy 
approaching  from  the  south  on  the  left.  There  the 
high  land,  which  in  a  narrow  ridge  extended  to  the 
road,  opened  into  a  broad  plateau  which  reached 
to  the  mountains.  On  the  southwest  the  plateau 
was  bounded  by  a  ravine  of  sufficient  width  to  be 
called  a  narrow  valley,  which  reached  from  the 
road  nearly  to  the  mountains  on  the  east.  Toward 
the  mountains  this  valley  ended  in  narrow  and  dif 
ficult  ravines,  and  beyond  it,  on  the  south,  an  ele- 


TO  rACE    P.  391 -VOL  .  /.    ( 


w. 


t-.' 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

i.      /  jC         *«  ^  -v  '  . 

yated  ridge  extended  from  them  to  the  road.  On 
the  western  side  of  the  plateau  toward  the  road,  in 
front  of  La  Angostura,  three  barrancas,  with  steep 
banks  of  loose  soil  and  pebbles,  cut  in,  dividing  it 
for  nearly  half  the  distance  toward  the  mountains 
into  three  narrow  ridges  salient  to  the  west,  the 
breadth  being  north  and  south.  Upon  its  north 
eastern  side  it  was  bounded  by  a  ravine  extending 
from  the  mountains  to  the  road,  and  the  country 
still  further  in  rear  was  cut  up  by  three  main  ra 
vines,  which,  with  many  branches,  divided  the  % 
ground  into  smaller  plains  of  different  capacities. 
The  mountains  which  bounded  it  upon  the  south 
east  rose  abruptly,  except  in  two  ridges,  which, 
with  a  sharp  ravine  in  the  angle,  united  near  the 
summit. 

When  General  Taylor  had  arrived  at  Buena  Vis-  . 
ta,  after  drawing  back  his  main  force  from  Agua 
Nueva,  he  left  the  troops  under  Wool's  tempora 
ry  command,  and  proceeded  with  an  escort  to  Sal- 
tillo  to  make  arrangements  for  the  defense  of  that 
place.  Before  his  return  on  the  following  morn 
ing,  the  clouds  of  dust  arising  from  the  direction 
of  La  Encantada  announced  the  approach  of  the 
Mexican  army.  The  long  roll  sounded  at  eight 
o'clock.  The  American  troops,  at  the  encampment 
at  Buena  Vista,  fell  into  their  ranks  with  three 
hearty  cheers,  and,  under  Wool's  command,  march 
ed  to  the  chosen  field  of  battle.  It  was  the  birth 
day  of  Washington,  and  the  remembrance  was  not 
lost  upon  the  soldiers.  They 'were  volunteers,  most 


..a.  .j.-v 


392  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

*  '-'-   f  0     \  •  * 

of  them  for  the  first  time  about  to  engage  in  battle ; 
but,  for  the  greater  part,  tfrey  were  strong  in  con 
fidence  in  their  position,  strong  in  their*  national 
pride,  strong  in  their  personal  bravery,  and,  for  the 
most  important  point  for  imperfectly-disciplined 
troops^  strong— they  had  confidence  in  their  gener 
al;  for  the  name  of  the  successful  commander  of 
Palo  Alto,  Resaea,  and  Monterey  was  in  high  re 
pute  with  Americans  and  Mexicans,  and  .was  in  it 
self  a  tower  of  strength. 

Upon  arriving  at  the  position,  Wool  posted  Wash 
ington's  battery  in  the  road  at  La  Angostura,  with 
.Colonel  Hardin's  first  Illinois  regiment  in  support 
upon  the  ridge  of  high  land  immediately  to  its 
left,  and  Colonel  M'Kee's  second  Kentucky  on  an 
elevation  in  its  rear.  On  Hardin's  left  Bissel's  sec 
ond-Illinois  was  formed, -and.  far  to  the  left,  under 
the  mouijtain,  Yell's  and  Marshall's'  battalions  of 
Arkansas  and  Kentucky  mounted  volunteers  were 
stationed  in  observation.  The  remaining. force,  con 
sisting  of  Lane's  Indiana  brigade,  the  Mississippi 
regiment,  two  squadrons  of  dragoons,  and  six  guns 
of  Sherman's  and  Bragg's  batteries,  were  kept,  in 
'  reserve  to  the  rear  of  the  plateau.^ 

In  this  order  the  advance  of  the  enemy  was 
aWaited.  Upon  finding  the  American  troops  in  po 
sition,  his  cavalry  pulled  up  and'  suspended  move 
ment  until  the  arrival  of  the  infantry  and  artille 
ry.  During  the  delay,  General  Santa  Anna  sent 

*  General  Wool's  Official  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate, 
first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  145. 


.THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO.     .  393 

to  General  Taylor,  who  had  meanwhile  return 
ed  from  Saltillo,  a.  summons  to  surrender  at  dis 
cretion,  inasmuch  as  he  was  surrounded',  by  an 
army  of  twenty  thousand  men;  and.  must,  in  the 
e^ent  of  a  hattle,  he  inevitably  destroyed  ;#  an  act 
of  courtesy  which  he  might  very  well  have  dis 
pensed  with,  had  he  considered  the  American  char 
acter,  and  especially  the  stern  bravery  of  the  .Amer 
ican  general.  The  answer  was  short,  courteous, 
and  a  decided  negative. 

The  Mexican  main  army  having  arrived,  Santa. 
Anna  commenced  his  dispositions  fojr  the  conflict. 
His  observations  had  made  'him  acquainted  with 
the  impracticable  nature  of  the  ground  upon  his 
left,  and  of  the, unguarded  state  of  the  mountains 
upon,  the  east,  and,  as  the  battle  must 'be  fought  in  • 
that  direction,  he  ordered  Ampudia  to  seize  q,nd  hold 
the  heights  with  his  light  division  without  delay,  f- 
•Ampudia,  who  had  arrived  at  one  o'clock,  soon  aft 
er  marched  to  the  mountains,  and  commenced  the 
ascent  by  the  southernmpst  ridge.  Wheri  this 
movement  had  been  observed,  Colonel  Marshall, 
who  was  re-enforced  by  a  battalion  of  Indiana  ri 
flemen  under  Major  Gorman,  dismounted  the  rifle 
companies  of  his  command,  and,  taking  post  on  the  • 
northern  ridge  of  the  ascent  with  them  and  Gor 
man's  party,  prepared  to  engage  the  enemy.  T,he 
lines  on  either  crest  gradually  approached,  as,  in 

*  Taylor's  Official  Report  and  Correspondence.    Executive  Document,  No. 
1,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  97,  98. 
t  Santa  Anna's  Official  Report. 


394  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

the  endeavor  to  outflank,  the  soldiers  climbed  up 
toward  the  angle,  and  while  their  efforts  were  con 
tinued  for  this  purpose  the  Mexican  army  was  tak 
ing  up  position  out  of  range  of  the  American  artil 
lery. 

Its  right,  a  battery  of  sixteen  pounders,  support 
ed  by  the  regiment  of  engineers,  rested  on  the 
mountains,  whence  Pacheco's  and  Lombardini's 
divisions  stretched  in  two  lines,  toward  the  west, 
to  the  road.  Two  batteries  of  twelves  and  eights 
were  posted  on  the  left,  and  the  battalion  of  Leon 
occupied  an  eminence  in  advance  of  the  main  line, 
directly  opposite  to  La  Angostura.  The  cavalry 
was  stationed  in  reserve  in  rear  of  either  flank,  and 
the  general  baggage  train,  under  the  protection  of 
a  strong  brigade  of  infantry,  was  parked  far  to  the 
south  of  the  field  of  battle.^ 

Upon  a  movement  by  Santa  Anna  in  observa 
tion  toward  the  mountains  on  the  west,  Taylor 
threw  two  guns  of  Bragg' s  battery,  supported  by  the 
second  Kentucky  regiment,  across  the  ravine,  at  a 
point  some  distance  to  his  rear,  whence  they  ad 
vanced  beyond  and  to  the  right  of  La  Angostura. 
To  prevent  the  enemy  from  coming  around  by  the 
base  of  the  mountains,  and  to  keep  up  communi 
cation  with  the  skirmishers  on  the  left,  General 
Lane  was  stationed  on  the  left  of  the  plateau  with 
the  second  regiment  of  Indiana  troops,  and  three 
guns  of  Washington's  battery,  under  Lieutenant 

*  Santa  Anna's  Official  Report. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  395 

O'Brien.     While  the  troops  were  in  these  positions, 
the  Mexicans  opened  the  battle.* 

A  shell  thrown  from  the  Mexican  howitzer  was 
the  signal,  and  immediately  Ampudia's  light  troops 
commenced  a  heavy  fire,  in  continued  rolling  vol 
leys,  upon  the  American  skirmishers  on  the  oppo 
site  ridge  of  the  mountain ;  but  they  lay  close  in 
the  rocks,  whence  the  rattling  clang  of  their  rifles 
announced  a  resistance  less  noisy  but  far  more  effi 
cient  than  the  stream  of  shot  which  was  poured 
from  the  opposite  ridge.  In  this  quarter  the  en 
gagement  continued  during  the  afternoon,  each 
party  climbing  higher  and  higher  upon  their  re 
spective  ridges,  until  two  lines  of  skirmishers  ex 
tended  from  the  base  n.early  to  the  summit  of  the 
mountain.  An  occasional  shot  at  long  range  was 
thrown  from  the  Mexican  batteries,  but  the  Amer 
icans  upon  the  plateau  awaited  the  main  move 
ments  for  closer  conflict  in  stern  silence,  and  would 
not  reply.  About  La  Angostura  the  time  had  been 
taken  advantage  of  to  strengthen  the  position. 
Hardin's  regiment  had  completed  a  parapet  along 
its  front,  and  an  epaulement  had  been  constructed 
across  the  road  for  the  protection  of  Washington's 
battery.  A  ditch  and  parapet  on  the  right,  among 
the  ravines,  had  been  made  and  occupied  by  the 
immediate  supporting  force  of  the  battery,  two 
companies  of  Illinois  infantry,  and,  with  this  forti 
fication,  the  attack  of  the  enemy  was  anticipated, 

*  Taylor's  Official  Report.  Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate,  first 
Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  133. 


396        '*          THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO. 

at  the  position  deemed  most  important,  in  perfect 
confidence. 

,  At  dark  the  contest  ceased  upon  the  mountain, 
and  the  -Americans  were  recalled  to  the  plain  for 
the  night.^  The  Mexicans  had  succeeded  in  out 
flanking  them  (though  the  position  had  not  as  yet 
been  turned),  and  held  on  to  the  ground  which 
they  had  gained.  In  the  affairs  in  that  direction, 
hpwever,  hut  four  Americans  had  been  wounded, 
while,  many  Mexicans  had  fallen  before  the  prac 
tice  of  the  riflemen. 

•The  night  passed  quietly  off  about  the  position 
.of  the  hostile  armies,  a  few  straggling  shots  be- 
tw.een  the  pickets  being  all  which  disturbed  the 
silence. 


•  General  Minon,  had  made  good  his  passage 
through  the  defile  of  Palomas  Adentro,  and,  while 
the  armies  were  in  position  about  La  Angostura, 
had  appeared  with  his  strong  brigade  of  cavalry 
upon  the  plains  of  the  valley  north  of  Saltillo. 
Santa  Anna's  orders  to  him  at  this  period  were  to 
remain  in  position,  and  to  fall  upon  the  American 
forces  in  their  retreat,  which  he  counted  upon  com 
pelling  on  the  following  day.f  For  this  duty  also, 
1000  mounted  rancheros,  raised  in  the  country 
about  Parras,  had  been  sent  by  a  mule  path  from 
Patos  to  the  village  of  Capellania,  to  harass  the  re- 

*  Colonel  Humphrey  Marshall's  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  1, 
Senate,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  165. 
t  Carleton's  History  of  the  Battle  of  Buena  Vista,  p.  43. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


397 


treat  from  the  opposite  flank  ;#  but,  if. they  ever 
arrived  at  their  destination,  they  never  showed 
themselves  in  the  operations.  Mmon's  appearance 
caused  Taylor  to  feel  some  anxiety  for  the  security 
of  his  depot  at  Saltillo,  and  at  evening  he  proceed 
ed  thither,  with  a  squadron  of  dragoons  and  the 
Mississippi  regiment,  to  complete"  his  arrangements 
for  defense,  as  he  was  convinced  that  the  battle 
would  not  take  place  before'  the  following  morn- 
ing.f 

Saltillo  was  garrisoned  by  four  companies  of  Il 
linois  infantry,  under  Major  Warren,  who,  upon 
the  appearance  of  the  Mexican  cavalry,  had  bar 
ricaded  the  streets,  and-  taken  possession  of  the 'Ca 
thedral  with  three  companies  of  Iris'  force.  A  re 
doubt  on  the  heights  south  of  the  town,  which 
commanded  several  approaches,  was  garrisoned  by 
the  other,  and  armed  with  Webster's  twenty-four 
pounder  howitzers.  General  .Taylor's  train  and 
head- quarters  camp  was  located  upon  the  brow  of 
the  hill  to  the  west,  guarded  by  two  companies  of 
Mississippi  riflemen  and  a  six  poun'der  gun.J  Hav 
ing  remained  during  the  night  at  Saltillo,  and  ver- . 
ified  these  dispositions  for  defense,-  General  Taylor 
returned,  on  the  morning  of  the  23d,  with  the  body 
of  the  force  which  had  accompanied  him  and  a 
piece  of  artillery,  to  the  field  of  Angostura. 

Before  his  arrival  General  Santa  Anna  recom- 


*  Santa  Anna's  Official  Report. 

t  General  Taylor's  Official  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate., 
first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  133.  t  Idem  ibidem. 


398  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

menced  the  action.  He  had  re-enforced  Ampudia's 
light  division  during  the  night  with  2000  men 
from  Pacheco's  and  Lomhardini's  corps,  and,  with 
that  re-enforcement,  Ampudia  had  stretched  his 
right  still  further,  to  secure  the  advantage  which 
he  had  gained  on  the  preceding  evening.^  At 
the  first  dawn  of  day  his  troops  renewed  their  fire ; 
for  the  American  skirmishers,  which  had  heen 
withdrawn  during  the  night,  having  been  re-en 
forced  hy  a  battalion  of  Illinois  troops,  under  Ma 
jor  Trail,  were  again  ordered  into  action.  Al 
though  the  enemy  showed  himself  in  great  force, 
and  occupied  many  points  which  the  Americans 
had  held  on  the  preceding  evening,  yet,  from  the 
rocks  which  covered  the  ridge,  they  maintained 
the  fight  in  spite  of  his  numbers  and  noisy  fire. 
At  sunrise  the  Mexican  skirmishers  poured  down 
into  the  ravine  from  the  southern  ridge  in  great 
strength,  with  the  apparent  intention  of  climbing 
the  opposite  steep,  and  carrying  the  position  by  di 
rect  assault.  They  were,  however,  soon  checked, 
for  Lieutenant  O'Brien  brought  forward  a  twelve 
pounder  howitzer,  and,  although  the  distance  and 
elevation  were  great,  he  tore  up  the  ravine  for 
much  of  its  length  with  shrapnel  shot,  and  so  ef 
fectually  that  the  Mexican  fire  in  the  vicinity  ceas 
ed  at  once,  and  their  skirmishers  clambered  up  the 
mountain  out  of  range,  amid  the  continued  shouts 
of  the  American  skirmishers  and  line.f 

*  Santa  Anna's  Official  Report. 

t  Carleton's  History  of  tfce  Battle  of  Buena  Vista,  p.  51. 


THE    WAR   WITH   MEXICO.  399 

While  this  was  transpiring,  General  Michelto- 
rena,  chief  of  Santa  Anna's  staff,  succeeded  in  plant 
ing  a  battery  of  eight  pounders  near  the  hase  of 
the  mountains,  on  the  ridge  south  of  the  plateau, 
whence  a  fire  was  opened  upon  O'Brien's  gun,  but 
at  so  long  a  range  that  it  was  ineffectual,  and  no 
reply  was  attempted.  From  the  activity  apparent 
in  the  Mexican  positions,  it  was  evident  that  San 
ta  Anna  was  making  his  dispositions  to  advance, 
and  Wool,  therefore,  prepared  to  receive  him. 
Bragg's  guns  and  M'Kee's  regiment  were  allowed 
to  remain  on  the  extreme  right.  Washington's 
battery,  with  Hardin's  first  Illinois  regiment  in 
support,  kept  the  pass  of  Angostura,  and  Colonel 
Lane's  third  Indiana  occupied  the  high  ground  in 
its  rear.  Bissel's  second  Illinois  regiment  occupied 
the  center  of  the  plateau,  with  a  piece  of  artillery 
on  either  flank,  opposite  to  the  head  of  the  second 
ravine,  which  cut  into  the  high  ground  from  the 
west.  Between  this  position  and  La  Angostura 
Steen's  squadron  of  the  first  dragoons  and  a  com 
pany  of  Texas  horse  were  posted.  To  the  left  of 
the  plain  General  Lane  had  the  second  Indiana 
regiment  and  O'Brien's  guns,  and  next  the  mount 
ain,  in  the  broad  ravine  to  the  north  of  the  plateau, 
were  portions  of  the  Kentucky  and  Arkansas  cav 
alry,  covered  on  their  left  by  the  skirmishers  on  the 
mountain.*  By  this  disposition  the  mass  of  force 

*  Wool's  Official  Report.  Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate,  first  Ses 
sion  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  146,  and  Carleton's  History  of  the  Battle 
of  Buena  Vista,  p.  53. 


•  400  THE  WAR WITH  MEXICO. 

.  was  Collected,  .about  La  .Angostura, "the  point  of 
greatest  strength,  ami. deemed  to  be  that  of  greatest 
importance,' while  the  left,  the  direction  iri  which 
the  line  could,  be  most  easily  turned,  was  defended 
by  corps^.with  wide  intervals,  and  three  .pieces  of 
artillery. 

In  the  morning  General  Santa  Anna  observed 
the  position  of  Bragg's  guns  and  M'Kee's  regiment 
upon 'the  extreme  American  right,  but  the  same 
reasons  which  induced  him  to  attempt  to  force  the 
passage  by  his  own  right  induced  him  to  neglect 
that  force,  and  make  his  battle  entirely  toward  the 
east.  He  therefore  brought  forward  his-  twelve 
.  pounder  battery,  and  planted  it  on  the  western  ex 
tremity  of -the  ridge  iri  front  of  the  plateau,  within 
,  *'  range  of  La.  Angostura,  and  organized  three  pow 
erful  columns  'of  attack..  The  first,  under  his  chief 
ejigiiieer,  General  Mora  y  Villamil,  was  made  up 

•  of  the  regiment  of  engineers,  the-  twelfth  of  the 
, '  line,  the  fixed  battalion  of  Mexico,  the  battalion 

'  of  Puebla,  and  the  guarda,  costa  of  Tampico.  The 
second  was  to  consist  of  the  remainder  of  Lombar- 
dini's  and  Pacheco's  divisions,  which  were  to  con- 
.  centrate  on  the.  plateau  at  the  base  of  the  mount 
ain,  and  move*  on  the  American  left. .  It  was  to  ef 
fect  al  junction  with  the  third*  column,  Ampudia's 
light  division,  r.e-enforced  as  it  was,  which  was  to 
sweep  down  the  mountain,  when  the  whole  great 
er  force  was  to  pass  on  to  'the  American  rear.  Mo 
ra  ^Villamil  and  Pacheco  each  had  powerful  sup 
porting  corps  of  cavalry,  and  the  infantry  force  about 


THE    WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


401 


the  baggage  train,  under  General  Ortega,  was  still 
in  reserve.^ 

The  heavy  rolling  volleys  of  Mexican  musketry 
and  the  sharp  crack  of  American  rifles  kept  up  the 
noise  of  battle  on  the  left  while  the  troops  of  the 
main  armies  were  taking  up  position.  General 
Mora  y  Villamil  formed  his  column  along  the  road, 
in  front  of  Washington's  battery,  out  of  range.  Pa- 
checo  collected  his  troops  in  the  valley  south  of  the 
plateau,  and  halted  out  of  sight,  while  Lombard! - 
ni's  corps,  from  the  highest  part  of  the  ridge  beyond 
it,  poured  down  in  splendid  array  to  join  him. 

The  Mexican  columns  soon  advanced,  Mora  y 
Villamil's  directly  upon  La  Angostura,  while  Pa- 
checo's  commenced  the  ascent  of  the  plateau  at  a 
point  near  the  western  extremity  of  the  southern 
most  ridge.  When  the  advance  of  this  column 
was  discovered,  Wool  was  at  La  Angostura;  but 
Lane,  as  had  been  directed,!  ordered  forward 
O'Brien's  guns,  supported  byxthe  second  Indiana 
regiment,  to  meet  and  check  it.  The  guns  were 
thrown  into  battery  to  fire  to  the  west,  upon  the 
southern  ridge,  near  its  base,  and  the  infantry  dis 
played  on  the  left  and  rear.  The  line,  thus  dis 
posed,  stretched  across  the  ridge  and  defended  the 
passage,  but  it  presented  its  flank  to  the  Mexi 
can  eight  pounder  battery.  As  soon  as  it  was 
formed,  Pacheco's  division  came  over  the  western 

*  Santa  Anna's  Official  Report. 

t  Wool's  Official  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate,  first  Ses 
sion  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  147. 

L— Cc 


402  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

crest  in  close  column  of  regiments,  and  its  advance 
opened  a  fire.  It  was  at  once  returned  with  spirit 
and  effect.  O'Brien's  shot  tore  through  the  thick 
ranks  from  front  to  rear,  and,  although  the  Mexi 
can  masses  were  crowding  up  in  haste  from  the 
valley,  the  head  of  the  column  was  checked  and 
thrown  repeatedly  into  confusion.  Its  advanced 
corps,  the  new  regiment  of  Guanajuato,  was  killed, 
wounded,  or  dispersed.  The  Mexican  eight  pound 
er  battery,  however,  had  opened  fire  upon  the  flank 
of  the  Indiana  troops.  To  get  beyond  its  range 
and  to  continue  to  defend  the  ridge,  Lane^  intend 
ed  to  advance  the  line,  and  O'Brien  had  already 
thrown  forward  his  guns  fifty  yards  nearer  the 
Mexican  column,  when  Colonel  Bowles  gave  an 
order  to  "  cease  firing  and  retreat."!  His  men,  in 
front  of  overwhelming  odds,  much  cut  up  by  the 
fire  of  the  Mexican  battery,  and  badly  disciplined, 
were  in  this  instance  but  too  glad  to  obey  him. 
They  broke,  and,  in  spite  of  all  efforts  made  by 
other  officers  to  restrain  them,  their  retreat  soon 
became  a  rout.  The  greater  number  of  the  men 
of  that  regiment  fled  beyond  the  range  of  fire; 
many  continued  their  flight  to  Buena  Vista,  and 
some  even  to  Saltillo.J  O'Brien,  with  his  guns, 
held  on  to  his  position  for  some  moments ;  but  the 
whole  fire  of  the  Mexican  battery  and  of  the  head 

*  General  Lane's  Official  Report.  Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate, 
first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  182-185. 

t  Carleton's  History  of  the  Battle  of  Buena  Vista,  p.  60. 

t  Wool's  Official  Report.  Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate,  first  Ses 
sion  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  147. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  493 

of  Pacheco's  column  was  concentrated  upon  him, 
and  he  was  compelled  to  retire.  His  horses  and 
cannoneers  being  much  cut  up,  he  was  obliged  to 
sacrifice  one  of  his  guns,  and,  upon  arriving  at  the 
position  of  the  main  force  at  La  Angostura,  he  had 
not  a  single  man  unhurt  to  serve  the  two  remain 
ing  pieces*^ 

Pacheco's  masses,  being  relieved  in  front,  came 
over  the  crest  of  the  plateau  and  effected  a  junction 
with  Lombardini's  corps,  which,  had  advanced  un 
opposed  across  the  head  of  the,  valley  arid  ascend 
ed  near  the  mountains.  The  attention  of  the  com 
bined  forces  'was  first  directed  to  the  American 
troops  upon  the  plateau,  and  a  heavy  fire  was  open 
ed  upon  Bissel's  second  Illinois  regiment,  and  the 
two  pieces  of  artillery  under  Lieutenants  Thomas 
and  French.  Four  companies  of  Arkansas  volun 
teers  had  been  ordered  to  dismount  and  move  up 
when  the  battle  commenced,  but,  upon  reaching 
the  plain,  they  fled  at  the  first  fire,  and,  with  few 
exceptions,  those  companies  were  heard  of  no  more 
during  the  action,  f 

When  the  Indiana  regiment  fled,  Colonel  Mar 
shall  recalled  his  dismounted  Kentuckians  from  the 
slope  of  the  mountain,  and  advanced  his  remaining 
mounted  companies  of  Kentucky  and  Arkansas 
troops  to  cover  the  retreat 4  His  skirmishers,  and 

*  Captain  O'Brien's  Official  Report.  Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate, 
first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  160. 

t  Carleton's  History  of  the  Battle  of  Buena  Vista,  p.  67. 

t  Colonel  Marshall's  Official  Report.  Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate, 
first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  167. 


404  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

Gorman's  and  Trail's  battalions,  fell  away  from 
their  positions,  and  retreated  along  the  base  of  the 
mountains  north  of  the  plateau,  and  by  degrees  to 
the  hacienda  of  Buena  Vista,  followed  by  the  cav 
alry  of  the  command,  for  direct  communication  with 
the  main  American  force  about  La  Angostura  was 
cut  off.  Ampudia's  light  division  pressed  on  down 
the  slope  in  pursuit,  and  the  American  position  was 
completely  turned. 

Mora  y  Villamil's  column  had  meanwhile  ad 
vanced  against  La  Angostura.  As  it  came  within 
close  range,  Washington  opened  his  battery  with 
terrific  rapidity  and  effect.  His  shot  tore  and 
crashed  through  the  dense  mass  of  Mexican  troops 
in  its  entire  depth.  They  advanced  but  little  after 
the  fire  had  opened,  and  in  a  few  minutes,  the  head 
of  the  column  being  completely  crushed  and  shat 
tered,  the  whole  mass  heaved  in  confusion,  broke, 
and  the  soldiers  fled  for  shelter  into  the  ravines 
and  gorges  which  set  into  the  plateau,  leaving  the 
road  encumbered  with  a  multitude  of  dead  and 
dying. 

As  this  fire  opened  from  La  Angostura,  Pache- 
co's  troops  pressed  heavily  on  the  small  American 
force  upon  the  plateau.  But  the  two  guns  and  the 
second  Illinois  regiment  held  their  ground  with 
wonderful  pertinacity,  falling  back  only  as  the 
masses  of  the  enemy  extended  to  the  north  and 
threatened  to  outflank  them,  and  halting  and  de 
livering  well-directed  fires  of  canister  and  musket 
ry  so  soon  as  the  temporary  danger  had  passed. 


THE    WAR    WITH   MEXICO. 

Upon  the  flight  of  the  second  Indiana  regiment, 
Bragg's  guns  and  M'Kee's  regiment  had  been  with 
drawn  from  their  position  on  the  extreme  right, 
Sherman's  remaining  section  ordered  to  advance, 
and  these  forces  hurried  at  once  to  restore  the  hat- 
tie  on  the  left.  Sherman  came  first  into  battery, 
and  Bragg,  arriving  immediately  after,  took  up  the 
cannonade.  Six  pieces  of  light  artillery  were  then 
in  play  upon  the  Mexican  troops  in  flank ;  for  Pa- 
checo's,  LombardinFs,  and  Ampudia's  divisions,  be 
ing  joined  by  a  heavy  support  of  cavalry,  and  giv 
ing  up  the  attempt  to  force  the  Americans  from 
the  plateau,  were,  as  had  been  ordered  by  Santa 
Anna,  moving  on  around  the  base  of  the  mountain 
to  the  American  rear.  The  American  artillery 
soon  told,  and  the  column  was  divided  on  the  plain, 
many  Mexican  troops  falling  back  to  the  valley  to 
.the  south.  Bragg  advanced  his  section  to  get  a 
closer  range,  with  four  companies  of  Hardin's  regi 
ment  in  support,  which  had  been  brought  up  by 
the  colonel  from  La  Angostura _so  soon  as  Mora's 
column  had  been  repulsed.  A  mass  of  Mexican 
troops  were  in  position  close  to  the  mountains,  and 
on  it  Bragg  directed  his  fire  ;  but,  during  the  pre 
vious  movements,  Santa  Anna  had  posted  there  a 
battery  of  heavy  guns,  which  were  unmasked  by 
the  supporting  cavalry  and  infantry,  and  replied 
with  successive  discharges  of  heavy  grape.  Bragg, 
unable  to  oppose  the  fire  with  that  of  his  light 
pieces,  withdrew  beyond  ranged 

*  Captain  Bragg's  Official  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate, 
first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress  p.  201. 


406  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

While  these  affairs  were  transpiring,  General 
Taylor  arrived  in  the  vicinity  of  the  battle  field, 
with  May's  squadron  of  dragoons,  Pike's  of  Arkan 
sas  cavalry,  a  piece  of  artillery  under  Lieutenant 
Kilburn  of  Bragg's  battery,  and  the  Mississippi  reg 
iment.  The  general,  with  the  cavalry,  proceeded 
at  once  to  the  plateau,  leaving  the  Mississippi  reg 
iment  at  Buena  Vista  for  sufficient  time  to  ^  allow 
the  men  to  fill  their  canteens.  It  was  high  time 
for  his  arrival,  for  the  natural  advantages  of  the  po 
sition  had  been  in  a  degree  lost,  and  the  result  of 
the  battle  then  depended  more  than  ever  upon  the 
hard  fighting  of  the  troops.  Many  officers  and 
men  had  already  fallen,  and  among  them  Wool's 
assistant  adjutant  general,  Captain  Lincoln,  a  gal 
lant  gentleman,  who  was  killed  while  vainly  en 
deavoring  to  check  the  fugitives  from  the  field. 
Of  these,  a  much  greater  number  than  was  credit 
able,  of  both  horse  and  foot  volunteers,  passed  in  a 
stream  to  the  rear. 

All  the  Mexican  force  which  had  turned  the  left 
was  on  the  advance.  Marshall's  Kentuckians, 
Yell's  battalions  of  Arkansas  cavalry,  and  Trail's 
and  Gorman's  battalions  of  rifles,  had  retreated,  and 
were  approaching  the  hacienda  of  Buena  Vista. 
The  fugitives  from  the  field  were  flocking  thither 
in  great  numbers;  and  although  General  Wool,  Col 
onel  Davis,  and  many  other  officers  strove  to  check 
them,  their  appeals  were  unheeded.  The  enemy's 
advance  of  infantry  was,  in  the  mean  time,  coming 
rapidly  on,  and  but  a  single  ravine  intervened  be- 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  4Q7 

tween  him  and  the  road.  In  the  crisis  of  the  mo 
ment,  Davis,  who  had  ridden  forward  through  the 
fugitives  to  examine  the  ground  upon  which  he 
was  to  operate,  without  wasting  more  time  in  the 
attempt  to  rally  them,  resolved  to  attack  the  en 
emy  in  front.^  Wool  approved  of  his  movement, 
promised  support,  and  started  in  person  to  order 
forward  the  third  Indiana  regiment  from  JL,a  An 
gostura.  Davis,  with  his  own  regiment  and  a  few 
men  of  the  second  Indiana  who  had  rallied  under 
Colonel  Bowles,  moved  forward  unsupported  against 
the  Mexican  advance.  He  deployed  out  of  range, 
and  advanced  at  double  quick  time  until  his  troops 
had  gained  their  distance,  when  they  opened  "  fire 
advancing."!  The  third  Indiana  regiment  had 
not  come  up,  and  the  Mexican  masses,  flanked  by 
cavalry,  with  portions  of  Pacheco's  and  Lombardi- 
ni's  divisions  in  close^  support,  were  moving  on ; 
but,  without  counting  the  overwhelming  odds,  the 
riflemen  still  kept  on  their  advance.  The  flanking 
cavalry  of  the  enemy  took  cover  in  a  ravine  upon 
the  American  right,  with  the  apparent  intention 
of  endeavoring  to  gain  the  rear  of  the  regiment ; 
but,  still  keeping  up  their  storm  of  shot,  the  gal 
lant,  troops  gained  the  crest  of  the  only  ravine 
which  intervened  between  them  and  the  enemy. 
The  Mexicans  halted  and  replied  with  heavy  roll 
ing  volleys  of  musketry,  but  the  ratio  of  loss  was 
fearfully  against  them.  In  a  few  moments,  the  reg- 

*  Colonel  Davis's  Official  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate, 
first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  192.  t  Idem  ibidem. 


403  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

iment,  with  a  shout  which  rang  high  and  loud 
ahove  the  roar  of  battle,  plunged  into  the  ravine, 
and  in  an  instant  reappeared  in  front  of  the  enemy 
on  his  own  side,  and  continued  to  advance.^  A 
closer  distance  brought  greater  destruction,  hut  the 
ratio  was  yet  against  the  Mexicans.  The  Missis- 
sippians  would  not  yield  or  halt,  and,  still  advanc 
ing,  poured  in  their  shot  with  additional  rapidity, 
until  the  Mexican  advance,  cut  up  and  disorgan 
ized,  lost  its  formation,  and  rolled  back,  a  disorder 
ed  multitude,  upon  the  supporting  forces. 

The  flanking  cavalry  was  in  the  mean  while  per 
sisting  in  the  attempt  to  gain  the  rear ;  but  when 
the  Mexican  infantry  gave  way,  Davis  brought 
up  a  party  to  the  brink  of  the  ravine,  and  fell  upon 
the  cavalry  as  it  was  ascending  the  bank,  killed 
the  commander,  and  dispersed  the  command.! 
Having  accomplished  this,  he  retired  beyond  the 
ravine  which  he  had  crossed,  where  he  was  soon 
after  joined  by  Lane's  third  Indiana  regiment  and 
Kilburn's  gun.  The  last  was  thrown  into  battery 
and  served  upon  the  Mexican  infantry,  then  far  in 
the  front,  near  the  mountains,  which  continued  its 
retreat.  The  two  regiments  and  piece  of  artillery 
advanced  to  the  position  where  the  Mississippians 
had  first  met  the  enemy,  when  a  gun  from  the 
heavy  battery  which  Santa  Anna  had  established 
on  the  plateau  opened  a  fire  which  drove  the  In- 

*  Carleton's  History  of  the  Battle  of  Buena  Vista,  p.  77. 
t  Colonel  Davis's  Official  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate, 
first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  193. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  499 

diana  regiment,  the  most  exposed,  to  cover  in  the 
ravine,  and  silenced  the  American  six  pounder, 
which  rejoined  its  battery.^ 

While  a  check  had  been  given  to  the  Mexican 
infantry,  the  cavalry,  with  Torrejon's  brigade  in 
advance,  had  skirted  the  mountains,  and,  as  Mar 
shall's  and  Yell's  commands  fell  back,  approached 
within  striking  distance  of  Buena  Vista,  where  the 
train  of  the  main  army  was  parked.  From  his  po 
sition  on  the  plateau,  General  Taylor  ordered  all 
the  cavalry  near  him  to  re-enforce  the  point.  The 
Mexican  cavalry  was  on  the  advance,  when  four 
companies  of  regular  dragoons  and  two  of  Arkansas 
volunteers,  all  under  May,  came  down  to  the  ha 
cienda;  but,  seeing  the  re-enforcement,  Torrejon 
pulled  up,  and,  after  a  short  pause,  fell  back.  May 
returned  to  the  plateau,  and  the  Arkansas  and 
Kentucky  men  being  left  unsupported,  Torrejon 
again  advanced,  and  came  down  upon  them  with 
his  whole  brigade  in  column  of  squadrons.  The 
charge  was  received  by  the  volunteers  in  line  near 
the  hacienda,  and,  as  the  Mexicans  approached, 
they  threw  in  a  scattering  fire.  Before  they  could 
drop  their  carbines  and  draw  their  sabers,  the  mass 
of  the  enemy,  over  one  thousand  strong,  was  upon 
them.  The  volunteers  numbered  not  more  than 
five  hundred.  In  an  instant  the  melee  became 
general,  and  the  whole  crowd,  in  confusion,  en 
veloped  in  a  cloud  of  dust,  drove  on  with  loud 

*  Colonel  Davis's  Official  Report.  Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate, 
first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  193. 


410  THE   WAR    WITH    MEXICO. 

shouts  toward  the,  hacienda.  There  a  number  of 
men  who  had  fled  from  the  field  had  taken  shelter, 
and  there  Trail's  and  Gorman's  battalions  had 
taken  post  after  their  retreat  from  the  mountains. 
They  occupied  the  azoteas  of  the  hacienda,  and 
the  adobe  walls  of  its  inclosures,  whence  a  rattling 
fire  was  directed  on  the  Mexican  brigade.  As  the 
mass  approached  it  divided,  one  half  following  the 
volunteers  into  the  street  of  the  hacienda,  while 
the  other  swerved  to  the  right  and  returned.  The 
Kentuokians.  and  Arkansas  troops  disentagled 
themselves,  and.  the  Mexicans  gave  up  the  pursuit 
of  their  advantage,  and  continued  their  course 
through «  and  beyond  ,  the  buildings  ;  for  May's 
command  had  been  re-sent  to  support  the  volun 
teers  with  two  pieces  of  artillery,  and  he  was  close 
at  hand,  IJpon  his  arrival,  Lieutenant  Reynolds 
opened  his  guns  upon  the  retreating  parties,  and 
continued  his  fire'  until  they  were  under  cover  and 
out  of  ranged  In  this  affair  General  Torrejon  was 
wounded,  and  left  thirty-five  men  dead  upon  the 
field.  On.  the  American  side,  Colonel  Yell,  Cap 
tain  Porter,  and  Lieutenant  Vaughn  died  in  the 
melee,  with  many  of  tjieir  best  and  bravest  men. 

Upon  the  failure  of  the  attempt  upon  the  ha 
cienda,  and  the  retrograde  movement  of  Dayis's 
and  Lane's  regiments,  a  fresh  brigade  of  Mexican 
cavalry  advanced  to  gain  the  road  along  the  broad 
ridge  in  which  the  Mississippians  had  first  engaged 
the  enemy.  It  numbered  about  one  thousand 

-  *  Carleton's  History  of  the  Battle  of  Buena  Vista,  p.  77. 


THE    WAR   WITH    MEXICO.  •    4^ 

lancers,  and  protected  by  infantry  in  its  passage 
of  the  different  ravines,  came  on  in  gallant  style. 
Davis  formed  his  regiment  across  the  ridge,  and  the 
third  Indiana  regiment,  with  a  large  portion  of  the 
second  (which  had  been  rallied  by  the  exertions  of 
Major  Dix,  Captain  Linnard,  and  other  staff  offi 
cers),  stretched  to  the  right  and  front,  closing  up 
the  ground  between  the  ravines.  Captain  Sher 
man,  who  had  been  firing  at  the  enemy's  infantry 
near  the  mountains,  brought  up  a  twelve  pound 
howitzer,  and  took  post  on  Davis's  left.  Both  flanks 
of  the  line  rested  on  the  ravines,  and  it  presented 
a  re-entering  angle,  giving  a  cross  fire  to  the  ene 
my,  who  was  rapidly  approaching.  But,  although 
the  lancers  had  started  at  speed  upon  the  charge, 
they  lacked  the  moral  force  with  which  to  continue 
it.  They  gradually  diminished  their  pace,  and 
pulled  up  to  a  walk  within  eighty  yards  of  the 
American  line.  The  commanding  officers  there, 
being  confident  of  success  in  receiving  them,  hatd 
ordered  the  fire  to  be  withheld,  and  the  troops 
awaited  the  word  with  shouldered  arms  ;  but,-  one 
or  two  pieces  being  fired,  the  whole  line  of  muskets 
and  rifles  was  brought  down  upon  the  enemy.  The 
aim  was  settled  in  a  momentary  pause,  and  the  next 
instant  the  whole  head  of  the  Mexican  column  was 
destroyed  by  the  well-directed  volley.^  Captain 
Sherman  commenced  firing  from  his  howitzer,  and 

*  General  Lane's,  Colonel  Davis's,  and  Colonel  Lane's  Official  Reports. 
Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p. 
182,  193,  188. 


412  THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO. 

the  mass  of  cavalry,  without  any  further  demon 
stration  of  attack,  fled  from  the  field. 

The  affair  at  the  hacienda  having  been  decided 
by  Torrejon's  retreat,  General  Taylor  ordered  the 
dragoons,  with  the  volunteer  cavalry  andReynolds's 
section  of  artillery,  to  move  against  the  enemy's 
right  flank,  near  the  eastern  side  of  the  valley. 
Bragg,  who  had  heard  the  uproar  at  Buena  Vista 
while  replenishing  his  ammunition,  had  proceeded 
from  the  vicinity  of  the  plateau  in  that  direction  at 
a  gallop.  He  arrived  after  the  affair  had  been  de 
cided,  and  Kilburn  having  joined  him  in  the  mean 
while,  he  opened  his  three  pieces  at  long  range 
upon  the  retreating  cavalry,  which  had  advanced 
against  the  Mississippi  and  Indiana  troops.*  He 
afterward  took  post  to  the  left  between  them  and 
the  dragoons,  and  regulated  his  movements  by 
those  of  the  enemy,  without  support,  until  Wool, 
at  his  request,  ordered  May  to  move  his  cavalry  to 
the  vicinity.  Reynolds  had  meanwhile  worked  his 
guns  with  rapidity,  and,  as  the  commands  united, 
the  artillery  was  advanced  with  confidence  toward 
the  enemy,  who  was  at  once  driven  back  against 
the  mountain  in  the  direction  of  the  plateau. 

There  the  battle  had  raged  in  a  continual  can 
nonade.  The  American  artillery  played  upon  the 
Mexican  troops  as  they  passed  and  repassed  on  the 
east,  and  although  only  three  pieces  (O'Brien's  sec 
tion  and  Thomas's  gun)  were  in  battery  at  the 

*  Captain  Bragg's  Official  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate, 
first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  201. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

point,  they  were  served  with  such  skill  and  rapidity 
that  the  passage  across  the  hase  of  the  plateau  was 
insecure,  in  spite  of  the  Mexican  eighteen  and 
twenty-four  pounders,  which  were  occasionally  di 
rected  to  silence  their  fire.  The  American  infantry 
kept  in  shelter  in  the  ravines,  except  when  a  body 
of  Mexican  cavalry  or  infantry  would  venture  with 
in  musket  range ;  then  a  short  roll  of  musketry 
would  vary  the  cannonade ;  but  the  main  effort  of 
the  Mexican  general  was  at  this  time  on  the  Ameri 
can  left,  and  his  advancing  parties  on  the  plateau 
were  easily  driven  back. 

When  the  American  forces  on  the  left  advanced 
and  drove  the  routed  masses  of  the  enemy  back 
upon  the  mountain,  his  heavy  artillery  opened 
upon  them  from  the  plateau,  but  it  had  little  effect. 
Bragg,  Sherman,  and  Reynolds  kept  pouring  in 
their  well-directed  discharges,  and  Thomas  and 
O'Brien  swept  the  line  of  retreat.  Bragg,  still  ad 
vancing  his  pieces,  obtained  a  closer  range,  and 
also  intercepted  the  route  to  the  Mexican  rear. 
The  situation  of  all  the  Mexican  force  which  had 
turned  the  American  left  was  at  this  time  critical 
in  the  extreme.  For  a  time  endeavors  were  made 
to  return  the  artillery  fire  with  musketry ;  but,  losing 
courage,  the  whole  body  of  troops  became  mingled 
in  utter  confusion.  Bragg  pressed  on  to  within 
close  canister  range,  and  worked  his  guns  with 
surprising  rapidity.  The  Mexican  mass  cowered 
under  each  stern  stroke,  as  the  shot  swept  through 
the  disordered  multitude,  and  while  some  vainly 


414  THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO. 

endeavored  to  escape  by  climbing  up  the  side  of 
the  mountain,  the  greater  portion  stood  in  bewilder- 
ed  confusion,  a  chaos  of  men  and  horses,  and  every 
succeeding  discharge  added  fearfully  to  the  num 
ber  of  dead  and  wounded.  In  fact,  .the  whole  body, 
of  over  five  thousand  men,  of  different  arms,  was 
cut  off,  and  its  destruction,  which,  had  not  the  fire 
of  the  artillery  been  interrupted,  was  inevitable, 
would  have  at  once  decided  the  fate  of  the  day. 
Bragg  was  following,  up  his  advantage,  and  con 
tinued' to  pour  in  his  canister ;  but,  while  his  pieces 
were  in  full  play,  a  white  flag  approached  from 
General  Taylor's  position,  passed  rapidly  in  his 
front  toward  the  enemy,. and  .he  ceased.^ 

At  about  this  period  of  the  action  three  Mexican 
officers  approached  the  position-  of  the  American 
troops  upon  the  plateau .  without  a  flag,  but  at 
speed,  and.  with  the  evident  intention  of  opening  a 
parley.  They  were  received  and  conducted  to 
General  Taylor,  and  inquired  of  Him,  from  Gen 
eral  Santa  Anna,  "  what  he  wanted."  The  in 
quiry  was  received  with  some  surprise,  but  was  re- 
plied  to  by  demanding  the  surrender  of  the  Mexi- 
c^  army,  and  time  was  allowed  for  consideration. 
Under  the  idea  that  the  corps  on/the  right  would 
surrender^  General  Taylor  sent  a  volunteer  aid-de 
camp  in  that  direction  to  carry  a  summons  and 
order  a  cessation  of  fire  from  the  American  bat 
teries.  Upon  the  arrival  of  the  envoy  at  the  Mex- 

*  Captain  Bragg's  Official  Report.  Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate, 
first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  202. 


THIS    WAR  WITH  MEXICO/ 

ican  position,  the  mass  closed  round  him,  and  he 
was  led  blindfolded  to  Santa  Anna.  The  .whole 
Mexican  force  .which  had  been  compromised  moved 
with  him,  under  protection  of  the  flag,,  to  the  se 
cure  position  south  of  the  plateau. 

Whether  the  scheme  had  been  intended  to  effect 
that  object  is  doubtful.  Santa  Anna  makes  no 
mention  of  the  matter  in  his  reports ;  and  it  can 
hardly  be  believed  that  a  man  of  his  talent  for  in 
trigue  would  have  sent  so  silly  and  impudent  a 
message,  had  it  originated  with  .him ;  but  certain 
it  is  that  advantage  was  taken  of  the  flag  to  with 
draw  the  compromised  troops  from  their  perilous 
position. 

Upon  the  return  of  the  Mexican  officers,  General 
Wool  accompanied  them  in  thje  direction  of  the 
heavy  battery  on  the  plateau,  to  communicate  with 
Santa  Anna  on  the  part  of  General  Taylor.  Ak 
though  the  American  batteries  had  .ceased  firing, 
the  Mexican  had  not,  but  kept  playing  upon  the 
infantry  near  the  guns  under,  which  their  troops 
had  just  passed  without  hinderance.  -  Wool,  find 
ing  that  they  would  not  cease  their  fire,  declared 
the  parley  at  an  end,  and  returned  without  having 
seen  or  communicated  with  Santa  Anna.^ 

Mr.  Crittenden,  who  had  borne  General  Taylor's 
message  to  the  Mexican  right  wing,  reached  the 
Mexican  general  after  it  had  escaped, :and  received, 
in  answer  to  his  demand,  a  demand,  fox  the  sur- 

*  Wool's  Official  Report.    Executive  Document,  No.  1  /Senate,  first  Session 
of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  149. 


416  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

render  of  General  Taylor.  The  communications, 
of  course,  resulted  in  nothing,  so  far  as  the  subject 
of  conversation  was  concerned,  but  the  whole  affair 
had  the  effect  of  allowing,  through  General  Tay 
lor's  humanity,  the  escape  of  the  Mexican  right 
wing,  and  of  annulling  the  advantages  which  had 
been  recovered,  in  some  degree,  on  the  part  of  the 
Americans.  But  while  the  American  envoy  was 
blindfolded  in  his  passage  to  Santa  Anna,  the  Mex 
ican  officers  had  reached  General  Taylor,  who  was 
then  on  the  plateau,  with  only  three  regiments  of 
infantry  and  three  guns,  and  had  enjoyed  a  full 
opportunity  of  observing  the  amount  of  force  which 
defended  the  key  to  the  pass  of  Angostura. 

The  Mexican  force,  with  the  exception  of  the 
three  heavy  guns  near  the  base  of  the  mountain, 
and  their  supporting  infantry,  was,  soon  after  the 
passage  of  the  flags,  clear  of  the  plain.  Six  Amer 
ican  guns,  the  Mississippi  and  Indiana  regiments, 
all  the  cavalry,  and  the  small  battalions  of  rifle 
men,  were  then  far  to  the  left,  where  they  had 
forced  back  the  Mexican  right  wing. 

In  the  interval  of  American  action  caused  by 
the  passage  of  the  flags,  and  before  the  entire  Mex 
ican  right  wing  had  rejoined  the  main  body,  Santa 
Anna  brought  up  his  reserves,  re-enforced  them  by 
the  remnants  of  Mora  y  Villamil's  column,  the 
eleventh  regiment  of  the  line,  and  the  battalion  of 
Leon,  all  of  which  he  formed  in  the  valley  to  the 
south,  in  column  of  attack,  which,  under  General 
Perez,  was  to  make  a  final  struggle  for  the  victory; 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  4^7 

for,  notwithstanding  the  successes  which  he  had 
gained  in  the  early  part  of  the  day,  and  the  escape 
of  the  right  wing,  he  had  been  driven,  by  the  hard 
fighting  of  the  American  troops,  and  the  splendid 
service  of  their  artillery,  from  many  important 
points,  and  had  only  the  plateau  upon  which  he 
could  operate.  To  the  strong  mass  which  he  had 
thus  formed  he  added  the  remnants  of  his  right 
wing  as  they  came  up,  and,  under  General  Perez, 
the  whole,  in  solid  column,  climbed  the  ascent  from 
the  valley.^ 

Wool  had  directed  O'Brien  to  advance  his  guns 
against  the  Mexican  troops  while  in  retreat,  and  his 
section,  with  Thomas's  six  pounder,  had  been  run 
forward  and  commenced  firing.  Colonels  M'Kee, 
Hardin,  and  Bissel,  whose  regiments  had  as  yet 
suffered  but  little,  led  them  forward  in  pursuit,  and 
had  advanced  near  to  the  southern  crest  as  Petez's 
column  of  full  12,000  men  came  over  in  a  blaze 
of  musketry.  Surprised  by  the  appearance  in  such 
force,  and  in  such  good  array,  of  an  enemy  who 
had  just  relinquished  the  field,  and  being  some 
what  scattered,  one  regiment  in  line,t  another  de 
ploying  from  column  of  di visions, $  another  in  col 
umn  of  companies,  and  in  advance  of  and  without 
the  assistance  of  the  artillery,  the  American  infant 
ry  delivered  a  fire,  and  the  greater  portion  sought 
shelter  in  the  center  barranca  of  the  western  side 

*  Santa  Anna's  Official  Report. 

t  Lieutenant-colonel  Weatherford's  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  1, 
Senate,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  174. 
t  Colonel  Bissel's  and  Major  Fry's  Reports.     Idem,  p.  176,  170. 

I— DD 


418  THE    WAR   WITH   MEXICO. 

of  the  plateau.  Some  continued  firing  from  its 
crests,  but  they  did  not  retard  the  advance  of  the 
Mexican  column.  All  which  opposed  that  was  the 
rapid  and  continued  discharges  of  artillery  with 
which  O'Brien  and  Thomas  tore  its  ranks ;  but,  al 
though  they  swept  through  the  column  with  ter 
rific  effect,  and  masses  went  down  at  every  round, 
yet  the  range  became  palpably  shorter  each  instant. 
Canister  was  substituted  for  round  shot ;  but  still, 
although  momentarily  checked,  the  mass  came  on, 
and  before  it  O'Brien  and  Thomas  retreated  by  the 
recoil  of  their  pieces.  At  that  time  not  an  efficient 
infantry  soldier  was  in  the  plain. 

The  volunteer  regiments,  mixed  in  confusion, 
were  crowded  in  the  deep  barranca,  and  rolled 
down  its  steep  and  shelving  banks  to  the  bottom, 
while  the  Mexican  infantry  enveloped  its  crest 
and  pelted  them  with  musketry,  to  which  they 
had  no  chance  to  reply. #  To  insure  their  destruc 
tion,  a  strong  battalion  of  lancers,  from  the  caval 
ry  reserves  along  the  road,  came  over  the  salient 
crest  of  the  southern  ridge,  and,  passing  the  sec 
ond,  were  about  to  close  the  mouth  of  the  barranca, 
the  only  avenue  of  escape  which  was  left.  Under 
the  fearful  storm  of  shot,  Colonels  M'Kee  and  Har- 
din,  Lieutenant-colonel  Clay,  and  numbers,  brave 
and  gallant  men,  of  inferior  rank,  were  slain  and 
wounded,  and  all  appeared  to  be  lost,  when  the 
movement  of  the  lancers  brought  them  in  range  of 
Washington's  battery  at  La  Angostura.  He  open- 

*  Carletou's  History  of  the  Battle  of  Buena  Viata,  p.  110. 
> 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  4^9 

ed  his  guns  at  once  with  accuracy  and  effect,  cut 
ting  up  and  driving  back  the  horsemen  from  the 
mouth  of  the  barranca,  through  which  the  volun 
teers  issued  in  a  stream,  and  fled  for  shelter  toward 
the  battery,  while  Washington  and  his  subalterns, 
Brent  and  Whiting,  kept  the  guns  in  play,  over 
their  heads,  upon  the  retreating  cavalry.  The 
Mexican  infantry,  being  unopposed,  descended  into 
the  barranca,  and  murdered  every  wounded  man 
who  had  been  unable  to  escape.^ 

On  the  plateau  affairs  were  at  the  crisis.  After 
the  escape  of  the  Mexican  right  wing,  Bragg,  be 
ing  fearful  that  the  enemy  would  concentrate  his 
force  and  attack  on  the  American  right,  had  start 
ed  with  all  speed  in  that  direction.!  When  the 
struggle  there  had  fairly  commenced,  officers  were 
sent  to  hasten  forward  Sherman's  battery,  the  dra 
goons,  and  the  Mississippi  and  Indiana  regiments. 
The  heavy  fire  about  the  position  soon  told  of  the 
necessity  of  their  presence,  and  Bragg  and  Sher 
man  urged  on  their  jaded  horses  with  whip  and 
spur.  Davis  and  Lane  led  their  regiments  at  a  run 
across  the  ravines  and  ridges ;  and  Bragg,  in  ad 
vance,  gained  the  plateau  just  as  the  Mexican 
masses  had  closed  upon  and  captured  O'Brien's 
guns ;  not,  however,  until  that  officer  and  all  his 
cannoneers  had  been  wounded.  Bragg  threw  his 
three  pieces  at  once  into  battery,  and,  with  Thom- 

*  Carleton's  History  of  the  Battle  of  Buena  Vista,  p.  111. 
t  Bragg's  Official  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate,  first  Ses 
sion  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  202. 


420  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

as's,  they  were  worked  with  all  the  energy  which 
the  crisis  demanded.  The  first  discharge  caused  the 
advancing  multitude  to  waver,  the  second  threw  it 
into  confusion,  and  the  third  insured  its  retreat ; 
for  Sherman  had  come  up  and  taken  up  the  fire, 
Washington  at  that  instant  opened  upon  the  lanc 
ers,  Davis  and  Lane  had  approached  and  opened 
fire  upon  the  Mexican  right  flank,  and  the  battle 
was  won. 

The  artillery  was  advanced  in  pursuit,  with  Da- 
vis's  regiment  in  support,  and  kept  up  a  fire  on  the 
retreating  masses  until  it  came  within  range  of 
the  heavy  guns  of  the  enemy,  when  it  fell  back 
again  to  the  north  of  the  plateau.  The  after  ef 
forts  of  the  Mexican  troops  were  confined  to  an  at 
tempt  to  remove  a  disabled  caisson,  which  had 
been  left  in  the  advance ;  but  they  were  driven 
from  its  vicinity  with  loss.  The  stream  of  their 
fugitives  had  borne  with  them  O'Brien's  two  guns, 
and  no  attempt  was  made  on  the  part  of  the  Amer 
icans  to  recover  them. 

When  night  fell,  the  noise  of  battle,  which  had 
died  away  since  the  repulse  of  the  Mexican  re 
serves,  ceased  entirely,  and  both  armies  occupied, 
in  the  main,  the  same  positions  whence  they  had 
moved  in  the  morning. 


When  the  battle  had  commenced  at  Angostura, 
General  Minon  moved  his  cavalry  from  the  valley 
north  of  Saltillo,  along  the  eastern  base  of  the 


THE    WAR   WITH    MEXICO.  421 

mountains,  with  the  apparent  intention  of  cutting 
the  communication  of  the  main  body  of  the  Amer 
ican  army  with  Saltillo.  A  few  shells  were  direct 
ed  upon  his  column  from  the  redoubt  south  of  the 
town ;  but  the  range  was  too  great  for  effect,  and 
the  cavalry  gained  the  plain  without  loss.  There 
it  intercepted  and  took  prisoners  a  few  fugitives 
from  the  field ;  but,  while  it  remained  in  position, 
Captain  Shover  brought  forward  his  gun  from  Gen 
eral  Taylor's  camp,  followed  by  a  promiscuous 
crowd  of  about  one  hundred  mounted  and  foot  vol 
unteers,  teamsters,  citizens,  and  servants,  all  shout 
ing  to  the  top  of  their  bent,  but  of  no  other  use 
than  to  make  a  show  of  a  supporting  force.  Sho 
ver,  keeping  in  advance  of  this  crew,  opened  his 
gun  upon  the  cavalry,  which  fell  back  before  his 
well-directed  fire.  Minon  had,  however,  left  a 
strong  corps  in  ambush  in  a  ravine,  whence  it 
could  charge  upon  the  gun  if  it  were  advanced  to 
annoy  the  retreat.  Shover  observed  a  single  horse 
man  who  watched  his  movements,  and,  reconnoi- 
tering  in  person,  he  discovered  the  position  of  the  de 
tachment  ;#  wherefore,  neglecting  the  main  body, 
he  brought  up  his  piece  to  an  enfilading  position, 
and  raked  the  ravine  with  a  single  shot  at  long 
range,  which  drove  the  detachment  out,  and  it  hast 
ened  to  j  oin  the  retreat.  C  aptain  Webster  had  sent 
a  twenty-four  pounder  howitzer  from  the  redoubt, 
with  a  company  of  infantry  in  support,  which  Lieu- 

*  Captain  Shover's  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate,  first 
Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  208. 


422  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

tenant  Donaldson  brought  up  at  the  moment,  and, 
both  pieces  being  advanced,  cannonaded  the  caval 
ry  until  it  reached  a  position  out  of  range,  north  of 
Saltillo ;  and,  the  communication  being  thus  clear 
ed  to  the  city,  no  further  attempts  were  made  by 
the  enemy  to  interrupt  it. 


During  the  night,  every  preparation  was  made 
on  the  American  side  to  receive  a  renewed  attack 
on  the  following  morning.  The  front  was  covered 
by  a  strong  chain  of  sentinels,  and  strong  pickets 
were  posted  to  the  right  and  left  to  guard  against 
being  turned  during  the  darkness.  The  troops 
were  supplied  with  rations  on  the  field,  and  the 
wounded  were  sent  in  wagons  to  Saltillo. 

The  remnant  of  those  companies  of  the  Missis 
sippi  regiment  which  had  been  engaged  were  sent 
to  garrison  the  town,  and  were  replaced  by  the  fresh 
companies  of  Illinois  and  Mississippi  troops  which 
had  held  it  during  the  battle. 

In  the  uncertainty  of  Santa  Anna's  advance  and 
of  his  field  of  battle,  General  Taylor  had  stationed 
General  Marshall,  with  a  battalion  of  Kentucky 
horse,  and  Captain  Prentiss's  heavy  battery  of  two 
twenty-four  pounders  and  two  eight-inch  howitzers, 
at  the  pass  of  La  Rinconada.  On  the  night  of  the 
22d,  he  sent  orders  to  Marshall  to  move  up  to  Bue- 
na  Vista.  Marshall  started  so  soon  as  he  received 
the  order,  and  by  strenuous  exertions  and  perse 
verance,  brought  his  command,  with  all  the  mate- 


THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO.  423 

rial,  to  within  striking  distance  of  Buena  Vista  on 
the  night  of  the  23d,  through  the  country  which 
was  at  the  time  occupied  hy  the  thousand  mount 
ed  rancheros  on  the  right,  and  Miiion's  cavalry  bri 
gade  on  the  left.  With  this  re-enforcement,  and 
the  fresh  companies  from  Saltillo,  General  Taylor 
was  enabled  to  present  on  the  field  of  battle  a  force 
in  numbers  slightly  superior  to  that  with  which 
the  action  had  been  opened  on  the  22d,  and  with 
one  piece  of  artillery  more,^  besides  having  the  ad 
vantages  of  the  superior  weight  of  metal  for  a  bat 
tery  in  fixed  position. 

When  daylight  broke  on  the  morning  of  the  24th 
the  preparations  had  not  been  completed,  but  the 
position  which  the  Mexican  army  had  occupied  on 
the  previous  day  was  clear  of  an  enemy.  Santa 
Anna  had  fallen  back  during  the  night  to  Agua 
Nueva,  leaving  his  dead  unburied  and  his  wound 
ed  uncared  for.  In  all,  these  amounted  in  number 
to  over  two  thousand,  including  several  officers  of 
high  rank. 

The  American  scouts  were  pushed  on  after  him 
to  observe  his  movements,  and  by  seven  o'clock  re 
turned  with  positive  information  of  his  retreat. 
Upon  receiving  it,  Taylor,  with  Wool  and  the  staff, 
moved  up  to  La  Encantada  with  an  escort  of  dra 
goons.  Thence  he  dispatched  his  assistant  adju 
tant  general,  Major  Bliss,  to  Agua  Nueva,  with  a 
proposition  to  Santa  Anna  for  an  exchange  of  pris- 

*  General  Taylor's  Report.      Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate,  first 
Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  137. 


424  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

oners,  a  request  that  he  would  'send  in  for  his 
wounded,  and  a  conciliatory  message,  expressing 
the  desire  of  the  American  government  for  peace. 
The  exchange  of  prisoners  was  effected,  and  the 
release  of  the  prisoners  taken  at  Encarnacion  and 
the  Palomas  pass  was  agreed  upon.  As  the  Mex 
ican  general  had  no  means  of  transporting  his 
wounded,  he  left  them  in  the  hands  of  General 
Taylor,  to  be  treated  as  humanity  might  dictate. 
But  he  was  just  then  in  no  humor  to  assent  to  the 
indirect  proposals  for  peace  which  were  contained 
in  the  message  of  the  American  commander,  and 
his  reply  expressed  a  determination  to  prosecute 
the  war,  and  to  say  nothing  of  peace  so  long  as  the 
Americans  were  west  of  the  Rio  Bravo,  or  occupied 
any  part  of  the  Mexican  territory,  or  continued  to 
blockade  the  ports  of  the  republic.^ 

Santa  Anna  was  in  a  position  of  great  difficulty. 
His  attempt  to  force  the  pass  of  Angostura,  in  spite 
of  all  his  arrangements  and  of  his  overwhelming 
numbers,  had  proved  a  total  failure,  however  much 
he  may  have  tried  to  disguise  the  fact  to  his  coun 
trymen  and  even  to  himself. 

With  his  army  beaten,  weakened  by  over  two 
thousand  killed  and  wounded,  and  by  more  than 
three  thousand  desertions,  he  was  in  position  with 
out  hospitals,  without  depots,  and  without  money, 
and,  worse  than  all,  a  revolution  was  springing  up 
in  the  capital  of  Mexico.  He  had  still  eighteen 
thousand  men  left;  and  when  his  energy  is  con- 

*  Santa  Anna's  Official  Report. 


THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO.  425 

sidered,  as  displayed  in  the  rapidity  with  which  he 
attempted  to  seize  the  advantages  promised  by 
Taylor's  weakness  about  Saltillo,  it  may  be  deem 
ed  strange  that,  in  the  situation  in  which  he  found 
himself,  he  did  not  make  another  effort  to  gain 
what  might  be  called,  with  more  reason,  a  victory. 
But,  with  all  his  energy  and  talent,  Santa  Anna 
had  not  that  steady,  stern  perseverance  which,  in 
a  general,  often  repairs  his  faults  and  makes  amends 
for  a  host  of  errors.  And,  indeed,  if  he  had  failed 
in  carrying  his  point  with  his  whole  force,  even 
when  his  troops  were  inspired  by  his  partial  suc 
cess,  when  the  advantages  of  position  had  been  in 
great  measure  taken  from  Taylor,  when  the  con 
test  depended  upon  the  bravery  and  hard  fighting 
of  the  troops  alone,  and  the  American  soldiers,  al 
though  in  numbers  but  one  to  three  and  four,  had 
wrested  from  him  point  after  pointr  and  when  the 
American  artillery,  with  a  few  steadfast  regiments, 
had  met  the  advance  of  his  overwhelming  masses 
in  the  last  effort  for  victory,  and  driven  them,  dis 
comfited  and  broken,  from  the  plateau,  it  might 
well  have  been  considered  doubtful  whether  suc 
cess  could  be  gained  by  a  further  continuation  of 
the  struggle. 

He  was  in  a  region  of  country  where  he  could  not 
easily  obtain  supplies  without  interruption  from  the 
enemy,  and  this,  his  alleged  reason  for  his  indecis 
ion,  operated  to  induce  his  retreat ;  wherefore,  on 
the  25th,  he  called  a  council  of  war,  only  necessa 
ry  when  a  general  wishes  an  excuse  for  such  a 


426  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

movement.  All  of  his  general  officers  coincided 
with  him  in  opinion,  and  on  the  26th  he  com- 
menced  his  retreat  toward  San  Luis,  with  a  view 
of  occupying  the  first  peopled  localities  on  the 
route.  Miiion,  who  had  returned  through  the  pass 
of  Palomas  Adentro,  had  joined  the  main  army, 
and  was  directed  to  follow  as  the  rear  guard. 

On  the  27th,  General  Taylor  moved  his  force 
again  in  advance  to  Agua  Nueva.  The  road  from 
Buena  Vista  to  that  point  was  strewed  with  dead 
and  dying  Mexicans,  and  numerous  wounded  were 
found  in  the  ruins  of  the  hacienda.  These,  as  well 
as  those  left  upon  the  hattle  field,  were  transport 
ed  to  Saltillo  and  treated  hy  American  surgeons. 

Nothing  prevented  General  Taylor  from  heating 
up  Santa  Anna's  head-quarters  on  the  morning  of 
the  27th  hut  the  jaded  state  of  the  dragoon  horses, 
and  the  want  of  water  on  the  route.  But,  having 
cared  for  the  wounded,  on  the  1st  of  March  he  dis 
patched  Colonel  Belknap,  with  all  the  cavalry;  two 
pieces  of  artillery,  and  a  regiment  of  infantry,  in 
wagons,  to  Encarnacioh,  for  the  purpose  of  cutting 
up  the  Mexican  rear  guard,  reported  as  being1  still 
at  that  point.  The  command  left  Agua  Nueva  at 
three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  and  made  the  dis 
tance  in  the  night.  The  same  appearances  of  hur 
ried  and  disordered  retreat  were  visible  which  had 
been  met  with  on  the  route  to  Agua  Nueva.  Mul 
titudes  of  dead  and  dying,  from  wounds,  fatigue, 
and  hunger,  encumbered  the  road ;  and,  upon  ar 
riving  at  Encarnacion,  that  hacienda  was  found 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  427 

unoccupied,  except  by  a  small  party  of  the  enemy, 
and  220  wounded  men  in  an  almost  utter  state  of 
destitution.  The  party  of  Mexican  cavalry  endeav 
ored  to  escape,  but  were  all  captured  and  made 
prisoners.  Belknap  returned  to  Agua  Nueva  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  2d;  and,  having  informed  Gen 
eral  Taylor  of  the  state  of  the  Mexican  wounded, 
with  characteristic  humanity,  he  sent  thither  a 
quantity  of  provision,  and  caused  such  as  could  be 
transported  to  be  moved  to  Saltillo. 

In  the  battle  of  Buena  Vista  the  American  force 
upon  the  field  numbered  4425  bayonets  and  sabers, 
exclusive  of  officers,  and  fifteen  light  field  guns. 
In  the  achievement  of  the  victory  and  the  effects 
which  have  been  narrated,  the  loss  was  267  kill 
ed,  456  wounded,  23  missing,  and  three  guns  cap 
tured.^ 


During  the  continuance  of  the  operations  of  the 
main  armies  about  Saltillo,  Generals  Urrea  and 
Romero,  with  their  corps  of  cavalry,  had  reached 
the  American  line  of  communications  through  the 
Tula  pass,  Victoria,  and  Montemorelos.  The  road 
between  Monterey  and  Camargo  had  been  guard 
ed  by  a  regiment  of  Ohio  volunteers,  of  which  one 
detachment,  under  the  lieutenant  colonel,  was  at 
Marin,  the  colonel,  with  the  head-quarters,  at  Ser- 
ralvo,  and  a  third  detachment,  under  the  major,  at 
Puntiaguda.  When  General  Taylor  had  become 

*  General  Taylor's  Official  Report.    Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate, 
first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  137. 


428  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

satisfied  of  Santa  Anna's  approach  on  the  21st,  he 
had  sent  orders  for  the  regiment  to  concentrate, 
and  move  with  all  speed  to  Monterey.  These  or 
ders  were  received  on  the  23d  at  Serralvo,  and  Col 
onel  Morgan,  having  Drought  up  his  detachment 
from  Puntiaguda  during  the  night,  and  destroyed 
the  stores  which  he  was  unahle  to  transport,  march 
ed  on  the  morning  of  the  24th. 

On  that  day  Urrea  made  his  appearance  near 
Ramos,  and  cut  up  an  upward-hound  train,  killed 
some  forty  or  fifty  wagoners,  captured  the  weak 
escort,  and  in  the  afternoon  appeared  before  Marin, 
where  his  troops  skirmished  with  the  American 
garrison. 

A  detachment  from  Monterey  having  arrived  and 
re-enforced  the  garrison,  Lieutenant-colonel  Irvin 
abandoned  Marin,  and  marched  on  the  25th,  with 
out  further  communication  with  Morgan,  who  ar 
rived  the  same  afternoon,  and  quartered  for  the 
night  in  the  town.  Irvin  continued  his  march 
without  interruption,  but  on  the  following  morn 
ing  Morgan  fell  in  with  Urrea  at  Agua  Frio.  A 
continual  skirmish  ensued  for  some  miles  along  the 
road,  as  far  as  San  Francisco.  The  Mexican  cav 
alry  hovered  about  the  column,  threatening  an  at 
tack  for  the  whole  distance.  To  oppose  it,  Mor 
gan  disposed  his  troops  in  square,  with  his  wagons 
in  the  center,  and  in  this  order,  without  a  close  en 
counter  with  the  enemy,  he  reached  San  Francisco. 
From  that  point  he  sent  forward  an  officer  to  com 
municate  with  Irvin,  who  was  by  this  time  near 


THE    WAR   WITH   MEXICO.  429 

Monterey.  Irvin  returned  with  two  field  pieces, 
which,  when  he  came  in  sight  of  the  enemy,  then 
in  advance  of  Morgan's  position,  were  at  once  open 
ed,  and  the  Mexican  cavalry  fell  hack  immediately 
to  the  rear.  Immediately  after,  a  heavy  fire  of 
escopetas  was  opened  upon  Morgan's  command, 
which  killed  one  captain  and  four  soldiers  and 
wagoners.  Irvin's  troops  were  then  moved  to  the 
right,  and,  from  a  general  discharge  from  the  whole 
force,  Urrea  fled.  The  column  continued  its  march 
to  Monterey  without  molestation. 

On  the  7th  of  March  Urrea  was  at  Serralvo,  and 
near  that  place  fell  upon  an  empty  train  of  one 
hundred  and  fifty  wagons,  which  had  heen  sent  to 
the  rear  immediately  after  the  hattle  of  Buena  Vis 
ta,  under  the  escort  of  six  companies  of  infantry 
and  two  guns,  commanded  hy  Major  Giddings. 
Urrea's  force  at  once  attacked  it,  killed  two  pri 
vates,  cut  the  train,  hurned  forty  wagons,  killed 
fifteen  teamsters,  and,  having  surrounded  the  rear 
guard  some  two  miles  from  the  advance,  he  sum 
moned  it  to  surrender;  hut  the  captain  in  com 
mand  was,  singularly  enough,  allowed  an  hour  to 
communicate  with  his  chief  in  the  advance.  The 
reply  was,  of  course,  a  refusal,  and  immediately 
after  it  had  heen  dispatched  a  re-enforcement  was 
-sent  to  the  rear.  The  Mexicans  gave  up  the  at 
tempt  to  consummate  their  success  and  enforce  the 
summons.  The  whole  command,  with  the  remain 
ing  wagons,  was  concentrated  in  the  advance,  and 
on  the  following  morning  entered  Serralvo  without 


430  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

opposition.  There  it  met  an  advancing  convoy, 
from  which  it  was  supplied  with  ammunition,  and 
proceeded  on  to  Camargo. 

Urrea  then  turned  his  attention  to  the  advancing 
train  under  escort  of  Colonel  Curtis's  regiment  of 
Ohio  volunteers;  but,  in  the  mean  while,  General 
Taylor  had  leisure  to  clear  his  communications. 

He  marched,  with  a  force  of  cavalry  and  light 
artillery,  from  Saltillo  on  the  8th.  On  the  I  "th 
he  sent  Colonel  Marshall,  with  the  Kentucky  cav 
alry  and  a  piece  of  light  artillery,  on  the  road  to 
Marin,  to  search  for  the  enemy;  but,  hearing  of 
Urrea  in  the  vicinity  of  Marin,  near  Curtis's  con 
voy,  he  joined  Marshall  with  his  escort,  and,  as 
Urrea  fell  back  before  his  advance,  effected  a  junc 
tion  with  Curtis,  who  was  sent  to  Monterey.  Tay 
lor,  with  the  cavalry  and  artillery,  pushed  on  after 
the  enemy,  who  fled  before  him  to  Montemorelos, 
and  thence  to  Victoria,  through  the  pass  of  Tula, 
and  out  of  the  valley  of  the  Rio  Grande.  Taylor, 
not  having  a  sufficient  cavalry  force  to  pursue  him, 
returned  to  Monterey.* 

Communication!  being  thus  re-established,  oper 
ations  upon  the  northern  line  were  thenceforth 
confined  to  simple  occupation,  and  active  war  in 
that  quarter  was  at  an  end. 


*  Report*  of  Colonel  Morgan,  Major  Shepherd,  and  Major  Giddingi.  Ex- 
'•cutivo  Document,  No.  1,  Senate,  finrt  Smrion  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p. 
210-217,  and  Correspondence  of  General  Taylor  with  the  Adjutant  Gen 
eral.  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representative*,  first  Sewon 
of  the  thirtieth  CongreM,  p.  1123. 


THE   WAR   WITH   MEXICO. 

The  want  of  communication  with  General  Tay 
lor  during  the  operations  about  Saltillo,  and  the 
knowledge  that  General  Urrea  was  in  force  upon 
the  line  of  Communications,  induced  a  state  of 
alarm  at  all  the  posts  on  the  Rio  Grande  from  the 
time  of  the  first  rumor  of  Santa  Anna's  advance 
until  the  receipt  of  the  intelligence  of  the  battle 
of  Buena  Vista.  In  consequence,  rumors  of  the 
complete  dcslruHion  of  Taylor's  corps,  ninl  Hie  re- 
conquest  of  the  valley  of  the  Rio  Grande  by  the 
Mexican  troops,  were  transmitted  to  the  United 
States ;  and  the  excitement  and  anxiety  there  were 
by  no  means  allayed  by  the  requisition  of  a  vol. 
unteer  colonel  who  commanded  at  Camargo,  for 
50,000  men  to  be  sent  instantly  to  the  country 
which  had  just  been  abandoned  as  the  seat  of  act 
ive  operations.  The  effect  of  all  this  anxiety  was 
to  increase  the  appreciation  of  the  battle  of  Buena 
Vista,  and  to  give  it,  in  the  estimation  of  the  pub 
lic,  the  first  place  in  the  record  of  achievements 
of  American  arms.  And  truly  it  was  a  glorious 
achievement. 

In  one  month  Santa  Anna  had  made  his  march 
from  San  Luis  to  Angostura ;  had  fought  the  battle 
which  it  had  been  hoped  would  arouse  the  national 
spirit  of  Mexico  to  continued  and  energetic  resist 
ance  in  deeds  as  well  as  in  words.  At  the  end  of 
I  he  moiilh  he  \v;is  in  rHivjil,  with  his  army  heatcn, 
cut  ii|),  mid  dispirited,  and  with  the  trophies  of 
three  guns  and  two  company  markers  to  show  as 
thn  IVuiis  of  the  victory,  lor  the  achievement  of 


432  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

which  he  had  made  such  preparations.  And  this 
was  the  result  of  a  hattle  fought  by  an  army  of 
over  20,000  Mexicans,  of  whom  one  half,  at  least, 
were  counted  as  the  veteran  soldiers  of  their  re 
public,  against  one  of  less  than  5000  Americans, 
the  greater  number  of  whom  were  badly  disci 
plined  and  had  no  experience  in  war. 

The  effect  of  the  victory  was  to  prevent  an  in 
crease  of  moral  power  on  the  Mexican  side,  to  force 
Santa  Anna  to  organize,  in  a  great  measure,  an 
entirely  new  army  for  future  operations,  to  secure 
possession  of  the  north  of  Mexico  and  safety  for 
the  American  frontier,  and  to  afford  time  for  the 
advance  of  the  main  operations  of  the  war  by  the 
southern  line  from  Vera  Cruz. 

These  results  could  hardly  have  been  more  favor 
able  to  the  American  cause  had  the  operations  been 
planned  and  executed  in  accordance  with  the  views 
of  the  most  enlightened  military  chieftain,  having 
for  his  object  the  furtherance  of  the  operations  of 
the  war,  to  the  end  set  forth  as  that  most  anxious 
ly  desired,  "  the  conquest  of  peace"  And  yet  the 
battle  took  place,  as  has  been  seen,  contrary  to  the 
anticipations  and  judgment  of  both  General  Tay 
lor  and  General  Scott.  As  it  did  occur,  and  was 
a  successful  action,  attended  with  great  results,  it 
increased  the  reputation  of  the  former,  and  as  it 
was  undoubtedly  a  dangerous  and  hard-contested 
one,  his  friends  and  himself  have  continued  their 
complaints  of  the  action  of  the  latter  and  the  War 
Department  for  placing  him  in  a  position  where  he 


THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO.  433 

gained  the  glory  of  the  battle,  regardless  of  his  own 
expressed  coincident  opinions  as  to  the  probability 
of  an  attack  in  that  direction.  And  in  judging  of 
the  military  acts  of  .General  Taylor  in  these  oper 
ations,  those  expressed  opinions  should  be  remem 
bered,  although,  nevertheless,  he  did  display  all 
those  sterling  qualities  of  a  commander  which  have 
established  his  popularity,  and  caused  his  errors  of 
judgment  and  inefficient  policy  to  be  overlooked. 

"  To  be  ready  at  a  moment  to  devote  himself,  if 
necessary,  for  the  welfare  of  the  state,"^  is  enu 
merated  by  a  great  military  writer  as  among  the 
qualities  which  acquire  for  a  general  distinction 
and  renown.  It  is  a  quality  of  the  heart  rather 
than  the  head,  it  is  true,  but  in  the  demonstration 
of  devoted  patriotism  lies  the  surest  road  to  popu 
lar  affection ;  and  the  rare  quality  appears  in  Gen 
eral  Taylor's  reply  to  General  Scott  of  January 
15th,  in  which  he  says,  "  I  will  carry  out  in  good 
faith,  while  I  remain  in  Mexico,  the  views  of  the 
government,  though  I  may  be  sacrificed  in  the  ef 
fort"  His  erroneous  impression  that  he  was  to 
be  sacrificed,  and  his  conclu'sions  with  regard  to 
Santa  Anna's  action,  do  not  affect  the  merit  of  his 
patriotic  intentions  and  devotion.  Had  General 
Scott,  in  his  answer,  treated  the  subject  as  one  af 
fecting  the  interests  of  the  service  rather  than  as 
a  division  of  troops  between  two  commanders  for 
personal  advantages  in  their  positions,  in  which 
light,  it  appears  from  their  correspondence,  both  of 

*  Montecuculli. 

I— EE 


434  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

the  generals  regarded  the  resources  of  their  coun 
try,  which  were  the  hone  of  contention,  the  ques 
tion  of  the  desire  of  sacrificing  General  Taylor,  on 
the  part  of  the  government  or  of  General  Scott, 
would  hardly  have  arisen.  He  and  his  friends 
would  have  heen  forced  to  have  considered  any  er 
ror,  if  error  there  were,  one  of  head  rather  than 
of  heart,  especially  as  General  Taylor's  anticipa 
tions  of  Mexican  action  were  the'  same  as  Gen 
eral  Scott's.  All  the  had  feeling  and  discussion 
of  the  subject  might  have  heen  saved,  though 
probably  General  Taylor  would  not  have  received 
so  much  applause  as  he  has,  since  it  has  been  made 
to  appear  that  he  was  the  object  of  persecution. 

In  moving  in  advance  to  Agua  Nueva,  after  he 
had  found  that  the  moral  force  of  the  volunteers 
of  his  command  had  been  somewhat  impaired  hy 
the  capture  of  the  scouting  parties,  General  Tay 
lor  acted  the  part  of  a  great  commander,  having  in 
view  the  restoration  of  confidence ;  but  he  entail 
ed  upon  himself  the  necessity  of  fighting  at  the 
southern  extremity  of  the  pass,  which,  inasmuch 
as  he  helieved  an  advance  of  the  main  Mexican 
army  toward  him  to  be  "  improbable,"  he  was  not 
at  the  time  prepared  for.  Believing,  as  he  did,  that 
"it  was  not  likely  that  a  serious  demonstration 
would  be  made  in  that  direction,"^  it  was  easy  to 
speculate  on  the  advantages  of  his  position  at  the 

*  General  Taylor  to  the  Adjutant  General,  February  7th,  1846.  Executive 
Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Con 
gress,  p.  1110. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  435 

southern  extremity  of  the  pass.     There  were  ad 
vantages,  as  he  stated,  and,  inasmuch  as  the  posi 
tion  was  strong,  the  victory,  if  the  battle  ensued, 
was,  in  fact,  comparatively  secure.     As   it  was 
the  boldest,  there  is  no  doubt  that  offering  battle 
to  Santa  Anna  at  that  extremity  was  the  proper 
course  of  action.     But  it  certainly  would  not  have 
been  had  the  danger  been  so  great  as  has  since 
been  represented,  for  General  Taylor  was  obliged 
by  neither  his  instructions  nor  immediate  necessi 
ties  to  take  up  the  position,  and,  saving  the  moral 
effect  a  retreat  would  have  had  upon  his  soldiers, 
the  result  of  the  operation  would  have  been  the 
same  upon  the  general  progress  of  the  War  had  he 
immediately  withdrawn  his  stores  and  troops  from 
Saltillo  to  Monterey.     The  morale  of  his  volun 
teers  might  have  been  in  a  degree  restored  when 
they  found  themselves  in  greater  strength  nearer 
the  base  of  operations,  and  behind  fortifications. 
At  Monterey  General  Taylor  could  have  withstood 
Santa  Anna's  attack  with  an  increased  force  of 
two  regiments,  fixed  artillery,  and  ammunition  in 
abundance,  and  with  provisions  for  some  months. 
His  objections  to  falling  back  to  that  place  he  has 
said  to  be,  that  he  could  not  forage  his  cavalry  and 
light  artillery.^     If  he  were  to  stand  a  siege  he 
wanted  but  a  small  force  of  either,  and  the  greater 
portion  might  in  safety  have  been  se,nt  to  re-enforce 
the  posts  on  the  lower  Rio  Grande,  and  join  a  re 
lieving  army.     The  physical  effect  of  detaining 

*  General  Taylor's  Speech  at  Pass  Christian. 


436  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

Santa  Anna  in  the  north  would  have  been  accom 
plished,  unless  he  refused  to  proceed  to  Monterey, 
and  retraced  his  steps  to  quell  the  revolution  in 
the  capital,  in  which  ease  General  Taylor  would 
have  failed  to  acquire  the  glory  of  victory,  but 
would  have  saved  his  troops.  <  If  Santa  Anna  be 
sieged  him,  he  certainly  could  have  held  out,  and 
the  Mexican  would  hardly  have  attempted  to  turn 
him  in  force  and  proceed  to  the  lower  Rio  Grande, 
leaving  five  thousand  enemies  in  his  rear.  Had  he 
left  a  portion  of  his  army  to  blockade  the  Ameri 
cans,  Taylor  could  have  fought  the  blockading  di 
vision  with  more  certainty  of  success  than,  as  it  ap 
pears  from  his  own  statements,  he  fought  the  bat 
tle  of  Buena  Vista ;  and,  the  blockading  force  being 
beaten,  the  Mexican  army  would  have  been  cut 
up  in  detail.  In  any  event,  the  operations  in  the 
north  would  have,  been  continued  for  some  months 
— certainly,  if  Santa  Anna  hoped  to  achieve  any 
thing,  until  the  18th  of  April,  for  even  General 
Taylor  would  hardly  admit  that  Santa  Anna  could 
have  captured  him  by  that  time ;  and,  in  the  mean 
while,  the  road  to  Mexico  from  Vera  Cruz  would 
have  been  open  to  General  Scott. 

But  when  General  Taylor  first  became  positive 
ly  informed  of  Santa  Anna's  advance  on  the  21st, 
then,  indeed,  had  he  retired,  he  would  have  made 
a  hurried  retreat,  which  would  have  had  a  most  per 
nicious  effect  upon  his  volunteer  troops.  Although, 
by  falling,  back  to  La  Angostura,  he  gave  up  the 
advantages  of  making  the  enemy  fight  in  the  desert, 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  437 

while  he  held  a  strong  position  in  front  of  the, first 
supply  of  water,  and  also  permitted  Santa  Anna,  if 
he  chose  to  run  the  risk,  to  halt  at  Agua  Nueva 
and  replenish  his  supplies  from  the  country  about 
Parras,  then  sixty  miles  to  his  left,  yet  the  pass 
opposite  the  defile  at  La  Angostura  was  but  a  mile 
and  a  half  wide,  the  position  was  strong,  he  had 
4500  troops  and  fifteen  light  guns,  and,  inasmuch 
as  there  was  a  possibility  of  being  turned  at  Agua 
Nueva  by  the  roads  through  La  Hedionda  and  La 
Punta  de  Santa  Elena,  the  victory  was  compara 
tively  secure  even  then,  with  good  dispositions 
upon  the  battle,  field.  Nevertheless, ,  as  appears 
from  a  letter  from  General  Taylor,  written  on  the 
night  before  the  battle,  which  his  friends  have  pub 
lished,  it  was  a  subject  of  great  anxiety  on  his 
part  at  the  time,  and  it  was  not  until  then  that  he 
made  up  his  mind  to  make  his  last  stand  at  La 
Angostura,  which,  it  is  true,  he  then  did  with  all 
the  determination  which  characterized  his  greater 
actions.  It  was  not  until  that  time  that  he  or 
dered  up  Marshall,  with  the  heavy  guns  and  the 
battalion  of  horse,  from  the  pass  of  the  Binconada, 
where  they  were  useless.  Then  it  was  a  matter 
of  great  hazard  to  bring  them  through  the  valley, 
for  Minon  in  force  had  already  taken  position  to 
the  north  of  Saltillo.  By  leaving  that  force  at 
such  a  point,  when  it  might  as  well  have  been 
at  Buena  Vista  on  the  22d  as  on  the  24th,  Gener 
al  Taylor  neglected  an  evident  principle  of  war: 
"  When  you  have  resolved  to  fight  a  battle,  collect 


438  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

your  whole  force.  Dispense  with  nothing.  A  sin 
gle  battalion  sometimes  decides  the  day"*  By  that 
neglect  he  was  deprived  of  four  heavy  guns  during 
the  action,  which,  without  consideration  of  the  su 
perior  weight  of  metal,  would  have  guarded  the 
defile  at  La  Angostura,  and  afforded  four  light 
pieces  more  for  the  general  hattle.  Four  pieces  on 
the  plateau  (Bragg' s  and  Thomas's)  held  the  whole 
mass  of  the  Mexican  attacking  column  in  check, 
and  "  saved  the  day."  Had  four  more  heen  on  the 
plateau  at  the  commencement  of  the  action,  there 
would  have  heen  nine  pieces  in  play,  leaving 
Bragg  with  two  on  the  right,  and  Sherman  with 
two  in  reserve.  In  that  case,  it  is  difficult  to  see, 
since  four  pieces  drove  hack  the  most  desperate  at 
tack,  how  the  Mexican  troops  could  have  gained 
their  first  advantages ;  no  loss  of  magnitude  would 
then  have  occurred,  as  there  did  toward  the  close 
of  the  action  in  retrieving  the  battle. 

General  Taylor  was  absent  when  the  disposi 
tions  for  battle  were  first  made  by  General  Wool 
on  the  22d.  But,  if  he  had  determined  to  fight  in 
advance  of  Saltillo,  his  arrangements  for  the  de 
fense  of  that  point  might  have  been  earlier  made ; 
and,  in  any  case,  as  it  certainly  was  the  point  of 
least  importance,  so  long  as  he  blocked  the  passage 
of  the  main  Mexican  army  at  La  Angostura,  it 
would  appear  that  he  might  have  sent  his  direc 
tions  for  the  dispositions  by  staff  officers.  But  he 
approved  of  General  Wool's  dispositions,  and  these 
may  be  the  subject  of  remark. 

*  Napoleon. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  439 

As  they  were  first  made,  the  heights  on  the  left 
were  unoccupied,  inviting  Santa  Anna's  movement 
to  the  direction  in  which  the  position  could  he  most 
easily  turned.  If  the  heights  were  of  any  conse 
quence,  it  would  appear  that  they  should  have 
heen  occupied  in  advance  of  the  enemy ;  and  that 
they  were  considered  so,  is  evident  from  the  opposi 
tion  which  was  made  to  Ampudia's  movement  hy 
the  American  skirmishers.  But  why  the  positions 
which  they  occupied  were  given  up  during  the 
night,  if  they  had  heen  worth  fighting  for,  and  the 
attempt  was  made  to  recover  them  on  the  follow 
ing  morning,  is  a  question. 

General  Taylor  was  again  ahsent  at  Saltillo 
when  the  hattle  recommenced  on  the  23d,  and  the 
dispositions  were  again  made  hy  General  Wool, 
hut  prohahly  with  his  knowledge  and  approbation. 
In  these,  the  key  of  the  position  was  considered  to 
he  "  the  eminence  immediately  on  the  left  of  Wash 
ington's  battery"^  at  La  Angostura,  and  the  great 
er  portion  of  the  force  xwas  concentrated  about  it, 
notwithstanding  the  enemy  evidently  showed  an 
intention  to  turn  the  left  in  order  to  get  possession 
of  it. 

Now  the  eminence  immediately  to  the  left  of 
Washington's  battery  would  most  certainly,  in  pos 
session  of  the  enemy,  have  given  him  the  victory 
and  "  a  free  passage  to  Saltillo."  But,  before,  he 
could  get  it,  he  had  either  to  force  the  pass  of  An- 

*  Wool's  Keport.     Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate,  first  Session  of  the 
thirtieth  Congress,  p.  146. 


440 


THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO. 


gostura,  or  sweep  the  American  troops  from  the 
plateau.  The  possession  of  the  pass  without  the 
plateau  would  have  availed  him  nothing,  for  if  he 
endeavored  to  penetrate  it  he  would  have  exposed 
his  flank ;  and,  moreover,  to  attempt  to  force  it  di 
rectly  in  the  face  of  four  pieces  of  modern  artillery, 
served  hy  such  gunners  as  those  of  the  American 
army,  with  the  protection  of  a  parapet,  was  useless, 
as  the  event  soon  proved  to  the  Mexican  general. 
But  two  full  regiments,  which  did  not  fire  a  shot  in 
defense  of  the  pass  when  Mora  y  VillaimTs  column 
was  repulsed,  were  stationed  about  it,  while,  to  op 
pose  the  advance  of  the  main  Mexican  army,  at  a 
point  where  the  American  troops  were  without  pro 
tection,  a  single  regiment  of  undisciplined  troops 
and  three  guns  were  thrown,  unsupported,  far  to 
the  front,  and,  as  if  that  was  not  sufficient,  were 
disposed  so  as  to  present  the  left  flank  to  the  Mexi 
can  batteries.  Under  such  circumstances,  it  could 
hardly  be  expected  of  volunteer  troops,  in  their  first 
fight,  to  stand. 

That  they  did  maintain  their  position  when,  as 
was  afterward  proven,  they  had  but  little  instruc 
tion  or  discipline,  speaks  much  for  the  personal 
bravery  of  the  men.  Had  the  troops  been  proper 
ly  disposed  and  the  fight  been  well  supported  there, 
the  testimony  of  Mexican  engineers  would  show 
that  the  victory  would  have  been  early  won,  so 
great  was  the  execution  of  the  light  artillery  which 
the  second  Indiana  regiment  supported.^ 

*  "  About  3000  infantry  and  a  supporting  force  of  cavalry,  under  General 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

When  it  fled,  the  flight  of  the  skirmishers  on  the 
mountain  was  a  matter  of  consequence,  and,  as  the 
Mexicans  had  a  footing  in  force  on  the  plain  whence 
they  could  operate  directly  against  the  "  key  of  the 
position,"  so  called,  "the  eminence  immediately  to 
the  left  of  Washington's  hattery,"  the  advantages 
of  position  were  in  a  great  degree  neutralized,  espe 
cially  after  the  Mexican  general  had  hrought  up 
his  artillery.  But  that  the  whole  plateau  was  not 
swept  immediately  after  the  flight  of  the  Indian- 
ians,  and  that  the  masses  of  the  enemy  were  de 
layed  hy  the  steady  front  of  the  second  Illinois 
regiment,  and  the  fire  of  two  guns  until  re-enforce 
ment  arrived,  speaks  volumes  for  the  hravery  of 
American  soldiers,  and  for  the  splendid  efficiency 
of  their  artillery.  From  the  moment  the  Mexi 
cans  gained  the  plateau,  the  hattle  was  hetween 
the  soldiers  as  well  as  the  generals ;  and  the  great 
quality  of  a  soldier,  and  perhaps  the  only  one  which 
is  indispensahle  to  a  general  after  the  commence 
ment  of  a  battle,  General  Taylor  possessed,  not 
only  in  greater  degree  than  Santa  Anna,  but  than 
most  of  those  mentioned  in  American  history. 
The  stern  determination  in  a  crisis  of  battle  was 
never  more  conspicuously  displayed  by  General 
Taylor  on  any  field,  and  that,  when  combined  with 

Pacheco,  moved  up  to  take  this  height,  and  at  nine  a  heavy  fire  was  opened. 
The  cavalry  charged  at  the  same  moment.  Many  of  our  corps  acted  badly ; 
but  much  havoc,  nevertheless,  was  made  among  the  enemy,  and  the  heights 
were  carried  by  force  of  arms.  If  at  that  juncture  we  had  been  attacked 
with  vigor,  we  should  probably  have  been  defeated.11 — Mexican  Engineers' 
Report. 


442  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

the  moral  effect  of  his  reputation  as  a  successful 
general,  could  hardly  have  failed  to  impart  the 
same  spirit  to  his  soldiers.  His  presence,  and  bold, 
determined  hearing,  had  much  to  do  with  restoring 
the  battle ;  but  his  entertainment  of  Santa  Anna's 
message  to  ask  "  what  he  wanted,"  and  his  mis 
sion  to  the  Mexican  right  wing,  had  the  effect  of 
placing  it  in  jeopardy  after  it  had  once  been  won, 
and  again  his  steady  firmness  of  purpose  had  much 
effect  in  its  second  restoration. 

But  the  fortunes  of  that  day  twice  hung  in  the 
balance.  That  they  were  immediately  saved  once 
by  the  brilliant  courage  and  hard  fighting  of  Da- 
vis's  Mississippi  regiment,  and  again  by  the  timely 
arrival  and  splendid  execution  of  Bragg's  battery, 
and  that  Davis  first  suggested  his  own  movement,^ 
and  that  Bragg  moved  without  orders  in  the  direc 
tion  of  the  plateau,!  and  that  both  came  in  at  the 
proper  time  and  were  both  successful — these  facts, 
while  they  render  any  comment  upon  the  conduct 
of  those  officers  or  their  commands  unnecessary, 
yet  add  examples  to  the  many  of  the  supremacy 
of  fortune  in  war. 

*  "  General  Wool  was  upon  the  ground,  making  great  efforts  to  rally  the 
men  who  had  given  way.  I  approached  him,  and  asked  if  he  would  send 
another  regiment  to  support  me  in  an  attack  upon  the  enemy  before  us.  He 
was  alone,  and,  after  promising  the  support,  went  in  person  to  send  it." — 
Colonel  Dams' s  Report.  Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate,  first  Session  of 
the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  192. 

t  "  As  they  were  retiring  by  the  very  route  they  had  advanced,  I  feared 
they  would  avail  themselves  of  our  weakness  at  that  point,  and  renew  the 
attack,  regardless  of  our  flag.  I  accordingly  reversed  my  battery,  and  urged 
my  horses  to  the  utmost." — Captain  Bragg's  Official  Report.  Executive 
Document,  No.  1,  Senate,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  202. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO-.  443 


In  the  movements  of  General  Santa  Anna,  and 
in  the  progress  of  the  battle,  were  developed  all  the 
energy  of  that  officer  in  preparation,  all  his  talent 
for  strategy  and  for  operating  upon  the  minds  of 
his  countrymen,  and  all  the  good  qualities  of  the 
Mexican  troops ;  but,  at  the  same  time,  all  their 
want  of  moral  power,  and  the  inconstancy  of  pur 
pose  in  a  great  crisis,  characteristic  of  Mexican  ar 
mies  and  leaders  ;  which,  in  strange  contradiction 
to  the  general  national  policy  of  their  country,  has 
rendered  her  efforts  in  arms  against  a  powerful  or 
determined  adversary  entirely  fruitless. 

The  celerity  and  secrecy  of  the  march  from  San 
Luis  are  almost  unsurpassed.  The  movement  from 
Encarnacion  upon  Agua  Nueva,  and  the  continued 
march  to  La  Angostura,  making  nearly  fifty  miles 
in  twenty-four  hours,  and  the  immediate  com 
mencement  of  the  battle,  when  it  is  remembered 
that  thirty-six  of  those  miles  were  without  water, 
and  that  the  men 'had  scanty  subsistence,  prove 
how  terrible  a  Mexican  army  might  be,  had  the 
troops  of  which  it  is  composed  only  the  moral  force 
to  prosecute  the  advantages  which  such  qualifica 
tions  for  undergoing  fatigue  and  privation  place 
within  its  reach. 

In  the  battle,  however,  although  General  Santa 
Anna  immediately  seized  the  point  which  offered 
advantage,  and  gained  the  point  which  he  first  de 
sired,  yet,  as  has  since  been  asserted  by  one  of  his 


444  THE   WAR'WITH  MEXICO. 

generals,^  there  was  a  want  of  combination,  and  a 
failure  to  prosecute  advantages  when  gained,  while 
he  kept  his  attention  fixed  upon  the  movements 
of  one  corps  rather  than  the  whole  hattle.  There 
fore  he  delayed  bringing  forward  his  reserves,  and 
throwing  the  greatest  mass  in  action  upon  the  de 
cisive  point,  which  was,  indeed,  the  plateau,  and 
over  it  to  the  eminence  to  the  left  of  Angostura,  un 
til  his  right  wing  had  heen  beaten,  and  the  Amer 
ican  artillery  and  troops  could  concentrate  upon 
the  second  point  of  attack.  Had  he  made  a  pow 
erful  stroke  at  an  earlier  period  of  the  hattle,  and 
strove  to  clear  the  plateau,  it  is  possible  that  he 
might  have  gained  the  victory; — certainly  he  would 
have  stood  a  better  chance  for  it.  But,  as  he  would 
then  have  met  the  three  regiments,  which,  isolated 
and  in  advance,  were  overthrown  at  once  by  the 
rush  of  his  masses,  in  position  and  near  their  artil 
lery,  and  since  four  light  guns  held  him  in  check, 
it  is  still  a  question  of  doubt  even  under  the  sup 
position. 

*  General  Minon. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  445 


CHAPTER  XI. 

Doniphan's  Expedition  into  the  Navajoe  Country — Insurrection  in  New  Mex 
ico—Affair  of  Canada— Affair  of  Embudo— Affair  of  Pueblo  de  Taos— Don 
iphan's  March  toward  Chihuahua — Affair  of  Brazito — of  Sacramento — 
American  Occupation  of  Chihuahua — State  of  Affairs  at  that  Place— Doni- 
phan  abandons  it — Marches  to  Saltillo. 

IN  order  to  fulfill  the  promises  made  in  his  vari 
ous  proclamations  to  the  inhabitants  of  New  Mex 
ico,  of  protecting  them  from  the  depredations  of  the 
Indians  in  their  vicinity,  General  Kearney  had  left 
orders  for  Colonel  Doniphan  to  enter  the  country 
of  the  Navajoes,  west  of  Santa  Fe,  and,  if  possible, 
to  make  a  treaty  with  the  chiefs  of  that  warlike 
tribe.  Upon  the  arrival  of  the  re-enforcements 
from  Fort  Leavenworth,  Doniphan  moved  his  reg 
iment,  in  three  detachments,  by  different  routes, 
into  the  country,  which  was  traversed,  for  most  of 
its  extent,  without  opposition.  He  was  successful 
in  concluding  a  treaty  of  peace  and  amity  with  the 
Navajoes,  and  the  different  detachments  returned 
to  the  Rio  Grande,  on  which  they  were  concen 
trated,  at  Socorro,  on  the  12th  of  September.  The 
march  was  one  of  remarkable  interest,  having  been 
made  in  the  winter,  over  snow-capped  mountains, 
through  a  country  previously  but  little  known,  and 
inhabited  only  by  the  barbarous  tribes  with  which 
the  .treaty  was  made.  But  its  story  is  more  that 
of  Western  travelers  than  of  the  war  with  Mexico. 


446  THE   WAR   WITH   MEXICO. 

Having  finished  the  duty,  Doniphan  prepared  to 
move  south,  to  join  General  Wool  at  Chihuahua, 
where  it  was  expected  that  officer  was  or  soon 
would  be.  At  Valverde  he  found  a  large  caravan 
of  American  merchants  awaiting  his  movements, 
and  on  the  14th  of  December  his  advance  marched 
from  that  place,  followed  on  the  16th  and  18th  by 
the  remainder  of  the  regiment  and  convoy.^ 

The  civil  government  which  General  Kearney 
had  established  in  New  Mexico  was  successfully 
administered,  without  the  manifestation  of  any  in 
tention  to  oppose  American  authority  on  the  part 
of  the  inhabitants,  until  the  month  of  December, 
on  the  15th  day  of  which  the  authorities  at  Santa 
Fe  received  information  of  a  contemplated  insur 
rection. 

The  ricos  of  the  country  had  found  themselves 
of  comparatively  small  importance  since  the  occu 
pation  by  the  American  army.  They  had  all  been 
in  league  with  Armijo,  and,  during  his  administra 
tion,  had  enjoyed  full  opportunity  of  exercising  of 
ficial  power  for  extortion  and  gain.  Finding  them 
selves,  in  many  instances,  thrust  from  office,  and 
in  all  treated  by  the  Americans  with  but  little  of 
the  respect  which  they  had  exacted  from  their  own 
people,  they  were,  of  course,  hostile  to  the  new  gov 
ernment. 

The  great  number  of  the  inhabitants  had  been 
accustomed,  from  long  habit,  to  pay  attention  to 

*  Colonel  Doniphan's  Official  Report.  Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Sen 
ate,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  496. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  447 

their  chiefs,  and  to  obey  their  priests  without  ques 
tion.  They  appreciated  none  of  the  advantages 
which  the  new  form  of  government  gave  to  them, 
and  entertained  the  hostility  to  foreigners  common 
in  all  half- civilized  countries ;  and  this  hostility 
was  doubtless  increased  by  the  rough  and  careless 
manner  of  the  Western  volunteers. 

The  rebellion  had  been  for  some  time  contem 
plated  at  the  time  of  the  discovery  of  the  conspir 
acy,  and  the  names  of  two  principal  instigators, 
who  immediately  fled  and  escaped.  Several  ar 
rests  were  nevertheless  made  at  Santa  Fe,  and  it 
was  believed  that  the  insurrection  had  been  crush 
ed  at  its  commencement.^  No  further  danger  was 
anticipated,  precautionary  measures  were  aban 
doned,  and  small  parties  of  Americans  traversed 
the  country  without  fear  of  molestation. 

The  principal  military  force  was,  at  the  time,  at 
Santa  Fe,  under  command  of  Colonel  Price,  of  the 
second  Missouri  regiment  of  mounted  volunteers, 
which  had  followed  Kearney's  movement  from  Fort 
Leavenworth.  But  various  detachments  were  post 
ed  at  the  different  villages  of  the  territory,  and  most 
of  the  horses  belonging  to  the  troops  were  grazing 
in  the  plains,  under  charge  of  small  parties. 

While  affairs  were  in  a  state  of  apparent  secu 
rity,  on  the  14th  of  January  the  insurrection  broke 
out.  On  that  day  the  governor,  Charles  Bent,  a 
man  who  had  been  selected  for  the  position  by  Gen- 

*  Colonel  Price's  Official  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate, 
first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  520. 


448  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

eral  Kearney  on  account  of  his  long  intercourse 
with  the  New  Mexicans  and  deservedly  high  char- 
acter,  was  brutally  murdered,  with  five  others,  civil 
officers  of  the  territory,  at  San  Fernando  de  Taos, 
a  pueblo  some  fifty  miles  to  the  north  of  Santa  Fe.* 
On  the  same  day  a  crowd  of  Indians  and  New  Mex 
icans  attacked  the  buildings  of  a  Mr.  Turley,  at 
Arroyo  Honda,  in  the  same  valley.  He  had  been 
for  a  long  time  a  resident  of  the  country,  and  it  was 
believed  that  he  was  deservedly  popular  with  the 
inhabitants.  After  a  gallant  resistance,  in  which 
the  assailants  suffered  severely,  the  buildings  were 
forced,  and  all  the  occupants  except  one  man,  who 
had  succeeded  in  making  his  escape,  were  killed. 
Throughout  the  northern  part  of  the  province  the 
insurgents  murdered  every  American  upon  whom 
they  could  lay  hands,  and  administered  a  like  fate 
to  all  Mexicans  who  had  accepted  office  under  the 
new  government. 

The  news  of  the  rebellion  reached  Santa  Fe  on 
the  20th  of  January,  by  which  time  it  was  fully 
organized  and  in  progress.  The  principal  force, 
consisting  in  greater  part  of  Pueblo  Indians,  led  by 
their  chiefs  and  the  principal  New  Mexicans  of  the 
department,  soon  marched  toward  Santa  Fe,  while, 
in  obedience  to  the  missives  of  the  leaders,  the  in 
habitants  of  different  villages  joined  in  the  rebel 
lion,  which  daily  became  more  formidable.  Col 
onel  Price  became  informed  of  the  movements  of 

*  Colonel  Price's  Official  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate, 
first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  520. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  449 

,the  enemy  by  intercepted  letters,  and  immediately 
took  steps  to  meet  the  danger.^ 

He  first  ordered  up  the  garrison  of  Albuquerque 
from  the,  south,  with  directions  for  a  portion  of  it 
to  re-enforce  Santa  Fe,  and  the  remainder  to  follow 
his  movement.  On  the  23d  he  marched  for  the  val 
ley  of  Taos  with  350  men  (most  of  them  dismount 
ed),  and  four  twelve  pounder  mountain  howitzers. 

At  noon,  on  the  following  day,  he  fell  in  with 
the  main  force  of  the  insurgents  near  Canada,  a 
small  village  north  of  Santa  Fe.  The  enemy  num 
bered  near  1500,  and  had  possession  of  highlands 
and  buildings  which  commanded  the  road.  Fear 
ing  that  he  might  escape  or  take  up  a  new  posi 
tion,  upon  receiving  intelligence  of  his  presence, 
Price  quickened  the  march  of  his  main  force,  leav 
ing  the  train  to  follow  as  it  might.  Upon  coming 
to  Canada,  he  sent  his  howitzers  at  once^  across  a 
creek  which  intervened,  and  opened  fire  upon  the 
houses  and  heights.  While  the  American  wagons 
were  yet  some  distance  in  the  rear,  a  party  of  Mex 
icans  and  Indians  strove  to  turn  the  main  force  and 
cut  them  off,  but  were  prevented  by  a  threatened 
attack  from  the  small  number  of  mounted  men  be 
longing  to  the  command.  When  the  wagons  ar 
rived,  a  battalion  of  infantry  thrust  the  enemy  from 
a  house  upon  the  American  right,  and  soon  after 
the  whole  force  was  ordered  to  advance.  The  me 
lee  became  general,  and,  in  a  short  time,  the  enemy 

*  Colonel  Price's  Official  Report.  Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate, 
first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  521. 

I.— FF 


450  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

was  routed  and  dispersed,  with  a  loss  of  thirty-six 
killed  and  a  large  number  of  wounded.  The  Amer 
icans  had  lost  two  killed  and  six  wounded.^ 

The  march  was  continued  up  the  valley  of  the 
Rio  del  Norte,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  28th  the 
command  was  re-enforced  by  the  arrival  of  Captain 
Burg  win  of  the  United  States  first  dragoons ,.  with 
his  own  and  a  company  of  Missouri  volunteers, 
and  one  six  pounder  gun.  Burgwin  had  been  at 
Albuquerque,  and,  although  his  troops  were  most 
ly  dismounted,  he  had  made  the  march  to  overtake 
the  main  body  with  great  rapidity.  The  com 
mand,  thus  augmented,  amounted  in  all  to  479 
men  and  five  pieces  of  artillery. 

At  La  Joya,  on  the  following  day,  it  was  learned 
that  a  party  of  insurgents  occupied  a  pass  on  the 
road  leading  from  the  practicable  wagon  route  to 
Taos,  to  the  village  of  Embudo.  The  pass  of  Em- 
budo  was  impracticable  for  either  artillery  or  wag 
ons,  and  at  its  narrowest  point  was  barely  wide 
enough  for  three  men  to  pass  abreast.  The  mount 
ains  rose  sharp  and  rugged  on  either  side,  with 
clumps  of  cedars  growing  in  the  crevices  of  the  rocks, 
which,  with  the  irregularities  of  the  surface,  afford 
ed  excellent  cover  for  a  defensive  party.  The  in 
surgents  we.re  posted  about  this  point  in  strength ; 
for,  although  they  were  badly  armed  and  equipped, 
they  numbered  between  six  and  seven  hundred. 

To  force  this  pass,  Captain  Burgwin  was  detach- 

*  Colonel  Price'8  Official  Report.  Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate, 
first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  522, 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  45^ 

•ed  with  a  party  of  180  men.  Upon  coming  within 
range,  he  sent  parties  up  the  slopes  on  either  side 
of  the  pass,  whose  fire  soon  told  upon  the  enemy. 
The  insurgents  hroke,  and  bounded  away  over  the 
steep  and  rugged  mountains  with  a  speed  which 
defied  pursuit  from  the  Americans.  Burgwin's 
command  proceeded  on  through  the  pass,  and  oc 
cupied  the  village  without  resistance,  having  lost 
one  man  killed  and  one  wounded  during  the  affair, 
and  inflicted  a  loss  of  nearly  eighty  in  all  upon 
the  enemy.^ 

On  the  30th  the  detachment  rejoined  the  main 
body  at  Trampas,  and  on  the  1st  of  February  the 
march  was  continued  over  the  Taos  mountain. 
Throughout  that  and  the  following  day  the  rugged 
route  lay  through  deep  snow,  and  the  severity  of 
the  weather  and  difficulty  of  the  road  tried  the  pa 
tience  and  hardihood  of  the  troops.  On  the  3d  the 
command  reached  San  Fernando  de  Taos,  the  scene 
of  the  massacre  of  Governor  Bent  and  his  compan 
ions.  San  Fernando  was  occupied  without  resist 
ance,  for  the  insurgents  had  fortified  themselves  in 
their  principal  place,  Pueblo  de  Taos,  and  were 
awaiting  an.  attack.  Colonel  Price  rode  forward 
to  reconnoiter  the  "  pueblo,"  which,  for  an  irregular 
Indian  position,  was  one  of  great  strength. 

The  buildings  of  the  "pueblo"  were  two  large 
houses,  rising  some  seven  or  eight  stories  in  an  ir 
regular  pyramidal  form,  each  capable  of  containing 

*  Colonel  Price's  Official  Report.  Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate, 
first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  523. 


452  THE  WA&  WITH  MEXICO. 

some  five  or  six  hundred  men,  and  a  strongly-built 
church,  besides  several  others  of  smaller  capacity. 
They  were  inclosed  hy  a  wall  of  adobes  and  pick 
ets,  of  an  irregular,  pentagonal  trace,  flanked  by 
small  bastions  at  the  angles.  The  walls,  houses, 
and  church  were  all  creneled  for  musketry. 

After  reconnaissance,  Price  determined  to  attack 
the  church,  which  was  at  the  northwestern  angle 
of  the  inclosure.  He  accordingly  brought  up  his 
howitzers,  and  cannonaded  it  for  about  two  hours 
without  any  positive  effect,  when  he  withdrew  his 
troops  for  the  night  to  San  Fernando. 

On  the  morning  of  the  4th  he  advanced  his 
whole  force  and  took  up  position.  The  mounted 
men  of  the  command  were  stationed  on  the  east  of 
the  inclosure  to  intercept  a  retreat.  The  main 
body  of  the  footmen,  the  six  pounder,  and  two 
mountain  howitzers  were  posted  on  the  north,  and 
two  companies  and  two  howitzers  on  the  west. 
The  artillery  opened  fire  upon  the  town  at  nine 
o'clock,  and  continued  playing  until  eleven,  by 
which  time  it  was  considered  impracticable  to  break 
the  walls  with  such  light  pieces,  and  Price  determ 
ined  to  carry  the  "pueblo"  by  assault. 

Captain  Burgwin  moved  forward  the  two  com 
panies  on  the  west,  and  at  the  same  time  four  oth 
ers  advanced  from  the  north,  against  the  north 
western  angle  of  the  inclosure. 

The  assailants  were  received  with  a  heavy  fire, 
but  nevertheless  they  rushed  on  and  gained  shel 
ter  on  the  western  side  of  the  church.  The  thick 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  453 

walls  of  the  building  were  then  attacked  with  axes, 
and  while  parties  on  that  side  endeavored  to  make 
a  practicable  breach,  others,  leaving  their  shelter, 
strove  ineffectually  to  force  the  door.  In  this  at 
tempt  Burgwin  was  mortally  wounded.  In  the 
mean  time  small  holes  had  been  cut,  through  which 
the  assailants  pitched  in  shells  upon  the  occupants, 
and  some,  having  climbed  up  to  the  roof,  fired  it. 
The  Indians  defended  themselves  stubbornly,  and 
fired  fast  and  heavily  in  the  direction  of  the  Amer 
icans.  The  six  pounder  was  brought  round  to  the 
vicinity  of  the  occupied  point,  and  opened  upon  the 
town  with  grape,  which  drove  the  Indians  hanging 
about  the  smaller  houses  to  cover.  The  gun  was 
then  advanced  to  within  sixty  yards  of  the  church, 
and  the  holes  which  had  been  cut  through  the 
walls  with  axes  were  soon  increased  to  a  practica 
ble  breach.  A  few  shell  and  stands  of  grape  were 
thrown  in,  and  the  assailants  rushed  through  the 
opening.  The  church  was  found  to  be  nearly  de 
serted,  and  the  Indians  soon  after  abandoned  the 
western  portion  of  the  village.  The  main  body 
took  shelter  with  their  women  and  children  in  the 
large  houses  of  the  "  pueblo."  Some  endeavored 
to  escape  to  the  mountains,  but  the  cavalry  posted 
to  intercept  a  retreat  cut  them  off  almost  to  a  man. 
The  Americans  occupied  the  abandoned  houses 
during  the  night,  and  early  on  the  following  morn 
ing  the  enemy  sued  for  peace.  Colonel  Price,  think 
ing  that  the  severe  loss  which  had  been  inflicted 
would  prevent  further  outbreaks,  granted  it  on  con- 


454  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

dition  that  the  instigators  of  the  rebellion  should 
he  delivered  up  to  him. ,  The  condition  was  com- 
plied  with,  and  on  the  7th  of  January  several  of 
them  were  hung  at  San  Fernando.  Of  the  five 
principal  leaders  of  the  insurrection,  hut  one  escaped 
the  fate  of  battle  or  of  execution,  and  he  was  not 
present  in  any  principal  affair. 

At  Pueblo  de  Taos  the  insurgents  lost  one  hund 
red  and  fifty  killed,  besides  a  large  number  of 
wounded.  The  Americans  had  seven  killed  and 
forty-six  wounded,  of  which  many  died. 

While  these  events  took  place,  minor  encoun 
ters  occurred  in  different  parts  of  the  valley.  The 
insurgents  were  busy  in  stampeding  and  stealing 
the  American  horses,  and  cutting  off  small  parties 
of  grazers.  In  breaking  up  a  gang  which  had  col 
lected  in  the  valley  of  the  Mora,  Captain  Hendley, 
of  the  Missouri  volunteers,  was  killed  and  his  par 
ty  repulsed.^  But  the  insurrection  had  been  ef 
fectually  checked,  so  far  as  operations  in  large  bod 
ies  were  concerned,  by  the  result  of  the  affair  at 
the  Pueblo  de  Taos,  although  deep-rooted  hostility 
to  the  Americans  was  manifested  in  the  predatory 
warfare  which  was  carried  on  for  some  subsequent 
time  by  detached  parties. 

The  civil  government  which  had  been  establish 
ed  by  General  Kearney  became  almost  a  dead  let 
ter  from  the  time  of  the  rebellion,  and  thencefor- 

*  Captain  Heudley  and  Lieutenant  Fitzpatrick  to  Colonel  Price.  Ex 
ecutive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress, 
p.  531-533. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  455 

ward  to  the  close  of  the  war  military  power  was 
necessary  to  vindicate  the  supremacy  of  the  laws. 


Colonel  Doniphan's  command  passed  the  Jorna 
da  del  Muerto,  a  distance  of  ninety  miles,  over  a 
dry,  arid  desert,  by  detachments,  in  safety.  The 
passage  of  this  desert  by  so  large  a  body,  accompa 
nied  as  it  was  by  the  large  convoy  of  merchant 
wagons,  was  in  itself  a  remarkable  achievement ; 
and  that  the  command  was  able  to  concentrate,  in 
any  condition  for  service,  immediately  afterward, 
is  indeed  a  matter  of  wonder.  At  one  time,  how 
ever,  a  portion  of  the  command  was  providentially 
relieved  by  the  fall  of  a  heavy  shower  of  rain,  when 
men  and  animals  had  nearly  given  out  from  thirst : 
an  occurrence  remarkable  in  itself,  for  at  that  sea- 
son  of  the  year  rain  seldom  falls  in  that  region. 

Upon  arriving  at  Dona  Ana;  information  was  re 
ceived  that  a  corps  of  700  Mexicans,  with  six  pieces 
of  artillery,  was  at  El  Paso,  in  readiness  to  oppose 
the  advance.  In  consequence  of  rumors  .to  the 
same  effect  which  had  reached  him  at  Valverde, 
Doniphan  had  sent  back  orders  to  Major  Clarke 
to  join  him  with  a  battery  of  four  sixes  and  two 
twelve  pounder  howitzers.^  Clarke  received  the 
order,  and  marched  from  Santa  Fe  a  short  time 
previous  to  the  insurrection. 

The  northwestern  departments  of  Mexico,  be 
sides  New  Mexico  and  California,  had  been  left  to 

*  Colonel  Doniphan's  Official  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Sen 
ate,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  497. 


456  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

their  own  resources  for  defense  by  the  central  gov 
ernment.  The  only  regiment  of  regular  Mexican 
troops  in  that  quarter  was  that  of  the  Vera  Cruz 
dragoons,  which  had  been  stationed  at  Santa  Fe, 
but  had  fled  with  Governor  Armijo  to  Chihuahua 
upon  Kearney's  approach.  The  men  were  no  bet 
ter  than  ordinary  Mexican  troopers,  and  much 
worse  mounted  and  equipped. 

General  Heredia,  who  commanded  the  north 
western  departments  of  Mexico,  and  Don  Angel 
Trias,  governor  of  Chihuahua,  had  received  inform 
ation  of  the  intended  march  of  General  Wool  to 
that  city,  as  well  as  of  the  occupation  of  New  Mex 
ico  by  Kearney,  and  had  been  for  some  time  act 
ively  engaged  in  preparing  for  defense.  The  mili 
tia  of  the  neighboring  departments  had  been  called 
out,  and  at  the  time  of  Doniphan's  approach  there 
were  under  arms,  in  the  State  of  Chihuahua,  near 
ly  4000  men,  besides  an  indefinite  number  of  ran- 
cheros,  armed  with  "  machetes"  and  other  ordinary 
weapons  of  the  country.  A  fair  proportion  of  artil 
lery  was  at  hand,  and  it  was  deemed  that  a  good 
defense  might  be  made  against  an  attack  either 
from  the  east  or  the  north. 

On  the  23d  of  December  Doniphan  continued 
his  march  from  Dona  Ana  in  the  direction  of  Chi 
huahua.  His  force,  including  the  merchants,  num 
bered  856  effective  men,  all  mounted  and  armed 
with  rifles.^  They  were  nearly  all  hardy  back- 

*  Colonel  Doniphan's  Official  Report.  Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Sen 
ate,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  497. 


THE    WAR   WITH    MEXICO. 

woodsmen,  excellent  marksmen,  and  full  ofr  cour 
age,  but  what  discipline  they  were  possessed  of 
amounted  to  nothing.^  On  the  25th  the  command 
arrived  at  Brazito,  an  encampment  one  day's  march 
from  El  Paso.  The  advanced  battalion  of  500vhad 
halted,  dismounted,  parked  the  baggage,  and,  while 
the  rear  detachment  was  yet  at  a  distance  of  some 
miles,  the  men  were  scattered  over  the  country  in 
search  of  wood  and  water.  At  this  juncture,  some 
most  in  advance  returned  and  reported  the  ap 
proach  of  an  enemy.  The  rally  was  sounded  at 
once,  and  the  force  was  formed  for  battle'  as  fast  as 
it  could  be  collected. 

To  those  acquainted  with  American  volunteers, 
especially  the  rangers  of  the  West,  the  scene  will 
readily  present  itself;,  but  to  military  men,  accus 
tomed  only  to  the  maneuvers  of  regular  troops,  or 
to  civilians,  whose  knowledge  of  the  operations  of 
war  is  derived  from  reading,  hardly  any  descrip 
tion  would  suffice  to  give  an  idea  of  the  forming 
of  American  volunteers  when  taken  by  surprise. 
The  hurry,  bustle,  confusion,  want  of  method, 
shouting,  discharging  of  rifles,  reloading,  and  un 
couth  formations,  and  the  bravery,  nonchalance, 
and  hearty  good- will  with  which  the  men  take 
whatever  place  they  happen  to  for  battle,  altogeth 
er  form  a  scene  rarely  to  be  met  with  in  the  mili 
tary  operations  of  any  other  nation. 

With  all  these,  however,  a  line  was  quickly 
formed,  but  not  before  the  enemy  had  approached 

*  Mr.  Ruxton's  work. 


458  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

within  half  a  mile  and  halted.  His  force  consisted 
of  1220  men,  of  whom  500  were  mounted.  Of  ar 
tillery,  he  had  one  small  howitzer.  His  line  was 
formed  with  the  active  hattalion  of  Chihuahua 
cavalry  on  the  right,  the  infantry  (national  guards) 
in  the  center,  and  the  Vera  Cruz  dragoons  on  the 
left.  While  forming  his  line,  and  before  the  Amer 
icans  were  in  any  thing  like  array,  a  Mexican  offi 
cer  was  sent  with  a  black  flag  to  demand  that  the 
American  commander  should  proceed  to  the  Mexi 
can  lines  for  a  conference,  and  with  a  threat,  in 
case  of  refusal,  that  the  Mexican  troops  would 
charge  and  capture  him,  giving  no  quarter.  He 
executed  his  singular  mission  in  good  style ;  but 
Doniphan's  answer,  characteristic  of  his  troops, 
was,  "  to  charge  and  be  d — rf."# 

The  Mexican  line  advanced  and  opened  fire 
with  the  howitzer,  and  with  muskets  and  escopetas, 
at  a  distance  of  four  hundred  yards.  The  cavalry, 
extending  to  the  right  and  left,  threatened  an  at 
tack  on  the  American  flanks.  But,  after  deliver 
ing  three  rounds,  the  infantry  approached  to  with 
in  long  rifle  range,  and  the  volunteers  commenced 
an  effective  practice,  which  threw  their  enemy  into 
confusion,  and  completely  checked  his  advance. 
In  the  mean  time  twenty  volunteers  mounted  and 
made  at  the  Vera  Cruz  dragoons,  which,  although 
numbering  thrice  the  American  force  at  the  point 
of  attack,  were  soon  overthrown.  The  whole  body 

*  Colonel  Doniphan's  Official  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Sen 
ate,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  497. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


459 


of  Mexicans  fled  to  the  mountains  in  the  vicinity, 
having  lost  forty -three  killed,  and  near  one  hundred 
and  fifty  wounded ;  of  the  Americans  hut  seven 
were  wounded,  and  those  hut  slightly.^ 

On  the  27th  Doniphan  entered  the  village  of  El 
Paso  without  opposition.  Having  ascertained 
there  that  General  Wool  had  not  advanced  upon 
Chihuahua,  and  that  his  advance  upon  that  town 
would  he  unassisted,  he  was  ohliged  to  await  the 
arrival  of  his  artillery.  He  remained  in  inactivity 
at  El  Paso  during  the  following  month,  hut  the  ar 
tillery  finally  came  up  in  the  early  part  of  Februa 
ry,  1847,  and  on  the  8th  the  advance  upon  Chihua 
hua  was  resumed.  The  Mexican  forces,  after  the 
affair  at  Brazito,  had  kept  at  a  respectful  distance, 
and  it  was  not  until  the  25th  that  any  thing  like 
a  demonstration  of  opposition  was  manifested.  In 
formation  was  then  received  that  a  large  force  was 
at  Encinillas,  a  hacienda  belonging  to  Governor 
Trias,  but  upon  the  arrival  of  the  Americans  on 
the  26th  it  was  found  to  have  retreated.  On  the 
following  day,  however,  upon  arriving  at  the  en 
campment  of  El  Sauz,  it  was  learned  that  the  ene 
my  was  in  position  at  the  pass  of  the  Sacramento, 
fifteen  miles  in  advance. 

The  road  south  from  El  Sauz  leads  through  an 
open  prairie  valley  between  two  sterile  mountains. 
The  pass  of  the  Sacramento  is  about  one  and  a 
half  miles  wide,  and  is  formed  by  a  spur  which 

*  Colonel  Doniphan's  Official  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Sen 
ate,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  498. 


460  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

juts  from  the  mountain  on  the  west.  Along  the 
northern  hase  of  the  spur  was  the  Rio  Sacramento, 
which  turns  to  the  south  near  the  hase  of  the 
eastern  mountain.  Some  two -miles  to  the  north 
the  main  valley  is  traversed  by  the  bed  of  the  Ar 
royo  Seco,  in  a  general  direction  from  northwest 
to  southeast,  until,  near  the  base  of  the  eastern 
mountain,  it  turns  to  the  south  and  empties  into 
the  Rio  Sacramento.  Between  these  two  streams 
the  ground  is  elevated,  and  divided  into  two  tables. 
The  western  is  nearly  level,  and  of  the  greatest  ex 
tent.  The  eastern  is  more  elevated,  and  more  di 
versified  in  its  topography. 

The  road  to  Chihuahua  from  the  north  crosses 
the  Arroyo  Seco,  rises  upon  the  elevated  land,  and, 
passing  to  the  west  of  the  dividing  line  between 
the  two  tables,  descends,  and,  turning  to  the  south 
east,  crosses  the  Sacramento  at  a  ford  at  the  base 
of  the  spur  from  the  west. 

The  Mexican  authorities,  both  civil  and  military, 
had  been  for  some  time  engaged  in  fortifying  the 
positions  about  the  pass,  and  had  expended  much 
labor  in  the  endeavor  to  make  it  defensible.  The 
whole  northern  crest  of  the  elevation  was  covered 
by  intrenchments,  though  most  of  them  were  but 
simple  breast- works  for  infantry.  The  main  forti 
fications  were  upon  the  eastern  table.  At  its  north 
eastern  angle  was  a  rugged  hill,  the  Cerro  Frijoles, 
some  hundred  and  fifty  feet  in  height,  which  was 
crowned  with  a  round  battery.  Two  other  bat- 
teries  were  along  the  northern  crest.  Along  the 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

dividing  ridge  between  the  tables,  a  line  of  in- 
trenchments,  consisting  of  round  batteries,  con 
nected  by  breast-works  for  infantry,  extended  south 
across  the  whole  plateau.  The  whole  system  on 
this  front  looked  upon  the  flank  of  the  road.  High 
up  on  the  Cerro  Sacramento,  south  of  the  river,  a 
round  battery,  similar  to  that  on  the  Cerro  Frijoles, 
commanded  the  other  positions  at  long  range. 
Upon  the  east  the  position  was  protected  by  in- 
trenchments  placed  at  convenient  positions,  but 
the  deep  bed  of  the  Arroyo  Seco  was  the  strongest 
defense  in  that  quarter. 

These  defenses,  such  as  they  were,  completely 
blocked  the  direct  passage  of  the  road,  but  the  sys 
tem  of  works  on  the  north  could  be  easily  turned 
on  the  west,  and  the  western  table  could  be  gained 
without  exposure  to  any  fire.  There,  indeed,  the 
main  line  of  works  upon  the  west  of  the  Mexican 
position  was  presented  directly  in  the  front  of  an 
enemy,  which  if  he  refused  in  his  advance,  he  must 
pass  under  the  fire  from  the  line  and  from  the  Cerro 
Sacramento. 

To  maintain  this  position,  General  Heredia  had 
a  force  of  near  4000  men  of  all  arms ;  1200  cavalry 
from  Durango  and  Chihuahua,  under  General  Gar 
cia  Conde,  1200  infantry,  1420  rancheros,  and  300 
artillerists,  with  ten  guns,  of  nine,  eight,  six,  and  four 
pounders.  The  cavalry  was  composed  of  the  active 
regiments  of  the  departments,  with  the  exception 
of  the  Vera  Cruz  dragoons.  The  infantry  was  the 
ordinary  militia  of  the  country,  enrolled  for  the  emer- 


462  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

gency,  and  the  rancheros  were  but  rancheros,  armed 
with  lassos,  corn  knives,  lances,  and  old-fashioned 
escopetas.^  As  for  the  proficiency  of  the  artille 
rists,  their  performances  on  the  field  told  hut  little. 

When  Doniphan  approached  on  the  28th,  the 
Mexican  forces  took  position  in  their  works,  and 
manned  and  armed  their  batteries.  Finding  the 
direct  road  obstructed,  and  that  the  route  to  the 
western  side  of  the  plateau  was  practicable  for 
wagons,  Doniphan  inclined  the  head  of  his  column 
from  the  road  while  out  of  range,  and  moved  rapid 
ly  in  that  direction.  He  gained  the  plateau  with 
out  opposition,  and  parked  the  wagons,  315  in 
number,  on  the  western  verge. 

The  enemy,  in  the  mean  time,  advanced  his 
cavalry  and  a  battery  of  artillery  from  the  intrench- 
ments.  Doniphan  formed  a  line  to  oppose  him, 
and  before  the  Mexican  guns  were  unmasked,  the 
American  artillery,  which  was  in  the  center  of  the 
line,  opened  a  heavy  fire.  The  Mexican  cavalry 
fell  away  from  their  artillery,  and  soon  after  gave 
way  and  retreated.  The  artillery  replied  to  the 
American  fire,  but  had  little  effect ;  the  shot  were 
nearly  all  aimed  too  high,  and  passed  over  the 
American  line,  doing  no  damage  other  than  killing 
a  few  mules  and  oxen  of  the  train.  The  cavalry 
having  retreated  beyond  the  intrenehments,  the 
guns  were  also  soon  after  drawn  back.  The  efforts 
of  the  Mexicans  were  then,  for  a  time,  directed  to 

*  Colonel  Doniphan's  Official  Report.  Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Sen 
ate,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  560. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  4(53 

removing  their  wounded,  of  which  there  were  many, 
and  a  gun  which  had  heen  dismounted,  and,  so  soon 
as  these  were  accomplished,  all  the  cavalry  retired 
slowly,  crossed  the  Rio  Sacramento,  and  halted  out 
of  range. 

During  these  movements  on  the  part  of  the  ene 
my,  the  American  line  had  heen  advanced  to  the 
right  and  front,  nearly  within  range  of  the  guns  on 
the  Cerro  Sacramento,  whence  three  mounted  com 
panies  and  two  twelve  pounder  howitzers  were  ad 
vanced  against  the  line  of  intrenchments.  The 
movement,  although  over  rough  ground,  was  exe 
cuted  at  speed,  and  the  howitzers  were  thrown  into 
battery  within  short  distance  of  the  works,  while 
the  troopers,  without  any  order  or  combination 
other  than  that  all  were  attacking  in  some  sort, 
rode  along  the  lines  seeking  an  entrance,  and  dis 
charging  their  carbines  at  the  enemy.  The  Mex 
ican  resistance,  though  noisy  while  it  lasted,  was 
short  and  inefficient.  Hardly  waiting  to  notice 
whether  their  fire  was  effective  or  not,  the  infantry 
soldiers  immediately  in  front  of  the  attack  broke 
and  fled,  leaving  a  clear  field  for  the  assailants.  The 
remaining  American  troops,  meanwhile,  had  ad 
vanced,  and  dismounted  upon  nearing  the  intrench 
ments.  Moving  forward  on  foot,  they  obtained 
good  rifle  range,  and  the  enemy  at  once  fled  along 
the  whole  line.  The  six  pounders,  during  this  af 
fair,  had  cannonaded  the  works  on  the  northern 
crest,  over  the  western  line,  in  reverse,  and  when 
the  volunteers  rushed  in  they  carried  these  also, 


464  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

and,  continuing  the  advance,  got  possession  of  the 
Cerro  Frijoles.  The  Mexicans  fled  in  every  direc 
tion,  pursued  by  the  mounted  volunteers,  who  cut 
down  great  numbers  of  them.  But  one  attempt 
was  made  to  rally.  A  crowd  of  lancers  came  up, 
and  endeavored  to  turn  the  American  right  to  at 
tack  the  train,  which  had  followed  the  movement 
of  the  troops,  but  they  fled  before  the  fire  of  the 
six  pounders. 

The  battery  on  the  Cerro  Sacramento  "had,  dur 
ing  the  engagement,  kept  up  its  distant  cannonade 
upon  the  Americans ;  but  it  did  no  damage,  for  the 
range  and  angle  of  depression  were  both  too  great. 
When  the  positions  upon  the  plateau  had  been  car 
ried,  the  American  artillery  was  directed  upon  it, 
and  a  party  of  mounted  volunteers  crossed  the  riv 
er  to  storm  the  height  on  horseback  ;#  another  bat 
talion  crossed  on  foot ;  but  the  whole  Mexican  force 
in  that  direction  fled  without  resistance,  and  the 
rout  and  victory  were  complete. 

In  this  affair  the  Mexican  forces  lost  three  hund 
red  in  killed,  nearly  the  same  number  in  wound 
ed,  forty  prisoners,  all  their  artillery,  ammunition, 
and  stores  of  subsistence,  such  as  they  were  (beans 
and  pinola). 

The  Americans  lost  but  one  man  killed,  one  mor 
tally  and  seven  others  slightly  wounded. 

On  the  following  day  the  column  entered  Chi- 

*  "I immediately  ordered  the  men  to  remount  and  charge  the  battery  on 
our  right." — Lieutenant-colonel  Mitchell's  Report.  Executive  Document,  No. 
1,  Senate,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.'  503. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  455 

huahua  without  opposition,  for  the  force  which  had 
been  dispersed  at  Sacramento  had  not  rallied. 
Governor,  generals,  colonels,  and  other  officers 
were  all  in  full  flight  to  the  south,  and  the  common 
soldiers  had  taken  refuge  in  the  mountains.  But, 
having  entered  the  city,  Doniphan  found  himself 
in  a  position  of  some  embarrassment.  His  horses 
were  broken  down  by  the  length  of  the  march,  and 
his  whole  command  had  been  without  pay  from 
the  time  of  leaving  Missouri.  The  backwoodsmen 
of  whom  it  was  composed,  having  little  or  no  idea 
of  discipline,  after  entering  the  city,  indulged  in  all 
kinds  of  license.  The  officers  were  unable  to  im 
pose  any  restraint  upon  the  men,  and,  in  the  lan 
guage  of  the  colonel,  the  state  of  things  was  "  con 
fusion  worse  confounded."^ 

Rumor  had  informed  Doniphan  that  General 
Wool  had  been  cut  off  near  Saltillo,  which,  although 
he  did  not  believe,  prevented  him  from  sending  a 
messenger.  On  the  20th  of  March,  however,  he 
learned  that  Santa  Anna  had  fallen  back  on  San 
Luis,  and  that  communication  was  practicable  with 
Wool's  head-quarters.  On  that  day  he  sent  a  re 
port  of  his  position  and  an  application  for  orders. 
He  had  previously  contemplated  moving  toward 
Saltillo  for  the  purpose  of  forming  a  junction  at  all 
hazards,  and  had  only  been  prevented  by  the  ur 
gent  solicitations  of  the  American  merchants  to  re- 

* '  Colonel  Doniphan  to  General  Wool,  March  20th,  1847.  Executive 
Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth 
Congress,  p.  1128. 

I.— G    G 


466  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

main  for  their  protection.  Doniphan  refused  to  re 
main  for  any  length  of  time,  and  prepared  to  ad 
vance  to  Saltillo. 

When  General  Taylor  received  information  of 
his  position,  he  sent  orders  for  the  movement,  and 
on  the  26th  and  27th  of  April  detachments  of  the 
command  marched  from  Chihuahua.  Moving 
through  Parras,  on  the  route  by  which  Wool  had 
contemplated  to  advance,  it  arrived  at  Saltillo  on 
the  22d  of  May,  without  other  hostile  adventure 
than  a  skirmish  of  a  small  party  with  some  In 
dians  near  Parras. 

From  Saltillo  it  proceeded  at  once  to  the  Rio 
Grande,  and  thence  to  the  United  States,  and  was 
discharged  at  New  Orleans. 

By  itself,  the  expedition  of  Doniphan's  command 
is  most  remarkable.  That  a  corps  should  have 
been  raised,  marched  three  thousand  miles  through 
an  almost  unknown  and  uncultivated  country, 
have  fought  its  way  against  overwhelming  num 
bers,  and  returned  to  its  point  of  departure,  and  all 
within  the  space  of  one  year,  and  that,  too,  with 
out  the  aid  of  modern  locomotion  for  the  active 
part  of  its  route,  is  indeed  an  event  to  which  it  is 
in  vain  to  search  for  a  recorded  parallel.  The  ac 
count  of  the  various  adventures,  and  of  the  differ 
ent  regions  which  were  visited,  would  form  alto 
gether  a  most  interesting  narrative. 

As  a  military  movement,  too,  the  march  was  re 
markable.  It  is,  without  exception,  the  greatest 
distance  ever  traversed  in  so  short  a  period  bv  any 


THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO.  457 

body  of  troops ;  and  accomplished,  as  it  was,  over 
many  of  the  greatest  obstacles  encountered  in  mil 
itary  operations,  the  display  of  energy  and  perse 
verance  was  creditable  to  both  officers  and  men  of 
the  command. 

But  as  for  the  effect  upon  the  war,  the  expedi 
tion  was  almost,  if  not  entirely  useless ;  for  it  nei 
ther  furthered  the  prosecution  of  the  policy  of  the 
United  States  in  seizing  upon  the  territories  of 
Mexico  as  indemnity,  nor  did  it  increase  the  in 
ducements  of  the  government  of  the  latter  to  make 
peace.  Chihuahua,  as  a  region  for  resources,  was 
worthless  to  both  parties.  Its  possession  or  its  loss 
gave  or  took  nothing  from  the  central  government 
which  might  conduce  to  the  support  of  the  war. 
Certainly  it  was  not  on  the  route  by  which  the 
heart  of  the  country  could  be  reached  by  the  Amer 
icans. 

The  only  furtherance  of  the  public  interest  which 
was  accomplished  by  this  expedition  was  the  dis 
play  of  force  in  the  Navajoe  country ;  and,  as  the 
treaty  concluded  with  the  chiefs  of  that  tribe  was 
doubtless  the  most  useful,  the  march  through  that 
country  was  the  most  difficult  and  remarkable  of 
all  the  achievements  of  the  command. 

American  bravery  and  Mexican  cowardice  were 
both  most  signally  displayed  in  the  affairs  at  Bra- 
zito  and  the  pass  of  the  Sacramento.  Of  skill  there 
was  but  little  demonstration  on  either  side.  That 
4000  men  in  intrenchments,  although  indifferently 
armed,  should  fly,  after  a  short  cannonade,  before 


4(38  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

the  wild  rush  of  less  than  one  fourth  their  number 
of  undisciplined  backwoodsmen,  having  nothing  to 
aid  them  but  their  personal  courage  and  their  good 
rifles,  is  indeed  remarkable,  and  proves  conclusive 
ly  the  cowardice  of  the  first  and  the  bravery  of  the 
second. 

It  is  difficult  to  see  any  reason  why  General  He- 
redia  should  have  advanced  his  cavalry  and  artil 
lery  alone  to  the  action,  when  his  enemy  must 
necessarily  have  been  obliged  to  attack  him  in  his 
intrenchments,  or  why  these  should  have  been 
masked,  while  he  commenced  the  battle  with  one 
third  of  his  force  against  the  full  strength  of  the 
Americans.  By  attempting  it,  his  cavalry  was 
beaten  at  once,  and,  had  any  thing  been  wanting 
to  insure  the  flight  of  the  infantry,  it  was  found  in 
the  rapid  retreat  of  the  advanced  forces.  Had  the 
infantry  stood  at  all,  it  is  hard  to  perceive  how  the 
Americans  could  have  conquered  with  so  little  loss. 

The  American  volunteer  officers  who  were  in 
this  battle  have  made  reports  which,  for  inflation 
of  style,  will  compare  well  with  those  of  Mexi 
can  commanders  ;  and  some  have  seemed  to  think 
that  they  have  discovered  new  important  princi 
ples  in  the  military  art.^  Nevertheless,  it  would 
not  be  safe  to  trust  to  their  experience,  or  to  act 
upon  the  fruit  of  it,  their  recommendations.  It 
will  be  difficult  to  convince  thinking  men  that  cav- 

*  "  It  is  abundantly  shown,  in  the  charge  made  by  Captain  Weightman 
with  the  section  of  howitzers,  that  they  can  be  used  in  any  charge  with  great 
effect" — Colonel  Doniphan's  Official  Report.  Executive  Document,  No.  1, 
Senate,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  501. 


THE   WAR   WITH  MEXICO.  459 

airy  is  the  proper  arm  for  storming  intrenchments, 
or  that  twelve  pounder  howitzers  are  particularly 
efficient  in  such  a  charge,  even  if  unlimbered  with 
in  fifty  yards  of  the  enemy,  unless,  indeed,  he  is  in 
flight  at  the  time  of  the  advance. 

Such  folly,  if  perpetrated  in  operations  against 
men  who  would  stand  at  all,  and  who  were  armed 
with  any  kind  of  fire-arms  which  they  knew  how 
to  use,  would  only  insure  the  destruction  of  hoth 
howitzers  and  cavalry ;  and  yet  the  idea  has  heen 
thrust  forth  in  official  reports,  and  newspaper  edit 
ors  and  critics  have  given  it  their  sanction. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

Commodore  Stockton's  Action  in  California — Insurrection — Preparations  to 
suppress  it — General  Kearney's  Arrival — Affair  at  San  Pasqual — At  Hill 
of  San  Bernardo — Expedition  from  San  Diego  to  Ciudad  los  Angeles — 
Passage  of  the  Rio  San  Gabriel — Affairs  at  Los  Angeles — Fremont's  Action 
in  the  North — Advance  from  Monterey — Surprise  of  San  Luis  Objspo — 
Advance  to  the  South — Capitulation  of  Cowenga — Dispute  between  Stock 
ton  and  Kearney — Kearney  and  Fremont — Arrival  of  Commodores  Shu- 
brick  and  Biddle,  and  Colonel  Mason — Trial  and  Conviction  of  Fremont. 

SOON  after  Commodore  Stockton  had  established 
the  civil  government  of  the  territory  of  California, 
in  what  he  believed  to  be  "  successful  operation," 
.and  had  restored  apparent  "  peace  and  harmony" 
to  the  people,^  he  received  intelligence,  through 

*  Commodore  Stockton  to  Mr.  Bancroft,  August  24th,  1846.  Executive 
Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth 
Congress,  p.  265. 


470  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

the  Mexican  newspapers,  of  the  official  declarations 
of  war,  and  the  energetic  preparation  for  its  prose 
cution  on  both  sides. # 

He  had  established  a  tariff,  and  issued  orders  for 
the  elections  of  different  officers  soon  after  the  oc 
cupation  of  the  Ciudad  de  los  Angeles.  Various 
officials  of  the  territory  under  the  Mexican  govern 
ment  had  come  in,  or  had  been  taken  prisoners, 
who  were  liberated  upon  parole  of  honor  not  to 
serve  against  the  United  States  during  the  war, 
without  exchange.  This  they  readily  gave,  and 
professed  themselves  satisfied  with  the  new  state 
of  things.  Believing  that  the  American  authority 
was  firmly  established,  the  commodore  intended  to 
relinquish  his  civil  and  military  duties,  and  on  the 
24th  of  August  commenced  preparations  for  leaving 
the  country  under  the  government  of  Lieutenant- 
colonel  Fremont.  On  that  day  Fremont  was  noti 
fied  of  his  ulterior  intentions,  and  soon  after,  on  the 
2d  of  September,!  commissioned  as  military  com 
mandant  of  California.  He  was  ordered  to  increase 
his  battalion  of  volunteers  to  300  men,  of  which 
50  were  to  be  stationed  at  Ciudad  de  los  Angeles,  50 
at  Monterey,  50  at  San  Francisco,  and  25  at  each 
Santa  Barbara  and  San  Diego,  leaving  the  remain 
ing  100  for  active  service  in  the  field.  Of  the  pres 
ent  force  of  the  battalion,  he  was  ordered  to  locate 

*  Commodore  Stockton  to  Major  Fremont,  August  24th,  1846.  Executive 
Document,  No.  4,  House  of  Representatives,  second  Session  of  the  twenty- 
ninth  Congress,  p.  675. 

t  Colonel  Fremont's  Trial.  Executive  Document,  No.  33,  Senate,  first 
Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  110. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


471 


50  men,  under  Captain  Gillespie,  at  Ciudad  de  los 
Angeles,  25  at  Santa  Barbara,  50  at  Monterey,  and 
50  at  San  Francisco,  and  to  proceed  in  person  to 
recruit  his  battalion  to  the  required  number,  300. 

At  this  time  the  commodore  intended,  after  he 
had  completed  his  arrangements,  and  delivered  up 
his  newly-acquired  civil  and  military  honors,  to 
sail  with  the  squadron  under  his  command  to  the 
south  of  Mexico,  capture  Acapulco,  land  a  force, 
and  advance  on  the  capital  to  co-operate  with  Gen 
eral  Taylor,  or,  at  least,  to  make  a  powerful  dem 
onstration  in  his  favor.^  Unfortunately  for  'the 
demonstration  of  its  impracticability,  this  scheme 
was  not  allowed  an  opportunity  for  development 
or  execution. 

Fremont  soon  after  proceeded  to  the  Rio  Sacra 
mento  to  recruit,  having  disposed  of  his  California 
battalion  as  ordered.  The  commodore  returned  to 
his  squadron,  and  sailed  for  Monterey,  taking  on 
board  a  small  detachment  which  had  been  left  at 
Santa  Barbara.  Soon  after  he  received  a  rumor 
that  a  thousand  Wallawalla  Indians  were  about 
to  attack  Sutter's  Fort  on  the  Sacramento,  and 
proceeded  to  San  Francisco. 

There,  on  the  30th  of  December,  a  courier  arrived 
from  Gillespie,  with  the  information  that  an  insur 
rection  had  broken  out  at  Ciudad  de  los  Angeles 
soon  after  the  departure  of  the  commodore,  and 
that  his  command  was  besieged  in  the  government 

*  Commodore  Stockton's  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  1,  House  of 
Representatives,  second  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  1045. 


472  T~HE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO. 

house.  Stockton  at  once  directed  Captain  Mervine 
to  proceed  to  San  Pedro  in  the  frigate  Savannah, 
and  from  that  point  to  relieve  Gillespie ;  sent  or 
ders  to  Fremont  to  join  him  at  San  Francisco  with 
all  the  equipment  which  he  could  ohtain,  and  de 
tached  officers  in  various  directions  to  recruit  vol 
unteers  for  the  battalion.'* 

On  the  12th  of  Octoher  Fremont  arrived  at  San 
Francisco,  and  emharked  on  board  the  merchant 
ship  "  Sterling"  for  San  Pedro.  Stockton  sailed 
the  same  day  in  the  Congress ;  hut,  as  he  received 
dispatches  by  a  merchant  vessel  from  Monterey 
that  that  town  was  in  danger  of  being  attacked,  he 
put  in  there  and  landed  re-enforcements.  On  the 
23d  he  reached  San  Pedro,  where  he  found  the 
Savannah  frigate,  with  Gillespie's  volunteers  on 
board.  They  had  retired  from  the  Ciudad  de  los 
Angeles  under  the  terms  of  a  convention  which 
Gillespie  had  signed  with  General  Flores,  chief  of 
the  insurgents,  who,  at  the  time  of  the  outbreak, 
was  a  prisoner  of  war  on  parole,  f 

Two  weeks  previous  to  Stockton's  arrival,  Cap 
tain  Mervine  had  landed  his  seamen  and  marines, 
for  the  purpose  of  marching,,  in  conjunction  with 
Gillespie's  party,  on  Ciudad  de  los  Angeles.  Twelve 
miles  out  of  San  Pedro  he  had  fallen  in  with  a 
strong  force  of  Californians,  with  one  piece  of  ar 
tillery.  A  skirmish  ensued,  in  which,  as  the  Amer- 

*  Commodore  Stockton's  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  1,  House  of 
Representatives,  second  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  1045. 
t  Idem  ibidem,  and  Colonel  Fremont's  Defense. 


THE    WAR   WITH   MEXICO.  473 

leans  had  no  artillery,  they  were  worsted,  and  the 
party  fell  back,  with  some  loss,  to  San  Pedro,  where 
they  embarked  on  board  the  frigate. 

Stockton  landed  a  strong  force  on  the  day  after 
his  arrival,  and  San  Pedro  was  reoccupied ;  but, 
after  waiting  some  time  without  receiving  any  in 
formation  of  Fremont  or  his  movements,  he  re-em 
barked,  and  proceeded  to  San  Diego.  At  this  place 
he  received  letters,  in  which  Fremont  informed  him 
that,  as  he  had  learned  that  it  would  be  impractica 
ble  to  obtain  a  mount  for  his  command  in  the  south 
under  existing  circumstances,  he  had  put  in  at 
Monterey,  where  he  could  make  all  preparations 
to  force  a  passage  to  the  Ciudad  de  los  Angeles  by 
land.  Upon  this  Stockton  ordered  Captain  Mervine 
to  proceed  in  his  vessel  to  Monterey,  to  aid  Fremont 
in  his  preparations,  and  sent  instructions  to  Lieu 
tenant  Minor,  who  commanded  at  San  Diego,  to 
make  endeavors  to  procure  horses  for  transporting 
an  expedition  of  250  men,  which  the  commodore 
proposed  to  lead  from  San  Diego.^ 

San  Diego  had  been  in  a  state  of  siege,  and  the 
garrison  straitened  for  want  of  provisions,  for  some 
time  before  Stockton's  arrival.  While  preparations 
were  going  on,  the  place  was  attacked  by  a  strong 
party  of  insurgents.  The  Congress  had  been  run 
over  the  bar,  and  grounded  inside  in  such  a  man 
ner  that  there  was  danger  of  her  tumbling  over; 
but,  notwithstanding  the  necessity  of  their  presence 
on  board,  a  strong  party  of  men  was  landed  under 

*  Stockton's  Report. 


474  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

Captain  Gillespie,  who,  in  connection  with  the 
garrison,  soon  repulsed  the  assailants. 

The  efforts  which  had  been  made  to  procure 
horses  and  subsistence  resulted  in  obtaining  about 
ninety  horses  and  two  hundred  head  of  beef  cattle ; 
but  the  horses  were  so  much  broken  down  that  it 
was  judged  to  be  impracticable  to  advance  before 
a  fortnight.  During  the  interval  the  force  about 
San  Diego  was  employed  in  constructing  a  fort  for 
the  more  complete  protection  of  the  town,  and  in 
making  up  the  necessary  articles  of  equipment. 

About  the  3d  of  December  Stockton  received  a 
letter  from  General  Kearney,  informing  him  of  his 
approach,  and  requesting  information  concerning 
the  state  of  affairs  in  California.  He  immediately 
sent  Captain  Gillespie  with  a  detachment  of  thirty- 
five  men  and  a  nine  pounder  to  open  a  communi 
cation. 


General  Kearney,  after  having  sent  back  Major 
Sumner  with  200  dragoons  on  receipt  of  the  intel 
ligence  of  Stockton's  and  Fremont's  apparent  con 
quest,  continued  his  march,  without  any  interrup 
tion,  through  the  Indian  country  into  the  settle 
ments  of  California.  The  first  intimation  of  any 
thing  like  hostility  to  be  apprehended  was  obtain- 
ed  on  the  22d  of  November,  when  a  camp  was  dis 
covered,  which,  from  the  trail,  appeared  to  have 
been  left  that  morning  by  a  large  mounted  force. 
It  was  at  first  believed  that  General  Castro  had 
reunited  his  forces  in  Sonora,  and  was  returning ; 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  475 

but,  upon  close  reconnaissance  of  the  party,  which 
was  fallen  in  with,  in  camp,  during  the  day,  it 
proved  to  be  a  drove  of  horses,  under  charge  of  a 
man  who  represented  himself  as  a  poor  employee 
of  several  ricos,  on  his  way  with  the  drove  to  the 
Sonora  market.  The  chief  men  of  the  party  were 
sent  in  by  Lieutenant  Emory,  who  conducted  the 
reconnaissance,  to  General  Kearney,  and  the  drove 
was  detained,  in  order  to  remount  the  dragoons, 
whose  horses  had  nearly  all  given  out,  and  whose 
mules  were  in  but  little  better  condition.^ 

On  the  following  day,  a  Mexican,  well  mounted 
and  muffled,  and  with  evident  preparation  for  a 
journey,  was  intercepted,  brought  in,  and  searched, 
and  proved  to  be  the  bearer  of  several  important 
letters.  They  were  addressed  to  General  Castro, 
his  brother,  and  different  men  of  note  in  Sonora, 
and  gave  an  account  of  the  insurrectionary  move 
ments  in  California  up  to  the  time  of  their  date, 
October  15th.  It  was  ascertained  that  the  drove 
of  horses  which  had^beeii  captured  on  the  previous 
evening  was  intended,  in  part,  for  General  Castro, 
and,  being  their  legal  prize,  the  dragoons  were  or 
dered  to  be  remounted.  The  horses  were,  however, 
all  wild,  and  but  little  fitted  for  immediate  service. 

The  march  was  continued  over  a  most  difficult 
and  desert  country  for  several  following  days,  dur 
ing  which  the  rations  were  consumed,  and  horse 
flesh  was  used  for  food.  On  the  3d,  however,  the 

*  Emory's  Journal.  Executive  Document,  No.  7,  Senate,  first  Session  of 
the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  95. 


476  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

command  arrived  at  Warner's  rancheria,  in  the  val 
ley  of  Agua  Caliente,  on  the  road  to  San  Diego. 
At  this  point  information  was  received  that  the 
American  forces  were  in  possession  of  San  Diego, 
Monterey,  and  San  Francisco,  hut  that  the  insur 
gents  held  all  other  parts  of  the  country.  On  the 
3d  another  capture  of  horses  was  effected  hy  Lieu 
tenant  Davidson,  hut,  like  those  previously  taken, 
they  were  wild  and  unbroken.1* 

On  the  5th  of  December  the  command  was  join 
ed  hy  Captain  Gillespie's  party  from  San  Diego, 
who  hrought  information  that  the  enemy  w^as  in 
force  at  San  Pasqual,  three  leagues  distant,  as  was 
afterward  ascertained,  under  Don  Andreas  Pico. 
A  party  was  sent  forward  from  the  rancheria  of 
Santa  Maria,  under  Lieutenant  Hammond,  of  the 
first  dragoons,  who  returned  at  two  o'clock  on  the 
following  morning  with  information  that  he  had 
found  the  enemy  and  had  heen  observed.  As  he 
was  then  on  the  direct  road  to  San  Diego,  all  hy- 
ways  having  heen  passed,  Kearney  determined  to 
move  forward  and  attack  the  enemy  hefore  day- 
hreak  on  the  following  morning. 

Twelve  dragoons,  under  Captain  Johnston,  con 
stituted  the  advance  guard,  with  which  marched 
the  general  and  staff.  Fifty  dragoons,  mounted, 
in  greater  part,  on  the  mules  which  had  heen  rid 
den  from  New  Mexico,  under  Captain  Moore,  and 
Captain  Gillespie's  volunteers,  followed  next,  and 

*  Emory's  Journal.  Executive  Document,  No.  7,  Senate,  first  Session  of 
the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  107. 


THE    WAR   WITH   MEXICO.  477 

two  mountain  howitzers,  under  Lieutenant  David- 
son,  brought  up  the  rear.  The  remaining  troops 
and  all  the  baggage  were  left  in  the  rear,  to  follow 
at  daylight. 

At  dawn  on  the  6th  of  May  the  American  force 
arrived  within  sight  of  the  enemy,  near  the  In 
dian  village  of  San  Pasqual.  Kearney,  with  his 
staif,  was  in  the  advance,  preceded  only  by  the 
advanced  guard  under  Captain  Johnston.  He  or 
dered  a  trot,  then  a  charge,  and  the  engagement 
was  commenced.^  Pico  received  the  charge  with 
a  continued  fire,  and  his  men  gave  way.  The 
dragoons  followed  in  pursuit,  but  the  Californians 
soon  rallied  and  returned,  while  the  dragoons  were 
scattered.  They  killed  Captains  Johnston  and 
Moore,  and  sixteen  non-commissioned  officers  and 
privates,  mortally  wounded  Lieutenant  Hammond, 
wounded  General  Kearney,  Lieutenant  Warner, 
of  the  topographical  engineers,  Captains  Gillespie 
and  Gibson,  of  the  volunteers,  and  eleven  soldiers 
and  employees,  and^  in  the  melee,  carried  off  one 
of  the  mountain  howitzers,  neither  of  which  was 
opened  during  the  affair.  Having  inflicted  this 
loss,  they  retired,  taking  with  them  their  wound 
ed,  f  A  large  body  soon  after  showed  itself  in  the 
American  rear,  which  occasioned  fears  for  the  safe- 
ty  of  the  train,  and  a  party  was  sent  to  bring  it  up. 
This  was  accomplished  without  opposition,  and  the 

*  'Emory's  Journal.  Executive  Document,  No.  7,  Senate,  first  Session  of  the 
thirtieth  Congress,  p.  108. 

t  General  Kearney's  Official  Report.  Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate, 
first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  515. 


478  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

Americans  remained  for  the  night  in  the  vicinity 
of  the  village. 

Captain  Turner  succeeded  to  the  command  dur 
ing  the  temporary  disability  of  the  general,  and  on 
that  evening  sent  a  communication  to  Commodore 
Stockton  reporting  the  engagement,  and  suggest- 
ing  the  propriety  of  his  sending  a  considerable  force 
to  meet  him  on  the  road  or  at  San  Pasqual.  The 
prospect,  as  stated  in  his  note,  would  appear  to 
have  been  gloomy,  for  the  command  was  without 
provisions,  and  it  was  deemed  that  it  might  be  im 
practicable  to  obtain  cattle  from  the  ranch  in  the 
vicinity.^ 

The  night  was  spent  in  burying  the  dead  and 
preparing  ambulances  for  the  wounded.  But  the 
position  of  the  force,  among  the  rocks  on  the  side 
of  the  road,  although  defensible,  was  one  which  al 
lowed  few  resting  places. 

On  the  following  morning  General  Kearney  re 
sumed  the  command,  and  marched,  in  escort  of  his 
wounded  and  baggage,  to  the  rancheria  of  San  Ber 
nardo.  At  this  place  he  collected  a  large  number 
of  cattle ;  but,  as  there  was  no  grass  in  the  imme 
diate  vicinity  of  the  rancheria,  the  column  moved 
toward  the  dry  bed  of  the  Rio  San  Bernardo,  which 
had  been  left  some  miles  to  the  left  in  the  march, 
the  captured  cattle  being  driven  with  the  command. 

Pico's  troops  had  fallen  back  along  the  road  to 
a  position  beyond  the  rancheria,  and  soon  after  the 

*  Fremont's  Trial.    Executive  Document,  No.  33,  Senate,  first  Session  of 
the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  188. 


THE  WAR   WITH  MEXICO.  479 

Americans  moved  off  the  main  body  of  the  enemy 
advanced  upon  the  rear,  while  a  party  dashed  at 
speed  toward  a  hill  immediately  on  the  left  of  the 
route  which  Kearney  was  following.  The  Ameri 
cans  moved  rapidly  in  that  direction  also,  but  the 
Californians  reached  it  first.  They  were  attacked 
by  the  American  advance  of  some  ten  or  twelve 
men,  and  driven  back,  with  the  loss  of  several 
wounded.  The  main  force  came  up  and  occupied 
a  defensive  position,  but  in  the  race  Pico  had  suc 
ceeded  in  carrying  off  all  the  cattle.^ 

The  situation  of  Kearney's  party  was  desperate. 
The  provisions  were  all  gone,  the  horses  dead,  the 
mules  knocked  up,  and  the  rapid  movement  to  gain 
the  defensive  position  on  the  hill  had  convinced 
the  general  that  it  was  out  of  the  question  to  move 
with  his  sick  and  baggage  in  the  face  of  Pico's  cav 
alry.  He  therefore  determined  to  halt  for  the  night. 
On  the  following  morning,  the  messenger,  Lieuten 
ant  Godey,  of  the  volunteers,  who  had  been  sent 
with  Captain  Turner's  note  to  San  Diego,  was  cap 
tured,  with  his  party,  within  sight  of  the  American 
position.!  Pico  immediately  sent  in  a  flag  of  truce, 
with  an  offer  to  exchange  the  prisoners,  four  in  num 
ber,  for  a  like  number  of  Californians.  Kearney 
had  but  one  to  exchange,  which  he  did  for  one  of 
the  party,  and  thus  received  information  of  the  safe 
arrival  of  the  letter  at  San  Diego.  The  answer 

*  Emory's  Journal.  Executive  Document,  No.  7,  Senate,  first  Session  of 
the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  110. 

t  Colonel  Benton's  Speech.  Appendix  to  Congressional  Globe,  first  Ses 
sion  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  982 . 


4QO  THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO. 

which  Stockton  had  transmitted  had  been  cached 
by  Godey  just  previous  to  his  capture,  but  was 
found  by  the  enemy. 

It  being  impracticable  to  move  with  the  wound- 
ed,  although  out  of  provisions  and  distant  from  wa 
ter,  it  was  determined  to  remain  on  the  hill. 

The  fattest  mule  was  killed  for  meat,  and  holes 
bored  for  water,  and,  with  the  supply  thus  obtained, 
a  shift  was  made  for  two  days.  On  the  night  of 
the  eighth,  three  persons,  Kit  Carson,  Acting-lieu 
tenant  Beale,  of  the  navy,  and  an  Indian  servant, 
volunteered  to  go  to  San  Diego,  from  which  San 
Bernardo  is  distant  twenty-nine  miles.  The  expe 
dition  was  one  of  extreme  peril,  for  the  enemy  had 
all  the  roads,  and  was  in  force  within  striking  dis 
tance,  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  river  bed ;  but, 
after  a  night  of  suffering  adventure  and  a  day  in 
concealment,  all  three  succeeded  in  reaching  San 
Diego  on  the  morning  of  the  9th,  with  the  intelli 
gence  of  the  dangerous  situation  of  the  party  on 
the  hill.* 

On  the  morning  of  the  10th  Pico  attacked  the 
camp,  driving  in  advance  of  his  troops  a  number 
of  wild  horses,  which  were  driven  back  by  the 
Americans,  and  the  attack  was  discontinued.  A 
few  horses,  killed  in  the  encounter,  were  used  for 
food.  As  many  of  the  wounded  were  able  to  trav 
el,  it  was  determined  to  attempt  a  movement  on 

*  Emory's  Journal.  Executive  Document,  No.  7,  Senate,  first  Session  of 
the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  Ill,  and  Colonel  Benton's  Speech.  Appendix  to 
Congressional  Globe,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  982. 


THE    WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  43^ 

the  following  morning,  without  awaiting  re-en 
forcement  ;  but,  during  the  night,  the  party  was  re 
lieved  by  the  arrival  of  some  two  hundred  sailors 
and  marines,  under  Lieutenant  Gray,  of  the  navy, 
who  had  been  sent  by  Commodore  Stockton  from 
San  Diego. 

The  position  of  the  troops  on  the  hill  of  San  Ber 
nardo  was,  at  the  time,  nearly  in  extremis.  Out 
of  provisions,  without  baggage — for  much  of  it  had 
been  burned  in  the  preparations  for  the  movement — 
without  animals — for  most  of  them  had  been  turn 
ed  loose  on  account  of  the  want  of  forage — and  with 
a  large  number  of  wounded  for  the  strength  of  the 
party,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  escape  could 
have  been  made  good  unless  the  re-enforcement 
had  arrived ;  and,  unless  a  move  had  been  attempt 
ed,  the  whole  party  must  have  been  captured  or 
starved. 

Upon  the  arrival  of  Godey  at  San  Diego,  Stock 
ton  had  made  preparations  to  send  a  re-enforce 
ment.  While  they  were  in  progress,  Beale,  Car 
son,  arid  the  Indian  had  come  in,  and,  in  the  urg 
ency  of  the  case,  Stockton  increased  the  strength 
of  the  party  to  over  200  men,  with  one  piece  of  ar 
tillery,  and  sent  it  off  at  ten  o'clock  at  night,  under 
orders  to  march  only  at  night. # 

Pico  retired  on  the  junction  of  Gray's  party  with 
Kearney's,  and  on  the  llth  the  whole  American 

*  Commodore  Stockton-'s  Report.  Executive  Document,  No.  1,  House 
of  Representatives,  second.  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  1051,  and 
Testimony  before  Court  Martial.  Executive  Document,  No.  33,  Senate,  first 
Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  189. 

I— HH 


482  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

force  marched  for  San  Diego,  where  it  arrived  on 
the  12th.  Pico's  force,  in  his  affairs  with  General 
Kearney,  has  been  variously  stated  at  from  80  to 
160  men,  and  his  loss  as  variously  from  11  to  high 
er  numbers. 

During  the  month  of  December  an  expedition 
was  organized  at  San  Diego  against  Ciudad  de  los 
Angeles.  Stockton  meanwhile  continued  to  exer 
cise  his  assumed  functions  as  governor  and  com 
mander  of  the  territory,  with  at  least  the  tacit  con 
sent  of  General  Kearney,  for  he  had  made  an  in 
formal  offer  to  the  general  to  turn  over  the  func 
tions  of  the  office  to  him,  which  had  been '  de 
clined.^  Upon  the  morning  of  the  29th  Kearney 
volunteered  to  take  the  command  of  the  troops 
which  were  about  to  march  against  the  enemy, 
which  Stockton  assented  to.  The  force  consisted 
of  the  dragoons  serving  on  foot,  a  battalion  of  sailors 
and  marines,  a  company  of  volunteers — in  all, 
about  500  men,  and  six  pieces  of  artillery  of  vari 
ous  calibers. 

On  the  4th  of  January,  when  past  the  deserted 
mission  of  Flores,  on  the  road  to  Ciudad  de  los 
Angeles,  a  flag  of  truce  was  received  from  Gen 
eral  Flores,  the  chief  of  the  insurgents,  proposing  a 
suspension  of  hostilities  in  California,  and  to  leave 
the  sovereignty  of  the  territory  to  be  decided  by 
the  general  result  of  the  war  between  the  United 
States  and  Mexico.  Stockton,  who  accompanied 

*  Testimony  before  Court  Martial.  Executive  Document,  No.  33,  Senate, 
first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  189. 


THE    WAR   WITH   MEXICO. 

the  expedition  in  the  character  of  governor  and 
oommander-m-chief,  at  once  refused  to  accede  to 
the  proposition,  and  the  march  was  continued.^ 

Approaching  the  Rio  San  Gabriel  on  the  8th  of 
January,  the  enemy  was  discovered  upon  the  op 
posite  bank.  The  river  was  about  one  hundred 
yards  wide,  knee  deep,  and  flowing  over  quick 
sand.  On  the  American  side,  the  approach  was 
nearly  level ;  but,  a  short  distance  from  the  oppo 
site  shore,  a  bank  fifty  feet  in  height  afforded  a 
commanding  position  for  the  Mexican  artillery. 
The  American  bank  was  fringed  with  a  thick  un 
dergrowth,  and  the  space  on  the  opposite  side,  be 
tween  the  river  and  the  height,  was  also  partially 
covered. 

As  the  Americans  approached  the  thicket,  they 
were  received  with  a  scattering  fire  from  the  ene 
my's  skirmishers.  In  the  mean  while  a  battery 
was  being  planted  upon  the  height  on  the  opposite 
side  of  the  river,  supported  on  either  flank  by  a 
heavy  squadron  of  cavalry. 

A  battalion  of  sailors  was  ordered  to  deploy  and 
cross  the  stream,  which  was  effected  under  fire 
without  serious  loss.  The  American  artillery  was 
then  dragged  over,  and  opened  a  lively  fire  upon 
the  height,  which  rendered  that  of  the  enemy  wild 
and  inefficient.  The  train  and  cattle  passed  with 
out  hinderance,  although  a  party  of  cavalry  at 
tempted  to  charge  upon  the  rear  guard;  it  fell 

*  Stockton's  Report.     Executive  Document,  No.  1,  House  of  Representa 
tives,  second  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  1051. 


484  THE    WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

back  in  haste  "before  a  few  volleys.  By  the  time 
the  whole  baggage  train  was  brought  over,  the  ene 
my  ceased  his  fire.  He  soon  after  made  a  charge 
upon  the  American  left,  which  was  received  in 
square  and  repulsed,  and  at  the  same  time  threat 
ened  the  right  with  no  better  success.  The  Ameri 
cans  soon  after  made  a  rush  for  the  height,  sup 
posing  that  would  be  the  contested  point,  but  the 
enemy  had  abandoned  it  and  retreated  from  the 
field.* 

On  the  following  morning  the  command  ad 
vanced  upon  the  Ciudad  de  los  Angeles  over  the 
broad  plain  of  the  Mesa.  Scattered  parties  of  the 
enemy  hung  about  its  flanks  during  the  march,  and, 
after  moving  five  or  six  miles,  his  main  body  was 
discovered  in  position  upon  the  right  of  the  road, 
under  the  crest  of  a  depression  in  the  plain.  The 
American  forces  inclined  to  the  left  over  the  plain 
to  avoid  giving  him  advantage  in  posting  his  artil 
lery.  As  they  arrived  opposite  the  enemy's  posi 
tion,  Flores's  guns  opened  at  long  range,  without 
much  effect  at  first,  but  in  the  mean  time  he  de 
ployed  his  force  and  took  position  with  two  small 
pieces  of  artillery  directly  in  front,  leaving  two 
nine  pounders  to  play  upon  the  American  flank. 
The  fire  from  the  nine  pounders  became  annoying 
as  the  Americans  advanced,  and  their  artillery  was 
opened  in  reply,  which  silenced  them  in  a  few 

*  Emory's  Journal.  Executive  Document,  No.  7,  Senate,  first  Session 
of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  119,  and  Stockton's  Report,  Executive  Docu 
ment,  No.  1,  House  of  Representatives,  second  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Con 
gress,  p.  1052. 


.      THE    WAR    WITH    MEXICO.  435 

minutes.  The  command  again  advanced,  and  the 
enemy  came  down  upon  the  left  and  rear  in  a 
charge,  hut  he  was  speedily  repulsed,  and  retreat 
ed  with  his  dead  and  wounded  (which  were  picked 
up  hy  his  horsemen  without  dismounting)  to  the 
mountains. 

In  these  two  affairs  the  Americans  lost  one  kill 
ed  and  fourteen  wounded,  including  two  officers. 

On  the  10th  a  flag  of  truce  arrived  with  propo 
sals  for  the  surrender  of  the  town,  which  was  dis 
tant  hut  a  few  miles,  upon  guarantee  of  respect  to 
persons  and  property,  which  was  given.  The  com 
mand  entered  during  the  morning,  and,  after  hav 
ing  quelled  a  riot,  secured  possession  of  the  capital 
of  Upper  California.  General  Flores  retreated  to 
Sonora.^ 

While  these  events  were  transpiring,  Lieutenant- 
colonel  Fremont  had  heen  engaged  in  organizing 
a  volunteer  force  in  the  northern  part  of  the  coun 
try,  and  during  the  month  of  Decemher  he  com 
menced  his  march  for  the  south,  with  a  force  of 
300  mounted  men  and  three  pieces  of  artillery. 
His  first  movement  was  upon  the  mission  of  San 
Luis  Ohispo,  which  he  took  hy  surprise,  after  a 
secret  march  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles,  and 
captured  the  commandant,  Don  Jesus  Pico,  with 
thirty -five  others.  Don  Jesus  was  the  head  of  the 
insurgents  at  the  time,  and  also  a  prisoner  upon 

*  Emory's  Journal.  Executive  Document,  No.  7,  Senate,  first  Session 
of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  120,  and  Stockton's  Report,  Executive  Docu 
ment,  No.  1,  House  of  Representatives,  second  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Con 
gress,  p.  1052. 


486  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO, 

parole.  He  was  sentenced  to  death  "by  a  court 
martial,  but  the  sentence  was  remitted  by  Fremont, 
who  thus  secured  his  influence  in  future  attempts 
to  tranquilize  the  country.  Having  this  object  in 
view,  in  his  future  movements  Fremont  abstained 
from  any  hostile  action  against  the  inhabitants  of 
the  towns  through  which  he  passed,  or  against  the 
small  parties  of  the  enemy  which  hovered  in  his 
vicinity.  After  a  long  and  tedious  march  over  a 
mountainous  country,  in  the  month  of  January  he 
arrived  with  his  force  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Ciudad 
de  los  Angeles.  The  main  Mexican  force  in  arms 
in  California,  under  Don  Andreas  Pico,  was  then 
encamped  in  the  plains  of  Cowenga.  Fremont 
sent  a  peremptory  summons,  to  which  he  received 
an  answer  requesting  a  parley.^ 

The  result  was  a  convention,  by  which  the  Cal- 
ifornians  delivered  up  their  artillery  and  public 
arms,  agreed  to  retire  peaceably  to  their  homes,  and 
to  aid  and  assist  in  tranquilizing  the  country. 
On  the  part  of  Lieutenant-colonel  Fremont  it  was 
agreed  that  life  and  property  should  be  guaran 
teed,  that  no  Mexican  citizen  should  be  bound  to 
take  the  oath  of  allegiance  until  the  conclusion  of 
a  treaty  of  peace  between  Mexico  and  the  United 
States,  and  equal  rights  and  privileges  were  vouch 
safed  to  every  citizen  of  California  as  enjoyed  by 
citizens  of  the  United  States  of  North  America. 
The  convention,  of  which  the  above  were  the  prin- 

*  Fremont's  Defense.     Executive  Document,  No.  33,  Senate,  first  Session 
of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  378,  379. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  437 

cipal  features,  was  entered  into  on  the  13th  of  Jan 
uary,  and  signed  and  approved  by  Fremont,  in  his 
character  of  military  commandant  of  California  un 
der  Stockton's  commission,  on  the  16th,  at  Ciudad 
de  los  Angeles.^ 

Agreed  upon  as  it  had  been  without  any  express 
authority  on  his  part,  Stockton  nevertheless  ap 
proved  of  it,  and  it  doubtless  had  great  effect  in  se 
curing  the  tranquillity  of  the  country.  But  about 
this  period  a  difficulty  arose  about  the  exercise  of 
the  chief  authority  in  the  new  territory,  which  was 
the  cause  of  much  subsequent  annoyance. 

Stockton  had  offered  the  management  of  affairs  to 
Kearney  soon  after  his  arrival  at  San  Diego,  which 
Kearney  had  at  the  time  refused.  During  the  stay 
at  that  place,  however,  he  had  reconsidered  the 
matter,  and  expressed  to  Stockton  the  opinion  that 
he  ought  to  be  the  governor  of  California,  which 
Stockton  then  declined  to  permit.  Kearney,  by 
Stockton's  permission,  commanded  the  troops  on 
the  expedition  to  the  Ciudad-  de  los  Angeles,  and 
during  that  expedition  the  question  of  rank  or  com 
mand  was  raised  by  neither.  But,  after  the  occupa 
tion  of  the  town,  the  capitulation  of  Cowenga',  and 
the  arrival  of  Fremont  at  Ciudad  de  los  Angeles, 
Stockton  commenced  preparations  for  organizing  a 
civil  government,  which  he  conceived  he  had  done 
in  the  previous  month  of  August. 

This  duty  Kearney  claimed  to  have  been  devolv- 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  1,  House  of  Representatives,  second  Session 
of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  1067. 


THE   WAR    WITH    MEXICO. 

ed  upon  him  by  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
and  on  the  16th  of  January  he  made  a  formal 
demand  upon  Stockton  to  "  cease  all  further  pro 
ceedings  relating  to  the  formation  of  a  civil  govern 
ment*  in  the  country" 

Stockton  replied  on  the  same  day,  and  refused  to 
comply,  and,  in  the  mean  time,  suspended  Kearney 
from  the  command  of  the  force  then  in  Ciudad  de 
los  Angeles,  with  the  exception  of  the  dragoons. 
Kearney  replied  on  the  17th,  and  stated  that,  for 
the  purpose  of  preventing  a  collision,  he  would  re 
main  silent  for  the  time,  but  that  the  responsibil 
ity  of  doing  that  for  which  he  had  no  authority, 
and  for  preventing  the  execution  of  the  President's 
orders,  must  remain  with  Stockton.  And,  in  a 
note  of  the  same  date,  he  informed  the  commodore 
of  his  purpose  to  leave  Ciudad  de  los  Angeles,  with 
the  escort  which  had  accompanied  him  into  the 
country,  on  the  following  morning. 

Prior  to  this,  however,  he  had  addressed  Lieu 
tenant-colonel  Fremont  without  reference  to  the 
commodore,  and  on  the  16th  had  sent  to  that  offi 
cer  certain  instructions  and  orders  concerning  the 
organization  of  the  California  battalion.  Fremont, 
although  he  had  reported  to  Kearney  as  command 
ing  the  forces  upon  his  arrival,  finding  the  ques 
tion  thus  thrust  upon  him,  decided  to  continue  his 
obedience  to  Stockton  until  the  question  of  com 
mand  between  the  two  was  decided. 

*  Fremont's  Trial.     Executive  Document,  No.  33,  Senate,  first  Session  of 
the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  90,  118,  195. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

On  the  16th  Stockton  issued  his  commission  to 
Fremont  as  governor  and  commander-in-chief  over 
California,  and  soon  after  left  Ciudad  de  los  An 
geles.^  Fremont  at  once  entered  upon  the  exer 
cise  of  the  duties,  and,  contrary  to  the  orders  of  Gen 
eral  Kearney,  soon  after  issued  orders  for  the  in 
crease  of  the  hattalion  of  volunteers  under  his  com 
mand.  He  apparently  considered  himself  supreme 
in  the  territory,  and  decided  questions  of  civil,  mil 
itary,  and  fiscal  matters  upon  his  own  responsibil 
ity,  without  reference  to  either  military  or  naval 
officers  of  superior  rank. 

On  the  20th  of  January  Lieutenant-colonel 
Cooke  arrived  at  San  Diego  with  the  Mormon  hat 
talion,  raised  in  Missouri  after  Kearney's  departure, 
which  had  followed  him  from  Santa  Fe  hy  another 
and  more  favorahle  route.  Leaving  him  in  com 
mand,  Kearney  sailed  from  that  place  on  the  31st. 
He  arrived  at  Monterey  on  the  8th  of  February, 
where  he  found  the  store-ship  Lexington  with  a 
company  of  United  States  artillery  on  board,  under 
Captain  Tompkins,  and  Commodore  Shubrick,  who 
had  arrived  in  the  Independence  razee  to  take  com 
mand  of  the  squadron. 

Upon  exhibiting  his  instructions  from  the  "War 
Department  of  June  3d,  Kearney  was  recognized  as 
the  commander  of  the  military  forces  in  California 
by  the  commodore,  but  in  relation  to  affairs  of  a  civil 
nature  Shubrick  had  instructions  of  a  later  date. 

*  Fremont's  Trial.     Executive  Document,  No.  33,  Senate,  first  Session  of 
the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  176. 


490 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


In  this  regard,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  had 
written  on  the  12th  of  July  to  Commodore  Sloat, 
supposed  to  he  in  command,  to  the  effect  that  he 
was  expected  to  take  possession  of  California. 
"  This,"  it  was  said,  "  will  "bring  with  it  the  neces 
sity  of  a  civil  administration."  "  Such  a  govern 
ment  should  be  established  under  your*  protection, 
and,  in  selecting  persons  to  hold  offices,5*  &c.,  &c. 

Shubrick  had  received  the  letter  containing  the 
ahove  extract  hy  the  Lexington  at  Valparaiso  on 
the  2d  of  December,  and,  in  view  of  its  explicit  in 
structions,  Kearney  acquiesced  in  the  civil  author 
ity  of  the  naval  commander.  On  the  13th  of  Feb- 
ruary,  Colonel  Mason,  of  the  first  dragoons,  who 
had  heen  sent  from  the  United  States  subsequent 
to  the  departure  of  Stevenson's  regiment  of  New- 
York  volunteers,  to  take  command  of  the  land 
forces,  and  to  exercise  the  functions  of  civil  gov 
ernor,  in  case  of  Kearney's  departure,  arrived  at  the 
Bay  of  San  Francisco,  where  Kearney  then  was  en 
gaged  in  selecting  sites  for  fortifications  and  other 
military  reconnaissance. 

Mason  hore  communications  from  hoth  the  war 
and  navy  departments  to  the  commanders  of  the 
different  hranches  of  the  service.  To  Commodore 
Stockton,  Mr.  Mason,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  had 
written  on  the  5th  of  November,  ordering  him  to 
relinquish  all  control  over  civil  matters  in  the  fol 
lowing  language : 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of 
the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  238. 


THE  'WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

"  The  President  has  deemed  it  best  for  the  pub 
lic  interests  to  invest  the  military  officer  command 
ing  with  the  direction  of  the  operations  on  land, 
and  with  the  administrative  functions  of  govern 
ment  over  the  people  and  territory  occupied  by  us. 
You  will  relinquish  to  Colonel  Mason,  or  to  Gen 
eral  Kearney,  if  the  latter  shall  arrive  before  you 
have  done  so,  the  entire  control  over  these  matters, 
and  turn  over  to  him  all  papers  necessary  to  the 
performance  of  his  duties."^ 

Kearney,  after  receiving  the  communications  and 
informations  borne  by  Mason,  returned  to  Monte 
rey  and  consulted  with  Shubrick.  On  the  1st  of 
March  they  issued  a  joint  circular  proclamation, 
setting  forth  the  intentions  of  the  United  States 
government,  and  the  different  duties  which  de 
volved  upon  the  naval  and  military  commanders, 
according  to  their  latest  instructions,  and  Kearney 
at  once  assumed  the  title  and  duties  of  governor 
of  the  territory. 

Prior  to  this,  Fremont  had  opened  a  correspond 
ence  with  Shubrick ;  but,  soon  after  receiving  his 
instructions,  the  commodore  informed  him  that  he 
considered  Kearney  in  command  of  the  troops,  and 
in  the  exercise  of  the  civil  authority,  by  order  of  the 
President. 

On  the  1st  of  March  Captain  Turner  was  dis 
patched  to  Los  Angeles  with  a  copy  of  the  joint 
proclamation,  and  orders  for  Lieutenant-colonel 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of 
the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  247. 


492  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

Fremont.  By  the  orders  he  was  directed  to  muster 
his  battalion  into  service  under  existing  laws,  and 
to  turn  over  the  command  of  the  southern  military 
district  to  Lieutenant-colonel  Cooke,  and  to  con 
duct  such  men  of  the  battalion  as  would  not  en 
gage  in  service  under  the  law  to  Yerba  Buena,  by 
Monterey,  where  they  would  be  discharged. 

Fremont,  however,  refused  to  turn  over  the  com 
mand  to  Cooke,  ordered  the  second  in  command 
of  the  battalion  to  hold  his  position,  to  obey  no 
orders  which  did  not  emanate  from  him,  and  soon 
after  started  express  for  Monterey.  The  reason  al 
leged  for  the  disobedience  of  orders  was  the  ap 
prehended  danger  of  an  insurrection  among  the 
Californians,  incited  by  the  vicinity  of  the  Mor 
mons,  of  whose  barbarity  they  had  received  many 
accounts. 

On  the  25th  of  March  Fremont  arrived  at  Mon 
terey,  and  had  an  interview  with  Kearney.  Com 
modore  Biddle  had  meantime  arrived  in  the  Colum 
bus  seventy-four,  and,  like  Shubrick,  had  acknowl 
edged  the  authority  of  the  general.  Fremont's  in-/ 
terview  was  not  satisfactory  to  either  party.  Kear 
ney  did  not  communicate  to  him  the  last  instruc 
tions  which  had  been  received  from  Washington, 
but  insisted,  before  having  any  conversation  with 
him,  upon  obedience  to  his  orders  of  March  1st. 
Fremont  offered  to  resign  his  commission  and  re 
turn  to  the  United  States.  Kearney  refused  it; 
and,  finally,  Fremont  promised  obedience,  and  re 
turned  to  Los  Angeles.  Soon  after  his  departure 


THE    WAR    WITH   MEXICO. 


493 


Colonel  Mason  was  sent  thither,  charged  with  the 
direction  of  affairs  in  the  southern  district. 

An  altercation  took  place  between  him  and  Fre 
mont,  which  resulted  in  a  challenge,  accepted  by 
Mason,  and  subsequently  postponed  by  him.  He 
returned  to  Monterey,  and  orders  from  Kearney  put 
a  stop  to  the  intended  duel.  The  general  proceed 
ed  south  to  Los  Angeles,  where  he  found  Fremont, 
who  was  relieved  from  duty,  and  prepared  to  join 
his  regiment  (mounted  rifles)  in  Mexico  by  pro 
ceeding  overland  to  the  Vera  Cruz  routed 

By  the  time  he  arrived  at  Monterey,  however, 
he  was  directed  to  accompany  Kearney  to  the 
United  States ;  for,  during  the  interval,  a  portion 
of  Stevenson's  regiment  of  New  York  volunteers 
had  arrived,  and  Kearney  turned  over  the  direction 
of  affairs  in  the  country  to  Mason. 

California  was  in  a  manner  quiet,  and  a  force 
then  present  and  at  hand  which  was  quite  suffi 
cient  to  maintain  the  supremacy  of  the  United 
States. 

The  controversy  between  the  principal  agents  in 
effecting  the  occupation  of  the  territory  of  California 
attracted  much  attention,  and  is  well  known  to  the 
people  of  the  United  States.  The  facts  of  the  case 
on  either  side  have  been  developed  in  the  trial  of 
Lieutenant-colonel  Fremont,  and  in  the  speech  of 
Senator  Benton  against  the  confirmation  of  General 
Kearney's  brevet  appointment. 

The  difficulties  were  the  natural  consequence 

*  Testimony  before  the  Court  Martial,  and  Colonel  Benton's  Speech. 


494  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

of  the  irregular,  and,  in  a  measure,  unauthorized 
course  of  action  on  the  part  of  Stockton  and  Fre 
mont,  and  the  nature  of  the  service  performed. 
This  action  proved  to  be  for  the  same  end  which 
was  desired  by  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
but  undoubtedly  was  undertaken  as  much  for  per 
sonal  aggrandizement  and  distinction  as  for  any 
well-defined  intention  of  carrying  out  the  wishes 
of  the  authorities  at  Washington.  This  never-fail 
ing  source  of  personal  enmity  caused  the  contro 
versy  between  Stockton  and  Kearney;  and  in  a 
stickling  for  prerogative  which  he  had  no  right  to 
assume,  and  which  he  was  immediately  to  relin 
quish,  Stockton  was  the. originator  of  serious  diffi 
culty.  The  consequences  of  the  difficulty  fell  upon 
Fremont ;  and  although  there  is  no  question  of  the 
illegality  of  his  disobedience  to  the  officer  of  the 
army  in  favor  of  one  who  had  no  legal  right  to  com 
mand  him,  yet  he  certainly  was  in  a  delicate  posi 
tion  when  appealed  to  by  two  officials,  one  his  su 
perior  in  army  rank,  and  who  had  yielded  a  tacit 
obedience  to  the  other,  and  that  other  the  officer 
under  whose  authority  Fremont  had  voluntarily 
raised  his  battalion  and  served  up  to  the  time. 

How  far  he  was  justified  by  circumstances  in 
continuing  his  disobedience  was  the  question,  and 
that  question  was  decided  against  Fremont  by  a 
court  martial.  He  was  found  guilty  of  "  mutiny," 
"  disobedience  of  orders,"  and  of  "  conduct  prejudi 
cial  to  good  order  and  military  discipline,"  and 
sentenced  to  be  dismissed  the  service. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  495 

The  President  remitted  the  sentence  in  consider 
ation  of  his  previous  valuable  and  meritorious  serv 
ices,  but  Fremont  refused  to  acquiesce  in  the  de 
cision  of  the  court  by  accepting  the  •executive  clem 
ency,  and  resigned  his  commission. 

The  early  action  in  California  which  brought 
about  the  nondescript  partisan  war,  though  suc 
cessful  in  effecting  the  occupation  of  the  country, 
had  many  other  evil  effects  than  that  of  causing 
the  difficulty  between  the  officers,  aspirants  for 
military  or  civic  honors.  A  great  waste  of  public 
property,  and  the  contraction  of  an  infinite  number 
of  debts,  which  could  not  be  legally  settled,  and 
which  are  not  settled  to  this  day,  were  among 
them.  The  civil  government  established  was  a 
nonentity,  and  the  various  mockeries  of  adminis 
trations,  for  they  were  but  little  else,  of  Stockton, 
Fremont,  and  Kearney,  had  effect  hardly  outside 
of  cannon  range.  A  species  of  military  superin 
tendence  was  the  consequence,  which  was  all  the 
government  which  existed  in  California  to  the 
close  of  the  war,  except  the  remnant  of  the  old 
Mexican  organization. 


496 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

Politics  in  the  United  States — Avowed  Policy  and  Recommendations  of  the 
Administration  at  the  Opening  of  the  second  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth 
Congress — Action  of  Congress — Attempt  to  create  a  Lieutenant  General — 
Provisions  made  by  the  twenty-ninth  Congress  for  the  Prosecution  of  the 
War — Politics  in  Mexico — Polka  Rebellion — Return  of  Santa  Anna  to  the 
Capital— Reorganization  of  the  Army. 

THE  flood  of  enthusiasm  which  had  been  raised 
in  the  United  States  by  the  occurrence  of  hostili 
ties,  and  which,  for  a  time,  seemed  to  have  set  the 
whole  current  of  public  opinion  in  favor  of  their 
vigorous  prosecution,  soon  found  vent  through  the 
usual  channels  of  political  controversy.  The  exi 
gencies  of  the  case  in  the  state  of  affairs  upon  the 
Rio  Grande,  as  understood  at  Washington,  at  first 
silenced  the  opposition  party  in  the  American  Con 
gress,  and  drove  its  members,  almost  without  ex 
ception,  to  acquiesce  in  the  vote  by  which  the 
state  of  war  was  officially  recognized,  and  the  im 
mediate  provision  made  for  its  support.  But  when 
the  crisis  was  past,  and  the  danger  of  implicating 
the  party  in  a  positive  declaration  against  the  meas 
ures  of  defense  was  over,  there  was  time  for  rest 
and  reflection.  To  the  people  of  the  United  States 
the  war  did  not  appeal  directly;  for  the  scene  of 
operations  was  distant,  the  taxes  were  indirect,  and 
the  war  was  commenced  with  an  overflowing  treas 
ury.  In  the  interval  of  active  operations,  and  the 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


497 


consequent  dearth  of  news,  the  conduct  of  the  gov 
ernment  was  closely  criticised.  The  opposition  par 
ty,  repenting  of  the  vote  by  which  its  members  had 
become  implicated  in  the  measure,  took  the  ground 
that  the  war  was  unjust,  and  returned  to  its  former 
position,  that  the  conduct  of  the  President  and  his 
advisers,  in  the  public  transactions  which  preceded 
it,  was  reprehensible.  Warring  against  the  admin 
istration  from  these  bases,  its  prominent  men,  re 
gardless  of  the  effect  upon  the  enemy  and  the  in 
terest  of  their  own  country,  lost  but  few  opportuni 
ties  of  publishing  the  principles  of  action.  The  in 
creased  expenditure  of  money  was  freely  comment 
ed  upon,  and  economy,  the  usual  cry  of  those  anx 
ious  to  get  the  management  of  a  public  treasury 
for  their  own  benefit,  was  set  forth  as  an  argument 
against  maintaining  the  national  honor.  The  na 
tional  interest  was  made  to  appear  incompatible 
with  the  war,  and  the  policy  of  the  administration, 
so  far  as  known,  was  bitterly  denounced.  What 
was  not  known  did  not  escape  criticism  before  the 
fact ;  for  the  various  newspaper  editors,  anxious  for 
articles  on  the  interesting  subject,  put  forth  their 
speculations  on  policy  and  plans  of  operations,  of 
which  few  knew  any  thing,  and  a  less  number  un 
derstood.  The  Whig  and  neutral  presses,  during 
the  interval  of  action  in  Mexico,  were  especially 
noisy  in  condemning  the  administration,  and  the 
abolition  prints  in  the  North  came  out  in  bold  de 
nunciation.  Had  all  these  succeeded  in  bewilder 
ing  the  Mexican  government  as  completely  as  they 
I— 1 1 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

'       .^     .  ;"--*• 

'    '•      .          '' 

did  themselves,  they  might  have  done  the  state 
some  service.  But  the  Mexican  functionaries  were 
nearer  the  .scene  of  action,  and  had  better  sources 
.  of  information  than  their  editorial  allies ;  and,  while 
they  took  the  speculations  for  what  they  were 
worth,  eagerly  seized  upon  the  demonstration  of 
domestic  hostility  to  the  American  government,  and 
drew  thence  inferences  favorable  to  themselves. 

The  Democratic  presses,' meanwhile,  strove  to 
keep  up  the  war  excitement,  and  to  bring  the  peo 
ple  to  the  support  of  the  administration  by  appeals 
to  patriotism.  But  they  had  no  capital  of  late  suc 
cessful  military  action.  Palo  Alto,  Resaca  de  la 
Palma,  and  the  bombardment  of  Fort  Brown  had 
lasted  for  a  few  months — long  enough  to  fill  up  the 
first  call  for  volunteers  with  surprising  rapidity. 
By  that  time  every  real  incident  had  been  narrat 
ed,  besides  an  infinite  number  which  never  occur 
red,  arid -the  unsatisfied  public  turned  anxiously 
for  excitement  to  politics. 

The  elections  for  members  of  Congress  occurred, 
for  the  most  part,  before  the  receipt  of  the  news  of 
the  battle  of  Monterey,  and  the  dilatory  action 
of  the  government,  the  enormous  expenditure  of 
money,  the  injustice  of  the  cause,  the  encourage 
ment  given  to  slave-holders,  and  various  other  top 
ics,  were  urged  by  the  opposition  candidates,  who, 
in  the  absence  of  military  news,  managed  to  se 
cure  a  majority  in  the  House  of  Representatives 
of  the  thirtieth  Congress. 

Notwithstanding  this  effect  of  the  opposition  to 


THE  WAR  WITfl  MEXICO.  499 

the  war,  the  avowed  policy  -of  the  administration 
underwent  no  change.  The  message  of  President 
Polk  to  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  at  the  opening 
of  the  second  session,  set  forth  that  "the  war  will 
continue  to  be  prosecuted  with  vigor,  as  the  best 
means  of  securing  peace.  It  is  hoped  that  the  de 
cision  of  the  Mexican  Congress,  to  which  our  last 
overture  was  referred,  may  result  in  a  speedy  and 
honorable  peace.  With  our  experience,  however, 
of  the  unreasonable  course  of  the  Mexican  authori 
ties,  it  is  the  part  of  wisdom  not  to  relax  in  the 
energy  of  our  military  operations  until  the  result 
is  made  known.  In  this  view,  it  is  deemed  import 
ant  to  hold  military  possession  of  all  the  provinces 
which  have  been  taken,  until  a  definite  treaty  of 
peace  shall  have  been  concluded  and  ratified  by 
the  two  countries." 

The  policy  in  reference  to  holding  the  territory 
of  Mexico,  as  indemnity,  though  not  explicitly 
avowed,  was  treated  of. 

"  The  war  has  not  been  waged  with  a  view  to 
conquest;  but,  having  been  commenced  by  Mexico, 
it  has  been  carried  into  the  enemy's  country,  and 
will  be  vigorously  prosecuted  there,  with  a  view  to 
obtain  an  honorable  peace,  and  thereby  secure  am 
ple  indemnity  for  the  expenses  of  the  war,  as  well 
as  to  our  much-injured  citizens,  who  hold  large 
pecuniary  demands  against  Mexico."^ 

For  the  different  recommendations  of  action  to 

*  Executive  Document.  No,  4,'  House  of  Representatives,  second  Session 
of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  p.  22. 


500  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

furnish  requisite  means  for  the  vigorous  prosecu 
tion  of  hostilities,  reference  was  made  to  the  reports 
of  the  secretaries. 

The  principal  one,  in  the  report  of  Mr.  Marcy, 
was  that  of  authorizing  an  increase  of  the  regular 
army.  The  various  embarrassments  and  incon 
veniences  resulting  from  the  employment  of  volun 
teer  troops  had  heen  experienced,  and  the  admin 
istration  had  become  aware  of  its  error  in  calling 
upon  them  to  serve  for  only  one  year ;  for,  by  the 
time  that  the  organization  had  been  completed, 
and  the  most  serious  embarrassments  had  been 
overcome  in  reference  to  the  troops  originally  call 
ed  out,  the  term  of  service  had  half  expired.  The 
obstinacy  of  Mexico  was  not  half  subdued,  and  the 
result  of  the  operations  then  in  course  of  prepara 
tion,  and  how  far  they  were  to  be  carried  before 
the  enemy  would  sue  for  or  agree  to  negotiations, 
remained  to  be  seen.  The  error  was  not  again 
committed,  and  those  volunteers  which  were  call 
ed  forth  in  the  fall  of  the  year  1846  were  to  serve 
during  the  war.  Still,  Mr.  Marcy  recommended 
the  employment  of  regulars  rather  than  volunteers ; 
for,  while  the  bravery  of  the  volunteers  was  ac 
knowledged,  he  wrote,  "  It  is  no  disparagement  to 
them  to  say  that  a  regular  force  is  to  be  preferred 
in  a  war  to  be  prosecuted  in  a  foreign  country. 
Besides,  considerations  of  economy  are  decidedly 
in  favor  of  troops  engaged  to  serve  during  the  war. 
I  am  most  solicitous  that  this  subject  should  re 
ceive  the  early  attention  of  Congress,  and  a  body 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


501 


of  troops  to  serve  for  the  war  may  be  raised  to  take 
the  place  of  those  volunteers  who  will  claim  a  dis 
charge  at  the  end  of  their  year's  service."^  He 
therefore  recommended  that  ten  additional  regi 
ments  for  the  regular  army  should  be  raised. 

It  was  further  recommended  to  Congress  to  make 
provision  for  the  retirement  of  aged  and  infirm  of 
ficers  of  the  army,  to  appoint  an  additional  major 
to  _each  regiment,  and  to  make  some  few  additions 
to  the  staff  corps ;  the  two  first  of  which  were  of 
crying  necessity,  as  a  glance  at  the  condition  of 
the  army  for  a  long  previous  period  sufficed  to 
show. 

Another  provision  which  was  requisite,  and 
which,  in  despite  of  recommendations,  Congress 
had  failed  to  act  upon,  was  again  urged  upon  them 
— that  of  granting  authority  to  courts  martial  set 
ting  in  foreign  countries  to  take  cognizance  of 
crimes  of  a  civil  nature  committed  by  any  persons, 
whether  enlisted  men  of  the  army  or  not,  which, 
under  the  existing  American  Articles  of  War,  they 
had  no  power  to  do. 

The  methods  recommended  for  providing  for  the 
deficiency  in  the  revenue  to  meet  the  expenses  of 
the  government  were  by  loan,  the  graduation  and 
reduction  of  the  price  of  public  lands  which  had 
been  long  in  market,  and  the  imposition  of  a  war 
revenue  upon  articles  of  import  on  the  free  list  of 
the  American  tariff. 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  4,  House  of  Representatives,  second  Session 
of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress,  p.  54. 


£02  TI*E   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

To  enable  the  President  to  proceed  immediately 
with  negotiations,  should  opportunity  occur,  soon 
after  the  commencement  of  hostilities  during  the 
previous  session  he  had  asked  for -an  appropriation 
of  three  millions  of  dollars,  which  application  was 
renewed  in  his  message.  . 

The  various  subjects  were  soon  taken,  up  and 
discussed  in  the  different  houses  of  the  American 
Congress;  but,  although  the  administration  party 
was  in  the  majority  in  both  branches  at  the  time, 
the  opposition  was  strong  enough  to  delay  action, 
in  the  view  which  was  taken  of  the  particular 
benefit  which  each  party  might  derive  in  the 
course  of  the  legislation.  Looking  to  their  own 
interest,  and  in  fear  lest  the  Democratic  party 
should  gain  popularity,  the  Whigs'  took  good  care 
to  debate  every  proposition  as  it  came  up,  although 
they  were  of  obvious  propriety,  and  had  been  urged 
upon  the  attention .  of  Congress  as  of  immediate 
necessity,  as  they  indeed  were ;  for,  in  keeping 
with  the  previous  policy  of -the  government,  no 
more  troops  were  called  for  than  were  deemed  ab 
solutely  necessary  for  present  purposes,  leaving  but 
a  small  margin  for  contingencies.  While  action 
upon  the  recommendations  was  delayed,  and  the 
different  bills  introduced  were  slowly  passing  the 
ordeal  of  legislative  criticism,  other  propositions 
were  brought  before  Congress. 

WKen  the  session  opened,  if  there  were  any  def 
inite  plan  of  operations  having  the  great  end  of 
the  war  in  view,  it  had  not  been  agreed  upon  be- 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  5-93 

tween  the  administration  and  either  of  the  gen 
erals  then  in  command,  in  the  field,  As  matters 
then  stood,  the  military  operations  were  in  prog 
ress  in  some  way,  hut  neither  of  the^  command 
ers  possessed  the  confidence  of  the  President,  or 
was  fully  aware  of  his  wishes  or  intentions.  Gen 
eral  Taylor's  plan,  which,  after  his  experiment  at 
Monterey,  he  had  given  as  his  view  of  proper  fu 
ture  action,  had  heen  received,  hut  was  not  ap 
proved.  General  Scott  was  organizing  the  expe 
dition  against  Vera  Cruz,  with  a  view,  as  he  said, 
of  marching  thence  upon  the  city  of  Mexico  ;#  and 
it  was  undoubtedly  the  intention  of  the  President 
that  the  march  should  he  made,  if  peace  were  not 
accepted  hy  the  enemy;  but  it  nowhere  appears 
that  General  Scott  was  assigned,  at  that  time,  to 
any  thing  else  than  the  command  of  the  particular 
expedition.  It  may  very  naturally  have  heen  a 
matter  of  inference,  on  his  part,  that  he  was  to  con 
tinue  in  the  command.  Whether  he  were  or  not, 
it  would  not  have  heen  good  policy  on  the  part  of 
the  administration  to  excite  his  suspicion  or  ill  tem- 
.per,  when  he  was  about  entering  upon  his  duties, 
by  informing  him  that  he -was  not ;  and.it  does  not 
appear  that,  at  the  time  of  leaving  Washington,  he 
had  any  knowledge  of  an  intention  to  supersede 
him.  His  inferences  and  the  recommendations  of 
the  President  were  entirely  antagonistic,  and  the 
charge  of  bad  faith,  in  permitting  him  to  depart 

*  General  Scott  to  General  Taylor.     Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House 
of.  Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  839. 


504  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

under  the  impression  that  he  was  to  continue  in 
command,  might  with  justice  have  heen  brought 
against  Mr.  Polk,  had  it  not  heen  for  the  previous 
conduct  of  the  general-in-chief ;  hut,  in  view  of 
his  early  correspondence  and  course  of  conduct,  his 
extreme  anxiety  at  the  time  for  employment  in 
the  active  duties  of  his  station,  and  his  complete 
dependence  upon  Mr.  Polk  for  any  assignment  of 
the  kind,  it  may  well  he  a  question  how  far  the 
latter  was  called  upon  to  sacrifice  his  policy  or  his 
wishes  to  benefit  a  man  who  was  notoriously  hos 
tile  to  his  administration,  and  who,  it  was  helieved, 
on  former  occasions  had  returned  the  honor  offer 
ed  to  him  first  hy  coolness,  and  then  hy  positive 
insult.  He  did  assign  him  to  the  command  of  the 
expedition  against  Vera  Cruz,  hut  the  main  ques 
tion  of  the  operations  to  he  pushed  to  the  conquest 
of  a  peace  was  in  great  measure  undetermined. 
Whether  General  Scott  had  heen  asked  for,  or  had 
given  his  opinion  on  the  subject  in  extenso,  does 
not  appear  in  official  correspondence  which  has 
heen  published ;  hut  in  neither  the  projet  of  in 
structions  which  he  submitted  to  the  Secretary  of 
War  for  his  signature,  nor  in  the  memoranda  on 
Vera  Cruz  and  its  castle,  nor  in  the  instructions 
which  were  actually  written  out  hy  Mr.  Marcy, 
does  it  positively  appear  that  he  was  ordered  to  ex 
ecute  any  other  duty  than  that  of  taking  the  fort 
ress  of  San  Juan  d'Ulloa  and  the  city  of  Vera  Cruz.^ 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of 
the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  1276,  1268-1272,  and  836. 


THE   WAR   WITH   MEXICO. 


505 


The  great  question  of  the  method  of  obtaining  a 
peace  from  the  enemy,  when  viewed  in  connection 
with  those  of  home  policy,  was  one  of  exceeding 
difficulty.  Had  the  United  States  been  a  mon 
archy,  and,  as  they  are,  the  most  powerful  nation 
on  the  continent,  it  would  have  been  of  easy  solu 
tion.  It  would  have  at  once  been  attempted  to 
force  Mexico  to  the  alternative  of  sueing  for  peace 
or  of  losing  her  nationality,  without  the  sacrifice 
of  etiquette,  moral  advantages,  or  national  pride 
in  making  the  different  offers  of  negotiation  which 
were  made.  But  in  the  United  States,  neither 
government  nor  people  were  prepared  for  such  a 
course  of  action.  Various  interests,  prejudices,  and 
sympathies  were  opposed  to  it ;  and  while  it  was 
wished  to  force  Mexico  to  terms  and  to  obtain  in 
demnity,  it  was  desirable  to  leave  her  in  an  inde 
pendent  and  prosperous  condition. 

The  first  great  thing  to  be  done  was  to  make 
the  governing  power  in  Mexico  sensible  of  these 
desired  ends,  and  the  consequences  which  must 
follow  if  they  could  not  be  accomplished — a  task 
of  some  magnitude ;  for,  while  so  great  a  diversity 
of  opinion  existed  at  home,  and  so  many  discus 
sions  as  to  the  policy,  avowed  and  secret,  of  the 
administration  were  being  published  in  the  Amer 
ican  prints,  it  could  be  no  very  easy  matter  to  con- 
vince  the  Mexicans  that  any  thing  like  a  spirit  of 
good  feeling  existed  on  the  part  of  the  government 
of  the  United  States.  It  can  hardly  be  believed 
that  there  did,  except  so  far  as  was  advised  by  in- 


506  THE   WAR  WITH   MEXICO. 

terest ;  and  when  the  administration  was  forced 
hy  the  outcries  of  the  opposition  to  make  the  very 
many  concessions  to  the  enemy,  it  was  forced  to 
commit  an  error  in  diplomatic  action.  The  peace 
which  the  United  States  had  the  right  and  power 
to  demand,  was  begged.  "  In  politics,  it  is  a  griev 
ous  fault  to  be  too  generous ;  gratitude  in  state  af 
fairs  is  unknown,  and  as  the  appearance  of  disin 
terested  kindness  never  deceives,  it  should  never  be 
assumed."*  The  appearance  of  kindness  in  the 
various  offers  which  had  heen  made,  although,  for 
reasons  of  interest,  they  would  have  been  carried 
out  in  good  faith,  certainly  had  no  effect  to  induce 
Mexico  to  accept  them.  On  the  contrary,  after 
each  one,  she  had  heen  as,  if  not  more,  obstinate 
than  before,  and  indulged  the  hope  that,  as  the 
United  States  were  so  desirous  for  peace,  they 
would  soon  give  up  the  war  of  their  own  accord. 

The  second  which  was  considered  necessary 
was  to  present  an  imposing  force,  to  threaten  while 
the  future  friendly  propositions  were  made,  and  to 
inflict  the  evils  of  war,  step  by  step,  until  the  terms 
were  acceded  to — a  military  task,  but  containing, 
in  combination  with  the  first,  many  elements  of 
difficulty ;  and  they  were  increased  when  it  was 
proposed  to  make  the  burden  of  the  war  fall  upon 
Mexico  by  raising  military  contributions. 

To  combine  all  these  in  harmonious  action  re- 
quired  a  plan,  and  one  which  had  in  it  more  talent 
than  is  usually  found  in  even  those  which  have 

*  Napier,  chapter  i.,  book  ii.,  vol.  i.,  Carey  &  Hart's  edition,  1842,  p.  79. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  597 

been,  successfully  executed.  A  plan  was  proposed 
by  Mr.'Benton,  chairman  of  the  Military  Commit 
tee  of  the  Senate,  arid  met  the  approbation  of  the 
President.  What  its  details  were,  or  whether  it 
was  practicable,  can  not  be  told,  for  it  has  not  seen 
the  light,  and,  moreover,  would  lack  the  great  test 
of  experience.  But  it  was  not  in  keeping  with  the 
ideas  of  either  Generals  Taylor  or  Scott,  and  as  the 
President  did  not  wish  to  take  the  responsibility 
of  removing  them,  or  of  intrusting  them  with  the 
execution  of  the  plan,  a  proposition  was  placed  be 
fore  Congress  to  the  effect  that  a  new  grade  should 
be  created  in  the  army,  for  the  period  of  the  war, 
senior  to  any  known  in  the  American  service.  If 
created,  it  was  to  have  been  filled  by  the  appoint 
ment  of  Mr.  Benton.^- 

In  this  proposition  the  opposition  members  saw 
the  attempt  to  appoint  the  succeeding  president  ;f 
for  both  of  the  commanding  generals  then  in  the 
field  were  upon  their  side  of  politics ;  and  while  they 
denounced  the  war  as  unjust,  they  praised  its  mili 
tary  achievements,  attributed  great  talent  to  the 
generals,  and  claimed  all  the  credit  of  successful 
management  for  their  own.  A  rival  on  the  other 
side  of  superior  rank,  and,  if  of  talent  and  with 
good  fortune,  of  superior  success,  for  he  would  bring 
the  war  to  a  glorious  termination,  was  greatly  to 
be  feared.  The  proposition  was  therefore  virulent- 

*  Colonel  Benton's  Speech  on  the  Lieutenant  Generalship. .  Appendix  to 
Congressional  Globe,  second  Session  of  the  twenty-ninth  Congress. 
t  Mr.  Mangum's  Speech  on  the  Lieutenant  Generalship.     Idem. 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

ly  opposed,  and  all  the  arguments  which  could  be 
urged  against  it  were  urged.  Among  others,  it  was 
loudly  proclaimed  that  it  was  a  slight  and  an  in 
sult  to  the  regular  army,  which  had  done  so  much 
for  the  honor  of  the  country — an  argument  of  some 
reason,  and  proper  enough,  had  it  not  been  that 
the  fixed  policy  of  the  country,  and  the  action  of 
both  parties,  had  been  a  continual  slight,  not  to 
say  insult.  Brought  in,  as  it  was  at  the  time,  to 
oppose  the  administration  and  save  the  general-in- 
chief,  who  was  wanted  as  a  presidential  candidate, 
the  "  appearance  of  disinterested  kindness"  could 
hardly  deceive  any  into  the  belief  that  the  Whig 
party  was  more  particularly  patriotic  or  grateful  to 
the  army  than  the  Democratic. 

The  proposition  to  create  a  lieutenant  general 
was  rejected,  and,  as  it  was,  had  a  pernicious  tend 
ency,  instead  of  simplifying  the  operations  and  in 
suring  a  good  understanding  between  the  executive 
and  the  commanding  generals.  It  had  the  effect 
of  souring  the  feelings  of  General  Scott,  who,  by 
the  failure  of  the  attempt,  was  left  in  command, 
and  of  diverting  his  attention  from  the  operations 
of  war  to  politics  and  personal  position,  which 
already  occupied  quite  a  sufficient  share  of  his 
thoughts.  In  his  own  words,  he  was  forced  to  at 
tend  "  to  the  fire  in  his  rear  from  Washington." 

A  second  attempt  was  made  to  obtain  the  same 
end  by  ingrafting  a  provision  to  a  bill  for  the  in 
crease  of  the  number  of  general  officers  of  the  army, 
that  the  President  should  be  authorized  to  place 


THE    WAR   WITH   MEXICO.  5  Q  9 

any  one  of  them,  without  regard  to  rank,  in  com 
mand  of  the  army  in  Mexico.  But  this  met  with 
the  same  opposition,  and  was  likewise  defeated. 

The  discussion  of  bills  for  the  increase  of  the 
army  and  for  provisions  for  the  war  was  protract 
ed  until  near  the  close  of  the  session.  The  oppor 
tunity  was  seized  in  this  connection,  by  persons 
desirous  of  sectional  popularity,  to  ingraft  on  some 
of  these  bills  a  proviso  affecting  the  abstract,  though 
dangerous  question  of  slavery.  It  was  fixed  upon 
that  which  made  the  appropriation  of  three  millions 
for  negotiating  purposes.  The  proviso,  known  as 
Mr.  Wilmot's,  made  much  excitement  in  the  North 
and  South,  and  the  continued  and  fiery  discussions 
between  the  members  of  Congress  from  the  differ 
ent  sections  were  another  element  of  delay. 

But,  finally,  bills  were  passed  providing  the  mon 
ey  required,  authorizing  the  President  to  raise  ten 
additional  regiments  for  the  regular  army,  and  to 
appoint  an  additional  number  of  general  and  staff 
officers ;  but  he  was  denied  the  authority  of  Con 
gress  to  select  the  general  to  be  intrusted  with  the 
command  of  the  army  and  the  prosecution  of  the 
war,  irrespective  of  the  rank  of  those  already  in 
the  field. 

The  effect  of  the  delay  in  legislative  action  will 
be  apparent  in  a  future  chapter.  But,  in  the  mean 
time,  and  while  the  preparations  for  inflicting  an 
other  blow  with  the  sword  were  in  progress,  the 
olive  branch  was  again  thrust  at  Mexico.  Mr. 
Buchanan  wrote  on  the  18th  of  January,  1847,  to 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

the  Mexican  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations,  offer 
ing  peace,  and  proposing  that  commissioners  should 
be  appointed,  to  meet  at  Havana  or  at  Jalapa,  to 
negotiate  a  treaty.  The  letter  reached  Mexico  just 
on  the  eve  of  a  revolution,  and  the  government  of 
Mexico,  whose  minister  answered  it,  was  power 
less  in  any  event.  -  The  answer,  so  far  as  it  went, 
was  but  a  repetition  of  former  answers  to  similar 
offers,  that  Mexico  would  on  no  account  appoint 
commissioners  without  the  previous  acceptance  of 
the  preliminary  condition,  that  the  American  troops 
should  evacuate  the  Mexican  territory,  and  that 
the  blockade  of  Mexican  ports  should  be  raised.^ 


While  political  controversy  delayed  the  action 
of  the  American  government  in  furnishing  the  nec 
essary  support  to  the  war,  by  causing  legislative 
discussions,  in  Mexico  it  produced  more  direct  op 
position  to  the  measures  of  the  administration  of 
Farias.  The  news  of  the  contemplated  attack 
upon  Vera  Cruz  and  the  Castle  of  San  Juan  d'Ul- 
loa  produced  new  exertions  to  raise  money,  the  im 
mediate  want  of  Mexico  in  carrying  on  the  war. 
As  it  was  believed  that  the  Castle  of  San  Juan 
d'Ulloa  was  of  great  importance  to  the  defense  of 
the  country,  the  vice-president,  and  those  of  his 
cabinet  who  remained,  pressed  the  negotiations  for 
the  sale  of  the  Church  property  on  more  ruinous 

*  Correspondence.  Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Senate,  first  Session  of 
the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  36-38. 


THE    WAR   WITH   MEXICO.  5  j  ^ 

terms  than  ever.  In  the  exigencies  of  the  moment 
the  Congress  gave  its  assent  to  the  sales,  and  upon 
this  the  opposition,  which  had  suhsided  during  the 
inability  of  the  government  to  effect  a.  sale,  broke 
out  again. 

The  priests  used  all  their  influence  with  the  pop 
ulace,  families,  and  even  the  women,  to  foment  dis 
cord  and  create  a  revolt.  Their  efforts. soon  had 
effect  in  the  city  of  Mexico  among  the  better  class 
of  inhabitants,  and  loud  denunciations  of  the  policy 
of  the  government  were  daily  put  forth.  The  bat 
talions  of  Victoria,  Bravo,  and  Hidalgo,  of  the  Na 
tional  Guard,  were  principally  composed  of  men 
of  that  class,  and  were  in  consequence,  and  because 
of  their  opposition  to  the  government,  special  ob 
jects  of  the  enmity  of  Farias  and  the  Puros.  The 
first  step  to  be  taken  was  either  to  get  rid  of  them 
or  to  render  them  harmless.  Those  battalions  were 
therefore  ordered  to  march  to  Vera  Cruz — officers 
and  men  at  once  refused  to  obey ;  then  to  deliver 
up  their  arms  and  accouterments,  that  they  might 
be  sent  to  the  threatened  point,  and  obedience  to 
this  order  was  likewise  refused. 

Upon  the  demonstration  of  an  intention  on  the 
part  of  the  government  to  employ  certain  battalions 
of  the  regular  army  which  had  been  retained  in 
the  city  to  enforce  the  latter  order,  a  pronuncia- 
miento  was  issued,  and  preparations  made  for  sup 
porting  it  in  arms.  The  citadel  was  seized  and 
held  by  the  Polkas,  for  so  the  insurgents  called 
themselves,  and  a  choice  was  made  of  a  leader. 


512  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

General  Pena  y  Barragan  was  spoken  of,  but  he 
was  absent  from  the  city,  at  his  country  house  at 
Mixcoac,  and  did  not  at  first  countenance  the  use 
of  his  name.  Upon  learning  the  selection,  Farias 
sent  an  escort  of  cavalry  to  arrest  and  bring  him  to 
the  palace ;  but  it  arrived  while  he  was  absent  from 
home.  Having  learned  of  the  intention  of  the  gov 
ernment,  without  returning  to  his  house,  he  repair 
ed  at  once  to  the  city,  and  placed  himself  at  the 
head  of  the  rebellion. 

Having  seized  and  garrisoned  several  convents 
in  the  most  thickly-populated  quarters  of  the  cap 
ital,  Pena  y  Barragan  issued  a  proclamation  against 
the  government  of  Farias,  in  which  he  declared  all 
contracts  made  for  the  sale  of  Church  property  null 
and  void,  and  all  commissions  conferred  by  the  ex 
isting  authorities  to  be  of  no  effect.  He  acknowl 
edged  Santa  Anna  as  President  of  Mexico,  although 
the  acknowledgment  was  in  contradiction  to  the 
original  plan  of  the  Polkas,  which  was  based  upon 
the  asserted  illegality  of  the  last  election  of  public 
officers. 

When  taken  together,  the  publications  of  the  in 
surgents  were  ridiculous,  and  the  inconsistency  of 
the  different  objects  of  the  movement  was  well  ex 
pressed  by  the  name  given  to  the  revolt  in  the  cap 
ital,  "  El  pronunciamiento  de  las  mugeres" 

The  government  party  occupied  the  palace  and 
the  Grand  Plaza,  to  which  the  principal  approaches 
were  strongly  barricaded.  The  Polkas  remained 
in  their  convents,  and  the  contest  of  the  factions 


THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO.  5^3 

was  principally  at  long  range.  Several  advances 
were  made  by  the  government  troops  on  the  con 
vent  of  La  Profesa,  the  head-quarters  of  the  insur 
gents  ;  but  they  always  retired  without  serious  loss, 
and  without  having  inflicted  any.  The  principal 
damage  done  by  either  of  the  parties  was  upon  a 
few  old  market-women  and  citizens,  who  traversed 
the  streets  in  pursuit  of  business,  and  were  some 
times  overtaken  by  a  random  shot.  But  in  the 
state  of  turmoil  which  existed,  a  third  party  ap 
peared  indirectly  in  the  contest,  in  the  shape  of 
the  robber  bands  which. usually  infested  the  high 
roads.  These,  taking  advantage  of  the  suspension 
of  the  police  government,  flocked  into  the  city  in 
great  numbers,  and,  by  their  plundering,  did  as 
much  damage  as  either  Puros  or  Polkas. 

That  all  this  disturbance,  and  the  ridiculous 
mimicry  of  a  civil  war,  should  be  going  on  in  the 
capital  while  the  main  army  was  engaged  in  fight 
ing  the  enemy,  and  when  a  serious  attack  by  a 
new  and  dangerous  line  of  operations  was  antici 
pated,  affords  a  sufficient  commentary  upon  the 
waywardness  of  the  Mexican  people,  and  makes  it 
a  matter  of  wonder  that,  out  of  such  material,  any 
man,  however  great  his  genius,  could  have  collect 
ed  and  controlled  any  formidable  means  of  defense. 

The  news  of  the  outbreak  reached  Santa  Anna 
while  on  his  retreat  from  La  Angostura.  In  his 
report  of  the  battle,  he  had  made  the  best  possible 
account  of  the  operations,  and  claimed  that  he  had 
gained  the  victory,  which,  however,  he  admitted, 
L— KK 


514  THE   WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

was  not  complete.  In  proof  of  his  claim,  he  enu 
merated  the  partial  success  of  his  attacks,  and  the 
trophies  of  guns  and  colors  captured  in  the  conflict. 
But  the  main  feature  which  was  apparent  in  the 
document  was  the  statement  of  the  difficulties 
which  he  had  encountered,  and  the  blame  of  which 
he  laid  at  the  door  of  the  government.  These 
were  asserted  to  he  the  cause  of  the  indecisive  na 
ture  of  the  so-called  victory,  and  the  government 
and  people  were  strongly  urged  to  rally  in  support 
of  the  war. 

Whatever  may  have  been  Santa  Anna's  policy 
before  the  battle  of  La  Angostura,  it  was  now  nec 
essary  for  his  own  safety  that  he  should  assert 
that  he  had  gained  a  victory,  and  proclaim  louder 
than  ever  his  warlike  intentions.  He  needed  all 
the  personal  popularity  of  which  he  was  possessed 
to  quell  the  revolution  in  the  capital,  and  that  was 
hardly  to  be  increased  by  an  acknowledgment  of 
disaster  on  his  part,  especially  when  some  of  his 
generals  were  accusing  him  of  incapacity.  His  va 
rious  bulletins  preceded  him  in  his  retreat,  and 
caused  the  belief  that  he  had  gained  a  victory  hon 
orable  alike  to  himself  and  his  country.  Under 
this  impression,  he  was  received,  as  he  passed 
through  different  cities,  with  every  demonstration 
of  joy  and  congratulation. 

Upon  reaching  San  Luis,  he  wrote  to  the  chiefs 
of  factions  in  the  capital,  recommending  a  cessation 
of  hostilities  until  his  arrival.  On  the  14th  of 
March  he  issued  a  proclamation,  announcing  his 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

departure  to  assume  the  reins  of  government,  in  or 
der  to  put  a  stop  to  the  civil  war  which  then  exist 
ed,  and  to  concentrate  the  whole  energy  of  the  na 
tion  upon  the  prosecution  of  hostilities  against  the 
Americans.^ 

Two  brigades  of  infantry,  one  of  cavalry,  and  the 
accompanying  artillery,  were  ordered  to  march  for 
Vera  Cruz  upon  their  arrival  at  San  Luis,  which 
place  was  to  he  garrisoned  by  the  remaining  troops 
of  the  army  as  they  came  up.  Santa  Anna  soon 
after  proceeded  to  the  capital. 

Upon  his  arrival  he  negotiated  with  the  insur 
gents,  and  succeeded  in  quieting  the  rebellion,  but 
not  until  Farias  had  been  sacrificed  and  expelled 
the  capital,  and  the  sale  of  Church  property,  as  a 
measure  of  the  policy  of  the  government,  had  been 
abandoned. 

Having  accomplished  this,  Santa  Anna  set  him 
self  about  reorganizing  an  army,  to  make  another 
attempt  at  stemming  the  tide  of  invasion.  And, 
truly,  it  was  a  work  of  magnitude.  The  want  of 
money  still  existed,  the  jealousies  of  the  parties  in 
the  late  disturbances  were  only  half  allayed,  many 
of  the  states  of  the  confederacy  were  dissatisfied, 
and  some  even  manifested  an  intention  of  declaring 
independence  of  the  central  government.  Agita 
tors  of  all  parties  were  at  work,  as  usual,  foment 
ing  discords  on  any  pretexts,  regardless  of  the  state 
of  the  country ;  and  while  all  professed  hostility  to 

*  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of  Representatives,  first  Session  of 
the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  1126. 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


the  invaders,  most  opposed  any  means  which  might 
be  taken  to  organize  a  defense.  To  all  of  these 
were  added  the  demoralizing  effect  of  three  great 
defeats,  not  counterbalanced  by  the  factitious  sem 
blance  of  a  victory,  which,  in  despite  of  proclama 
tions  and  rejoicings,  began  to  take  its  legitimate 
place  in  the  opinion  of  even  Mexi  cans .  These  were 
a  few  of  the  difficulties  presented  to  Santa  Anna, 
and  they  can  only  be  appreciated  by  those  acquaint 
ed  with  Mexican  character. 

The  Congress  had,  however,  hailed  his  return 
with  high-sounding  declarations  of  patriotism,  and 
professions  of  immediate  and  energetic  action  un 
der  his  government.  Its  active  course  was  pro 
ductive  of  no  more  than  had  been  previously  ac 
complished.  Every  thing  for  the  support  of  the 
war  was  left  to  be  provided  by  the  genius  and  en 
ergy  of  Santa  Anna,  while  the  miserable  political 
intrigues  progressed  among  the  members  of  the 
legislative  body. 

Santa  Anna  wished  soon  to  absent  himself  from 
the  capital,  to  take  command  of  the  army  in  the 
field ;  but,  at  first,  that  was  legally  impossible,  with 
out  leaving  the  executive  power  again  in  the  hands 
of  Farias — an  event  which  would  have  at  once 
aroused  the  Polkas,  and,  in  the  mean  time,  that 
party  had  acquired  the  ascendency  in  the  Congress. 
Santa  Anna  professed  that  he  would  consent  to 
none  but  legal  measures,  and  it  was  for  some  time 
doubtful  how  the  matter  could  be  arranged.  At 
length  the  fertile  inventive  genius  of  the  Mexican 


THE    WAR    WITH   MEXICO. 

legislators  hit  upon  the  expedient  of  abolishing  the 
office  of  vice-president,  and  with  it  the  incumbent, 
Farias.  To  replace  him,  and  to  provide  for  the  ex 
ercise  of  the  executive  power  during  Santa  Anna's 
absence,  it  was  decreed  that  a  "president  substi 
tute"  should  be  appointed  by  the  Congress,  and  the 
choice  fell  upon  General  Don  Pedro  Anaya,  who 
assumed  power,  and  Santa  Anna  was  at  liberty  to 
join  the  army. 

On  the  31st  of  March  he  issued  a  proclamation 
announcing  the  fall  of  Vera  Cruz,  and  the  proba 
ble  advance  of  the  American  army  upon  the  capi 
tal.  The  disaster  was  attributed  to  the  fatal  dis 
cords  which  had  existed,  and  Mexicans  were  urged 
to  wipe  out  the  disgrace  by  renewed  and  harmoni 
ous  action. 

Although  open  strife  had  ceased,  the  various  ca 
bals  and  intrigues  were  still  objects  of  Santa  An 
na's  attention,  and,  before  his  departure,  he  took 
good  care  to  arrange  schemes  by  which  they  were 
to  be  kept  in  check,  for  the  election  of  a  president 
was  soon  to  take  placet  But,  having  made  his 
arrangements,  on  the  2d  of  April  he  left  the  capi 
tal,  to  join  the  army  in  the  vicinity  of  Vera  Cruz. 

*  J.  P.  de  Mora  to  Santa  Anna.  Executive  Document,  No.  60,  House  of 
Representatives,  first  Session  of  the  thirtieth  Congress,  p.  1087. 


APPENDIX   TO  VOL.  I. 


CORRESPONDENCE  OF  CITIZENS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  WITH  GENERAL 

ALMONTE. 

No,  I, 

"New-York,  Feby.  19th,  1847. 
"  To  Gen.  Almonte. 

"  DEAR  SIR, — On  the  receipt  of  this  letter,  you  will  be  inform 
ed  that  yours  of  the  28th  of  Novr.  was  duly  received  by  me,  and 
I  am  very  much  obliged  to  you  for  the  kind  and  expressive  man 
ner  with  which  you  write  it  to  me.  Although  I  am  not  a  Mexi 
can  by  birth,  yet  in  feelings  I  am  a  Mexican,  and  as  such,  with 
your  kind  invitation,  I  will  write  to  you  from  time  to  time,  and  I 
hope  that  the  interchange  of  our  views  will  be  as  a.greeable  to  you 
as  it  will  be  pleasing  to  me.  The  communication  which  you 
promise  to  transmit  to  me  '  through  some  friend,'  I  will  wait  for 
it  with  the  greatest  anxiety,  hopeing  that  it  will  enable  us  to  make 
a  countermove  in  this  country,  while  the  energy  of  the  government 
will  be  employed  in  Mexico.  I  have  carefully  examined  the  sub 
ject  that  I  submitted  to  you  in  my  last  letter,  and  beg  leave  to 
say  that  my  views  have  not  been  changed  by  time  ;  and  I  assure 
you,  sir,  that  I  am  ready  to  confront  our  enemy  as  soon  as  I  hear 
from  you,  and  the  necessary  arrangement  can  .be  made  for  that 
purpose.  My  dear  Gen.,  I  hope  that  you  will  be  able  to  see  that 
the  plan  can  be  arranged  without  communicating  its  contents  to 
more  than  two  or  three  persons,  and  the  vigorous  manner  with 
which  I  design  to  prosecute  it  would  enable  me  to  paralize  the 
energy  of  the  government  on  the  outset  of  the  operation.  The 
most  of  the  troops  of  the  line  are  in  Mexico,  or  soon  will  be,  and 
the  arms  that  I  designed  to  use  would  enable  me  to  cope  success 
fully  with  any  irregular  troops  that  could  be  brought  against  me. 
But  whether  I  succeed  in  obtaining  the  means  necessary  to  enable 
me  to  take  a  part  in  the  contest  or  not,  I  hope  the  result  of  the 
war  will  be  advantageous  to  the  Mexican  arms.  The  subject  that 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

is  paramount  with  me  is  to  see  a  union,  a  union  among  the  people 
and  the  people's  leaders,  which  will  enable  you  to  present  a  solid 
front  to  the  enemy  of  your  country.  I  feel  some  solicitude  about 
the  financial  affairs  of  the  country,  and  I  hope  that  you  may  suc 
ceed  in  adopting  some  plan  that  will  prove  equal  to  the  exegency 
of  the  war.  I  am  convinced,  however,  that  you  will  be  obliged 
to  issue  bills  of  the  denomination  of  $5,  $10,  $20,  $50,  and  $100, 
for  the  use  of  the  army  and  for  the  general  purposes  of  the  govern 
ment.  If  the  annual  expenses  is  greater  than  the  income,  you 
must  be  able  to  make  up  the  deficiency ;  and  if  you  fail  in  doing 
so,  it  will  prove  desastrous  to  the  army.  The  emition  of  paper 
money,  we  are  told  that  it  originated  with  the  Spanish  army  in 
Spain,  and  I  think  that  if  you  refer  to  war  in  Europe  with  Napo 
leon,  you  will  see  that  England  depended  mainly  upon  the  Bank 
of  England,  which  for  thirty  years  did  not  pay  any  specie,  and  I 
hope  that  it  will  be  possible  for  your  government  to  issue  paper 
that  would  be  received  as  a  currency  of  the  country  in  all  the  de 
partments  in  Mexico.  If  each  department  would  guarantee  the 
redemption  of  a  certain  amount  in  so  many  years,  and  the  clergy 
would  assume  a  part  of  the  amount,  and  if  the  government  would 
receive  the  same  for  dues,  I  think  you  would  be  able  to  issue  about 
$25,000,000  every  year  for  three  or  four  years.  But,  if  I  should 
be  able  to  take  the  field,  the  war  would  not  last  four  years  between 
Mexico  and  the  United  States.  To  enable  you  to  meet  your  en 
gagements  for  the  purchase  of  military  stores,  &c.,  if  the  amount 
contributed  by  the  clergy  and  the  departments  should  be  in  part 
gold  and  silver,  I  think  that  you  would  be  enabled  to  manage 
your  financial  affair  with  more  facility  than  you  ever  will  be  able 
to  do  under  the  present  system.  Your  annual  income  must  be 
equal  to  your  annual  expenses,  and  if  not,  you  must  provide  for  the 
deficiency  ;  and  how  will  you  do  it,  unless  you  could  obtain  money 
upon  the  credit  of  the  government  ?  The  idea  of  the  respective 
states  in  Mexico  paying  a  sufficient  sum,  or  the  church,  as  a  mode 
to  furnish  the  government  with  the  means  for  conducting  the  war, 
will,  in  my  opinion,  fail,  unless  it  could  be  done  in  such  a  way  as 
to  make  it  work  with  harmony.  If  the  churches  would  pay  over 
to  the  government  the  annual  income  over  their  expenses,  and 


APPENDIX.  521 

charge  5  or  6  per  cent,  for  the  use  of  it,  and  would  consolidate 
the  interest  with  the  lone  during  the  war,  I  think  it  would  add 
much  to  the  vigor  of  the  nation  in  conducting  the  war  against  her 
enemy.  I  would  like  to  finish  these  views  upon  this  financial 
question,  but  I  must  forbear  unless  desired  by  you.  I  hope,  sir, 
you  will  appreciate  my  motive  for  adverting  to  this  subject,  and 
attribute  it  only  to  my  anxiety  for  you  as  the  financial  agent  of 
your  country,  and  for  her  prosperity.  I  will  expect  to  hear  from 
you  soon,  and,  in  the  mean  time,  you  will  hear  from  me  again.  I 
am,  dear,  your  obd't  serv't,  and  a  devoted  friend  of  your  country, 
(Signed),  "  LEWIS  H.  PUTNAM." 

No,  2. 

"No.  1. 

"  Deer.  21,  1846. 
"  MY  DEAR  FRIEND, 

"  The  false,  partial,  exaggerated,  and  inflammatory  statements 
in  Folk's  Message,  of  supposed  or  pretended  wrongs  done  by  Mex 
ico  to  the  United  States,  is  producing  its  effect  upon  the  ignorant 
and  superficial,  even  among  Whigs  and  opponents  of  the  war.  We 
may  be  able,  in  some  measure,  to  do  away  this  impression,  by  giv 
ing  the  facts  as  to  our  claims,  and  details  of  the  wrongs  and  in 
sults  which  Mexico  can  array  as  an  offset;  but  you  are  aware 
that  it  takes  a  long  time  for  truth  told  by  a  private  citizen  to  over 
take  falsehood  flying  on  the  four  winds  from  the  President's  lips. 
Now  it  does  appear  to  me  that  a  counter  document,  issued  with 
equal  solemnity,  and  from  an  equally  conspicuous  source  in  Mex 
ico,  is  demanded.  Permit  me  to  suggest  some  points  as  proper  to 
be  treated  of. 

"  1.  The  real  nature  of  the  pretended  injuries,  as  being  to  pri 
vate  persons  and  private  property,  and  not  public  wrongs  or  na- 
.  tional  indignities,  and  as  being  also  the  results  of  mistakes  of  sub 
ordinate  officers  in  applying  your  laws,  or  the  ordinary  case  of  tak 
ing  private  property  for  public  use,  as  in  the  impressment  of  vessels 
and  forced  loans,  for  which  Mexico  has  never  refused  a  due  indem 
nity,  nor,  indeed,  in  any  case  where  it  should  be  found  to  be  due. 
"2.  The  wrongs  and  outrages  committed  by  smuggling,  and  by 


522  THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

national  vessels  of  the  United  States,  involving  most  palpable  na 
tional  insults,  as  the  elopement  of  vessels  from  your  harbors  when  in 
custody  of  officers  of  the  government,  and  the  carrying  off  to  sea,  in 
one  instance,  if  no  more,  of  one  of  those  officers.  Also  the  capture 
of  your  public  vessels  by  ours,  merely  because  they  were  engaged 
in  executing  your  revenue  laws  against  smugglers,  and  endeavor 
ing  to  enforce  and  maintain  the  authority  of  the  nation  in  Texas 
and  on  its  coasts. 

"  3.  The  outrage  of  Com.  Jones  (probably  the  result  of  secret 
orders)  at  Monterey.  You  know  Jones  says  that  he  aimed  to  do 
in  the  new  state  of  things  (which  he  pretends  to  suppose)  what 
the  government  would  order  were  they  to  communicate  with  him. 
Also,  the  outrage  committed  by  the  Alert  (I  think  the  vessel  was 
called)  at  San  Diego ;  and  the  pre-eminent  outrage  (under  pre 
texts  insulting  to  common  sense)  of  Gaines's  invasion  of  Mexican 
territory  in  1836. 

"  4.  The  utter  neglect  and  refusal  of  our  government  to  make 
any  satisfaction,  or  give  any  indemnity  for  pecuniary  damage  in 
any  of  these  cases.  They  did  not  even  bring  Jones  to  a  court  of 
inquiry,  a  thing  never  before  omitted  in  such  a  case,  though  the  ex 
cuse  were  far  more  plausible  than  Jones's.  Why  should  they  not 
have  inquired  into  the  matter  ?  Jones  was  not  within  the  juris 
diction  of  Mexico,  and,  in  fact,  none  but  our  government  could  pro 
ceed  against  him,  and  elicit  the  facts  which  the  two  nations  had  a 
right  to  have  spread  before  them.  They  were,  in  my  opinion, 
afraid  of  the  defense  which  Jones  could  make. 

"5.  The  repeated  attempts  to  obtain  Texas  by  negotiation — 
under  Jefferson,  in  1805-6,  as  stated  by  Mr.  Gorostiza ;  the  mil 
itary  irruptions,  with  the  connivance  of  the  government,  as  stated 
by  Wilkinson ;  the  final  application  for  a  grant  of  a  district  as  an 
asylum  for  Catholics  persecuted  in  the  United  States;  the  perjury 
by  which  others  obtained  land,  and  their  frauds  thereupon ;  the  per 
tinacious  and  insolent  attempts  to  make  Mexico  the  slave  catcher 
of  the  United  States  ;  the  audacious  threat  (repeatedly  used  for  ob 
taining  such  a  stipulation)  that  the  American  slave-holders  would 
come  and  take  them  by  force,  and  the  government  demand  an  in 
demnity  for  them  !  the  attempts  of  Poinsett  to  get  Texas,  his  inter- 


APPENDIX.  523 

ference  for  that  purpose  in  the  domestic  dissensions  of  Mexico,  and 
his  agency  in  setting  up  a  military  usurper,  giving  thereby  the  first 
example  of  disorder  and  anarchy  ;  the  conduct  of  Butler,  his  suc 
cessor  ;  the  infamous  pretensions  brought  forward  to  a  boundary  at 
the  Nueces  as  the  Sabine,  and  then  of  a  Sabine  emptying  itself 
into  the  Rio  Grande ;  the  insolent  demands  and  dirty  intrigues  of 
that  fellow  under  the  private  instructions  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  and  his  final  attempt  to  bribe  to  the  amount  of  half 
a  million  to  obtain  the  cession  of  Texas.  Mr.  Adams  saw  in  the 
department  of  state  Butler's  letter,  in  which  he  proposed  direct 
bribery  and  asked  for  the  money,  and  the  instructions  of  the  Presi 
dent  indorsed  on  the  letter  to  this  effect,  viz.,  that  this  government 
would  have  nothing  to  do  with  designating  persons  to  whom  money 
should  be  paid,  but  that  if  half  a  million  more  were  required  to 
effect  the  purchase,  the  money  should  be  ready,  and  be  added  to 
the  five  millions  previously  offered.  You  know  that  Forsyth,  in 
an  official  letter,  while  he  affects  to  disapprove  in  the  name  of 
the  President  of  Butler's  proposed  means,  nevertheless  tells  him 
that  the  President  is  willing  that  he  should  try.  There  must  be 
men  in  the  city  of  Mexico  who  know  whether  Butler  did  try. 

"6.  The  whole  affair  of  the  conspiracy  disclosed  by  Mayo,  and 
other  evidence,  doubtless,  in  possession  of  your  government.  But 
ler's  '  precious  collection'  may  be  bought  cheap,  if  you  want  it. 
Many  other  points  I  might  mention,  such  as  the  insulting  and  out 
rageous  conduct  of  Americans  to  officers  of  the  law,  .to  the  citizens, 
government,  and  judicial  tribunals,  all  in  the  overbearing  and  in 
solent  spirit  caught  from  their  government. 

"  God  bless  you,  my  friend,  and  your  righteous  cause.  It  is 
time  that  the  people  of  Mexico  and  the  friends  of  justice  every 
where  were  cheered  by  some  hard  and  vengeful  blow.  Now  is  the 
time  (when  our  troops  are  bloated  with  an  overweening  confidence 
'of  their  invincibleness  and  contempt  for  their  enemies)  to  strike  a 
terrible  blow.  Such  a  blow  would  bring  a  storm  of  indignation 
about  Polk's  ears  which  would  make  him  quail.  You  know  what 
the  elections  already  indicate ;  but  let  me  tell  you  candidly,  un 
less  your  countrymen  fight  longer  and  harder — unless  the  tide  of 
success  is  turned,  or,  at  least,  checked — millions  of  souls  here  who 


524 


THE  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


would  be  loud  against  the  slavemongers  and  murderers  will  settle 
down  into  resignation  to  what  will  seem  to  them  destiny  !  In 
the  name  of  the  God  of  justice,  in  the  name  of  liberty  and  human 
ity,  let  Santa  Anna  strike.  Don't  forget,  if  you  do  make  a  man 
ifesto,  the  confessions  of  Upshur  and  Calhoun,  that  annexation  was 
to  secure  the  existence  and  safety  of  the  institution  of  slavery  in 
the  United  States,  and  the  declaration  of  the  latter  that  it  was 
from  no  hostility  to  Mexico,  conclusive  proof  that  at  that  time  our 
government  did  not  dream  of  making  the  claims  on  Mexico  a  pre 
text  for  war.  There  is  an  idea  current  among  the  people  that  the 
Mexicans  do  not  know  how  to  take  aim.  It  has  doubtless  been 
derived  from  the  correspondence  of  the  army.  If  this  defect  exist, 
it  must  be  fatal.  An  army  of  Julius  Ccesars  would  be  used  up 
in  short  time,  firing  at  random  themselves  and  taking  the  fire  of 
Americans,  who  universally  learn  to  shoot  from  their  boyhood.  It 
is  a  tradition  of  the  country  that  the  troops  of  the  United  States 
had  the  advantage  of  the  British  in  the  war  of  the  Revolution,  be 
cause  ours  took  aim  as  they  would  to  kill  game,  while  the  British 
did  not  take  aim,  but  only  fired  in  the  general  direction  of  their 
adversary. 

"  FarewelL  God  bless  you  and  your  cause  is  the  prayer  of  your 
affectionate  FRIEND. 

"  The  fate  of  the  admirable  Mexican  woman  who  was  killed 
while  administering  succor  to  the  wounded  has  excited  universal 
sympathy.  Should  you  write  me,  please  number  your  letters.  I 
have  written  you  twice  since"  the  receipt  of  your  Havana  letter, 
the  last  I  have  received. 

"  Two  more  points  I  must  barely  hint  at.  The  embezzlement 
of  full  power  sent  to  Mr.  Obregon  by  the  hands  of  Poinsett  and  his 
messenger,  and  the  charge  of  falsehood  made  against  the  Mexican 
secretary  of  foreign  affairs  on  the  evidence  of  Greenhow."* 

*  The  continuation  of  the  letter  is  written  across  the  first  page  in  the  orig 
inal.  The  postscript  is  written  across  the  second  page. 

The  original  letter  is  directed  on  the  back  to  "  General  Almonte,  city  of 
Mexico,"  and  bears  the  postmark  of  Habana,  an  indistinct  postmark  of  the 
British  steam  packet,  and  the  figure  1,  all  in  blue  ink. 

END  OF  VOL.  I. 


•  '•>* 


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LIBRARY,  UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA,  DAVIS 

Book  Slip-Series  458 


R.S. 
war  with  Mexico. 


Call  Number: 


R57 
v.l 


R57 


259943 


